

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
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VOLUME VIII



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CONTENTS FOR JANUARY, 1915

THE MODERN MISSIONARY	<i>James L. Barton</i>	1
THE PROTESTANT MISSIONARY PROPAGANDA IN INDIA	<i>J. P. Jones</i>	18
IMMORTALITY	<i>Howard N. Brown</i>	45
THE RUSSIAN DOUKHOBOBS AND THEIR RELIGIOUS TEACHINGS	<i>Aurelio Palmieri</i>	62
EXCAVATIONS IN PERSIA	<i>John P. Peters</i>	82
AFTER SIX DAYS: A NEW CLUE FOR GOSPEL CRITICS	<i>Benjamin W. Bacon</i>	94
REVIEWS AND NOTICES		122

CONTENTS FOR APRIL, 1915

MYSTICISM IN PRESENT-DAY RELIGION	<i>Rufus M. Jones</i>	155
THE ETHICAL VALUE OF ORIENTAL RELIGIONS UNDER THE ROMAN EMPIRE	<i>Clifford Herschel Moore</i>	166
THE ATONEMENT AND THE MODERN PULPIT	<i>William F. Lofthouse</i>	182
RELIGIOUS RESERVE	<i>Edward F. Hayward</i>	205
THE CONTRIBUTION OF PROFESSOR ROYCE TO CHRISTIAN THOUGHT	<i>John Wright Buckham</i>	219
SIR OLIVER LODGE'S BRITISH ASSOCIATION ADDRESS	<i>Edwin H. Hall</i>	238
REVIEWS AND NOTICES		252

CONTENTS FOR JULY, 1915

JOHANNES WEISS: IN MEMORIAM	<i>F. Crawford Burkitt</i>	291
THE PERMANENT SIGNIFICANCE OF MIRACLE FOR RELIGION	<i>William Adams Brown</i>	298
THE FUNCTION OF THE EDUCATED AND OF THE UNEDUCATED MINISTRY	<i>Francis J. McConnell</i>	323
EVOLUTION AND THE OTHER WORLD	<i>Paul Elmer More</i>	339
THREE NOTABLE DREAMS	<i>George Batchelor</i>	357
RECENT CHURCH UNION MOVEMENTS IN CANADA	<i>Daniel James Fraser</i>	363
WHAT AILS THE CHURCH?	<i>Thomas N. Carver</i>	379
REVIEWS AND NOTICES		400

CONTENTS FOR OCTOBER, 1915

THE POSITION AND PROSPECTS OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH	<i>Alfred Fawkes</i>	439
THE CONFLICT OF MORAL OBLIGATION IN THE TRILOGY OF ÆSCHYLUS	<i>Benjamin Aphthorp Gould Fuller</i>	459
FRA SALIMBENE AND THE FRANCISCAN IDEAL	<i>Ephraim Emerton</i>	480
REFLECTIONS OF RITUAL IN PAUL	<i>Benjamin W. Bacon</i>	504
RECENT EXCAVATION AND EXPLORATION IN PALESTINE	<i>George L. Robinson</i>	525
REVIEWS AND NOTICES		553

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436
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INDEX OF AUTHORS

BACON, BENJAMIN W. . .	After Six Days: A New Clue for Gospel Critics . . .	94
	Reflections of Ritual in Paul	504
BARTON, JAMES L. . . .	The Modern Missionary	1
BATCHELOR, GEORGE . . .	Three Notable Dreams	57
BROWN, HOWARD N. . . .	Immortality	45
BROWN, WILLIAM A. . . .	The Permanent Significance of Miracle for Religion.	298
BUCKHAM, JOHN W. . . .	The Contribution of Professor Royce to Christian Thought	219
BURKITT, F. CRAWFORD . .	Johannes Weiss: In Memoriam.	291
CARVER, THOMAS N. . . .	What Ails the Church?	379
EMERTON, EPHRAIM	Fra Salimbene and the Franciscan Ideal	480
FAWKES, ALFRED	The Position and Prospects of the Roman Catholic Church	439
FRASER, DANIEL J.	Recent Church Union Movements in Canada . .	363
FULLER, BENJAMIN A. G. .	The Conflict of Moral Obligation in the Trilogy of Æschylus	459
HALL, EDWIN H.	Sir Oliver Lodge's British Association Address .	238
HAYWARD, EDWARD F. . . .	Religious Reserve	205
JONES, J. P.	The Protestant Missionary Propaganda in India	18
JONES, RUFUS M.	Mysticism in Present-Day Religion	155
LOFTHOUSE, WILLIAM F. . .	The Atonement and the Modern Pulpit	182
McCONNELL, FRANCIS J. . .	The Function of the Educated and of the Uneducated Ministry	323
MOORE, CLIFFORD H. . . .	The Ethical Value of Oriental Religions under the Roman Empire	166
MORE, PAUL E.	Evolution and the Other World	339
PALMIERI, AURELIO	The Russian Doukhobors and their Religious Teachings	62
PETERS, JOHN P.	Excavations in Persia	82
ROBINSON, GEORGE L. . . .	Recent Excavation and Exploration in Palestine	525

⁸ HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

VOLUME VIII

JANUARY, 1915

NUMBER 1

[The EDITORS think the two articles following may have an interest in that they describe the present missionary situation from the point of view of an official at home and a missionary in the field, and that they reach substantially the same conclusions.]

THE MODERN MISSIONARY

JAMES L. BARTON

BOSTON

No one can speak with authority on the subject of the modern missionary policy of American societies, to say nothing of the societies that have their home in England and on the continent of Europe. Any general statements made with reference to modern missionary work can be successfully contradicted. No one appreciates these facts better than the writer of this article. Missions are so complicated and diversified, by tradition and practice, by the opinions of administrators, and by the ability and characteristics of the missionaries, that a vast and widely separating difference in a variety of respects runs through the whole body of missionary operations. Hence the almost insuperable difficulty of making general statements as to present missionary policy and methods without exposing oneself to a rejoinder that would be difficult satisfactorily to meet. It should be thoroughly understood that no statement hereinafter made can be of universal application.

We are bound to recognize that there is a fundamental difference between missionary societies. Some of them

put supreme emphasis upon oral preaching; others upon education and the development of educational institutions; some are interested primarily in industrial enterprises and the development of industrial training; while still others, perhaps embracing the larger number of societies, are interested in many forms of modern missionary endeavor.

What is said hereafter is based upon seven years of practical experience as a missionary in the heart of one of the great mission fields, followed by observations made in other important countries like Japan, China, India, etc. It has also been the privilege of the writer for twenty years to share in many missionary conferences, in which missionary policies, motives, and methods have been extensively discussed by representatives of the principal missionary societies of the world. With this, added to a continuous contact for the same period with administrators of missionary societies and with the practical problems growing out of such administration, he speaks, not for any one Board or Society but in a general way, of the modern missionary cause as a whole.

Much of the general criticism of missions and missionaries has been at times deserved. There have been and still are flagrant cases of sectarianism—more formerly than now—calling down upon missionaries and their work the just criticism of those who would put Christianity before sect and life before creed. It is not surprising that travellers coming into contact with this sectarian spirit have proclaimed the conclusion that the whole missionary cause is honeycombed by a provincial and destructive sectarianism. At the same time, in every mission field there is a small scattered and unrelated group of fanatical, independent, irresponsible missionaries. So far as the writer's observations go, these are among the most glaringly conspicuous missionaries in any country. They ostentatiously pose and are

vociferous in the declaration of their unusual consecration. Many general criticisms can be traced to some independent missionary or group of missionaries of this character who are condemned as severely by the missionaries of the regular missionary societies as by the unsympathetic tourists.

It must be acknowledged, moreover, that during the first century of modern missions which has just closed experiments were inevitable. There were no precedents for carrying on foreign missionary work in any country. It was inevitable that mistakes should occur, and, in view of the lack of co-operation at home and abroad, mistakes made by one missionary society were repeated by another and another. There are no more severe critics of the mistakes made during this period than the mature missionaries and the executives of the missionary societies.

Let no one think that either the missionaries or the executive officers of missionary societies regard their work as above and beyond criticism. The most of the societies welcome the criticism of the intelligent and unprejudiced.

There is much in modern missions that is frequently referred to as a change of policy which in fact is only the result of increased knowledge on the part of the observer. At the same time we must acknowledge that fundamental changes have taken place—especially during the last quarter of a century—in policy, methods, and motive, little understood outside administrative and supporting circles, which are rapidly bringing modern missions into the closest sympathetic relations with modern methods of Christian work at home. With a view to discovering some of these changes we will consider a few of the present aims and policies of foreign missions.

(1) There has been a marked change in the attitude of foreign missionaries and foreign missionary societies

as well as of the rank and file of the churches at home toward the non-Christian religions. It was not long ago that all non-Christian religions were labelled "false." One would have been a bold advocate of comparative religion who would have been ready, a generation ago, to declare that good was to be found in them all, that each non-Christian religion represented the result of the groping of other races and other peoples after God, and that they reflect and are the result of a human longing for communion with some spiritual Being or Beings. It was not long ago—even within the memory of some of us—that comparative religion was not taught in our universities or theological schools. Books written upon the non-Christian religions were superficially condemnatory. The marked advance in the line of investigation and publication on the subject need not be here discussed. All this has led to a more accurate knowledge of these religions, their history, development, and claims, thus bringing the whole Christian world into more sympathetic relations with the non-Christian world.

The modern missionary goes out with the purpose of conserving all true values in the religious thought, life, and practices of the people whom he approaches. The writer has never personally known of a missionary making attacks upon the religion or religious beliefs of the peoples of the East. The modern missionary proclaims a sympathetic, constructive gospel. One would travel far and wide today in the mission field to find missionaries using any other method of approach.

(2) Sectarianism is rapidly disappearing. It is the shame of missionary work that it has been so prominent in the past, but it has never been so glaringly conspicuous in the foreign mission field as it has been here at home. There have never been among missionaries or native Christians the same bitter theological controversies that have characterized denominational relationships

in Europe and America. At the same time, there have been differences which never ought to have occurred and which have done much to hinder the spread of Christian truth among non-Christian peoples.

Perhaps one of the reasons why sectarianism has not been more emphasized in the mission field is the fact that through some wise provision of Divine Providence natives of no mission country are able to pronounce correctly the names of the leading denominations of the West. At the same time it has been impossible for the most sectarian of missionaries—and there have been some—adequately to explain the actual difference separating the leading denominations of the world. One can well imagine how almost impossible it would be to make perfectly clear to an intelligent Japanese or Chinese or Indian the vital differences existing between half a dozen different kinds of Presbyterians or Methodists or Baptists, or why it is that differences resulting in our Civil War, and ending when the war ceased, should be now perpetuated in Asia. The missionaries have found it impossible, even had they been so inclined, to take time and strength to explain to the people of the East the causes that separate denominations in the West, in the face of their crying need to know God and their relation to Him and to each other, and to know Jesus Christ in his beauty and power. As some one has well said, a missionary becomes impatient of any demand put upon him to discuss the amount of water required for baptism with a man who is worshipping the cobra. Imperative urgency and need have compelled the elimination of sectarianism and the closer union of Christian forces for aggressive conquest.

One needs but to refer to the great foreign missionary conferences that have been held in the United States and in Europe, in which representatives of all Protestant missionary societies have come together to discuss the

great common interests of the cause. The missionary societies of North America have for twenty years met in annual conference. Growing out of the Edinburgh Missionary Conference there has been created a Continuation Committee of forty members representing the Protestant communions of the world. Thus the Christian forces are coming together for the elimination of the differences which have separated and for the combination of resources for world-conquest. This is indeed a modern movement, begun well this side of the middle of the last century, resulting in the mission fields in interdenominational theological seminaries, colleges, and medical schools, to say nothing of national non-sectarian churches. The modern missionary is Christian first, with sectarianism in the remote background.

(3) One of the most marked changes taking place in the foreign mission propaganda during the last century has been the shift of emphasis from the individual to society. The social aspect of Christianity was not given due recognition at home or abroad a generation ago. It is not strange therefore that while the missionaries were promoting great, sweeping social movements, international in character and fundamental in reach, they did not recognize them as such, but continued there as we did here to put supreme emphasis upon individual conversion.

Nowhere did Christian leaders, even a generation ago, rise above an individualistic conception of Christianity and grasp its great comprehensive outreach, as it puts its stamp upon the home, society, and the State. Here too the missionaries were well in advance of the Christian leaders at home in their recognition of the sociological power of the gospel they preached and taught. They began early to lay the foundation of Christian institutions which readily and quickly became larger than the individual. These missionary institutions and the ex-

tension of Christianity through them have exerted a fundamental influence for changing the ideas and ideals of the people and in creating a Christian sentiment and a Christian atmosphere. This change has been marked in many countries, as, for instance, in India, where the force of the Christian movement can no longer be measured by the number of those who have been gathered into churches, but where it is necessary to take into account the changed attitude of vast populations with reference to Christianity and especially to the person and character of Jesus Christ. One would make a great mistake today in attempting to establish the success of Christian missions by columns of statistics. The great subtle intellectual and social advance of Christianity in the non-Christian world is fundamental, far-reaching, and revolutionary. In every missionary country of prolonged occupancy, the missionaries note with as keen satisfaction these general, fundamental changes growing out of the introduction of Christianity as they do the rapid increase in the number of those accepting baptism.

While the missionaries do not lose sight of the individual—and cannot—they have reached the point where they plan for the development of Christian institutions that shall reshape public sentiment, instil their ideals and lofty purposes into every phase of society, and ultimately put the stamp of their teachings upon every department of social, intellectual, and national life. The missionary today is consciously face to face with the great national, social problems of the countries in which he is located; problems that are not exceeded, hardly approached, in importance or in scope by those that confront the social worker at home. The successful solution of these problems will produce a religious as well as a social revolution for the non-Christian world.

(4) Missionaries are the creators of educational systems and the promoters of modern education in all

countries entered. There has never been difference of opinion as to the importance of the missionaries' training "native helpers" at first hand. The discussion over education became earnest when the earlier training schools developed into collegiate institutions and when Western languages were introduced. Many supporters of missions favored the training of native workers, but refused to give for teaching Asiatic students mathematics, history, philosophy, and science. Some even took the ground that higher education was detrimental to the development of Christianity since it equipped the student for earning a living outside the Christian ministry. One missionary, in his objection to higher education and especially to the teaching of the English language, put it, that he was strenuously opposed to "equipping students with wings which they might use after graduation in flying away from the service of the mission into secular employment."

This battle-ground has been thoroughly fought over, and at the present time the missionary collegiate institutions as well as the schools of lower grade are recognized as legitimate means of implanting Christianity securely in the heart of the non-Christian world. Here too it was necessary to get away from the individualistic idea of Christianity to the broader conception of its mission in order to understand how a Christian college in a non-Christian land may become one of the most powerful constructive influences for breaking down prejudice and superstition, preparing the way for correct religious thinking, and establishing the principles of Christianity throughout the country. Missionary colleges and lower schools are today among the most honored and respected Christian institutions in the countries where they have been established, and in some of these countries they still hold supreme place. The Christian missionary is responsible for the present governmental education

system of India, and it is well known that modern education was introduced by missionaries into China in the face of persistent and united opposition of the *literati*, to say nothing of other countries where they have been the leaders in the development of the modern intellectual life.

Within the last ten years higher education in the mission field has received a mighty impulse owing to its increased popularity and in some cases to the urgent appeal of the people themselves for enlargement and extension of missionary institutions. The political changes that have taken place in many of the great mission fields have created an unprecedented demand for both men and women educated according to Western ideals. This has made the modern mission school of all grades popular beyond every expectation and has compelled a better equipment both in teaching staff and in plant. It has brought out a larger support on the part of the natives both by way of government grants and increased tuition. It has forced the development of high schools into colleges, and of colleges into universities. In Japan the Japanese leaders and the missionaries are urgently appealing to the Christians in America to unite in establishing one great general Christian University for Japan. The same is true with reference to China, although, owing to the great size of China, three or more universities are demanded.

The rapid growth of higher education has compelled the missions of various denominations to unite, thus bringing together the societies and denominations at home. In this educational movement there is being developed the closest co-operation between the different communions and Boards, the resultant institutions bearing the name of no denomination but known only as "Christian." The modern educational development in the mission field surpasses in scope and in significance and in rapidity

of growth that of any similar general movement in history. It is calling for the most expert Christian educationalists for every department of instruction, and especially for the organization and direction of educational systems.

It is a significant fact that at the present time in the Christian schools of the mission fields there are more than 3,000,000 pupils under Christian instruction. There are no religious tests for admission or for graduation. The position is taken with reference to religion that no one, either of the East or West, can claim to possess an all-round education until accurate knowledge of the history, claims, and content of Christianity, the religion of the greatest nations of the world, is obtained.

(5) It is not customary to think of the missionaries as having to do with the industries of a country, much less with its foreign commerce. Are they not sent out to preach the gospel? And what has the gospel to do with the creation of industries within the country or the development of commerce between that and other countries? And yet there is no other body of men and women who have gone out from the West into foreign countries who have contributed more for their internal development and external trade than these very missionaries. We may call this a "by-product" of missions, if we please, and yet the fact remains that just as soon as Christianity is implanted in any country and begins to develop institutions which spring inevitably from it, the industrial life of the people correspondingly improves and foreign commerce begins.

Experience demonstrates that as soon as an Asiatic becomes a Christian, he immediately begins to be, all things else being equal, worth more than he was before, not only to himself and to his family but to the society in which he lives and to his country. It has been proved that when the conservatism of the Oriental has been

broken through to such an extent that he is ready to change his religion, he is also more ready than before to exchange his old industrial customs and traditions for what is better. In other words, the Christians for the most part become reformers in things ordinarily considered quite remote from religion, and leaders in the introduction of new industrial as well as social ideas into their own immediate surroundings.

It would be indeed a short-sighted and narrow-minded missionary who would withhold his advice and assistance from individual Christians and from Christian communities, as they endeavor to throw off their old conservatism and strive to develop industrially along new lines. This may mean, as it does mean in many a mission field, the introduction of modern tools and training of natives in their use, the teaching of industries in a great variety of forms, and the development, on a small scale of course, of commercial enterprises that first claim the advice and aid of those familiar with Western ways. Some of the most encouraging and helpful modern enterprises in Africa and Asia had their origin at a mission station and were developed under the advice and direction of a foreign missionary.

It is a part of the foreign missionary's business to see that the Christian society becomes the most prosperous and progressive society in the country, and anything he can do that will lead to such a development becomes as much a part of his missionary work as does the teaching of school and the organization of churches. A church made up of ignorant, unprogressive, unenterprising beggars would make a poor show in any country as the Church of the Living God.

This development of missionary effort has risen from the conception that the Gospel is more than a gospel for the soul of man, but it is equally a gospel for his mind and his body and his environment, a gospel that

affects the man in all of his relationships, and that as such it must lift up and purify, glorify, and strengthen every relationship into which he enters. In Africa, it is just as much the privilege and duty of the missionary to see that the Christians move out of their old *kraals* into houses sanitarily constructed and suited to the preservation and development of moral character as it is to provide them places of worship. A missionary from Africa told the writer not long since that he had observed that the native preachers who knew how to make and lay brick and manufacture furniture and introduce improved methods of tilling the soil, were without exception the most influential and constructive preachers of Christianity.

The gospel that the missionary preaches is the gospel that gives an abundant life. Under the modern missionary interpretation, that means a broader, better, higher living along lines of modern civilization—a living that elevates the entire community.

(6) There has never been any question as to whether it were proper for a missionary to be a physician and to practice medicine in the mission field, because there has always been the example of Jesus Christ himself, of whose reported miracles more than one-half were miracles of healing. The original idea of medical missions was that they broke down opposition and prepared the way for the preacher. The medical missionary was therefore a kind of John the Baptist crying in the wilderness and preparing the way for him who followed with the direct gospel message. Hard after that was the idea that the practice of medicine among the needy and helpless was a clear, unmistakable demonstration of that for which Christianity stands. This second conception of the place of medical missions in the non-Christian world still stands unchallenged. Few fail to understand the benevolent character of medical missions, where the

doors of the dispensary and hospital are open and where the patient, however poor or forsaken, finds loving hands ready to receive him and minister to his needs. The power of the medical work is limitless.

But beyond this, medical missions have been demonstrating in an unmistakable manner the value of human life. This demonstration is necessary in lands like China and India, and in fact all or nearly all the non-Christian countries where the value of life is lightly held. Into such communities the medical missionary comes with his tremendous emphasis on saving life, and little by little the lesson is learned that any human life—all human life—is worth saving even at great sacrifice.

Beyond this, medical missions have introduced ideas of hygiene and sanitation. It would seem as if the East must have been long ere this completely depopulated through universal violation of every known law of sanitation. Medical missionaries have become in these countries not simply preparers of the way, demonstrators of fundamental Christianity, alleviators of unalleviated distress, but they are setting up new standards of living which cannot fail to produce a healthier, stronger, and more robust humanity.

To make this work permanent, medical missionaries are organizing medical colleges through which these new ideas of modern medicine and hygiene shall take root in the soil of the country itself. These medical institutions give young men and even young women thorough courses in modern medicine. These go out as practitioners to disseminate and perpetuate the ideals which they have acquired in the missionary institution.

The missionary Medical College at Peking, China, with its foreign and native staff, and with the senior class of Chinese students, threw itself into the breach two years ago when the pneumonic plague started in Northern Manchuria and began to spread, with its one

hundred per cent of fatality, down across North China and so threatened Japan and the whole known world. When it seemed as if nothing could stay its progress, the faculty of the Medical College in Peking with a large corps of volunteer Chinese students from the senior class set themselves to the task, and in three months the plague was stamped out, and in the meantime a serum was discovered that proved to be of great value. The medical missionaries who established the College at Peking performed for the whole world a service no money could ever buy, which is beyond all praise. This is but an illustration of what the medical missionary in his individual work, as well as through his teaching of natives, is accomplishing in stamping out the plague spots of the world. Through their effort cholera has ceased to be the terrible scourge it was a generation ago in Turkey and in India. If the missionary forces should be allowed to enter Mecca, they would get at the very heart of the cholera scourge of the Mohammedan world, and in a brief period, if left free to act, reinforced by their native pupils, they would make cholera almost an unknown disease.

In addition to the direct medical operations, the missionaries have been successful distributors of relief in times of overwhelming disaster, setting an example in the use of relief-money so as to preserve the self-respect of the individual while saving life. They have been the organizers of some of the greatest relief-movements of the century, as in India during the great famines in late years, and in Turkey during the massacres that left in their bloody trail tens of thousands of helpless widows and orphans. They have thus been the organizers of systematic, orderly, and reasonable relief at a minimum cost for a maximum of results. Whatever criticism may be brought to bear upon the ordained missionary and his methods and his work, one must stand in reverent silence before the medical missionary whose work is beyond

criticism, the beneficent results of which are touching the ends of the earth.

(7) We have left to the last in our discussion the subject of the doctrines which missionaries preach and teach and to which they are committed. There has been much misunderstanding on this point in the past, and there will probably be much in the future. There has been a change in emphasis at home in the presentation of Christian truth, and still greater changes will undoubtedly take place in the years to come. As the environments of men and their temptations pass through radical changes, it is inevitable that there should be different emphases in the presentation of Christian truth to meet the new need of the new time and the new methods of thought. While truth is the same in all ages, there is often a wide difference in its application; and while the needs of men are the same today that they have been through all time, yet there is often an imperative call for change in the methods of meeting them.

There is no doubt that one of the principal doctrines taught by the missionaries in the earlier part of the last century was the doctrine of salvation for the world to come. One needs but to read the sermons that were delivered at home at that time and study the books of theology that were printed and taught during that period, to note the fact that Christianity then put its supreme emphasis upon preparation for death. When a person was asked if he were "saved," it was implied to mean saved from eternal destruction and to eternal happiness.

At the present time, the missionary preaches salvation no less than before, but it is salvation for the life that now is—salvation to oneself and for himself, and to society and for society—salvation for the sake of the world in which he lives. It is now taken for granted

that if a man is saved for the life that now is, he will be abundantly prepared for the life that is to come. Our Lord announced that his mission upon earth was to give abundant life; the modern interpretation would say that Christ came to fit men to live and to live now. Missionaries today throughout the world are preaching to non-Christians the possibility through Christ of being saved now—saved from the sin of their present and past life, saved from evil habits, evil thoughts, evil purposes—saved from the destruction of their immortal life and made fit to live among men.

Little emphasis is placed upon redemption in order that one may inherit an eternal life of rest and peace with God; while over against this is the plea that men should be saved and need to be saved in order that they may give to their fellowmen and to the world a life that was intended for the world. In other words, the preaching of the missionary today is to lead men through their living contact with the Christ to empty themselves of the selfishness that has dominated them during their former life, and to be filled with the spirit of unselfish service which dominated the Christ, and which, when taken on by them, will send them forth to render a like service to their fellowmen. The theology of the missionary today aims at the saving of the multitudes for life, the abundant, unselfish, glorious, Christlike life, that they may make that life count for the spiritual upbuilding of their fellowmen.

This being the case, decreasing emphasis is placed upon creeds and mere forms of expression of belief. The missionaries are writing creeds less than they were in the earlier days. They are asking the native Christians, after they have had full and ripe experience in Christian life and service, to put into their own language and form what Christianity means to them; in other words, to give to Christian truth and life their own Oriental interpre-

tation. At the great Edinburgh Missionary Conference held in 1900, the chairman of one of the Commissions in presenting his report to that Conference made the following statement:

“We can never understand our own Holy Scriptures until they are interpreted to us through the language of every nation under heaven. We can never know our Lord Jesus Christ in fulness and in the length and breadth of His love until He is revealed to the world in the redeemed life and character of men out of every race for which He died.”

This statement was manifestly approved by more than two thousand missionary leaders from the Protestant denominations of Christendom.

The doctrines of the modern missionary are becoming greatly simplified, and as such bear fruit in the words and in the living of those who take the name of Christian. They remember that Jesus Christ himself was an Oriental and that in order to appeal to the Oriental mind he must be clothed in the Oriental atmosphere, speak from the Oriental point of view, and show himself adapted to the Oriental heart.

To sum up, the modern missionary recognizes the universality of Christianity and its adaptation to the whole man and his environment. He regards his mission so to present the Christ in all his vital and vitalizing power that he may dominate individuals and society, so that there shall eventuate a rounded, enlightened, prosperous, progressive Christian civilization. The modern missionary therefore is a Christian worker of boundless vision, with the goal of his labor nothing less than nations transformed, new civilizations constructed on eternal foundations, and the ultimate consummation of the Kingdom of God on earth.

THE PROTESTANT MISSIONARY PROPAGANDA IN INDIA

J. P. JONES

MADURA, INDIA

A few years ago (1906) the Protestant missionary enterprise in India celebrated its bicentenary. A few months ago the centennial celebration of the founding of American missions in India was an occasion of much joy. It must be a matter of deep interest, not only to the missionary body, but to the members of our Christian community in America to study both the progress and the vast and, in some cases, revolutionary changes of this great enterprise on the mission field. Even during the missionary experience of the writer innovations have been numerous and fundamental. To those who think that the missionary enterprise is wanting in the spirit of the age, the transformations which have already taken place and are constantly going on will lead to astonishment. These changes have been coincident with and a part of the progress of the Christian world in thought and life, and embrace not only the forms and methods of work but also the fundamental principles which underlie and permeate the whole work. In the present paper it is proposed to study a few of these innovations which have marked the onward march of this great movement.

I. We will first consider the present motives of the missionary enterprise, as compared with those of a century ago. There has been, at this point, a very definite advance. That which now animates the mis-

sionary, and the Christian church and society which are behind him, is different from the motive power of a century ago. At that time it was the deep sense of the appalling condition of the heathen and the unutterable doom which awaited them in the future world, which stirred the Christian church to its first activity in their behalf. The command of Christ, his last commission, that his disciples go even into the uttermost parts of the earth to disciple the nations, was then recognized, but was a matter of secondary importance as the missionary motive. Today there is a change of emphasis given to these two motives. A sense of the love of Christ to our race and loyalty to him in his command to go forth as missionaries of the Cross, have today become the dominating note and animating motive of this great enterprise. When the writer sought appointment as a missionary, many years ago, he sent, with his application, a statement of his doctrinal beliefs and convictions. The sainted secretary of the society accepted this statement with the remark, however, that it was inadequate as to the lost condition of the heathen. The candidate was urged to acquire deeper convictions as to the impenetrable gloom and hopeless condition of the non-Christian world, with the idea that this only, or at least chiefly, would furnish an adequate motive to his life-work. That, to the secretary and to the missionary of half a century ago, was the supreme test of the doctrinal attitude and motive-conviction required. It is not that the condition of the non-Christian world has become to the missionary a matter of less concern, or that the ambition to save it is less consuming; but there has loomed up on his horizon another vision of compelling beauty and power which increasingly occupies his thought and demands his allegiance. It is the Christ of all authority and infinite love, calling men to go into the darkest regions of the

earth to disciple the nations. Loyalty and love to him have become the prime incentive to action. This last commission of our Lord is the Magna Charta of the modern missionary. It is not the cry of the heathen but the call of the Lord—not the vision of a hell which yawns to receive these undisciplined nations who know not Christ, but the vision of a Paradise which has been prepared for them and which now claims them—this it is which stirs men today to missionary consecration and service.

In other words, the supreme motive of a generation ago has been relegated to the background and has ceased to stir men as it was wont to do. For those peoples are no longer strangers to us as they were to our forefathers. In the onward march of civilization they have become our neighbors, yea, our brothers, the common children of the Heavenly Father. Indeed, this change has come to us as a necessary consequence of the modern vision of heaven and of earth. We think no longer of God as the dread King of the universe, but as the infinite loving Father and Saviour. His love now inspires the missionary's thought and has become the measuring rod of his appreciation and interpretation of Him. He knows also that He is the Father of all men and that His call to go and carry His redemptive message to the non-Christian world is the command of love. It has become the supreme test of discipleship that he is loyal to Him and, as never before, is spellbound by the vision of His love and is eager to run, even to the uttermost parts of the world, at the call of His service. The heathen are no longer to the missionary enemies to be shunned, but brothers to be converted and won to membership in the great family of God. The realization of this vision, the fulfilment of this duty, the inspiration of this universal love—this it is which finds today the supreme emphasis as the missionary motive.

II. In like manner the aim of the missionary enterprise is not entirely the same as it was even a third of a century ago. What did the missionary of the past hold, and what does the missionary of the present entertain, as the consummation to which he devotes all his life? Formerly it was particularly sought to bring individuals, through personal influence and teaching and prayer, into touch with Christ and into membership of his church. Former missionaries were largely individualistic in their activities and purposes. At the present time we note a transfer of emphasis from the conversion of the individual to the regeneration of the country. As Rev. Bernard Lucas has well said, "We now seek not to save the soul of the Hindu but the soul of India." In his interesting book, *The Empire of Christ*, he also presents this difference of aim by means of an extreme illustration. He compares the lost condition of the non-Christian world to a shipwreck. In the past the church was concerned with, and gave itself entirely to, the work of rescuing individual passengers who were in imminent danger of a watery grave. Now, however, the church thinks not so much of rescuing individuals as it does of saving the ship itself. By which he means that the missionary is at the present time more concerned with the condition of India, as a whole, than he is with that of any individual or class in the country.

All missionaries may not be conscious of this change of aim or of emphasis, but it enters into their deepest thoughts as it does into the animating purpose of their life and work. These two aims are not, practically, so far apart as they may seem; for no one will contest the statement that the only, or at least the most successful, way of saving the soul of India is by bringing individual Hindus, one by one, to Christ. Nevertheless, these different aims, even as a matter of emphasis, are of considerable importance. The missionary whose vision does

not carry him, in his ambition, to the uplift and salvation of more than a few souls or small communities in that great land, cannot possess the power and inspiration of a man who has taken the whole country into his love and purpose, and its regeneration as a definite object of his daily prayer and a distinct inspiration to all his activities.

In harmony with this difference of aim we also find what Mr. Lucas elsewhere characterizes as the two contrasted methods of "proselytizing and evangelizing"; by which terms he signifies the purpose of bringing individuals into organic connection with the Christian church, on the one hand, and the work of preparing the whole community fully to know and heartily to accept the gospel, on the other. It may be said that the earlier method and aim was the dominant one in past years. Missionaries felt that their work achieved little, and was practically without results, unless it brought men to an open confession of Christ and to a public entrance into the Christian church. At the present time missionary statistics signify less than formerly, and mere entrance into church membership conveys not so much value in permanent results as it once did. The missionary propaganda has two definite results, represented by the parables of the mustard seed and of the leaven. The growth of the church itself, represented by the mustard tree, is full of encouragement to the missionary worker; but it is by no means the only, indeed it is not the chief, encouragement which he finds in his work today. It is rather the leavening influence of the gospel, its assimilating and transforming power upon all the institutions and upon the lives of those people who have not accepted openly the Christian faith. The writer feels strongly that his chief encouragement has come through the leavening influence of gospel truth, its ideals of life, and its outgoing service upon the non-Christian community of India. In harmony

with this, the missionary finds his purpose increasingly realized, not so much in the numerical growth of the Christian church and community, as in the advancement of the Kingdom of God in that land. The Christian church, as an organization, has ceased to be the supreme aim of his endeavors and test of his success. It is of more comfort and assurance to him to witness the transforming influence of the gospel of Christ in that great land, whereby comes, without observation, the dynamic power of the Kingdom of our Lord. The missionary no longer regards the organized church of God as of supreme importance, but rather as one, though the greatest, instrumentality in the furtherance of the Kingdom of Christ. This is the Institution whose coming he daily yearns for, and whose growing power becomes the subject of his constant prayer.

It may be interesting to consider this subject from another viewpoint. We witness today a new and stirring motto—"The Evangelization of the World in This Generation." It is very much exploited, especially in young people's Conventions. It has found more enthusiastic promulgation, during the last few years, than has almost any other. There are difficulties involved in this motto. The first is that it is unfortunately connected in many minds with the well-known doctrine of the coming of Christ. It is maintained that Christ cannot come again until all nations have heard the gospel; hence their eagerness to conduct a certain type of evangelization. But if "evangelization" is to mean anything that will be of permanent value to the world, the work involved must be impossible in this generation. There is very little value in covering the whole world, in a short time, with a single preaching of the gospel to untrained heathen. This motto has not been promulgated by missionaries; for they know too well the supreme difficulty of the job in hand. They

understand that their work has only begun in a community when they have entered and first preached to them the gospel message. With infinite patience they must again and again visit them, give word upon word and line upon line and convey repeatedly the message, not only until it is understood and accepted, but also until it germinates in their mind and fructifies in holy lives and in a self-propagating church. The command is not only to go and bear witness, but also, and chiefly, to "*disciple*" the nations, a much more serious and difficult task. The aim of the missionary, therefore, is not that of sowing broadcast the seed of the Word, but also of patiently and in prayer watering that seed and cultivating that ground until it becomes verily Emmanuel's land, filled with a people who know him and who will be forever kept by him.

III. The Missionary Attitude toward Non-Christian Faiths.

This attitude has undergone a marked transformation during the last third of a century. It was till then generally believed that all the ethnic religions of India, and Mohammedanism too, were of the devil. It would have been blasphemy for one to say that God had had anything to do directly in the development of the past religious history of that great people! It was under the influence of this conviction that former missionaries, the writer included, offered themselves for service in India. Today a missionary candidate, with this conception of a God-deserted India, would not only be an anachronism but would also be spurned by India and an alien to the present missionary body itself. India is the most religious country on earth. That God should have left to its own ignorance and misery a people who are so "God-intoxicated" in their temperament and whose aspirations after God, during the last thirty centuries, are so marked in all their writings and institutions, is

preposterous. Even the ancient apostolic teaching should have warned them against such folly. The ignorance of the West as to the sacred writings of India was a substantial excuse for the contempt of past generations. Today the new hemisphere of Indian literature has been opened to us. While it is still true that the religious lapses of India were lamentable and numberless; that superstition fouled the most sacred precincts of religious thought and life; that conceptions of God descended to the lowest depths of grossest idolatry; that teachings concerning man and salvation were degraded and absolutely unworthy; and, above all, that the people were devoid of the purest light of God in the face of Jesus Christ; nevertheless, we must maintain that God did use these inadequate and limited means to lift this people to greater heights and richer blessings than they otherwise would have attained. The report of the World Missionary Conference of 1910 says in this connection: "Below the strange form and hardly intelligible language lies life, the spiritual life, of human souls needing God, seeking God, laying hold of God so far as they have found Him. Until we have at least reached so far that under the ceremonies and doctrines we have found the religious life of the people, we do not know what Hinduism really is." There is under all the errors and mean spiritual gropings of India a religious life of the people which has, in some way or other, been fostered by, or at least kept in existence through, some of these teachings and institutions which we so deplore.

Missionaries now differ as to the place and function of these non-Christian faiths as related to the future religious life of the people. Some agree with Mr. Farquhar in his excellent book, *The Crown of Hinduism*, that Hinduism and all other non-Christian faiths are to find their fulfilment in Christianity. This is a

position based upon the evolution principle. A vast number of missionaries, however, reject this theory, thus boldly stated, as a dangerous doctrine. Still they believe and teach that all the truths of non-Christian religions and all the aspirations of their worshippers are realized and fulfilled in Christ Jesus. Christ came, in a comprehensive way, to fulfil not only the vital truths of Judaism but also those of all other faiths. These are but isolated, distorted, prismatic rays of which he is the full-orbed Sun of light and life. It is neither adequate nor true to speak of ethnic religions as "the backward, undeveloped faiths which in due time will, if left alone, ultimately grow into the highest, each one reflecting its own peculiar light and giving its own coloring to ultimate truth." This conceit would seem more plausible if all these undeveloped cults were not much older than Christianity, and were not in a degenerate condition steadily descending into lower planes of ethical efficiency and spiritual attractiveness.

The new theory gives approval and dignity to many of the outstanding teachings of ethnic religions, which indeed have helped to preserve these faiths through many centuries of superstition, corruption, and error; but it does not give either sanction or sacredness to the faiths themselves. It rather shows that whatsoever services they may have rendered and whatsoever truths they may, even distortedly, have preserved in the past, their mission is now closed, and they must retire in behalf of a religion which presents in purity all the rays of truth which they ever reflected and proclaims that there is only "*one* Name given under heaven wherein men may be saved."

It must also be added that, whatever one's attitude toward the separate teachings of Hinduism or toward that whole amorphous thing called Hinduism may be, he cannot but look with profound sympathy and deep

appreciation upon the tender faith and mystic piety of the people. Our attitude toward the non-Christian religions is one thing; that toward the touching though blind devotion of their disciples is another. Professor Hogg, in the *Year Book of Missions in India* (page 121) has aptly said: "It is just as vital to the cause of Christ that uncompromising war should be waged against living Hindu beliefs as that there should be an ungrudging reverence shown toward living Hindu faith." The missionary attitude, therefore, is still one of unceasing antagonism to these faiths, both because (whatever they may have been in the past) they are grossly decadent and unequal to the task of leading souls to God and to salvation, and because the supreme light and blessing of Christianity and of modern civilization has dawned upon the land.

Another question of growing importance relates to some of the dominating thoughts and universal convictions of India. Are these to be regarded as foul errors, to be utterly overthrown and discarded; or is the new Christian faith of India to take account of these teachings and to adopt, or to adapt, some elements or aspects of them toward its own highest embodiment and strength in that land? The greatest struggle of the Indian church is yet to gather about this question. To illustrate: is there room for some type of Vedantic pantheism in Christianity? Even now a few missionaries are advocating, as a wise basis for the new Christian doctrine of God, the adoption of the qualified theistic monism of Ramanujan which is so popular in South India and even in other parts of the land. Others advise that the missionary body make friends with the universal Hindu doctrine of *Karma*, or retributive justice, and its corollary, the doctrine of transmigration. Hindus who are friendly to our faith claim, with a show of truth, that no religion can prevail or even survive in India which

does not, in some form or other, accept these universal and permanent postulates of the Indian mind. We know that in the history of our faith in the near East and West distinguished Christian teachers and Church Fathers have not hesitated to adopt and promulgate these teachings in some form or other; and it is not easily to be supposed that the self-directing Christian church in India will not, in the future, grapple with these problems, and always with a mental bias toward these fundamental doctrines of their ancestral faith.

IV. The Message to be preached.

No subject is of greater importance to the missionary propaganda than that of the message which it is to present to the people of that land. What shall be the content of the missionary message? In this matter modern missionaries are worse and also are better than their fathers. They are worse, since they are too much diverted from the simple gospel message and its proclamation because preoccupied by a thousand other subsidiary thoughts and absorbed by efforts to relieve the physical and temporal needs of the people. They are better than their fathers because they realize, as men of former generations did not and could not, the foreign aspect and accent of our faith as held and presented by the man of the West to him of the East. As the East, and especially India, is revealing itself increasingly to us, we learn the antipodal viewpoint with which they and we study and apprehend everything. In times past (and even now, in some cases) the missionary thought that all the doctrinal prepossessions, historical bearing, and even sectarian politics, which he had learned in the West, were equally valid and available for the East; but he now knows India better than this, and grasps more fully the significant fact that the gospel according to the West, in three-quarters of its content and in all its interpretative spirit, is and must remain foreign and

largely unintelligible and wanting in appeal to the people of India. It is distinctly a child of the Occident, harmonizing with Western characteristics and biassed and shaped by climatic influences and habits of life. Today the missionary strives to reduce the gospel to its primary content and simplest message; he unwinds the swaddling bands and elaborate robes and furnishings so tenderly wound about it by Greeks and Romans, Celts and Anglo-Saxons, and other Christian races, during their time of possession and propagation. How difficult indeed for any man to disentangle from his message those racial prepossessions which his own and other peoples were compelled to add to it in order to make it their own and to give it their own interpretation, which renders it palatable and delectable to them, omitting also their shibboleths which expressed it in their own patois and with their peculiar accent! So long as these foreign accretions, which are not of the essence of the gospel, are not separated from the true message of the Saviour and omitted from its presentation to India, so long will India continue to decline to consider it, because it has a foreign stamp upon it. It is "not Christianity but Churchianity," as one Indian recently expressed it. In other words, India is waiting for the unvarnished, naked message of the gospel—a gospel denuded of that crop of Western herbage which should not be transplanted there if for no other reason than that it cannot live in the tropics. A few years ago the writer listened to a most eloquent address by Kali Charran Banerjee, the most distinguished Indian Christian of that day, in reference to this very question; and he will never forget the remark offered with all earnestness to the five hundred missionaries there assembled. "Gentlemen of the West," he said, "we of the East do not want your adjectival Christianity. What we need is the substantive thing." It is this "adjectival" type of Christianity

which has been too much in evidence in the missionary propaganda. The failure of Christianity thus far to become indigenous, prevalent, and triumphant throughout the land, is largely the failure of the West to adapt its Christian message to that people, which is really the inability to translate our faith back to its original terms, terms which are more intelligible and natural to the East than to the West.

This message must, for this reason, cease to be in the form of a doctrine, a philosophy, or an institution. It must become once more a purely *personal* message. India must be given an unembellished vision of a personal God in Christ Jesus. His personality must illumine and thrill the message. India must have the vision of the Mount of Transfiguration, when it also, with the three disciples of old, must "see Jesus only." And to them must be left to accept and to interpret his life and work in their own time and especially in their own way, which will be, most assuredly, in a way very different from ours. He will be to them the mystic Christ, loved by a mystic passion beyond anything ever known in the West. Listen to the passionate words of the famous Kesub Chunder Sen, who never accepted our faith but who loved Jesus with a warmth rarely known among Western Christians. "None but Jesus, none but Jesus, none, I say, but Jesus, ever deserved this bright, this precious diadem, India, and Jesus shall have it. My Christ, my sweet Christ, the most lustrous Jewel of my heart, the Bridal Adornment of my soul! For twenty long years have I loved Him in my miserable heart. I have found Him, though oftentimes persecuted, though oftentimes soiled by the world, I have ever found sweetness and joy unspeakable in my Master, Jesus. He, the Bridegroom, cometh among you. May India adorn herself as the bride, in her glittering apparel, that she may be ready to meet Him." Why has not

India the same right to claim from us what the Greeks sought from the disciples of old when they said, "We would see Jesus"; and why not also the same privilege with us to weave their web of faith about him and to formulate in their own way their convictions and doctrines concerning him, and to build up whatever institutions they may find appealing to them and suited to them in the New Testament? It is only when they can and will achieve this that our faith will become their faith, the living, inspiring, and triumphant faith of India. In other words, the man of the West must constantly endeavor to avoid obtruding himself and his Western inheritance upon the people, in order that Christ may have free course and be glorified in that land.

Of course it is unnecessary to add to this the conviction that, of all the Western excrescences of our faith, none is more unnecessary, objectionable, and injurious to India than the denominational craze and sectarian fervor which have, by their transfer there, made our cause so ridiculous and scandalous and impossible. But, thanks be to God, missionaries themselves are today becoming increasingly disgusted with, and are relegating to the background, these very things which all deplore.

V. The Work to be accomplished.

It should be said, in the first place, that the field for this work is the World. World-wide opportunities are inviting, so that there is no longer need of the prayer of the last generation, that God would open the lands of hermit nations to the gospel. India is already an open country. It is true that in a few places in some of the Native States the gospel finds no welcome. On the other hand, there are many open, inviting fields in that land that are practically unoccupied. There are twenty-seven Native States with no Christian workers whatever.

The missionary propaganda has many departments of work.

First comes the work of preaching the gospel. This is neither ignored nor minimized today, though it does not receive the exclusive attention of half a century ago. To it have been added many other departments which are useful and essential to the salvation and to the development of the whole man. Anything that appertains to human betterment finds place today in the scheme of missions. It is no longer the picture of the missionary of the early part of the nineteenth century, standing in the shade of a tree preaching to a few undressed savages. He is rather the leader and inspirer of a mighty organized enterprise, whose many departments of effort touch the life of the people at all points and seek to ameliorate the condition of man in all spheres of his life and activity.

The Indian missionary church has now so far developed, under foreign guidance, that it is, in many of the older missions, not only approaching self-support but also self-direction and self-propagation. Of the thirty-nine thousand Indian Protestant Christian workers, seventeen hundred are ordained clergy, men of growing culture and large responsibility, upon whose shoulders have been placed, to a considerable extent, the pastoral direction and leadership of the Indian church. This situation has released foreign missionaries for other departments of work. An increasing number of them are devoting themselves to the education of the six thousand youth who are studying in the thirty-eight Missionary Colleges, besides those in the one hundred and twenty-seven Normal Training Schools, the eighty-six Theological Schools, the one hundred and sixty Industrial Institutions, the four Medical Colleges, and the thirteen thousand five hundred Elementary Schools. In all of these institutions five hundred and fifty thou-

sand youth are being trained for life and service under the inspiration of a host of wide-awake missionaries. Hundreds also are devoting themselves to medical work connected with the six hundred and ten mission hospitals and dispensaries, where more than three million patients are annually treated. An increasing number are giving themselves to the production and dissemination of Christian literature, which department is rapidly becoming one of the most influential forms of missionary activity. As instruments in this propaganda there are more than fifty publishing houses and presses, some of which are among the largest in India.

Industrial training and work has also become an important part of the activity of these missions; and in this same line there are a number of Christian Peasant Settlements which have done more or less good in various sections of the country. Besides these, there are one hundred and eighty-one Orphanages, seventy-two Leper Hospitals and Asylums, eight Institutions for the Blind and Deaf Mutes, twenty-three Rescue Homes and twenty Industrial Homes. In these more than three hundred institutions, twenty thousand people are cared for. Indeed, such is the passion among many missionaries for all forms of philanthropy and humanitarian activity, that it threatens to limit and to injure the more common and fundamental forms of Christian work. While funds for the Christian enterprise are limited, and while the time and strength of the missionary force is very inadequate, many fear (and with reason) that this broadening out of the work must weaken the enterprise at its centre and dissipate the energy of missions to the detriment of the whole work.

As a part of this multiplying of the humanitarian channels of mission activity many apprehend also the danger that the line between Christian mission effort

and ordinary philanthropy will be obliterated. Indeed, some of the more advanced among the mission force have swung entirely away from the direct Christian conception of their propaganda and claim that they "are in India not to make Christians but good men and women out of the people"; as if, forsooth, the highest aim of the missionary has not always been to make good men and women *by* making Christians of them! If these two aims are to be placed in antithesis, the whole missionary conception must be largely covered with confusion. To many the chief danger is that missionary efforts and aims may be so multiplied and broadened out that distinctly Christian purposes will disappear and be supplanted by mere desires and activities for human betterment. The latter can thrive only when following the former and inspired by them. The missionary must give himself to the supreme effort of bringing men into loving relationship with Christ and his Kingdom. He is in India, not primarily or chiefly, for the amelioration of the temporal condition of men, or to bring to them the blessings of a Western civilization, but rather to bring Christ and his Gospel unto them that, through these, all other blessings may abundantly follow.

VI. The Modern Missionary.

There are fifty-two hundred Protestant missionaries in India—men and women of all shades of Christian belief, with all kinds and degrees of equipment for the work. Never was the missionary better equipped, on the whole, to render effective missionary service, and never was there a keener demand for missionaries of the best training and noblest character. He should be possessed of certain definite characteristics and qualifications.

1. He must of course be possessed of distinguished piety. Nothing can make this unnecessary or secondary, no matter how broad the basis or manifold the depart-

ments of missionary work. Whatever else this enterprise may signify, it cannot cease to involve, above all else, the transfer of the Christian faith to a new land. In this work no other force is comparable to the exemplification of sublime faith in a deeply devout and pious life. Some are in danger of forgetting this at a time when the work is so much specialized and departmentalized. The missionary, whether he be an industrial, a medical, an educational, or an evangelistic worker, must be qualified and adapted to reveal by life the highest spiritual type of his religion.

2. The missionary must be a man or woman of culture and of constructive thought. India, with its vast systems of thought, its profound metaphysics and subtle dialectics, must be supplied with the representatives of the highest training of the West. Vast changes are afoot there. The thought, the faith, and the institutions of the past are crumbling under the attacks of all the destructive forces of modern civilization. They tend to leave everything, even the most cherished things of life and of thought, with an interrogation point stamped upon it. These destructive agencies are legion. The missionary is almost the only constructive force in all the land for the upbuilding of faith and piety. He must know how to edify (build up) and to give full reason for the faith that is in him. These are days of growing culture. The college students of India have doubled in number during the last five years. Our cause must, therefore, have worthy leaders. He must be able to lead the pantheist through the pathway of reason to "Our Father who art in Heaven." He must make the devotee of intellectualism conversant with "the Power, not himself, which makes for righteousness."

He must also possess true sympathy with, and an appreciation of, the people and of their religion. The old era of conceit and contempt has lasted far too long. The

man of racial arrogance and of religious pride and vanity must give way to him who knows well and appreciates thoroughly the genius of our religion for fraternity and fellowship, and who realizes the religious genius of India, past and present. The Western missionary, even as the Western politician, in India, has been cursed too much with an arrogance which has colored his message and has helped to defeat his ends.

It is not enough that a missionary love the people; he must appreciate them also. The most serious difficulty in India at the present time is the racial one. India has unwillingly been brought into the British Empire. But in the Empire it has neither social nor racial position. The Hindu is classified with the Hottentot as an inferior, to be loved, it may be, but not to be esteemed. Indians resent this. They have been trained by the English to glory in their past and to esteem themselves highly for what they are now. The missionary should be the last one to deny to them the respect and the honor due to them.

He must also be a leader of men. It is of much comfort and help to him in this particular to know that the people of India have a genius for docility. They easily respond to worthy leadership. In this particular they are very unlike present-day Japanese, who insist upon being in the forefront of all movements. But the people of India look for a high type of manly character and sterling piety among their leaders, whereby they may easily be inspired and directed. This leadership, however, must be increasingly not of the official but of the personal, type. The missionary must be willing to stand in the shadow of the Indian and become to him, inoffensively, "the power that is behind the throne." His leadership must not be of the obtrusive, demonstrative kind, but one that loves obscurity, whereby its purposes

can best be realized and its cherished principles be exemplified and glorified.

VII. The Harmony of Missionary Agencies.

Until a few years ago there was as little mutuality and fraternity among Protestant missions as there is now between Catholics and Protestants. It was every society and every mission for itself. Whatever connection there may have been was usually a source of constant friction and unpleasantness. They kept as far apart as possible, that jealousy and opposition might be prevented or minimized. At the present time a marked change is everywhere apparent. Missionaries are becoming increasingly sensitive to the evil of sectarian narrowness and denominational shibboleths which have kept them apart and their work divided. The spectacle of this enterprise thus conducted by numberless mutually jealous and rival sections of our Protestant faith has disgusted the missionary body in all parts of India. They have been led to see the absolute necessity of comity, union, and fellowship among all representatives of our cause, if it is to triumph in that land. They realize, as never before, not only the futility, but also the absurdity of continuing in this the greatest conflict in the history of our faith by means of Christian forces which are disunited and disinclined to enter into close fellowship and mutual love and esteem.

The recent movement toward fraternal regard, union, and the spirit of federation in work has become the most hopeful and vital feature of the Protestant missionary enterprise in India. It has developed markedly on three lines during the last few years.

It has appeared in the form of mutual sympathy and fellowship in work. The separate activities of adjacent missionary bodies are, in many places, being united and a vigorous attempt is being made to reduce both expense and friction by the united prosecution of their

work. Different territorial boundaries are readjusted, with a view not only to reduction of expenses but also for the economy of the force of workers which is so lamentably inadequate.

The Church Federation scheme was launched at Jubbulpore in 1909. This movement has progressed and has already brought into its ranks many of the leading societies now at work in India. It is called "the Federation of Christian Churches in India," and, without interfering with the existing creed of any church or society which enters it, it aims "to attain a more perfect manifestation of the unity of his disciples for which the Redeemer prayed, by fostering and encouraging the sentiment and practice of union, by organizing union effort wherever and whenever possible, by making the welfare of all the churches in the Federation an object of vital interest and concern to all, by strengthening throughout the entire brotherhood the sense of a common life and heritage; and in general, to seek through all such effort to hasten the consummation of the kingdom of God in India." There is doubtless a large future for this movement on the wider lines of Christian Federal Union.

Organic Church Union also is definitely sought and indeed has been partially achieved. The ecclesiastical union of all the churches established in South India by the United Free Church of Scotland, the Church of Scotland, the Dutch Reformed Church of America, the Congregationalists of England and of America, including altogether a Christian community of one hundred and fifty thousand souls, into one ecclesiastical body called "the South Indian United Church," is perhaps the most remarkable result thus far achieved on this line. It is a noble testimony to these separate denominational societies in the home lands that they gladly acceded to the request of their missionaries by allowing those

Indian Christians, formerly connected with them, to become thus a separate body and organized into an Indian Church. At the present time the Wesleyan body of South India and the Basel Mission also are seeking union with the United Church of South India.

In addition to this there is a remarkable movement of the various types of Presbyterian communions to unite together; also a Pan-Lutheran movement has been organized with a view to bringing together the very different and conflicting sections which bear the name of Luther. In brief, the cause of union is marvellously popular in all parts of the land. The Indian Church itself is eager for this fellowship and the missionaries are heartily pursuing the same end, so that the prayer of our Lord—"that they all may be one"—may be rapidly answered.

And in order to add to the success and utilization of all these new forces for Christian union, God has directed the Continuation Committee of the Edinburgh Conference to come to the aid of India. Dr. Mott, as Chairman of the Continuation Committee, has certainly achieved a great and memorable work in these days of wonders, by organizing all Protestant mission forces of India into a more or less solid phalanx. By the National Council and the eight Provincial Councils with a host of subsidiary and affiliated committees, the work of union has reached a position of prestige and an organized expression of power such as no one even hoped for a few years ago. No encouragement has overtaken the missionary body in India, during the last century, which is comparable to that of the last decade, whereby the scattered forces of Christ have come together and are rapidly being welded, by love and fellowship, into one great dynamic for the redemption of that land. India needs nothing more than the vision and the impact of a united Christianity; and the eagerness of all the mis-

sionary bodies to realize this oneness of life and fellowship in Christian service is the most inspiring and hopeful spectacle presented by missions in India today. It is thus also that the church of the mission field is being prepared by God to wield the mightiest power by its reflex influence for the unification of the scattered and divided forces of the home lands.

VIII. The Relation between the Home Society, the Mission Organization, and the Indian Church.

These are the three bodies chiefly involved in this enterprise.

The Missionary Society is mainly concerned with the Home Base, in the cultivation of the mission spirit in the Home Church, and in securing and administering the funds necessary to conduct the work. Its influence is also much felt on the foreign field.

The degree with which Home Societies wield power in the administration of affairs on the mission field varies greatly in different lands. This influence, generally speaking, corresponds to the longitude of the country of the Society at work. For example, the Societies of the continent of Europe largely reserve the power in their own hands and give little liberty of action to their representatives on the mission field. Moving westward we come to Great Britain, which keeps a wholesome check upon its missions while at the same time giving them many rights of initiative. Coming still farther west we behold the Societies of the United States of America, which grant to their foreign missions almost complete autonomy of action and self-direction. This is perhaps more than ought to be given to them; provided of course that every Society keep in closest touch with and is thoroughly well informed about its missions. A Society which does not thus thoroughly know all the affairs of its missions should not assume that it has wisdom enough to warrant its interference with their deliberate and unanimous action.

On the mission field there are two bodies—the Mission Organization and the Indian Church—whose relationship is ever changing and is becoming increasingly tense. In the first stages of the life and activities of a mission there is no Native Church to consider; or it is in such infantile helplessness as to possess little thought or will of its own. Its life and interests are in the care and keeping of the Mission. But when the church comes to a stage of self-consciousness, with ever-increasing ability to support and to direct itself, it naturally and increasingly demands from the Mission the ecclesiastical and administrative power which the Mission has hitherto held in its own hands. It is not every Mission that possesses the wisdom rightly to decide how far to withhold this power or to transfer it to the church; nor does it always possess adequately the grace of self-effacement to push itself into the growing shadow of the church. Or perhaps it may be so eager to relinquish this power as to surrender it with too much precipitation, before the church is prepared to exercise wisely the power of self-direction. In South India there are Missions which delay too long the gift of even a moiety of self-direction to the church, while others have seriously retarded their own prosperity and the healthy development of the church by surrendering to it at too early a stage both ecclesiastical and administrative power. Perhaps the latter tendency is more manifest and common than the first mentioned in the older and well-developed Missions of South India.

Another question has reference to the ability of the Mission Church to change its ecclesiastical affiliation and especially to unite with other Indian Christian Churches in forming a United Native Church for India. This has already been freely granted, as we have seen, by some societies and denominations in the home lands to the Mission Churches founded and nourished by

them. It is a worthy form of self-abnegation which, however, must be guarded, lest it prove to be another way of contributing to the strength of other denominational missions. A few years ago an Anglican Bishop in India sought to establish with another Indian Church such a union of its churches. The consummation could have led to nothing else but the absorption of that Indian Church into the Church of England.

The crux of the present situation is found in connection with the administration of foreign funds. All agree that the Indian Church must have the right to administer all the money which it collects from its members. But shall it have the use and control of moneys sent to the mission from Europe and America? The Mission has hitherto been, in the main, regarded as the almoner of the Home Churches on the foreign field. When the missionaries have completed their work in a certain field and then have handed over their power to the Indian Church, shall the American or the British Church still continue to aid the foreign Church founded and hitherto nourished by it? Or shall it persist in sending its money only to support or aid work conducted by its missionaries? There is danger involved in any answer given to this question.

One would naturally say that a Mission Church, which is able to undertake entire self-direction, ought, as a corollary, to support itself and all its institutions. The continued use of foreign funds under those circumstances would pauperize the church and rob it of that virility and manly self-dependence and outgoing benevolence upon which its prosperity, not to say its very existence, must depend.

On the other hand, it should not be forgotten that in all the important missions of India institutions of learning and other forms of progressive Christian activity have been established, for the maintenance of which

Home Societies have been responsible. The Indian Church cannot possibly undertake at once, even if it ever can, the support of such agencies. How could they finance a great, unendowed college or an expensive hospital? These and other departments of work represent too great a financial responsibility. If all these are abandoned by the Home Church and Society and are left to the tender mercies of the poverty-stricken mission community, they must gradually fail and cease to exist.

One other problem may be mentioned here, which is greatly exercising missionaries and Christians in Japan and which will soon become of importance and urgency in India. In the relationship of the Mission and the Native Church, shall the Mission be under the Native Church or the Native Church be within the control of the Mission? As we have seen, the Mission Organization in India has wielded the power as its own specific right. There is little doubt but that the majority of missionaries would maintain that when the Mission has to become subject to the Native Church, it is clear evidence that the time for the disbanding of the Mission has arrived. If the Church has attained unto its majority and insists upon exercising all the rights of majority plus the control over its own parent, the Mission, it is evident that that Mission can no longer be of any aid to the Church and will render its highest service by its departure for other fields where it can undertake a new work for the Kingdom of Christ.

In conclusion, it is only necessary to add that the missionary enterprise, like all other great, far-reaching undertakings, is in a constant state of flux. It is forever passing on to new conquests by novel methods under the inspiration of fresh visions and with unfamiliar emphasis upon Gospel truths. Its world-wide object remains the same, though expressed by ever-changing forms. Loyalty to Christ has always been felt, but it

leads to actions and visions that are today widely removed from those of half a century ago. The widening horizon, the advance of civilization, the progressive Christian consciousness and its new vision of man's need and destiny and of God's nature and purposes—all these give to the missionary enterprise and outlook a novel aspect and bring to it a vigor, a hopefulness, an inspiration, and an assurance of success such as it never before enjoyed.

IMMORTALITY

HOWARD N. BROWN

I wish to begin what I have to say on this theme by frank acknowledgment that the idea of a future life often seems to me, as I suspect it has seemed to many reflective minds, all but unbelievable. It may be true, for all that, as many unbelievable things have turned out to be true. Indeed my present purpose is to argue as best I can that it is true. But I have to start with the recognition of a certain natural repugnance toward it, on the part of minds accustomed to look at things in the cold light of reason and common sense.

The case against it, as we are rather apt to look upon the life of the world, is almost conclusive; so strong that many now do not take the trouble to look much on the other side. So far as we can see, death is the total extinction of a human being. No hint comes to us at the moment of dissolution that anything survives the wreck of the physical frame. If there be a soul which escapes from that catastrophe unhurt, it is by some invisible way that wholly eludes our notice. To all appearance the life of a man is snuffed out, like a candle by the wind, and the lifeless body is left the sole remainder of what has been. When we try to think of the soul as a surviving entity, we almost inevitably ask where and how it continues to exist; and if we put these questions to our imagination, that faculty is apt to suffer total collapse. We are not accustomed to think of the air about us, or the ether above us as being peopled with invisible spirits; or, if we do endeavor to think that the souls of men "after they are delivered from the burden of the flesh" have the

freedom of these wide spaces, we do not easily conjecture what they should find to do there to make existence supportable.

Furthermore, though one may say with the Psalmist, "If God be for us who can be against us," we are quite apt now to make instinctive reference to Nature for an indication of the attitude of the universe toward us; and Nature appears to be absolutely indifferent whether we live or die. We are interlopers rather than otherwise, so far as her scheme of things is concerned. She does not take kindly to our improvements on what she has established. One is tempted to think, at times, that Nature would be willing to see the earth rid of our presence altogether, and there is not much suggestion that she would in any wise strain her resources to provide us more of existence than is here afforded us. On the whole, any healthful and honest mind is naturally disposed a good part of the time to be very much a skeptic with regard to a future life.

But there are several considerations that may properly induce us to distrust this unfavorable verdict. Some of our useful and matter-of-fact contrivances for utilizing the forces of Nature were absolutely incredible not so very long ago; and we are obliged to posit the existence in Nature of realities so strange to our experience that we have no language by which to describe them. When it is said of the ether of space, for example, that it is more solid than the most solid metal known to us, and yet so tenuous that planetary bodies move through it entirely without friction, there is an apparent contradiction of terms which it is very hard for reason to accept. Things may appear quite impossible to us, and yet we may be forced to acknowledge their validity.

It may occur to us also that whatever difficulty we have in making the idea of immortality seem probable and real, that difficulty has always existed for those who

were inclined to think seriously about the subject. It is perhaps somewhat harder for us than for men in other times to arrive at a positive conviction about the future life. But it never could have been easy for the more intelligent part of the world to reach hopeful assurance by a process of reasoning. And yet somehow men have believed; not the ignorant multitude only, but the philosophers. There must have been evidence not immediately apparent to the superficial sight, capable of making some weight against negative probabilities. I protest that when I consider what the fact of death appears to be in the common sight, and how people have always behaved in presence of that fact, the persistence of the belief in immortality seems to me to involve, in itself, a problem which current explanations are quite inadequate to solve. How did man, looking upon his dead, ever dare to form an expectation of a life to come? Why was not the thought of the soul's continued existence outfaced from the very first by sight of that which staggers our belief?

When we attempt to find the origin of religion in the mere crude theory of the savage or childish mind we ought to remember that, within the limits of our observation, a religion of pure theory never could be made to "go." I listen to explanations of the way in which primitive humanity was innocently led to ascribe the movement and growth of natural bodies to "spirits of the air," and I say to myself that after all this does not explain. There must have been some experience which supported this huge outgrowth and manifestation called religion in the early life of mankind. The men of those days must have found something better than mere conjecture with which to confront the great and ever-present fact of death. There is more to say of a probable basis in experience for the hope of immortality; though here I limit myself to affirming that it affords just pre-

text for deeper examination of the question than that on which our natural repugnance to it stands.

Above all, when we consider what the idea of an immortal life has stood for in the development of the higher moral qualities of our race, and what is likely to be the fortune and hazard of spiritual faculties when deprived of this alliance, we have motive enough for looking very carefully, and very far, before we yield altogether to that voice within us which says that the hope is most likely illusive.

We will not pause to elaborate this point; but I hold that nothing could well be more shallow than the sneer sometimes directed against those who will be good only for the lure and hire of heavenly bliss; and of all vain dreams, that of a wide-spread ethical culture which has given up religious hope seems to me, as the world now stands, one of the most baseless. That there are many people capable of making every sacrifice demanded by morality, though they believe that death ends all, one freely grants. But that the thought of a reckoning to come in another state of being has held a strong restraining influence over the vast majority of mankind, is scarcely to be called in question; and, knowing what men now are, I fancy no sensible person would like to see that influence withdrawn. Even when the moral life has reached a point where it can sustain itself temporarily without the help of such beliefs, it is still a question how long it will maintain its high enthusiasms and its peculiar valuations of conduct apart from religious idealism; and it is safe to say that very little worthy to bear the name of religion would long survive after the idea of immortality had perished.

Two great fundamental interests have always fed the religious aspirations and endeavors of men. One of these interests is that of securing help from unseen sources for the work and striving of our daily life here;

the other is the interest of seeing this life open into another and larger life to come. Of these two interests, I hold the latter to be by no means least. As human development is being shaped, I should say it might have to play quite the larger part in the religion of coming time. Certainly many of the ways in which religion formerly proposed to put man in alliance with spiritual powers for his worldly advantage are being gradually closed up. No longer in any civilized land do people much resort to their priests to ward off disease, or to secure a plenteous harvest. It is probable that in the more enlightened part of the Church of our day the thought of the hereafter is far more efficacious than the thought of immediate safety or prosperity by way of holding people to the religious customs of their fathers; though of course both interests may still be recognized. When we look the way the world is going and to the men and women who stand where the rest of mankind must slowly follow, it seems quite certain that religious discipline will be less valued as a means of securing advantage in the present race and warfare of life, and that the Church will have to live more and more on whatever assurance it can give of the reality of the idea of immortality.

Among the varied and conflicting opinions given as to the cause of weakness in religious institutions, and the prescriptions offered for building up their strength, it seems to me probable that their inability to convince the present world of the soul's immortality is at least a partial explanation of their failure to hold the attention of men; and that no device will enable them to recover their lost prestige till they can better answer the need of human nature at just this point.

We have much incentive, then, to look into this question to the uttermost, to treat it as a matter of supreme practical importance, and to let no small thing stand in

the way of such study of it as may bring to light every source of assured hope and reasonable probability. He who is aware of a certain skepticism in his mind with regard to the hereafter may well determine that this feeling shall not prevent most careful examination of every argument that can be presented in favor of the belief in a future life, or shut out any evidence that may possibly be found for its support. It is a question of such enormous moment and consequence that one can but lament the too common disposition of the educated mind at the present time to ignore it.

The main support of a reasonable belief in immortality is, I suppose, the apparent impossibility of constructing any rational scheme of existence without it. We are, to be sure, unable to prove that this is a rational universe; and some people appear to think that all things must be held in suspense until we can show the rationality of existence as a whole. But plainly all talk, of every kind, is vain and foolish unless we assume that we live in a rational world. We do assume that as a matter of course. If the assumption be nothing else, it is at least one of the necessary rules of the game, and we cannot play at all unless we hold to it. Thought itself is stricken with entire paralysis when it seriously entertains the supposition that the universe may not be built upon or proceed by any reasonable plan. If we are to continue to think about the world, we have to accept the hypothesis of its rationality.

But we cannot really see the world in a rational light without putting the thought of immortality into the general scheme of things. We can perhaps stop with saying that in some fashion unknown to us and entirely beyond our ken, the universe is able to justify itself as a reasonable creation. But since the whole effort of our minds is to find out what its reasonable order is, that unknown and undiscovered rationality of things is only

by some minute shade better than total irrationality. Objective existence is practically worthless, for our purposes, save as it presents itself to us in some reasonable aspect; and the world as a whole does not look reasonable, unless the human life that it contains is thought of as being prolonged into another state of being.

A world which goes through all the changes that this planet has experienced and expends all the energy that has here been put forth, with no resultant gain, is, in our sight, but a foolish kind of world; and nothing in its vast size as compared with our bulk, or its measureless antiquity as compared with our span of years, can shield it from that reproach. The stoutest faith imaginable in a supposed rationality of the whole of being can hardly support the plain folly and uselessness of such a long process of upbuilding, when the final end has nothing to show for the vast sum of effort expended. Our planet appears to be on its way toward the final extinction of its vital forces. If nowhere is any product of the huge machine being gathered and stored up, if in the end nothing is added to the sum of being by what has been here transacted, then life is not reasonable, as judged by any standard that we can apply to it.

Some attempt has been made to give it a reasonable appearance by supposing that as inferior orders of life have been forced to give way in part and yield to our control, so some superior kind of being will at last arise to put man under subjection to his rule. But this speculation does not amend the difficulty. In the first place, this superman would have to appear at once in overwhelming numbers, or we should probably kill him off in order to keep our headship of living things. In the next place, the speculation is of no use by way of helping us to the conception of a reasonable universe, unless we make the planet itself indestructible, and endow the superman, at least as a race, with earthly immortality.

The only possible way by which we can supply existence as we know it with a reasonable end is to carry our own life forward into another state of being. That gives to the life of the world a purpose, where otherwise no purpose can be discovered or imagined.

This, I should say, is the great argument in favor of immortality; and I am disposed to think that it has weighed more, all along, with the common mind than has the desire for continuance of life. It has been a good deal taken for granted that the wish was father to the belief; that men have wanted more life than this earth could afford them and therefore have formed the idea of another world to succeed this. No doubt such longing has played its part in building up the world's faith. But it appears to me rather easy to overestimate this factor of a composite result, and to ignore still stronger roots out of which the faith has grown. The desire for a future life is probably not so universal and not so strong as many seem to think. For one thing, the race has not imagination enough to dress the belief in any very attractive garb. The underworld of classic days must have presented rather a sad and dreary prospect to those who thought of it as a place of future abode; and the imagery which the Church has borrowed from the Book of Revelation has never made heaven seem so desirable that Christians were in any great hurry to get to it. To vast numbers of human beings life here has not been an exceedingly precious boon, and life hereafter has not extended to them a very welcome beckoning hand. On the whole, I doubt if the mere desire to have life prolonged has been as efficacious in producing faith as has been this other motive, to provide a reasonable view of existence and bring it within the compass of our understanding.

To be sure, man is, thus far, rather an emotional than a rational being. But he has rational instincts none the

less; and it is not required of the untrained mind that it should consciously think things out very far in order to sense a situation. It is so evidently the readiest way to provide the world with an intelligible meaning—to suppose that what we see here is the opening chapter of a drama to be completed elsewhere—as to warrant us in calling this inference one of the main supports of the common belief. Here, I think, has been with all classes of men a powerful answer to the natural skepticism of the common-sense view. There has been no getting away from it. Men have not had to grope after the idea that what they could see of life required some further unfolding for its explanation, but the idea has, so to speak, sought them and held them with a grasp they could not shake off. They could not choose but feel how inexplicable life was if the whole of it was under their eye, and their one resource was to push it forward for completion into an unseen world.

We have then, thus far, two strong impulses in human nature which tend to counteract each other. There is a certain tendency of the mind, looking upon the surface of things, to say, "This future cannot be. In sober truth, death for each one of us must be the end of all things." But there is something like an equal tendency of the rational part of our being to assert that it will not have the universe left a mere muddle upon its hands, and that the immortality of the soul is required to make sense out of existence.

One does not know how it would have fared with the idea of a future life if the matter had been left at the mercy of this opposition. But it has not been so left. We have spoken of some probable basis for this idea in the experience of our race. In our contemporary life there is a vast deal of what is assumed to be traffic with the unseen world; and one does not require to know much of history to be assured that, in all ages and from

the very first, that same traffic, or what passed for it, has been going on. Whether this experience was valid or fictitious, at all events vast numbers of human beings have believed it to be real; and that undoubtedly has had most to do with sustaining the idea of immortality. Spirits have been frequently seen, if we may credit what men in all times have said. Spirits have spoken, so that earthly ears could hear and understand; and this has been not mere vague rumor of something far off, but has been told on testimony that the uncritical mind at least knew not how to impeach.

Take, for example, the beginnings of our Christian faith. If anything was certain to the followers of Jesus during the first few years after his death it was that he had somehow risen from the dead. We can explain away what we please otherwise, but I do not see how their faith that he had been seen alive after his death on the cross is to be explained away. Not everybody, of course, credited the report of those witnesses who testified to this fact, but great numbers did; and it was out of this, in large measure, that the Christian religion got its start. Supernatural appearances, real or supposed, have been quite common in all lands. They are by no means rare at the present day; and it is this evidence of men's eyes and ears, however mistaken that evidence may have been, which has fed the world's belief.

One may doubt whether that belief, except as thus nourished, would ever have amounted to much among the possessions of the ordinary mind. Very probably it would have remained an uncertain speculation, hanging in suspense between positive and negative influences playing upon it, and never could have served as much inspiration or warning for men in their daily living. It has been some kind of experience with a life manifesting itself from the other side of the chasm of death, or what was taken so to be, that has given to faith in im-

mortality its most vital and quickening power. And this suggests the question whether we stand in any different case from the men who have gone before us; whether, in the absence of something that we can depend upon as real evidence of the life hereafter, belief in it is likely to have for people of our generation much more than a sort of academic interest. I am frank to express my own judgment that the idea is not likely to be of great consequence to the world of coming time, apart from some reinforcement of it by evidential means.

Most Christians, I suppose, if they believe at all, believe chiefly because they have not yet seriously doubted that Christ rose from the dead. But future generations are not likely to put so much dependence on that single incident. The idea must find a broader basis than that, in the experience of the race, in order to commend itself to people of scientific training and temper. This view of the case, that with us, as heretofore, something in the way of evidence is likely to be needed to put reality into the idea of a future life, lends considerable importance to a careful examination of what purports to be, in a measure, proof of the hereafter; to see whether or not it does contain anything on which the best reason can feel entitled to rely.

Yet that study, for some rather obscure reason, has found but little favor in the modern world. The Catholic Church undertakes to frown it down altogether; not on the ground that it is mere foolishness, but because the spirits with which one thus comes in contact are alleged to be wicked and depraved. One suspects that behind this objection there is an uneasy sense of insecurity about the Church's own hold on supernatural agencies, if they are brought under close critical study and review. For my part, I think I should not be so extremely particular about the moral character of spirits, if once I could be assured that they were spirits.

Orthodox science has poured much ridicule upon this undertaking, without adequate cause. It has chosen to take the position that the whole field to be investigated was nothing but a mass of preposterous illusions, and that only an untrustworthy intellect could think of finding there what was worth serious attention. But this judgment has been held without adequate information on the subject. It is an interesting field of study when one gets into it, whatever probable outcome the study may seem to have; and so many men of the highest eminence in science have now found in it the grounds of faith in a future life, that the charge of foolishness and irrelevance ought to be given up.

Having followed with some care, for quite a period of years, the literature of psychic research, I should like, in few words, to set forth my understanding of what its problem is, and to what extent it has made headway in dealing with that problem. The phenomena that it undertakes to investigate may be briefly described as follows: first of all, there is a mind in what is called a state of "trance," which appears to be more or less akin to the hypnotic sleep. This mind is having a vivid dream, and is automatically talking or writing out that dream. Most of the dream is of no more consequence, so far as we can tell, than any other deliverance of one talking in his sleep. But now and then there is injected into this trance or dream an element that assumes absorbing interest. This element takes the form of an attempt to reveal personal identity on the part of people no longer living here on earth. Names (or parts of names) are given, which these people bore while in the flesh. Features are described and incidents are recalled, apparently in the endeavor to give assurance that the person to whom these appertain is still living. The problem centres in the question where this element in the alleged communications comes from.

A great deal of the disfavor which psychic research has had to encounter results from misunderstanding of what it is that the study seeks to investigate. It is objected that the supposed spirits have but little to say that makes sense, and say this little very badly. George Washington comes and not only manifests no improvement in his spelling but positive deterioration of his grammar. But no one need pay any attention to all this. It is probably nothing but the dream of the subconscious mind. If there be any communication from the other side, one can see from the records now accessible that it is a matter of extreme difficulty, and that it comes only in fragmentary form. It seems most probable also that only to slight extent can this communication come in words. It comes mainly, if at all, in the form of mental pictures, which the dreaming mind describes.

When societies for psychic research first began to publish reports of their proceedings, these reports, so far as they contained anything suggestive, were commonly dismissed as stories of fraud. The so-called medium, it was said, got up her facts beforehand, and gave them out in an assumed trance as messages from the dead. But as time has gone on that accusation has disappeared so far as psychic research is concerned, and it has now, so far as I know, no respectable backing. To one who knows of the safeguards adopted it is simply ridiculous. Another favorite way of accounting for what was striking in these messages was to attribute them to chance coincidence. But that also has been dropped by those who have much knowledge of what it is that requires to be accounted for. A random guess might hit upon a true incident here and there; but when it comes to a connected series of incidents, substantially true to life, the theory of chance cannot be strained that far.

The matter is now reduced to a simple alternative—"spirits or telepathy." The information that sometimes comes through the dreaming mind is either drawn from the minds of living people by some sort of telepathic process, or it is impressed upon that mind from a source quite outside our earthly life. Many are saying, "Of course it is telepathy." Now while I am quite ready to grant that this latter hypothesis cannot be shut out, I am by no means willing to admit that it is "of course" true. Nobody will say that, I think, but the one who wants it to be true. The most ardent champion of the spiritistic hypothesis can hardly claim that a demonstration of the reality of a future life has been made out of anything that psychic research puts before us. That is to say, no evidence that it has gathered thus far can be surely depended upon to convince dispassionate but doubtful minds. People who were before entirely skeptical have been converted by this means, and people too of no mean order of intellect; but it will not convince everybody, as it ought to do if it were a real demonstration.

What may be reasonably claimed, as I conceive, is that the spiritistic hypothesis fits the facts to be explained rather better than does the telepathic hypothesis. To begin with, the appeal to telepathy is about as much an appeal to the unknown as is the appeal to spirits. How any subconscious mind can gain such access to another's store of memories as this theory requires; above all, how it can make so good selection from that store of what is pertinent to the occasion, is quite beyond explanation. Such powers far transcend any gift that we know of as being normally within the mind's possession. Furthermore, information is sometimes given of which it seems quite impossible to imagine that it was taken from the minds of living people anywhere adjacent. If it was procured by telepathy, it must have

been procured across some hundreds of miles of space, and from people whom the subconscious mind never heard of. Then the facts fit very well with the spiritistic explanation, because what is given would so naturally come from that source; that is to say, the main effort appears to be directed toward the establishment of personal identity, which, if the process of communication were in anywise difficult and uncertain, would naturally be the first consideration.

Objection is sometimes made that if anything comes from the other side, it should be statements about the manner of life in that other world. I do not think so. In the first place, if, as I suppose, the foundation of the process is the impression upon the subconscious mind of a set of mental images, very likely that mind would be totally unable to receive or make anything of a set of images quite unfamiliar to it. In the next place, granted a line of communication through which was known to be unstable and inadequate, would not the first impulse of an intelligence at the other end of that line be to say, "I am here, this is I; and you may know it by such and such tokens!" One may say that this talk of a set of pictures put into the dreaming mind from an extraneous source is altogether conjectural. That is of course true; but there are the facts, calling for an explanation of some kind. All I say is that in the present state of our knowledge, the spiritistic explanation seems to me on the whole most reasonable.

What, for example, are we going to do with ghost stories of which the world is full, and which demand attention, one may say, if human testimony is good for anything, anywhere? That a spirit becomes visible, clad in the habiliments of earth, is to me unbelievable. But that a telepathic hallucination may be strong enough in our minds so that we may seem to see objectively what is only a subjective image, I hold to be quite credible. The only

kind of telepathy we know anything about, however, is that in which there is a sending as well as a receiving agent; and where should that sending agent be if not in another world?

Psychic research, I should say, has established a probability, larger or smaller as it may be estimated by different minds, that some intelligible sign may come back to us, who wait our turn, from those who have entered the mysteries of the spiritual world. To many this probability, what there is of it, has already proven of immeasurable worth as a confirmation of their feeling that this ought to be somehow a reasonable world, and a reinforcement of their hope that broken links of friendship and affection may be again reunited. I know not why others also should not find this value in it, would they take the trouble to inform themselves of the grounds on which it rests. Should this probability increase with the further accumulation of evidence, as I myself have considerable expectation that it will, one can see here a possible strengthening of the whole basis of religious confidence, not to be despised. Not much, if anything, need be now looked for by way of added knowledge as to what life, in that other state of being, is like. The channel is too slender and too flickering to support with any degree of certainty such communications. At best, we are much like those who listen where miners have been imprisoned in their underground caves, and hear some signs which lead us to conclude that they are still alive.

But I wish to plead that this in itself is greatly worth while. That much good can come from indiscriminate experiments in untrained hands seems improbable. But if a body of men possessing the requisite scientific equipment were, after due investigation, to reinforce the opinions I have here expressed, it could not fail to exert vast influence. I think that the studies which psychic

research has begun ought to be taken up and carried forward by a goodly number of dispassionate minds. Many investigations are being pursued at great expense along lines that promise far less for the higher life of our race. Psychic research, in my judgment, has a case to command respect from those who will give it candid examination, and one that is not going to remain forever smothered by mere contempt.

THE RUSSIAN DOUKHOBORS AND THEIR RELIGIOUS TEACHINGS

AURELIO PALMIERI

Of all European countries Russia is the most prolific in religious sects. Distrust of the Orthodox state church, on the one hand, which is regarded as too closely allied to the political power and unmindful of its duties to the people, and, on the other, religious ignorance with its consequent superstition, have given rise to innumerable sects, which range from religious nihilism to the most rigid traditionalism.

It has been justly said that Russian Christianity is, above all else, a ritual Christianity. It rarely penetrates to the hearts of its members, the recesses of the moral life of the individual. Its task, its mission, is social rather than individual, and, above all, is external: the pomp of the rites, the splendor of the ceremonies, the richness of the sacred vestments and ornaments, constitute the essential element in the religious life of the Russian people.

Against this general tendency of Russian orthodoxy have sprung up, through a spirit of reaction and under the influence of Protestantism, the rationalistic sects, which aim to rid Russian Christianity of its ritual dross, to bring into greater activity the inner life of religious feeling, and to establish direct relations between God and man without the mediation of pastors invested with a divine mission. These sects, in short, while not rejecting Christianity, propose to simplify it, to free it from its theological *patina*, so to speak, and to make its great principles effective in the life of society.

Among the rationalistic sects which in recent times have been eager to bring about a social transformation through a simplification of Christianity, doctrinal as well as ritual, the best known is that of the Doukhobors, or "Champions of the Spirit." Their tragic vicissitudes, the ringing appeals of Tolstoi to the civilized world in their behalf, the heroism of their attempts to effect a reconstruction of the social order which would overturn the foundations of modern society and establish the kingdom of God in the depths of every soul, have given them a wide reputation. In the present article I propose to narrate briefly the origin and history of the sect, and especially to set forth at somewhat greater length its religious teachings as given in authentic documents.

The name of the Doukhobors (Russian, *Doukhobortsy*) is derived from two Russian words, *dukh*, "spirit," and *borets*, "champion, contestant." Taken in a negative sense, the name may be interpreted as a striving *against* the Spirit; and in this sense it is used by the adversaries of the Doukhobors, who consider them as heretics who reject all the elements of the supernatural life of the church and the mysterious operation of the Holy Spirit in the soul through the instrumentality of the sacraments. The Doukhobors, on the contrary, interpret the name of the sect in a positive sense: they are the men who contend *for* the Spirit, its champions; that is, enemies of the external element of religion, preaching the worship of God in spirit and in truth. Their aim is to re-establish Christianity in its purity, to devote themselves to the service of the Spirit, and in it to make their own all the energies of the spiritual life. For this reason they also call themselves "the Sons of God," because the Spirit of God manifests itself in them with greater vigor. The designation "Doukhobortsy" was first used by Ambrose Serebrennikov, Archbishop of Ekaterinoslav, who died in 1792.

The historical origin of the Doukhobors is involved in dense obscurity. The leaders of the sect assert that their teachings are derived from the three Jewish youths (Hananiah, Mishael, and Azariah) whom Nebuchadnezzar threw into the fiery furnace. It is possible, as Novicky supposes, that these youths symbolize the first preachers of the sectarian doctrine, Kuhlman and Nordman, who were burned alive at Moscow in 1689 for preaching the necessity of the second advent of Christ, or, perhaps, Demetrius Tveritinov, founder of a Russian sect at Moscow in 1713, who, with his followers, was condemned to perish at the stake.

According to a Doukhobor confession of faith presented in 1791 to Kakhovsky, governor of Ekaterinoslav, the cradle of the sect was in the village of Nikolskoe, or Nikolavevka, in the district of Pavlograd, government of Ekaterinoslav, and its first apostle was Sylvan Kolesnikov (1750-75).¹

Kolesnikov cannot, however, be regarded as the first founder of the sect. About 1740 a former sergeant in the Prussian army in the village of Okhocee (district of Zmiev, province of Kharkov) preached the doctrine of the Quakers, closely resembling that of the Doukhobors.²

In 1737 there arose at Moscow another sect, which professed that a revelation was made by God immediately to each of its members, rejected the rites of the Church, ascribed to the sacraments a symbolical value only, and in its assemblies invoked the Holy Spirit. Whatever may be the case with these hypotheses, it is a fact that there is a close kinship between the doctrines of the English Quakers and those of the Doukhobors. We have, indeed, no knowledge of the way in which the religious teachings of the English sect were propagated in Russia;

¹ This document is published in the *Ctenia* (Lectures) of the Society of Russian History and Antiquities, associated with the University of Moscow, Vol. II (1871), pp. 26-79.

² Lenz, *Commentationes de Duchoborcis* (Dorpat, 1829), p. 9.

but it appears indubitable that the Doukhobors are one of the ramifications of English Quakerism, to whose doctrines in more recent times have been added elements derived from Tolstoi.

Toward the end of the 18th century, Doukhobors were scattered all over Russia, but their chief centres were in the governments of Kharkov, Ekaterinoslav, and Tambov. They are numerous also in the Ukraine, which Novicky regards as the cradle of the sect.³ The Russian government treated them with the greatest severity, because it saw in their teachings the seeds of future social revolutions. In 1779 the Doukhobors among the Cossacks of the Don were exiled to Siberia; the same fate overtook those of Kharkov in 1793-94. Other Doukhobors were sentenced to flogging, to have their noses cut off, to confiscation of their goods; women as well as men had to endure this inhuman treatment.⁴

Under the rule of Alexander I, the condition of the Doukhobors was greatly ameliorated. Two senators, Lopukhin and Neledinski-Meletzky, appointed in 1801 to investigate the state of the Doukhobors, urged upon the Czar to mitigate the severity of the laws in regard to them. By a ukase of January 25, 1802, Alexander I decreed that the Doukhobors who had been banished to Siberia should be allowed, with a subsidy from the government, to establish themselves on the banks of the river Molotchnaia in the government of the Tauris. Another ukase (December 16, 1804) granted the same permission to the Doukhobors of the provinces of Tambov and Voroneje. This concentration of the adherents of the sect on the banks of the Molotchnaia lasted until 1821, when the Russian government forbade it.

³ Livanov, *The Molokans and the Doukhobors of Tambov in the 18th Century*, *Vsemirnyi Trud*, Vol. III (1887), pp. 245-297; *The Molokans and the Doukhobors in the Ukraine*, *Viestnik Evropy*, Vol. X (1868), pp. 673-701; XII, pp. 809-836.

⁴ Novicky, *The Doukhobors. Their History and Religious Doctrines* (Kiev, 1882), pp. 51-54.

The fertility of the soil and the mildness of the climate were so favorable to the growth of the Doukhobors that by 1808 they already possessed nine villages, Bogdanovka, Spasskoe, Troitzkoe, Terpienie, and Tambovka, on the banks of the river, Rodionovka, Efremovka, Gorieloe, and Kirillovka, near the lake of Molotchnaia. Terpienie was the religious centre of the sect, the residence of its head, Savelio Kapustin, who introduced community of goods and collective labor for his own benefit. From 1805 to 1820 the economic prosperity of the Doukhobors continually increased; the purity of their morals and their observance of the laws of the state gained them the favor of Alexander I, who abstained from persecuting them, although certain orthodox bishops, for instance, Job Potemkin, Archbishop of Ekaterinoslav (1812-13), tried to incite him to do so.

The situation changed under Nicolas I (1825-55), who, at the instigation of the orthodox clergy, renewed rigorous measures against the Doukhobors, and sent many of them to Siberia. A ukase of January 26, 1841, decreed that the colonists on the Molotchnaia should migrate to the government of Imeretia and settle in the district of Akhaltzykh in Transcaucasia. The Doukhobors stolidly accepted this decision, and between the years 1841 and 1845 five thousand of them migrated to that district. Here they built new villages, and exhibited marvellous endurance of the severity of the climate. The headship of the sect had passed into the hands of an energetic woman, Luceria Kalmykova, who called to her assistance in her mission a peasant, Peter Vasilevic Verighin. When she died, in 1886, she named Verighin as her successor.

The change of government in Russia in 1881, with the assassination of Alexander II, and the hostility of Pobiedonostzev, Chief Procurator of the Holy Synod, against all the Russian sects, provoked anew severe

measures against the Doukhobors. Peter Verighin and five prominent members of the sect were exiled to the government of Archangel; and since Verighin continued to direct the affairs of the sect from his exile, the Russian government banished him to one of the most desolate cities of Siberia, Obdorsk.⁵ As he was passing through Moscow in 1894, before setting out for Siberia, Verighin received as a gift from Tolstoi that author's famous work *The Kingdom of God is Within You*. This book had a great influence on the subsequent development of the religious teachings of the sect. At the same time, Verighin advised his brother, Basil Verighin, who had come to visit him in Moscow, to counsel his fellow religionists to abstain from taking oaths, to refuse to serve in the army, not to participate in any act of violence, and to destroy their arms.

His counsels were put in practice. Some desertions occurred at Elisabetpol, Kars, Akhalkalaki, Tiflis, and Manglis. Other Doukhobors refused to render military service, or burned their arms. The Russian government replied to these acts of insubordination by first occupying the Doukhor villages with some companies of Cossacks, and in the sequel compelling their inhabitants to migrate to Georgian villages in the districts of Duchet, Gory, Tionety, and Signakh. As they were allowed only three days to prepare for their departure, they were compelled to dispose of their cattle and their fields at prices greatly below their value.

Scattered through the Georgian villages, the Doukhobors had to suffer extreme privations from poverty and the rigor of the climate. Many of them became blind. In the space of three years, four hundred and fifty persons died. Believing themselves doomed to speedy extermination, they refrained from procreating children.

⁵ Biriukov, *The Doukhobors: collection of articles, reports, letters, and other documents, with a selection of their psalms* (Moscow, 1908), pp. 65 f.

A report of their sufferings written in 1897 contains the following lamentable details: "In the Georgian villages the proprietors of the land demanded that the Doukhobors should labor for them almost for nothing, or be satisfied with a morsel of bread; and they, in conformity with their religious principles, made no complaint. Famine began to mow down its victims in their ranks. Furthermore, the authorities did not allow the dead to be buried in Christian cemeteries. There were cases in which the Doukhobors, expelled from their villages, died of want or of disease by the roadside, and the survivors had to drag the bodies with them because they were not permitted to bury them. They were, in fact, interred in the fields with the consent of the owners."

The sufferings of the Doukhobors had an echo in Russia. Tolstoi took up his pen in their defence. In a letter addressed to them in 1897 he congratulated them on the persecutions they were subjected to for Christ's cause. In another letter, of March 19, 1898, he turned to the civilized world and called for aid for a people of twelve thousand souls condemned to the most atrocious persecutions because of their zeal to put into effect the great principles of Christianity. In the same year, Peter Verighin, from his place of exile, wrote as follows to the Empress Alexandra Theodorovna: "I beseech you, O sister in Christ, Alexandra, to persuade your husband to put an end to this persecution of the Christians. The women and children suffer in our villages; hundreds of men languish in prison. We are guilty of but one offence—that of wishing to remain Christians. We have renounced the use of flesh, of wine, and of everything that tends to the corruption of morals. And if we do not kill animals, it is not strange that we do not admit the possibility of killing one of our own kind. The government demands of us that we learn the use of arms, that is to say, the trade of

murder. To these commands we will not yield. In the Caucasus we are hardly twenty thousand; consequently, we can inflict no loss on the government, even if we refuse to render military service. The best thing, therefore, would be for us to remove elsewhere, to a place where we can live unmolested."

Convinced that the Doukhobors were resolved to die rather than to give up their principles, the Russian government gave them permission to emigrate from Russia, on condition that they should remove at their own charges, and that they should never return.

By the aid of the financial and moral support given them by the English Quakers, the Doukhobors began to emigrate to the Island of Cyprus. The first company, consisting of 1,126 persons, disembarked there on August 26, 1898, and established themselves in the villages of Atalassa, Pergamos, and Kukhlia. The lands allotted to them were fertile, and the Doukhobors set themselves with feverish activity to cultivate them. But the unhealthy climate rendered all their exertions vain; in a few months fifty-one deaths occurred among them. The rest then asked to be allowed to emigrate to Canada.

The first company, about two thousand in number, arrived there in January, 1899, and directed their journey to the province of Manitoba. These came from the villages of Bogdanovka, Troitzkoe, Orlovka, Tambovka, Spasskoe, and Efremovka. A week later they were joined by nineteen hundred from the province of Kars and from the government of Elisabetpol. In June a thousand arrived from Cyprus, and, shortly after, two thousand more from the province of Kars; so that the whole number exceeded seven thousand. The cities of Selkirk and Winnipeg in Manitoba became their principal centres. On the lands assigned them they erected eight hundred houses.⁶

⁶ Tversky, *The Epic of the Doukhobors*. St. Petersburg, 1900.

On February 27, 1900, Count Tolstoi sent them a letter, which is a formal invective against private property: "To gather together an individual fortune," he wrote, "and to keep it for one's self, is to do contrary to the will of God and to his laws." The Doukhobors made haste to put in practice Tolstoi's theories. On February 11, 1901, in a letter addressed to all nations, they protested against the laws of Canada. They declared that private property is a violation of the divine laws; that marriage and divorce do not fall under the jurisdiction of human laws; that the police and the state have no business to register births and deaths.

This letter was sent to the civil authorities of Canada also, October 14, 1900. The government replied, January 7, 1901, reminding the Doukhobors of the hospitality they had received, and declaring that it was not possible to change for them the general legislation.

In 1902, Peter Verighin arrived in Canada. The Doukhobors received him as a representative of divinity. He insisted on the necessity of the Doukhobors possessing all of their property in common, but at the same time restrained the zeal of some fanatics who wanted to turn loose their horses and cows because man has no right to compel them to labor as slaves.

Several hundreds of Doukhobors, released from their exile in Siberia, reached Canada in 1905, bringing up the whole number to about eight thousand. Under the direction of Peter Verighin they began to practise the community of goods, to cultivate their lands in common, and to distribute food in equal rations to the workers. In 1907, the government of Canada, in order to constrain the Doukhobors to submit to the general legislation, took away from them a large part of the lands which had been assigned them, and distributed it to immigrants of other nationalities. The allotments of land originally assigned to the Doukhobors at the rate

of a hundred and sixty acres to each family were cut down to fifteen acres. The Doukhobors made no protest, and declared that they had bought other lands to cultivate in common.

As Biriukov, one of their admirers, writes: "Their struggle with the world, with evils within and without, is not yet ended. Their ideal is infinite. The Doukhobors themselves recognize the relative feebleness of their powers, the remoteness of the goal they are seeking to attain. The forces of the contestants are not equal. The two parties are guided by different conceptions of life. On one side, the world, with its material enjoyments; on the other, the doctrine of Christ, which does not annul the eternal blessedness of the free spirit. On one side, death, on the other, life. To us Russians, these pure ideals of strong men, of modest workers, ought to be dear."

The investigation of the religious beliefs of the Doukhobors is rendered difficult by the scarcity of documents which give precise information about the doctrines professed by them. The principal documents relating to their teachings are the following:

1. The Confession of Faith of the Doukhobors of the province of Ekaterinoslav, sent in 1791 to the governor Kakhovsky. Novicky is inclined to think that this confession is to be attributed to the Malorussian philosopher Skovoroda.⁷ This confession is a real little theological treatise, which discloses in its author a mind accustomed to constructive thinking.⁸

2. The colloquy between the archimandrite (later, metropolitan) Eugene Bolkhovitinov (1837) and two Doukhobors of Tambov, Matthew and Ermolaus Kuzmin. The colloquy took place in the monastery of Alexander

⁷ Novicky, pp. 210 f.

⁸ It is printed in the *Ctenia* of Moscow, Vol. V (1874), pp. 137-145; in the *Vestnik Evropy*, Vol. X (1868), pp. 697-700; and in the work of Butkevitch, *Dukhobortsy* (Kharkov, 1909), pp. 29-34.

Nevsky in St. Petersburg in 1802. Rather than an official exposition of the doctrine of the Doukhobors, the document records the personal opinions of those who took part in the conference.

3. An expository résumé of the teachings of the Doukhobors, composed in 1805 by the senator Lopukhin.⁹

4. The Catechism of the Doukhobors. There are two different redactions. One of them is ascribed to Count Tolstoi or to Prince Khilkov, and intersperses political and social aphorisms among religious maxims; the other is entitled *Principles of the Doctrine of the Doukhobors*, and contains two hundred and thirty-two questions and answers, divided into two tractates.¹⁰

5. The principal source, however, is the so-called *Living Book* of the Doukhobors, published by Bontch-Bronevitch, at St. Petersburg, 1909. By the title *Living Book* the Doukhobors designate oral tradition, that tradition which lives in their minds and in their hearts, and is contrasted with the Bible, the book of the dead. The book is composed of psalms woven together of verses and phrases from the Psalter, extracts from the Old and New Testaments, prayers and fragments of the Orthodox liturgical books, ideas and doctrines peculiar to the sect. These psalms, the Doukhobors say, are so many that they cannot be numbered. No single man, though endowed with the strongest mind, can learn them all. The book is therefore preserved in its entirety in the memory of the whole community; it is the complex of all their memories and all their hearts; it is handed down from generation to generation by word of mouth; fathers reveal it to their sons. It endures eternally, as the soul which comprises it in itself is eternal. It is incorruptible, and

⁹ *Characteristic Treatises of the Society of the Doukhobors*. Cteniia, Vol. III (1861), pp. 3-16; Butkevitch, pp. 35-40.

¹⁰ It is to be found in the Livanov's book, *Raskolniki*, I, 463-470; Butkevitch, pp. 41-56.

in this differs from the Bible, which contains an alteration of the teaching of Jesus Christ.

The origins of the *Living Book* go back to the beginnings of Christianity. The Evangelists report with many inaccuracies the teachings and deeds of Jesus Christ. Others, however, preferred to preserve in their hearts the treasures of the Christian revelation, and transmitted the same to the forefathers of the Doukhobors. Furthermore, Jesus Christ granted to the heads of the Doukhobors the authority to select the best passages in the Psalms of David and incorporate them in their book. He also watches over it, in order that the contents may not be changed.

The psalms of the *Living Book* contain paragraphs laudatory of the "divine race" of the Doukhobors, and contumelious language against the Orthodox Church, the author of all the persecutions of the "elect."

The *Living Book* is consequently the principal source of revealed doctrine. The Holy Scriptures are, on the contrary, considered to be as it were a dead book, the reading of which perverts the understanding. At the beginning of their existence, the Doukhobors not only did not condemn the holy books, but drew from them all that seemed in conformity with their beliefs; above all, the texts of the gospel were used to formulate moral teachings. Later the Bible ended by losing for them its importance altogether. The Doukhobors made an exception, nevertheless, for the Gospel of John, because they discovered in it traces of their doctrine of the Logos. They lay blame upon the Evangelists as falsifiers of the words of Jesus Christ. Moreover, the Bible is a dead book, which can never rise to the height of the living word which penetrates the soul.¹¹

Further, the books of the Bible have not a literal sense. Many of the sacred narratives are simple moral allegories. Cain personifies the persecutors of the true

¹¹ Novicky, p. 246.

church; the confusion of tongues, the divisions of Christendom; the passage of the Red Sea, the final discomfiture of the devil; the miracle at Cana, the union of Jesus Christ with our souls, a union which transforms our tears into the sweetest wine. To understand the Holy Scriptures, moreover, the elect have no need of the teaching of the church. If the word of God lives in us, we necessarily feel its mysterious inflow. The individual interpretation of the Holy Scripture is nothing but the inner illumination of the spirit.

The Doukhobors reject the traditions also. The word of man does not deserve credence, whether that word be uttered by the Fathers, or whether it be enunciated by the Councils. The church has no power to judge men and condemn them to hell, because it does not know their individual sentiments and cannot know whether man's actions are prompted by self-love or love of God. God does not condemn those who through ignorance express their ideas badly or interpret badly the sacred books. Those sin who constrain their brethren to accept the teaching originating in their spirit, and believe themselves depositaries of revealed doctrines.

In regard to God, the Doukhobors admit that God exists from eternity; but before God wisdom exists. God dwells on Mount Zion, and Mount Zion is in the realm of faith. There was a time when the Word took refuge in the bosom of God, and God in the bosom of the Word. The idea of God dissolves in the theology of the Doukhobors in a mystical pantheism. Undoubtedly, in their catechism the Doukhobors acknowledge the unity and trinity of God, but in a sense different from that of Christian theology. The First Person is really God; the Second expresses the eager quest of the truth; the truth, then, is the Holy Spirit. The Father is the memory, the Son the reason, the Holy Spirit the will. The Father is the light, the Son the life, the Holy Spirit

the repose. The Father is the height, the Son the length, the Holy Spirit the depth. The first is the height, because it is impossible to conceive anything more exalted; the second is the breadth, because the reason roams in the fields of the infinite; the third is the depth, because human research cannot exhaust its mysteries.

The Trinity is real, because it is incarnated in the society of the elect; if the latter did not exist, God would be a myth. Man thus is identified with God; or rather God is the soul which is operative through three forces. Individuals are distinct elements of divinity, and for this reason the Doukhobors are called among themselves "Sons of God," and venerate one another. Each one has in his soul the spark of divinity.

The Doukhobors do not believe in the divinity of Jesus Christ. Jesus is the man in whom divine intelligence has revealed its fullest energies. Kapustin considered Jesus as a man who differed in no respect from other men, and about whose birth there was nothing supernatural. Jesus is the Son of God in the sense that he represents the divine wisdom. The accounts in the Gospel relating to the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus are to be understood in a mystical sense. The sick who were healed and the dead who were brought to life by Jesus are sinners. The death of Jesus was not voluntary, otherwise he would not have refused the cup of suffering. The resurrection of Jesus signifies that he is hidden in the souls of the elect. His body suffered the corruption of matter, but his spirit remained at first in the hearts of the Apostles, who were therefore called heavens, and then passed into the souls of the elect.

The Gospel is, as it were, a journal of our existence. Everything that is there narrated concerning Jesus is repeated in us, who are born, suffer, die, and rise again. Jesus is therefore the eternal gospel, living in men's

hearts. He is the word engraved upon our souls. His death does not involve the expiation of the sins of mankind. Jesus is a virtuous man, a son of God, one of the great heroes of the sect; and since he abides in the living recesses of our heart, the mission of the Holy Spirit is useless. In fact, the Doukhobors admit the existence of the Holy Spirit, but do not attribute to it any efficacy in the religious life of mankind. The sanctifying and vivifying power of the Spirit is reserved exclusively for Jesus Christ. The Doukhobors have also rejected the worship of the Virgin Mary, whom they revere only as a woman of eminent virtue.

According to the Doukhobors, human souls existed before the creation of the visible world. The fall of Adam and Eve is threefold: before the creation, after the creation, and in the life of the human race. The chief cause of the fall of the first man was self-love. The sin of Adam was not transmitted to his descendants. Every man is the responsible author of his own salvation or perdition. The sins of the fathers are not a hindrance to the salvation of the sons. Souls are infused into the bodies of children when the latter have attained an age which varies between six and fifteen years, and are sufficiently advanced to learn the psalms of the Doukhobors. After death, the souls of the bad pass into the bodies of brute beasts, and good souls into the bodies of righteous men. The souls of those who do not belong to the sect enter the bodies of unclean animals. When they have gone into the bodies of brutes, they no longer remember anything of their former existence.

The doctrine of the resurrection of the body is not clearly expressed in the Doukhobor confessions of faith. At the end of the world, Jesus Christ, with a human figure, accompanied by the female saints, will come to judge sinners, whom he will condemn to eternal punishment. The

righteous will remain with him on earth. The difference, accordingly, between the present and the future life of mankind will consist in the exclusion of sinners from the dominion of the earth. The righteous will continue to live on earth as they formerly did. But the world will not come to an end, because when the sinners have been cast out, the earth will be heaven. Heaven for the Doukhobors is synonymous with virtue.

Starting with the principle that before God every man must answer for his own deeds, the Doukhobors do not admit the salutary influence of prayers for the dead. They consider death as a change of state, and therefore do not bewail the loss of their dear ones. In the theology of the Doukhobors, the church is not a divine and visible institution, but the assemblage of those whom God chose from among men to guide them in the paths of his grace or of his life. These faithful ones are not bound together by an identical symbol of faith or by the same liturgical practices. They are scattered through the whole world, and assume diverse names, and have in their ranks even persons who do not profess the Christian religion. The very Jews who follow the inner inspiration of the Spirit and who do good are members of this invisible church. Hatred of the hierarchy is a characteristic mark of the sect. The priesthood is not necessary. Jesus is the only priest from whom we ought to expect our salvation. The priestly ministry may be fulfilled by any one who hears the call of the Lord. Successors of Jesus in his priesthood are the men who are pure in mind and body. For the exercise of the priestly ministry it is not necessary to have the permission of any authority whatever. An inward preparation suffices, namely, the illumination of the soul. The office of the priesthood does not consist in performing liturgical functions; the sacerdotal mission consists in the preaching of the word of God and in the conversion of the erring. The priest-

hood of the Orthodox Russian church mechanically celebrates its liturgical rites and repeats sacred discourses; but because it is not inwardly enlightened by God, its words fall on a barren soil. The people remains sunken in ignorance, and concerns itself solely about the external rites. The Orthodox priests, consequently, do not lead souls to salvation, and without warrant usurp to themselves the titles of fathers and teachers.¹²

If the priesthood is inward and the church invisible, the sacraments have no longer any reason for existing. They have a mystical significance. Baptism is useless, especially when it is conferred on children not yet come to the use of reason. The water of baptism bathes the body outwardly but does not purify the soul. By means of an inward baptism the soul is purified in the blood of Jesus Christ, renounces all evil ways, and repents of its misdeeds. The efficacious baptism is the putting away of one's own sins, a spiritual second birth.

There are seven baptisms, or seven spiritual rebirths: (1) The soul abandons its sins; (2) the soul recognizes the ways of the Lord; (3) the soul repeats the words of God; (4) the soul feels the spiritual anointing of prayers; (5) the soul inwardly confesses its faults; (6) the soul communes spiritually; (7) the soul mounts up to heaven by the martyrdom of sufferings or of mortification. He who receives this second baptism becomes superior to the angels, he lives with God, and besides his temporal name receives an eternal name which God will reveal to him in the other life. Those who have not been thus baptized are no different from dogs and cats, and will have no place either in heaven or in hell. The salvation of the soul is very rare: one man out of a thousand is saved, and one woman out of a million, for women are naturally stupid.¹³

¹² Livanov, pp. 84 f.

¹³ Novicky, p. 249.

Confirmation is a useless rite. Confession has no efficacy, for the church has no power to remit or to retain sins. True confession is spiritual, and consists in the penitence of the soul. The Doukhobors exact of their adherents public confession of their faults.

The communion also is rejected, on the ground that Jesus did not demand outward signs but the inward development of the powers of the soul. The bread and the wine enter through the mouth, but do not reach the heart. Jesus purifies us inwardly.

Marriage is contracted without special ceremonies. Parents ought not to hinder free love. The contracting parties must have attained the age of puberty, and they swear mutual fidelity in the presence of God. In many cases the wife is a mother before she comes to live with her husband. If a man abandons his wife after she has become a mother, he is expelled from the community. Divorce is allowed in case of adultery, and in such cases the children remain with the mother. After the death of one of the married pair, the survivor is at liberty to contract a second marriage and a third.

The religious worship of the Doukhobors is extremely simple, and corresponds to their dogmatic teachings. Churches are useless, because subject to decay. The true church is found in the soul, and of it the Doukhobors give a fantastic description. It has four walls: the first is formed by the Apostles; the second of the virgins; the third of the aged men; the fourth of the women and of the *myrrhophori* who went to search for Jesus in his tomb. The church has three doors: one for entrance, one for exit, and the third facing the west. It is filled with faithful servants of God, adorned with curtains, that is, sacred songs. There is in it oil in a goat's horn, and the goat's horn symbolizes the race of the elect. There is also a censor, namely, good deeds. The lighted coals signify the flames of desire, the word of God.

The altar in it is the asylum of true Christians. Upon it rest the sacred vessels, namely, the law of God; the gospel, that is Christ; the cross, whose four points symbolize the prophets, the apostles, the angels, and the archangels, respectively.

Though inimical to external forms of worship, the Doukhobors do not entirely suppress prayer. They have halls in which they gather to praise the Lord, empty and bare halls, with a plain wooden table in the middle. The members of the sect assemble there on festival days. The men take their places on the right, and the women on the left. After saluting one another in the name of the Lord, the first in the row of men on the right recites a psalm, to which the rest listen in silence. When the first psalm is finished, another psalm is recited by the second man, and so on in succession, first down the row of men and then down that of the women. The choice of the psalms is free, and each must recite his psalm from memory. Afterwards they sing, and during the song those present give one another the kiss of peace and bow thrice to each other in reverence of the divinity that is in them. The children prostrate themselves thrice before the aged. When this ceremony is over, the assembly dissolves, with a salutation to the Lord. There is no preacher to explain the psalms; every one is inwardly enlightened. After the service the children say the catechism together, while the adults converse on religious subjects and give vent to their antipathies toward the Orthodox Russian Church, which they call "*griekha*," or Church of the Sinners.

The Doukhobors have no special religious festivals. Outwardly, however, they observe the feast days of the Orthodox calendar, which they devote to collecting honey. They preserve the memory of many observances in honor of the Madonna, and celebrate Saint Flora and Saint Laura in the capacity of protectors of cattle.

The worship of images is, in the eyes of the Doukhobors, a very grave sin. They acknowledge the existence of angels and saints, but regard prayers addressed to them as useless, because every one must be saved by his own efforts. Among the saints who are revered by the Doukhobors as "Sons of God," the most important are Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, David, the three youths who were cast into the fiery furnace, the ancient prophets, the Apostles, and the martyrs of the sect.

The Doukhobors do not use the sign of the cross or any other outward manifestations of religion. Fasting is understood by them in a spiritual sense of abstaining from vice and from drunkenness. They have no special rites even for the burial of the dead. Those in the province of Melitopol confined themselves to singing over the fresh graves of their dear ones the following responsive hymn:

O Doves, with the deep blue wings!

We are not doves, we are not blue.

O Swans, white swans!

We are not swans, we are not white. We are angels, we are archangels; we soar through the world, the snowy world.

What do ye see? What do ye hear?

We see, we hear, how the soul separates from the body, how the soul takes its departure.

Forgive me, my body, my white body. I have lived in thee, have caressed thee, have flattered thy passions, have brought thee to punishment.

Go, O souls, go to Christ the Redeemer, and leave the poor body, leave it in its earthly resting-place.

As will be readily seen, this hymn is a dialogue between the soul, the body, and the angels.¹⁴

¹⁴ Titov, *The Sect of the Doukhobors, Missionerskoe Obozrenie*, 1897, Vol. I, pp. 245-255, 377-388, 497-514; Kamenev, *The Sect of the Doukhobors*, St. Petersburg, 1905; Stavrov, *The Sect of the Doukhobors: its Past and its Present, Khristianskoe Tchtenie*, 1905, Vol. I, pp. 237-253, 386-396; Biriukov, *The Doukhobors*, Moscow, 1908; Butkevitch, *The Doukhobors*, Kharkov, 1909.

EXCAVATIONS IN PERSIA¹

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From the head of the Persian Gulf extend two great plains, the one stretching northwestward along the Tigris and Euphrates, the other northeastward along the Karoun. These two plains constitute Turkish and Persian Arabistan respectively. They were the seat of one of the earliest and most highly developed civilizations of the world, or perhaps rather of two competing and rival civilizations. Once the region teemed with a vast population. Now it is largely desert. Both plains depend for their fertility not upon the rain, but upon the rivers which flow down from the mountains. When these were diked and dammed and carried every-whither by irrigating canals, the Babylonian plain and the steppe of Persian Arabistan were immensely fertile, capable of sustaining by their own products an enormous population. Now dikes and dams are broken and canals choked and the life-creating water runs to waste, part of the year causing inundations and turning vast regions into lakes and swamps, and the remainder of the time moving seaward through a single channel, shrunk far below its banks.

In ancient Babylonia there were at each succeeding epoch many famous cities, centres of political power or religious influence, such as Nippur, Erech, Eridu, Ur, Sippara, Babylon, Seleucia, Ctesiphon; and, in the Caliphate, Kufa and Baghdad and Bassorah. In the steppe of Persian Arabistan, on the other hand, there was but

¹Le Palais de Darius I^{er}. A Suse Ve. Siècle Av. J. C. Simple Notice par M. L. Pillet, architecte diplômé par le Gouvernement. Paris (Geuthner), Mai, 1914.

one great dominating city, so far as we now know, from the earliest period to the time of its final destruction, namely, Susa. The site of this ancient capital was discovered by Loftus in 1851, when attached to the commission for the delimitation of the Persian-Turkish boundary. His excavations there, as at various Babylonian sites, while hasty and superficial, were remarkably successful, both in determining the names and locations of the ancient cities and also in furnishing valuable architectural and inscriptional material for more scientific study. After Loftus Susa lay fallow until 1884, when M. and Mme. Dieulafoy commenced the excavations which enriched the Louvre with those beautiful enamelled bricks, the frieze of the lions and the frieze of the archers.

It was the German excavations in Babylonia in the following decade which revealed the source of this branch of the ceramic art, carried to such a degree of excellence by the Persians, the manufacture of ornamental enamelled bricks, constituting friezes, representing animal and human figures, for the ornamentation of palaces, temples, and streets. The German explorers found such friezes in use in the Babylon of Nebuchadrezzar for the decoration of gateways and in the processional street of Ishtar. These friezes were composed of bricks of two sorts, representing an earlier and a later period of the art, separated only by a few years, evidence of the creation and development of the industry at that great period of Babylonian development. From Babylon the industry was transferred to Persia after the conquest, and it is the Persian Empire and its capital, Susa, which have furnished us with the most remarkable and the best developed specimens of this ceramic art. From the ancient Persians in turn the art was passed on to their successors, and until the seventeenth century certainly Persia and the Persians were famous for their tiles and glazed pottery.

The Dieulafoy excavations were remarkably successful in procuring for the Louvre picturesque museum articles, and in revealing the peculiar and barbaric magnificence of Persian art and architecture; but they yielded little of historical importance in the way of inscriptions of the Persian period and absolutely nothing from an earlier date. Even their architectural and artistic results, striking as they were, were imperfect. The excavation of the Persian palace was not completed, and from the Dieulafoy excavations it was impossible to restore it with any sort of detail.

On a voyage of observation in 1891 De Morgan, known at that time as an Egyptian explorer, became impressed with the importance of the site of Susa, and marked it as a place to be explored scientifically and completely. For this purpose and for other work to be achieved later in Persia, he developed a plan which won the support of the French government, and in 1897 the *Délégation Scientifique en Perse* was organized to undertake the investigation of the mounds of Susa, under a monopoly granted to the French government, by which France and France alone was empowered to conduct archaeological investigations in Persia. De Morgan found at Susa three principal mounds: the Mound of the Palace, on which Loftus and Dieulafoy had conducted their excavations; the Acropolis, on part of which stood an ancient Mohammedan shrine and place of pilgrimage, the Mosque of the Prophet Daniel; and a third hill, which he designates as the Mound of the Royal City, larger in extent than either of the other two. These three mounds almost surround a great open place which he designates as the *Place d'Armes*, or the Bazaar. The French commenced their excavations with the intention of permanence, and at the present time there stands on the Acropolis not only the Mosque of the Prophet Daniel, above referred to, but also a structure which might be mistaken for a mediaeval

Arabic castle, and which is really a stronghold—the combined fort, storehouse, and residence of the French explorers.

De Morgan's excavations have been remarkably successful in results and thoroughly scientific in method. The collections which the *Mission* has sent to France embrace not only monuments, inscriptions, objects of art, utensils and jewelry of every sort and every material, but palaeontological collections, geological collections, and collections in the field of natural history. Several halls in the Museum of the Louvre are full of historical and artistic objects found at Susa. A number of the prehistoric objects collected by the same *Mission* may be found in the Museum of St. Germain, while geological and natural history collections from the same source are exhibited in the Museum of Natural History and School of Mines in Paris.

No excavations have been more scientifically and elaborately conducted than those of De Morgan; and the French *Mission* has excelled all others in this, that the publication of results has followed discovery with remarkable rapidity. Inscriptions found have been transliterated and where possible deciphered, and text, transliteration, and translation published almost at once in noble quarto volumes, at a price and in a manner to make them accessible to scholars. Objects of art have been treated in a similar manner and put at the disposal of the artistic and archaeological world in facsimile and description at the earliest possible moment. Consequently it has been possible for the world of scholars to follow the French excavations and assist in their interpretation, as they have not been able to do elsewhere. The earlier English explorations in Assyria and Babylonia were conducted primarily with a view to securing objects for museums, and especially inscriptions, in which they were remarkably successful. The French from the

outset showed a greater inclination to conduct really scientific work, as witness the excavations of Thomas, Place, and Botta at Khorsabad, and Oppert's ill-fated scientific *mission* to Babylonia. Earlier excavations also even the singularly successful American expedition to Nippur, were spasmodic and hence able to explore but a small part of any one site; only the French explorations in Tello constituted a partial exception to this lack of continuity. The German excavations in Babylonia and Assyria, at Ashur, Babylon, and now at Erech, under the *Deutsche Orient-Gesellschaft*, begun about twenty years ago, and the French excavations at Susa, under the *Délégation Scientifique en Perse*, mark a new era in the exploration of those regions, by their permanence and thoroughness, combined with their scientific methods.²

De Morgan's excavations have revealed to us the existence at Susa of a civilization as early as that of Babylonia. Before he began his work we knew indeed from Babylonian inscriptions of contests at an early period between Elam and Babylonia, confirming Bible references. Our idea of the Elamites had been, however, of a semi-barbarous, outside, hostile force, invading and overrunning Babylonia from time to time, as the Huns overran middle Europe or the Danes England, rather than of a people substantially in the same stage of civilization as the Babylonians, their rivals in the struggle for empire. We now recognize the Persian Arabistan and the Turkish Arabistan, to which must be added also Assyria, as parts of one larger civilization, competing and struggling with one another for the mastery, differing in language and in certain details of civilization precisely as Germans

²Such was the honorable rivalry of Germans and Frenchmen in the field of archaeology before the present unhappy war. That, it is to be feared, will put an end for many years, so far as those peoples are concerned, to the finer arts of peace, including explorations in Persia and Babylonia. All the more it behooves Americans to take up that work; and especially the Universities of Pennsylvania and Chicago should resume their long-suspended excavations in Babylonia.

and French differ from one another, not however in markedly different stages of civilization, the one semi-barbaric, the other cultured, but rather at about the same level.

De Morgan's excavations have given us our first real knowledge of the inhabitants of Elam, the country of which Susa was the capital, by the discovery, among their other remains, of numerous inscriptions, the so-called proto-Elamite, of the period before and about the time of the Babylonian Sargon, and the Elamite of the Kassite period, more than a thousand years later. Both classes of inscriptions make use of the cuneiform signs which were common property in Elam and Babylonia. These inscriptions show us movements of races and peoples in Elam as in Babylonia, now one race and one language dominant, now another, all using the same cuneiform script; and before that script was invented, the pottery displays the same shifting of peoples and culture, one replacing another, sometimes destroying, sometimes building upon its predecessor. The civilization of Elam as of Babylonia was composite, stratum upon stratum, and the excavations in the two regions reveal a practical identity of development, similar influences working at about the same time in each. At times Elam was the aggressive and dominant power, overrunning and exploiting or subduing Babylonia; at times it was beaten and pushed back. When Babylonia was united, it was stronger than Elam; but Elam had the advantage through all of its history of a relative unity under one great city, while Babylonia was mostly divided among a number of great cities, each struggling with the others for the mastery. So in general Elam was the aggressor; only when one city succeeded in dominating the rest in Babylonia were the Elamites driven out, or in their turn conquered. This was notably the case in the time of the great Hammurapi, who brought Babylon to the

front and united all the lower country of the Tigris and Euphrates into an empire more solid than any which had existed theretofore. He seems to have subjugated Elam utterly, but in doing so to have prepared the way for new invaders of Babylonia, and for a new race of Elamites. So when a couple of centuries later the weak Babylonian kings of his dynasty were supplanted by Kassites, Babylonia began to suffer once more from the invasions of Elamites, whose inscriptions show them, however, to have spoken a different language from their predecessors of a greater antiquity. It was only with the absorption of Babylonia in the great Assyrian Empire of the Sargonids that this Elam was finally subjugated and destroyed. The Assyrian great kings perceived that to maintain dominion in Babylonia they must not only drive the Elamites out of Babylonia, but must also conquer Elam itself. Even this, however, proved insufficient. Again and again Elam rose in revolt, alone or in conjunction with Babylonian insurgents, until at last, under Sennacherib and Ashurbanipal, Susa was utterly destroyed and blotted out. But by this policy of creating a vacuum the Assyrians in fact prepared the way for a new Elam, and for the final conquest of Babylon by Susa. They destroyed the buffer states to the east, which had held back the Iranian invasion.

It is after the fall of Assyria and the creation of the new Babylonian kingdom, under Nebuchadrezzar's weak successor in Babylon, Nabonidus, that Susa again comes to the front as the capital of the little kingdom of Ansan, the home of the conquering Cyrus; but it was Darius who first made it the capital of the Persian Empire. A new race now occupied the ancient site, inheriting the ancient civilization and the old cuneiform script. This latter they adapted to their language in such a way as to make it almost an alphabet, a procedure typical of their treatment of the entire civilization of the past which

they had inherited. Then for two centuries Elam was the centre of empire and the centre of oriental culture, until the conquest of Alexander the Great finally destroyed its glory. He seems to have applied the torch to Susa as to Ecbatana—at least the French investigations show nothing of importance at Susa after his time—and in the Parthian and Sassanian, as in the succeeding Arabic period, Darius' great palace was nothing but a place of interment for the dead. The Mohammedan conquest completed the desolation of Persian Arabistan, which had begun earlier with the Greek conquest. There was no population by which or for which to maintain the dikes and dams. There was no great city in the steppe, like Seleucia and Ctesiphon and Kufa and Baghdad in Babylonia, and so the Persian Arabistan was allowed to go to waste before its twin sister of the Tigris and Euphrates became the desert that it now is.

Because it was earlier laid waste, therefore certain remains of antiquity have been preserved in Susa which have apparently vanished from the older Babylonian cities, and indeed Susa has been the means of preserving some of the most precious Babylonian antiquities. In their invasions of Babylonia the Elamites at different periods carried off immense numbers of gods and goddesses, temple treasures containing objects of gold, electrum, silver, and copper, and also priceless inscriptions. Numbers of these were recovered and returned to Babylonia at a later date, especially in the Assyrian invasions; others were destroyed along with the Elamite temples; others, however, were buried and thus preserved, in the destruction of those temples. The most famous and most important individual discovery, made by De Morgan at Susa in 1902, was that of Hammurapi's Code of Laws. This was a huge stele, some nine feet in height, which had been set up by Hammurapi in Sippara, dedicated to the Sun-God, the local deity of Sippara, who is

represented on the stele as imparting those laws to Hammurapi, much as in the Old Testament God is represented as imparting to Moses laws for the Hebrews. This is the most ancient code of laws yet discovered. It stood in the same relation to previous codes as in England the Laws of Alfred stood to older laws and customs. Hammurapi collated and made use of former codes, adding to them new laws adapted to present conditions, and thus laying the foundation of the jurisprudence of the Babylonian and Assyrian Empires and their dependencies. Apparently similar steles were erected in other places, but of these only the merest fragments have been recovered. All the others perished in one way or another. This stele, which was carried off by the Elamite invaders in the Kassite period, as the Germans carried away antiquities from Peking, was by that very act of vandalism strangely preserved for futurity.

Next in importance to this among individual objects found at Susa we should perhaps reckon the monument which depicts Naram Sin's expedition of conquest through and over the eastern mountains. This is a striking piece of work, promise of a development of the plastic and pictorial art which never reached fulfilment. It was carried off from Babylonia to adorn the great Elamite temple and thus preserved to us. When Ashurbanipal ravaged and destroyed Susa, he carried back numerous monuments and steles, as his predecessor Sennacherib had done, but fortunately not all. What they carried back is lost; what they left behind has been preserved. The Acropolis and the Tel of the Royal City yielded to the excavators stratum upon stratum of civilization, people following people, conquest after conquest, destruction and renewal, from a prehistoric period down to the Grecian era.

Quite otherwise was it with the Mound of the Royal Palace. Here, as at Khorsabad, the city of Sargon of

Assyria, a huge artificial mound had been built up above the level of the surrounding country, a sort of a concrete foundation of stones and gravel, firmly welded together, containing absolutely no antiquities, virgin soil in that regard, although artificially constructed. When Darius I made Susa his capital, he built this terrace in the same manner and on the same principle as the Assyrian kings of old had built like terraces for their palaces. The palace was half within, half without the city, a method of construction which prevailed in the east to a late date, as witness the famous palace of the Byzantine emperors at Constantinople. As in its foundation, so also in its superior construction Darius' palace resembled in general the palace of the Assyrian Sargon above referred to, and the constructions which the Germans have found in Babylonia. Darius was the heir not only of the Elamite, but also of the Assyrian-Babylonian civilization. So, in spite of the change of religion, from Babylonian to Persian-Zoroastrian, we find at the doors of Darius' palace guardian genii, curious sphinx-like creatures with human heads and winged lion bodies. Above these is exhibited the winged disc in Persian form, the symbol of Ormuzd; but the emblem of the Babylonian Marduk is also in evidence on the side walls. These genii and the divine symbols at the doorways were to guard the entrance against hostile spirits. We have also in Darius' palace the same long and narrow rooms as in the palace of Sargon at Khorsabad, grouped around courts. Some one hundred and ten rooms in all have been excavated, grouped about three larger and three smaller courts. The important passages and hallways in these groups were beautified by the friezes of enamelled bricks, to which reference has already so many times been made. The art of making such bricks was not known at the time of the construction of the Assyrian palaces, where the friezes were made of slabs of limestone or alabaster.

The friezes of enamelled, figured bricks are, as already stated, an inheritance and a development of the later Babylonian art of Nebuchadrezzar's period. In general at Susa as in Babylonia, architectural effect depended upon mass and color rather than form. The usual material of construction was unburned brick; but one exception there was to this, namely, the great throne hall, made of stone, utterly unlike in this respect any Babylonian structure with which we are familiar, or even the Assyrian palaces; in which latter stone was used, but, except in the matter of the colossal genii at the doors or statues here and there, only for purposes of facing, not as an independent building material, least of all in the form of columns. That is the special feature of this throne-hall, the Apadana. It is a hall of columns. In this it resembles the Persian remains at Persepolis. Naturally it has suffered more from vandalism than any other part of the palace. The stones have been excavated and broken in pieces. Little is left but foundations and fragments of columns, pediments and capitals here and there, by means of which and by comparison of the ruins of Persepolis, the skilful archaeologists and architects of the French *Mission* have restored the general plan and architectural design of this building; in which we find a divergence from and an advance upon the preceding architecture and art both of Assyria and Babylonia, a new contribution of the Persians, in the use of stone, and especially of stone columns, of a style and in a manner peculiar to themselves.

In connection with this great palace the explorers believe that they have found signs of a paradise or garden, such as is described in the biblical Book of Esther, as connected with the palace then occupied by King Xerxes. Oddly enough, the little brochure which has been put forth by M. Pillet as a sort of guide-book for the ordinary

man, and which is the excuse for this present notice, treats the Book of Esther as historical, and bases upon its statements and allusions some of the interpretation of the plan of the palace. Esther is really a book of very much later date than the time of Xerxes, and such traditions as it contains of Susa and its palace have passed through so many generations and such diverse hands that no biblical scholar of the present day would venture to base any scientific conclusions thereon. The relation of Esther to the Palace of Darius (which, built originally at about 500 B.C., was burned down in the time of Artaxerxes I, about 440, restored by Artaxerxes II, as inscriptions show, about 420, to be finally destroyed by fire in the time of Alexander the Great, about 323 B.C.) is practically the same as that of the Mosque of Daniel to the Acropolis on which it now stands.

With this exception M. Pillet's little brochure is scientific as well as illuminating and intensely interesting. Its object is to put before the ordinary reader a general description of the palace which Loftus began to explore in 1851, the excavation of which the Dieulafoys resumed in 1884, which was attacked again at the commencement of M. De Morgan's work in 1897 under M. Jéquier, and which was only finally completed, if such an excavation can ever be said to be complete, last year. This has not been the most fruitful or valuable part of the excavations in other regards, but architecturally the palace is the only building at Susa which it has been possible to restore with any degree of completeness.

The work is well illustrated, with various maps and plans and with some charming little sketches and photographs made by the author on the spot.

AFTER SIX DAYS: A NEW CLUE FOR GOSPEL CRITICS

BENJAMIN W. BACON

The conception of a preliminary period of ritual preparation for occasions of special sanctity is common to many religions, including that of the Old Testament, where the touching of holy things or coming into the divine presence requires a period of previous abstinence from anything involving ceremonial defilement. In 1 Sam. 21 5 and Ex. 19 10, 15 this period is of "three days." The longer period of "six days" is required for the supreme occasion when Moses meets Yahweh face to face on Sinai (Ex. 24 16), and this interval becomes as it were stereotyped in the most distinctive of Jewish institutions, the periodic seventh day "the sabbath of the Lord thy God," to which the preceding six days of toil lead up. The Jew labors and does all his work in the first six days of the week in order that he may rest and enjoy the fruit of his toil the seventh day, just as in the creation Yahweh's activity had led up to a period of satisfied contemplation of all that He had made as "very good." In like manner the later speculators of both Synagogue and Church expected the toil and turmoil of the six ages of "this world," each of one thousand years' duration, to lead up to the blessed repose and fruition of "the age to come," ushered in by the "thousand years" of Messiah.

To our modern view, which makes the holy day the beginning instead of the end and climax of the week, much of the forward look (if I may so express it) of the earlier practice is lost. To the Jew of New Testament

times every Friday was "Preparation"-day (*παρασκευή*).¹ He had in addition a special "Preparation"-day for every great feast, and a ritual observance to mark it (the *Kiddush*). The peculiar chronology of the Fourth Gospel seems in fact to make the year of the crucifixion one in which the "Preparation of the passover" (Jn. 19 14), i.e. Nisan 14, coincided with the regular weekly "Preparation" (ver. 31). It may be that the fourth evangelist is thus seeking harmony with his predecessors. At all events he shows the persistence of the Jewish institution of *Kiddush* or pre-sanctification.

We should expect, therefore, so long as this "forward look" survived in the hebdomadal calendar of the early Church, that the period of "six days," the regular interval between holy days, would have special significance, perhaps alternating with other expressions for the week, just as the *Hexaëmeros* of Philo (literally the "six-day" period) becomes the accepted symbolic phrase for Christian writers on the end of the world, because the millennium or great sabbath of God (Heb. 4 9-11) was expected to dawn when the world had completed six thousand years from the creation.

In point of fact, direct reference to a preparatory period of abstinence before great solemnities is by no means lacking in the very earliest records of the Church. The great Paschal controversy of the second century, breaking out on three successive occasions, and threatening in Irenaeus' time to disrupt the Asiatic from the Western church, was largely concerned with the duration of the preliminary fast which led up to the supreme feast of the Christian calendar. As Irenaeus wrote to Victor of Rome *ca.* 195 A.D.:

"The controversy is not only concerning the day (*i.e.* whether only a Lord's day should be observed as the Easter feast, or the Jewish

¹ In a personal letter Professor George F. Moore of Harvard kindly explains that the Greek term is a rendering of the Hebrew *hakanah*, which has no ritual or moral sense, but refers simply to the preparation of food for the sabbath.

Passover day on whatever day of the week it might fall), but also concerning the very manner of the [preceding] fast. For some think that they should fast one day, others two, yet others more."

This practice Irenaeus expressly says

"has not originated in our time, but long before, in that of our ancestors."

"Forty hours" seems to have been the minimum period of preliminary fasting. "A whole week" was the general practice of the Church in Epiphanius' day (385 A.D.),² which in our own has extended to the forty days of Lent. The *Gospel according to the Hebrews*, which was not far from contemporary with our own Matthew, reflects a system of fasting from the evening of the institution of the Supper to the Appearance to James (1 Cor. 15 3 f.), which this Gospel related as the first resurrection appearance to a disciple.³ Unfortunately we cannot be sure what the interval was. At least it was more than the "forty hours" between Jesus' death and the bursting of the tomb. It may have coincided with the "three days and three nights" of Mt. 12 40, or may possibly have covered "a whole week." The passage has not merely the dubious attestation of Jerome, but is borrowed by him from the unimpeachable authority of Origen. Its bearing will be manifest to all who remember the importance attached in the second century to the correct observance of fasts and feasts, especially in the matter of time. After relating the appearance to James, the narrative continued:

"For James had vowed that he would eat no bread from that hour when he had drunk the cup of the Lord until he should see him rising from those that sleep."

² Panar. I, 1, 3; lxx, 12.

³ It is preceded by a leaving of the sindōn (linen sheet) by the Risen One "with the servant of the high priest," doubtless as a testimony unto them. Had this Gospel a different version of Mk. 14 51 f., representing the loser of the sindōn as one of the servants of the high priest?

It related next the Lord's loosing of the vow of abstinence:

"Bring a table, said the Lord, and bread," and added: "He took the bread, and blessed and brake it, and gave to James the Just, and said unto him: My brother, eat thy bread; for the Son of man is risen from among them that sleep."

Had we more of this fragment of the Palestinian Gospel we should probably be able to say just how long a period of fasting before the Easter feast was commended by the example of the Lord's brother in the interval between his "drinking the cup of the Lord" and being commanded to break his fast. As it is, we can only note the ritual interest and phraseology of the fragment, and its extremely early attestation to the observance of the preparatory days of fasting, whether three or more in number.⁴

Almost equally early and wide-spread is the attestation to the observance of a preliminary period of fasting before administration of baptism, the Church's other great sacrament. The *Teaching of the Twelve* (100-125 A.D.) is explicit in its prescription of "one or two days" of preliminary fasting before baptism (vii, 4), and in the Clementine writings this is treated as equally indispensable. In Tertullian's day (210 A.D.) the preliminary days before baptism were occupied with catechetical teaching, prayers, vigils, and fasting. *After* the baptism there was further observance of a retrospective or commemorative character. The neophyte observed a week of abstinence from washing of hands and face (*abstinentia a lavacro*).

⁴ It would be precarious to suggest a connection between Ev. Petri, vii, 26 f. and the preparatory fast. The passage reads: "And I [Peter] with my companions was grieved, and wounded to the heart we hid ourselves, for we were sought by them as malefactors, and as desiring to burn the temple. And on account of all these things we were fasting, and sat mourning and weeping night and day until the sabbath." If there be connection, it implies observance of the fast only on Good Friday. It is broken off by the sabbath, regardless of the fact that the disciples are still "weeping and grieving" (xiv, 59) at the end of the feast of unleavened bread, ignorant of what has transpired at the sepulchre "during the night of the dawn of the Lord's day" (ix, 35).

As we shall see, the tendency was strong to concentrate baptisms so far as possible on a particular date, just as observance of the Lord's Supper was focussed at the celebration at Easter. The date for baptisms was the feast of Epiphany or Twelfth Night, i.e. the night of January 5-6, twelfth from the feast of the Nativity (December 24-25). This was the second greatest feast of the ecclesiastical year, commemorating the Baptism of Jesus, or as the name "Epiphany" implies the "Manifestation" of his glory. In later liturgies, such as the Mozarabic, the week preceding Epiphany is occupied with such preparatory observances as Tertullian prescribes for baptism.

The question for us to determine is whether these religious observances are not in part even older than Christianity, and whether some traces of them may not be found on the pages of our own canonical Gospels, as well as in writings which though uncanonical are substantially contemporary.

In the Preface to my *Beginnings of Gospel Story* (1909, page ix), I urged application in gospel criticism and interpretation of a method to be termed "aetiological," because based on the working hypothesis that

"The motive of the biblical writers in reporting the tradition current around them is never strictly historical, but always aetiological, and frequently apologetic. . . . The evangelic tradition consists of so and so many anecdotes, told and retold *for the purpose of explaining or defending beliefs and practices of the contemporary Church.*"

The first requirement under this method would therefore be a study of early ritual and belief, on the theory that ritual reflects the significance found *anciently* in the narrative. Its form, if not sometimes its origin, would presumably be due to the observance, in cases where we have reason to regard the observance as older than the extant form of the story. The methods and data of the historian of religion are here peculiarly serviceable in view of the well-known fact of the survival

in Christianity of earlier religious observances both Jewish and Pagan.

The method is not altogether new. An example of "aetiological" interpretation in common application occurs in the correspondence commentators justly note between the successive features of the Feeding of the Multitude, as related no less than six times in the Gospels, and the ritual of the *Agapé*. In both we have (1) orderly arrangement of the multitude at evening, (2) blessing and breaking of the bread by the presiding minister, (3) distribution of the food, (4) collection of the remnants by the deacons or almoners.

A further instance may be found in the Easter observances to which reference has already been made. In my volume just cited on page xxix, in speaking of the special form of evangelic tradition current at Rome in the time of our oldest Gospel (Mark, 75–80 A.D.), appeal is made to our knowledge from the "Paschal" controversies of the second century of the chronological difference between Roman and Asiatic practice—a matter of vital importance for the feeling of the period.⁵ The difference was already of long standing when Polycarp visited Anicetus in Rome (ca. 150 A.D.); the East claiming (with good reason) the sanction of apostolic practice for celebrating the "fourteenth" Nisan (whence the name "Quartodeciman") with "the [Jewish] people," regardless of the day of the week. The West held it abhorrent "to celebrate the sacred mystery of the Resurrection on any other than the Lord's day."

Now the (Roman) Gospel of Mark has a remarkable series of exact notations of time covering the whole period of the Passion story—and no other—from the

⁵ Thus Peter, Bishop of Alexandria (ca. 300), quotes a Quartodeciman Trecentius: "We have no other purpose than to keep the memory of his [Christ's] passion, and at the time when those who from the beginning were eye-witnesses have handed down." Cited by Drummond, *Authorship and Character of Fourth Gospel*, 1904, p. 477.

Anointing "in Bethany in the house of Simon the Leper" (Mk. 14 1-3) to the Resurrection. Moreover the time is divided more minutely and exactly in proportion as the culminating periods of ritual observance are approached. The night of Vigil in Gethsemane, corresponding to the vigil of Passover (Ex. 12 42), and the day of the Crucifixion are even divided into quarters, or "watches," of three hours each (Mk. 14 17, 41, 72; 15 1, 25, 33, 34, 42), each marked by its own significant event. Knowledge of the importance anciently attached to (chronologically) correct observance of the Easter vigil,⁶ fast, and feast, suggests that these precise notes of time are made by the (Roman) evangelist in the interest of ritual.

Thus on the eve of Good Friday "at evening" (Mk. 14 17) the Church celebrates its "Passover of the Lord." Mark's narrative and its parallels explicitly note at the close (ver. 25) that henceforth the observance is made "new in the kingdom of God." The closing "hymn" receives particular mention (ver. 26). Through the midnight watches the Church keeps its Passover vigil⁷ (Ex. 12 42), remembering the boastful word of Peter, and his denial of his Lord "at cock-crowing." The command "Watch and pray that ye enter not into temptation" emphasized by the contrast of Jesus with the sleeping disciples, and by the remorse of unfaithful Peter, occupies the salient point of the story (14 38, 72). Thus again "at dawn" of the following day (Good Friday), the Church recalls the "good Confession witnessed before Pontius Pilate." The second watch is marked by the Crucifixion "at the third hour."⁸ Next, at the midday

⁶ See above, note 5.

⁷ See the chapter on "Quartodecimanism" in my *Fourth Gospel in Research and Debate*, 1910, pp. 412-439. The vigil with its readings from the Gospels (*διανυκτερεύοντες ἐν ἀναγνώσει*) formed a constant feature of the observance, while debate raged as to time and duration of the fasting.

⁸ The Fourth Gospel particularly specifies the sentence to the cross as given "at the sixth hour," Jn. 19 14.

watch, comes the Darkness "at the sixth until the ninth hour," with the parting cry "at the ninth hour." The fourth watch ends with the Burial "when even [sunset] was now come, it being the Preparation" [Friday].

The strongest proof that these exact notes of time in the Synoptic (i.e. Markan) passion story are really made in the interest of ritual is the singular contrast afforded by the Fourth Gospel. This narrative has almost equally minute notation for the chronology of the passion period, but follows a different and irreconcilable system. In John we have datings not by days of the week (cf. Mk. 15 42), but by days of the (lunar) month (Nisan). The reckoning begins as in Mark with the Anointing (Jn. 12 1 ff. = Mk. 14 1 ff.); only according to John this—or rather the Arrival in Bethany, sunset marking the beginning of a new day—occurs not two but *six* days before the passover. Doubtless Epiphanius⁹ is correct in connecting the story of the Anointing (five days before passover according to Jn. 12 2) with the Mosaic law for the "setting apart of the passover lamb" (Ex. 12 3). Jewish ritual fixes this observance in fact "on the tenth day" (of Nisan), i.e. five days before the passover. Quartodecimans, who observed Easter coincidently with the Jewish feast, and prided themselves on their conformity herein to "the [Mosaic] law," "took the sheep from the tenth day, recognizing the name of Jesus from the *iota*" (i.e. the I of Ἰησοῦς, in numerical value = 10).¹⁰ Fortunately the *Syriac Didascalia* affords positive confirmation of this obscure intimation of Epiphanius, by declaring (c. xxi) that "on Monday *tenth of Nisan* Jesus was in the house of Simon the Leper" (cf. Mk. 14 3 with Jn. 12 1 f.).

The Johannine paschal datings continue (12 12) with the Triumphal Entry "on the morrow" (Nisan 11?),

⁹ Panar. I, 3.

¹⁰ Epiphanius *ibid.*

followed (Nisan 12?) by a Withdrawal (12 36), which concludes the public ministry. Jesus is henceforth with "his own." Whatever uncertainty might exist as to the dating of Entry and Withdrawal is corrected in the next note of time; for when the story resumes (13 1 ff.) it is still "before the passover" (Nisan 13). The Foot-washing "after supper" marks the beginning of the great day when "Christ our passover also hath been sacrificed" (Nisan 14—slaughter of the lambs), while "the third day" after (Nisan 16, i.e. "Firstfruits") is the day on which Christ rose "and became the Firstfruits of them that slept." The *hexaëmeros* begins with the Anointing (Nisan 10), and culminates with the Resurrection (Nisan 16).

So for the special day of vigil and fasting (Good Friday). As in Synoptic tradition, the whole period is divided in John also, but less minutely and on a different plan. The night of vigil seems to be spent in discourse and prayer until the coming of the betrayer, though there is no mention of a command to watch, or of the disciples' failure to live up to it, but only of Peter's Denial, which is of course, by implication, at cock-crowing.¹¹ "At dawn" (18 28) comes the Confession before Pilate, accompanied by a second positive intimation that the passover feast is still to be celebrated (28 b). "The sixth hour" (midday) is marked (19 14), contrary to Synoptic tradition (cf. Mk. 15 25), as that of the fateful Sentence to the Cross; but there is no further note of time till the day closes with the burial at sunset. Then we learn that it was "the Jews' Preparation" (Friday). The following day, we are told (19 31), was "a high day," which would of course follow from its being both a sabbath (by weekly reckoning) and also

¹¹ Peculiarly strong evidence exists both textual and structural for regarding this episode as well as its reflection in the Appendix (Jn. 21 15-19) as a supplement to the earliest form of this Gospel.

First of Unleavened Bread (Nisan 15). There is no further note of time until the Resurrection before dawn "on the first day of the week" (19 42; 20 1).

But to return to our *hexaëmeros*, whose beginning is so distinctly marked in Jn. 12 1 as "six days before passover." The Crucifixion, as we have seen, coincides with the slaughter of the passover lambs in the evening of Nisan 14, the Resurrection with the offering of "first-fruits" of the new harvest on Nisan 16. This coincidence is no fancy of the modern critic, but corresponds, as ancient Quartodecimans pointed out, with the two figures of Paul in First Corinthians. Writing at the season of Passover (16 9) he exhorts the Corinthians first (1 Cor. 5 7 f.) to "put away the old leaven"¹² . . . for Christ our passover is sacrificed for us"; again he declares (15 20, 23, 36 f.): "Now is Christ risen from the dead—like the new corn from the seed—and become the 'first-fruits' of them that slept." The latter of these two figures is adopted in full by our evangelist (Jn. 12 24). The very foundation of ancient Quartodeciman reasoning was this correspondence of the Passion dates with the Mosaic festal calendar. Quartodecimans pointed out that

"The resurrection is a further witness (to the observance of Nisan 14). In point of fact (γούρ) [Christ] rose on the third day, which is the first day of the season of the [seven] weeks of harvest, the day on which it was commanded the priest to offer the sheaf."¹³

Epiphanius (375 A.D.) found a way of harmonizing Synoptic with Johannine chronology by rendering Lk. 22 7 "the day of unleavened bread came, on which they *should have* sacrificed the passover" (i.e. unleavened

¹² Putting away the old leaven is the ceremony which marks midday of Nisan 14 in the Jewish ritual. Hence the expression "the fourteenth, the day on which the [Jewish] people put away the leaven," in Polycrates of Ephesus (195 A.D.).

¹³ Clement of Alex. Fragment in Paschal Chron.

bread—Nisan 15—came on, which the Jews, by error, had counted as Nisan 14 when the lambs are sacrificed).¹⁴ The fault which he finds with the Quartodecimans is that they do not go far enough with their conformation to the Mosaic law. They confined their celebration to a single day; whereas they ought to have chosen the sheep on the tenth day, and so fasted for five days, thus conforming to the general practice of the Church in *celebrating a whole week* (i.e. until Firstfruits, Nisan 16).¹⁵

In a word the passion-chronology of the Fourth Gospel is in the main carefully adapted to the ritual practice which the Quartodecimans of Asia insisted they had received in unbroken tradition from the apostles. It justifies reckoning the chief date “with the [Jewish] people”; but it also “celebrates a whole week.” It makes the Anointing in Bethany correspond with the Setting apart of the Lamb on Nisan 10, the Crucifixion with the Slaughter of the Lamb at evening of Nisan 14, and the Resurrection with Firstfruits on Nisan 16.

On the other hand, it seeks a maximum of agreement with Synoptic tradition by the statement (19 31) that “the day of that sabbath was a high day.” This establishes also the *weekly* fast and feast of primitive Christian practice (cf. Mk. 2 20; 16 2), and produces a partial harmony by assuming that “the Preparation of the passover” (19 14) happened *in that particular year* to be also “the Jews’ Preparation” (i.e. a Friday), so that the ensuing sabbath would be not only the seventh day of the week, but doubly sacred because also the “first day of unleavened bread” (Nisan 15). “First-

¹⁴ This harmonistic device is by no means original with Epiphanius. Eusebius had previously employed it and even the Quartodecimans of the second century accuse their opponents of “making the Gospels conflict,” besides not obeying the (Mosaic) law. Irenaeus, who opposed the Quartodecimans, had a reverse system of harmonizing, adapting the Johannine to Synoptic chronology; but he does not explain how (Haer. II, xxii, 8).

¹⁵ Panar. I, 1, 3; lxx, 12.

fruits" on the morrow would therefore fall on "the first day of the week."

The *Syriac Didascalia* thus appears to be justified in reckoning the Anointing as "on Monday tenth of Nisan," which implies the Royal Entry on Tuesday(?), Withdrawal on Wednesday (?), Footwashing on Thursday, followed by Vigil (in the Upper Room), Betrayal and Crucifixion on Friday, Rest in the grave on the Sabbath, and Resurrection on Sunday.

Now if modern critics and commentators on the Synoptic tradition, such as Heitmüller, are correct in speaking of a Markan "scheme of six days" for passion week,¹⁶ it doubtless is intended to begin, like the Johannine, with Monday; though in Synoptic tradition not the Anointing in Bethany, but the Royal Entry (Mk. 11 1-11) signalizes the day. We have thus in *both* traditions a six-day period or *hexaëmeros* leading up to the great anniversary of the Resurrection. It is important to observe, however, that the fundamental reckoning of the fourth evangelist is annual, while the coincidence of week-days is merely harmonistic and incidental. The disciple who celebrated Holy Week according to the calendar of the Fourth Gospel would keep the Lord's Passover "on the day that the [Jewish] people put away the leaven"¹⁷ (Nisan 14). This coincidence with the Jewish feast would occur *every* year. He would *occasionally* find himself in coincidence with Christians of Western observance of Easter, i.e. whenever Nisan 14 happened to fall on Friday. Both traditions, Synoptic as well as Johannine, outline the events of passion week under a "scheme of six days."

There is important confirmation of the "aetiological" method and of the results already outlined, besides a great intrinsic interest, in observing how the fourth evan-

¹⁶ Heitmüller, *Jesus*, 1913, p. 58.

¹⁷ The expression of Polycrates of Ephesus (195 A.D.).

gelist has prefaced his story of the public ministry of Jesus with another *hexaëmeros* of the Master with his disciples. This sequence of days has even the appearance of leading over into the peculiar chronology of John, in much the same way that the *hexaëmeros* of the Priestly Writer of the Pentateuch in Gen. 1 1-2 4 leads over into the chronological system of the sacerdotal law. In this case the feast is that which Chrysostom designates "the first [i.e. of the year], Epiphany." It was especially honored in the East, and was in fact the counterpart of Easter, having among its other functions that of the sending out from Alexandria of the famous annual "Paschal letters," which fixed the ecclesiastical calendar for the year.

Every observant reader is struck at once on comparing the Johannine with the earlier Gospels by the large place the fourth evangelist gives, after the Prologue, to a Self-revelation of Jesus to his Disciples at the Baptism of John (Jn. 1 19-2 11). This self-revelation is described as occurring in a sequence of six days and culminates in the Miracle at Cana of Galilee on the seventh. In fact from the point where the Baptist bears his "witness that this is the Son of God" and points Jesus out as "the Lamb of God that taketh away the sin of the world," down to the "manifestation of his glory" which convinces the disciples in Cana, we have in this series of presentations of Jesus in his various messianic functions a complete anticipation of the Synoptic story of the Confession of Peter, Prediction of the Cross, Promise of the *Parousia* and Transfiguration (Mk. 8 27-9 8 and parallels).

Were we to classify the Gospels in accordance with our knowledge of early ritual observance in the Church, we should characterize the Fourth, which begins with the *manifestation* of Jesus to be the Son of God, as an "Epiphany" Gospel; whereas Matthew and Luke, each of which prefixes to Mark an account of Jesus' miraculous birth,

should be called "Nativity" Gospels. Mark is the common starting-point; but its statement of the divine sonship is manifestly regarded by all as inadequate, Matthew and Luke developing in one direction, John in the other. The development of ritual has light to throw upon the matter.

Ancient observance wavered between the *dies natalis*, and the *dies natalis virtutum domini*. The Gnostic sects even observed the date of Jesus' baptism by John as the "birthday of the Saviour" (γενέθλια τοῦ Σωτῆρος), because, as they maintained,

"It was not till [the *Aeon*] Christ descended into Jesus (Mk. 1 10 f.) that he began to do miracles and to heal and reveal the unknown Father, and declare himself openly the Son of the first man."¹⁸

The earlier Gnostics naturally admitted only the Gospel of Mark.¹⁹ Later they gladly availed themselves of the Gospel of John. The Church catholic, on the other hand, in its two more recent Gospels of Matthew and Luke, had meantime supplied the deficiencies of Mark, removing by means of their accounts of Jesus' birth as "Son of God" (Lk. 1 35) the opportunity Mark had afforded to interpret the title "Son of God" in a Docetic or Adoptionist sense. This effort to counteract Gnostic tendencies in the later Synoptic Gospels, also reflected in the second clause of the Apostles' Creed, appears again in very marked degree in the development of ritual observance. The orthodox (especially in the West) emphasized the Nativity, and deprecated the Gnostic disposition to magnify Epiphany as the significant feast. Thus the eighteenth of the letters of Leo (440-481 A.D.) protests to the Sicilian bishops against the tendency there prevalent to regard the baptism of Jesus as having borne the same import for him and conveyed the same grace as the baptism of believers to them. Pope

¹⁸ Irenaeus, *Haer.* I, xxx, 18. Specifically "Cerinthus" in xxvi, 1.

¹⁹ Irenaeus, *Haer.* III, xi, 7.

Siricius (385) had protested against the custom of baptizing at Epiphany for this same reason. At first in the East the Nativity was celebrated on the same day as the Feast of the Baptism (January 6), the ancient Feast of the Epiphany of Dionysus. Later in Rome and the West it was celebrated on December 25, the Julian winter solstice, or *dies invicti solis*. This Roman date gradually took the place of January 6, so that Epiphanius even goes so far as to fix a new date (November 8) for the Baptism. To quote (in abstract) the clear and scholarly article of Professor Kirsopp Lake ("Epiphany" in the *Dictionary of Religion and Ethics*):

"In the fourth century in Constantinople, Antioch, Alexandria, and probably elsewhere, before December 25th had been accepted as the date of the Nativity, January 6th was observed as the feast *both* of the Nativity and the Baptism. Silvia's account of her pilgrimage (325 A.D.) shows that in Jerusalem January 6th was observed as the feast of the Nativity. Whether it was also (in Jerusalem) the feast of the Baptism is doubtful. F. C. Conybeare's researches into Armenian ritual seem to prove the Armenian a combination of the Jerusalem rite celebrating the Nativity and a Greek rite (Alexandrian or Antiochian) celebrating the Baptism."

The meaning of this is that in Jerusalem, as elsewhere, orthodox ritual felt the dangers still attaching to the observance of the ancient (pagan) feast of the Epiphany of Dionysus. The ritual for this feast, almost exactly as described by Epiphanius for the *Koraeon*, or Temple of *Kόρη* (the Virgin goddess) at Alexandria, is repeated to this day on December 24-25 in the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem.²⁰ With the Gospels of Matthew

²⁰ Those who, like the present writer, have attended the all-night observance of Dec. 24-25 in Bethlehem will think themselves almost to be reading an account of this Christian ritual in Epiphanius' description. The feast of *Kόρη* (Virgin mother of Dionysus) was celebrated on Jan. 6. The preceding night (Jan. 5-6) was spent in singing and worship of the images of the gods. At dawn descent in procession was made to the crypt, bringing up thence a wooden image which had the sign of the cross and a star of gold on hands, knees, and head. After being carried in procession this was returned to the crypt. The Virgin (*Kόρη*) was declared to have given birth to the *Aeon*. Compare with this the present-day ritual for Dec. 24-25 at Bethlehem.

and Luke Jerusalem observance first makes the primitive celebration of Epiphany, or "Manifestation" of Godhood, a celebration of divine *birth*. Ultimately under Roman influence it adopts a new date. The Fourth Gospel, on the other hand, remains true to the primitive sense of the Markan tradition. It ignores the birth stories, and treats "the beginning of the gospel" as a *Manifestation* of the Godhood, first to the Baptist, at Jordan, afterward to the disciples at Cana. The interval between the two is a six-day period of didactic preparation.

The fourth evangelist is not only "spiritual," but conservative and harmonistic. Gnostic misconstruction is met in two ways. We have first a Prologue presenting a Pauline doctrine of Incarnation, which ends with the explicit declaration (1 14 ff.) that the Logos "became *flesh* and tabernacled among us, and we beheld his glory." As Irenaeus justly observes,²¹ "According to the opinion of no one of the heretics was the Logos of God *made flesh*." Secondly, the Baptism itself, so misused in the interest of Docetic and Adoptionist tendencies, is now thrown completely into the background. The reader only learns of it by implication (1 32 f.), while every device of language is employed to make unmistakably clear that its significance is exclusively declaratory (1 19-27, 33). John's baptism is purely and solely that *John* may "see and bear witness that this is the Son of God." Its significance to the (supposedly) repentant multitudes who were also baptized is absolutely ignored. To Jesus it has none.

We are not now concerned primarily with this general contrast between Epiphany gospels and Nativity gospels. It is enough merely to point out the difference of the fourth evangelist's method from that of the second and third for meeting the misuse of Mark. We propose to deal merely with the chronological framework in which the fourth evangelist has compacted all that he has to

²¹ Haer. III, xi, 8.

tell of Jesus' Self-manifestation to the Disciples, noting that he combines the Synoptic traditions of the Declaration of the Baptist, the Call of the First Disciples and the Declaration of the Messiahship and Confession of Peter at Caesarea Philippi into a great complex of Witness to Jesus as "Son of God" (1 34), "Lamb of God" (1 29, 36), "Messiah, which is being interpreted Christ" (41), "him of whom Moses in the law and the prophets did write" (45), and finally (51) "Son of man." The point to be brought out is that here as at the close of his narrative the evangelist has divided his material into the form of a *hexaëmeros*, culminating "on the third day" after the declaratory discourses (1 19-51) in a symbolic "beginning of his signs in Cana of Galilee," where Jesus "*manifested his glory* and his disciples believed on him."

It is fortunately possible to prove that the early oriental Church understood this "sign" of the turning of the water into wine following upon the Baptism "in Bethany beyond Jordan" (Jn. 1 28) with the Self-revelation to the Disciples, as really belonging to the Feast of Epiphany on January 6th, just as it understood the Anointing in (the other) Bethany, the Triumphal Entry, Footwashing, Crucifixion and Resurrection, as belonging to the feast of "the Passover of the Lord" which constituted its other great Holy Week.

As regards the antiquity of Christian veneration for the feast of the Baptism of Jesus we have testimony beyond all dispute. Clement of Alexandria describes the followers of the arch-gnostic Basilides (*ca.* 125 A.D.) as celebrating it on January 6th (11th Tybi), the date of the Epiphany of Dionysus. Some, however, observed January 10th.²² As with the pagan festival in the *Koraeon*, the preceding night was spent as a preparatory vigil,

²²Tybi 15. This was probably to conform to the Basilidean system of thirties and halves of thirty. Jesus was *thirty* years of age. His ministry covered fifteen years of the reign of Augustus and fifteen of that of Tiberius, &c.

“readings” taking the place in the Christian rite of the “singing and worship of the images” in the pagan.²³

Was there, besides this vigil corresponding to the vigil of the resurrection feast, an observance of preliminary days more or fewer in number? It is difficult to trace back in orthodox observance just what days of preparation may have been prescribed for the great “first feast” of the year. In the Mozarabic or Spanish missal, as well as in the Breviary, there is first mention of a “Sunday before Epiphany”; next a mass *in jejuniis Epiphaniae*, i.e., a fast of three days covering January 3–5. This is doubtless primarily intended for catechumens in preparation for baptism, January 6th being the favorite date. That these preliminary days were occupied with the “laying of the foundation of repentance from dead works and faith toward God,” follows from all our knowledge of the “teachings of baptisms” and of the primitive system of catechetics. But it is apparent that usage differed. Just as in the case of the preparation for Easter, as described by Irenaeus: “Some think they should fast one day, others two, yet others more.” By the time of Epiphanius “a whole week” of observance (not of course unbroken fasting) was the general practice of the Church before Easter. All we can be sure of is that the practice of baptizing at Epiphany made necessary a preliminary period of teaching as well as the days of fasting and night of vigil.

Is it then unreasonable to trace a connection between the “six days” of “teaching” which according to Mark 9 2 and Mt. 17 1 separate the Self-declaration of Jesus as the Christ to the disciples at Caesarea Philippi from the “theophany” of the Transfiguration, and the Johannine six days which intervene between the Witness of the Baptist that this is the Son of God, and the “Manifestation of his glory” to the disciples? The parallelism in

²³ Strom. I, xxi, 146, ἐορτάζουσιν προδιανικητερόντες ἐν ἀναγνώσει.

content of teaching is not unsupported by traces of ritual interest even in the Synoptists. For the theophany is given at the close of a night of vigil wherein the drowsiness of "Peter, James, and John" is contrasted with the prayerful watching of Jesus, as in the story of Gethsemane (Lk. 9 32), and the Johannine preliminary days have as their content an equivalent for the teaching at Caesarea Philippi.²⁴

Unfortunately we have no clear light from primitive practice beyond the data already given to determine whether the "teaching of baptisms" or other services preceding Epiphany covered this exact number of days, or only something like it. Our use of the term *hexaëmeros*, is somewhat general, meaning days of preparation for a sacred occasion like those leading up to the sabbath in Gen. 1 1-2 4, or those leading up to the theophany to Moses in Ex. 24 16, whether an exact correspondence of day for day can be traced or not. If, however, we simply take the notes of time as given in the Johannine account of the Witness to Jesus at his Baptism and Manifestation of his Glory to the Disciples in Jn. 1 19-2 11, we shall have the following succession of days: Day *one*: John's Proclamation of his Mission to Baptize in "Bethany beyond Jordan," 1 19-28. Day *two*: John's Witness to Jesus "on the morrow," 29-34. Day *three*: Sending of the two First Disciples to Jesus, who begin to learn of him "about the tenth hour," 35-42. Day *four*: "on the morrow," full Self-declaration of Jesus to the Disciples, including Confession of Peter and Promise of the Revelation of the Son of man, 43-51. At this point follows a vacant day like the sabbath after the crucifixion—day *five*—and "on

²⁴ The variant of Lk. 9 28—"about eight days"—would merely indicate the backward instead of the forward look; as the later Church spoke of "the octave" of Epiphany. To Luke the Confession of Peter would be the Epiphany and the Transfiguration its "octave." To Mark and Matthew it would be the beginning of preparation.

the third day" is the Wedding at Cana—day *six*—2 1. The miracle by which Jesus "manifested his glory and his disciples believed on him" (2 11) follows in the evening. It comes therefore at the beginning of the *seventh* day from the Baptism, in which it was given to John to "see and bear witness that this is the Son of God."

For completeness' sake a possible explanation should be added of the single minuter note of time relating to the precise hour when on the third day the first disciples accepted Jesus' invitation and placed themselves under his instruction through the night until the ensuing morning (1 39). If the aetiological method be applied, it will appear more reasonable to compare such ritual notes as Mk. 15 25, 33 f., and Jn. 19 14, than to imagine the evangelist cherishing a sentimental regard for the precise hour of his first contact with Jesus.

In my volume, *The Fourth Gospel in Research and Debate*, 1910, I cited the following fact:

"A very ancient note of time embodied in the 'Western' text of Acts 19 9 informs us that Paul's preaching 'in the school of Tyrannus' at *Ephesus*, was 'daily from the fifth to the tenth hour.'"

If the independent indications of acquaintance on the part of this "Western" interpolator with early conditions in Phrygia justify us in looking upon this as evidence that in Ephesus public preaching customarily ended "at the tenth hour," this would be the natural time to begin the instruction of catechumens.

Further indications are not wanting to lead us to look upon this Johannine story of the Declaration of the Son of God and the Manifestation of his Glory in a Beginning of Miracles somewhat as a series of lessons for Epiphany. But on these we cannot dwell. Limitations of space forbid also that we should here consider the noteworthy connection between the two groups of narratives which Mark has placed the one

at the opening of the Galilean Ministry, the other at the beginning of the Journey to Calvary (Mk. 1 1-39 and 8 27-9 29). In each case we have a declaration of Jesus to be the Son of God, followed by a Manifestation of his Glory, though on the former occasion the Manifestation consists of a Beginning of Miracles at the great Sabbath in Capernaum (Mk. 1 14-39). In each case we have a Voice from Heaven declaring the Sonship, and an Opposition between Sonship "according to the things that be of God," and "the things that be of men." We even have the Rebuke of the Tempter in the same words,²⁵ although in the Temptation story it is literally Satan who presents the lower ideal, whereas at Caesarea Philippi it is Peter(!). In each case we have, finally, suggestions of the prayers, fastings, and vigils of Jesus, in greater or less contrast with the disciples (cf. Mk. 1 13, 35-39 and parallels, with 9 4-6 and parallels). Jn. 1 19-2 11, considered as lessons for Epiphany, would combine the essential factors of both these Synoptic occasions, as we have seen; while Jn. 2 12 briefly dismisses the Markan account of the Beginning of Miracles. Upon this correspondence we cannot delay, because the really decisive evidence connecting the Johannine *hexaëmeros* with Epiphany is as yet untouched.

The reader in any degree open to the suggestions already made must surely begin to ask: Is there any clear proof connecting this portion of the Fourth Gospel with the ancient celebration of Epiphany on January 6th as the Feast of the Baptism of Christ and Manifestation of his divine Powers (*natalis virtutum*)? And if such connection exists, can it be proved that the observances are not dependent on the Gospel, instead of conversely? The fact is indisputable that in all the

²⁵ Mark does not indeed give the moral content of the Temptation story, but only states the fact (1 13). The moral content is reserved for 8 27-33; but the occurrence of the Rebuke (8 33) in the very words of Mt. 4 10 cannot be accidental, and the transfer is the significant point.

most ancient rituals Jn. 2 1-11 is the lesson for Epiphany; even the West, when transferring the significance of the feast to the Coming of the Magi, *still retaining the Wedding in Cana* as part of the lesson. But may it not be that the Beginning of Miracles was chosen simply from appropriateness? Why suppose that Jn. 2 1-11 was written to fit the occasion?

The answer is apparent to all who know the real antiquity of the Feast of the Epiphany, and the nature of its pre-Christian observance. For January 6 was not chosen to commemorate the Baptism of Jesus and Manifestation ("Epiphany") of his divine power because of a historical tradition that he was actually baptized on January 6, any more than December 25 was chosen because of a historical tradition that the *dies invicti solis* happened to be Jesus' real birthday. The date, January 6, was chosen because in Egypt and throughout the oriental world it had been from time immemorial the feast of the "Epiphany of Dionysus," the god of returning light and life. The proof that Jn. 2 1-11 is written with an eye to the celebration of this Feast of Epiphany (in Christianized form) and not conversely, is the fact that the "Beginning of Miracles" substituted by the fourth evangelist for the Markan exorcisms and healings in Capernaum is an unmistakable parallel to the wonders told in Egypt, Arabia, Phoenicia, Ionia, and doubtless elsewhere also, of the Epiphany of Dionysus. For as Pliny, Pausanias, and a host of writers both heathen and Christian make clear, the *turning of water to wine* at his festival on January 5-6 was the typical wonder of the god of the vine.²⁶ In some sanctuaries of the god

²⁶ Pliny, Nat. Hist. II, 231, relates of the consul Mucianus that he believed the story, Andro in insula templo Liberi patris fontem nonis Januariis semper vini saporem fundere. Cf. Pausanias, VI, xxvi, 1, 2. Athenaeus, I, 61, p. 34a, relates of a place ἀπέχων ὀκτὼ στάδια τῆς Ἡλείας, ἐν ᾧ οἱ ἐγχώριοι κατακλείοντες τοῖς Διονυσίοις χαλκοῦς λάβητας τρεῖς κενοὺς παρόντων τῶν ἐπιδημοῦντων ἀποσφραγίζονται καὶ ὕστερον ἀνοίγοντες εὗρισκουσιν οἴνου πεπληρωμένους. See a long list of further authorities cited by Walter Bauer Hdb. z. N. T., Johev., ad loc.

the miracle was performed on water contained in stone or brass receptacles; in other localities the spring or stream itself was turned to wine on the anniversary. Epiphanius knows of the belief as attaching to the wondrous Nile as well as to the marvellous springs of Petra and Gerasa. He had himself tasted the water changed to wine at Cibyra in Caria.²⁷ The change took place, he expressly says, annually, at Epiphany, *on the anniversary of the miracle at Cana*.

In the case of streams like the Nile and the Adonis (Nahr Ibrahim) where the change of color at time of flood has produced legends traceable to a remote antiquity, the physical origin of the legend is unmistakable. Thus the "green water" of the Nile at Cairo at "low Nile," produced by quantities of algae from the swamps of the Soudan, passes away with the first rise (early in July), the algae being unable to live in turbid water.

"By August the river in lower Egypt is full of dark, red-brown sediment, brought down by the Blue Nile and the Atbara."²⁸

That the pagan legend of the blood of the slaughtered Osiris cast into the Nile has its origin in this phenomenon of the rapid change in color at the beginning of flood from "green" to "dark red-brown," will not be doubted even by those who hesitate to attribute a similar origin to the biblical story of Moses' turning its waters to blood. The same is of course true of the legend of the slaughtered Adonis and the Adonis river, which annually at the beginning of flood (January) discolors the whole Mediterranean off the shore at Byblus (Jebeel) with its blood-red sediment. But we are concerned simply with the antiquity and extent of the Dionysiac legends of the

²⁷ Panar. li.

²⁸ F. R. Cana in Enc. Brit. ed. xi, s.s. "Nile."

turning of water to wine on January 6th.²⁹ Additional evidence of so well attested a fact is hardly required; but it is well to note that the modern custom (in Russia and elsewhere) of blessing streams and rivers at Epiphany (January 6) goes back not only to Christian but into pre-Christian antiquity.³⁰ It was the day in which Christ by his baptism had "consecrated the streams of Jordan," as Ignatius himself (115 A.D.) writes to the Ephesians (xviii) of the passion of Jesus as "cleansing water" (cf. Jn. 2 4). Hence one of the functions of the day was the solemn consecration of water for baptisms throughout the year. Just as the modern pilgrim still obtains his bottle of water for baptisms from Jordan at the place of the Baptizing, so in pagan times, as we learn from Aristides Rhetor (135 A.D.), it was part of the *ὕδατος* (i.e. Water-festival) in Alexandria on Tybi 11 (January 6) to draw water and store it up for purposes of lustration. This water was exported like the modern Jordan water, and was supposed to improve with age like wine.³¹

Finally, Epiphany as the "first feast" came to have the same calendar importance for the Church as the *Rosh-ha-shanah* for the Synagogue. For on it the "Paschal letters" were sent out to determine the fasts and feasts of the ecclesiastical year.

It may, of course, be mere coincidence that the *hexaëmeros* with which the Fourth Gospel begins, has its

²⁹ Egyptian datings are of course different. Variants arise from causes both physical and religious. The flood of Nile begins in July, not January. On the other hand, the calendar is largely determined by astral phenomena, so that sun-myths and nature-myths intermingle. Finally, the Egyptian calendar rotates through the year, the Egyptian year being defective.

³⁰ The same Maximus Taurinensis who speaks of Epiphany as the *dies natalis virtutum* (sc. Domini), gives three alternative traditions of the origin of its observance: *Ferunt enim hodie Christum Dominum nostrum vel (1) stella duce a gentibus adoratum, vel (2) invitatum ad nuptias aquas in vino vertisse, vel (3) suscepto a Iohanne baptisate consecrasse fluentia Jordanis* (Hom. xxix).

³¹ Oratio, Oxford ed. of 1780, ii, 573 and 612. Cited by Lake in Dictionary of Religion and Ethics, s.v. "Epiphany."

start on New Year's Day of the Julian calendar (January 1). The "Witness of John" to the Jews (1 19-28), like his baptism of Jesus, falls appropriately within the limits of the old year; for John, though greatest of the prophets, is less than the least in the kingdom of God. But "on the morrow" he proclaims Jesus as "Lamb of God," Giver of "the Spirit," and "Son of God" (29-34). This (if the evangelist has the beginning of the year in mind) would be January 1. For the Confession of Peter "on the morrow" (35-42) falls thus on January 2, the Promise of the Revelation of the Son of man given "on the morrow" (43-51) falls on January 3, the Arrival in Cana "on the third day" falls on January 5, and the Changing of the Water of "the Jews' Purifications" to the New Wine of the Kingdom of God takes place in the evening of January 5-6, i.e. on "Twelfth Night," or Epiphany.

However the case may be with this possibility of an attempted adjustment in Jn. 1 19-2 11 to the Julian calendar, as in Cappadocia was the practice for the observance of Easter,³² it is highly probable that the synchronism with the rebuilding of the temple, in the story of the beginning of the public ministry, which in Jn. 2 13-22 follows immediately after the Manifestation "to the Disciples," has been purposely adapted to mark the birth of Jesus as synchronous with the rebuilding of the temple and consequently his death as occurring when he had lived exactly a jubilee of years ($7 \times 7 = 49$). For, as we have shown in the work already cited,³³ the "year of the two Gemini" (29 A.D.) was an accepted date for the Crucifixion from the very earliest period to which our sources reach back. And yet this date is *certainly*

³² The Cappadocian Quartodecimans adopted March 25, i.e. vernal equinox of the Julian calendar, in every year as their fixed date for the Feast of the Resurrection. See Bacon, *Fourth Gospel in Research and Debate*, 1910, p. 391 ff.

³³ *Fourth Gospel*, &c., p. 390 ff.

incorrect; for *no* method of calculating the incidence of passover permits it to fall on either a Thursday or a Friday in 29 A.D. The date 29 A.D. for the Crucifixion is *artificial*, like the elaborate datings of the Jewish rabbis, and like those of Hippolytus and the later Christian chronographers. But it is the chronological starting-point for both Luke and John. Only the fourth evangelist looks upon Jesus as older "when he began." The synchronism of Jn. 2 20, substituted for Lk. 3 1 f. at approximately the same point in the story, means (as it was understood to mean by the author of *de montibus Sina et Sion*) that Jesus attained, either at this passover or the next, the age of 47 years. At the passover of Jn. 6 4 he had therefore attained 48 years, at the ensuing feast of tabernacles of Jn. 7 2 he was "not yet fifty years old" (8 57); but at the passover of the crucifixion he had attained 49 (i.e. 7×7) years, so that the beginning of his fiftieth or "jubilee" year marked "the hour when he should be glorified."

This interpretation of the calendar and chronology of the fourth evangelist implies of course that he does not accept the statement of Lk. 3 23 that "Jesus when he began (his ministry) was about thirty years of age." But what is the real source and value of this Lukan date? In my article "*Lukan vs. Johannine Chronology*"³⁴ and the further discussion of the subject in the volume already referred to,³⁵ I endeavored to show that the item Lk. 3 23 stands absolutely alone, though its clear and positive statement has carried everything before it in later attempts to fix the date of Jesus' birth. Matthew's narrative certainly implies that he was much older. Luke's own sources imply that he was born "in the days of Herod the king" (Lk. 1 5), if not that he had "fully attained the age of forty years" when he began

³⁴ *Expositor*, vii, 15 (March, 1907), pp. 206-220.

³⁵ *Fourth Gospel*, &c., ch. xv.

his ministry (Ac. 7 23). Moreover the ancient tradition of "the elders" derived by Irenaeus³⁶ from Papias, that Jesus had fully attained the age of the teacher (forty years), when he began to teach, is by no means to be lightly disregarded. But while able to show that the thirty-year item was in conflict with earlier tradition, and suspecting that it stood connected with the system of reckoning by fifteens and thirties characteristic of the Basilidean chronography, I was not then able to point to any specific passage to which it might be traced. I may venture now to refer to the statement of Jerome in his commentary on Ezekiel concerning the current interpretation of Ezek. 1 1. He tells us that the date, "In the thirtieth year," was usually understood of the prophet's age,³⁷ but while denying this goes on to explain that "the fourth month in the fifth day of the month" means January fifth "the day still observed as Epiphany," and that "symbolically" Ezekiel in saying "In the thirtieth year, in the fourth month, the fifth day of the month, the heavens were opened and I saw visions of God" is "prefiguring the Lord and Saviour, who came to his baptism at thirty years of age, which for man is the age of maturity." Thereafter in spite of his rejection of the current interpretation Jerome adds:

"It must also be understood that the Lord came to baptism in the thirtieth year of his age, in the fourth month, that which among us is called January and stands first at the opening of the year. . . . And he [Ezekiel] adds 'the fifth day of the month' to signify the baptism, at which 'the heavens were opened' to Christ, and this is still the adorable day of Epiphany."³⁸

I cannot but think that in this ancient dating of Epiphany on the basis of Ezek. 1 1, as occurring on

³⁶ Haer. II, xxii, 5. The whole chapter is significant.

³⁷ Non, ut plerique aestimant, tricesimus annus aetatis prophetae dicitur.

³⁸ Comm. in Ezek. ad loc.

January 5, in the thirtieth year of Jesus' age, we have the real origin of the unique statement of Lk. 3 23, that when "the heavens were opened" to Jesus, and he "saw visions of God" and began his ministry, "he was about thirty years of age." The fourth evangelist has the same dating for Epiphany, but holds that Jesus had nearly attained the age of *fifty* years. Irenæus, as we know, attempts to reconcile the two by extending the ministry over a period of twenty (!) years.³⁹

³⁹ Haer. II, xxii.

BOOK REVIEWS

BOOKS ON THE OLD TESTAMENT AND THE APOCRYPHA.

A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE OLD TESTAMENT. GEORGE BUCHANAN GRAY, D.D. Charles Scribner's Sons. 1913. Pp. 253. 75 cents.

THE LITERATURE OF THE OLD TESTAMENT. GEORGE FOOT MOORE. Home University Library of Modern Knowledge, No. 65. Henry Holt & Co. 1913. Pp. 256. 50 cents.

THE BOOK OF JOB. HOMER B. SPRAGUE, Ph.D. Sherman, French, & Co. 1913. Pp. 243. \$1.25.

LE LIVRE DU PROPHÈTE AMOS. Extrait de la Bible du Centenaire, préparée par la Société Biblique de Paris. Société Biblique de Paris. 1913.

As Professor Gray says in his introductory chapter, little even of the canonical literature of the ancient Hebrews was written with any immediate intention that it should form part of a sacred book. This being so, an inquiry into the origin and history of this literature has to consider two questions which are more or less distinct. The one question is, how and when did the Jewish community accept this literature as sacred and authoritative; the other question is, how and when were the contents of this literature written.

Professor Gray in his volume concerns himself immediately with the second of these questions, prefacing his work with the briefest statement only of conclusions which many have reached and in which he concurs, viz.: Parts of the "Law" were accepted as an authoritative book as early as Josiah's Reformation in 621 B.C.; the whole, or substantially the whole, Law was so accepted by 444 B.C.; the "Prophets" became part of the Jewish Scripture not improbably soon after 250 B.C.; and the "Writings" gradually obtained the same position within the next two or three centuries. Then follow two hundred or more pages devoted to a popular but satisfactory statement of how and when the contents of the various Old Testament books got into their present form.

Professor Moore, on the other hand, devotes the first chapter of his valuable little volume to a discussion of the first of the above questions: How and when the Jewish community accepted the Old Testament canonical books as sacred and authoritative. This discussion on the formation of the Canon is marked by that in-

cisiveness of attack and clearness of statement which renders all the writer's work so valuable. The book as a whole is excellent, and is unquestionably the best popular treatment of the subject to put into the hands of interested laymen and laywomen.

The Book of Job is admittedly the finest literary creation of Semitic genius; as such it should not be reserved for the enjoyment of the few who may master Hebrew, but should be made accessible to all for their joy and inspiration. Dr. Sprague has studied the problem for twenty years, and the results lie before us in iambic metre. The Prologue and Epilogue he has left in prose.

An introductory essay advances the theory that the Book of Job is an allegory of man's past, present, and future, and that the main object of the discussion between Job and his three friends was the refutation of the prevalent hard-and-fast doctrine of the Old Testament, that worldly prosperity measures merit. It proposes a more hopeful solution of the mystery of undeserved suffering in the light of the doctrine of Evolution. It accounts for Job's inconsistencies by the theory that at times his unparalleled sufferings affected his reason, paroxysms of wildest frenzy alternating with lucid intervals of sweetness and light.

The Book of Amos possesses an interest all its own as being the oldest Hebrew book that has been preserved to us. Yet it gains a stronger claim than this upon our attention when once we have carefully read it; for the book has something inexplicable about it in that, oldest though it is, it presents many of the greatest thoughts of literary prophecy at an already high state of development. Any new translation of the Book of Amos, especially one that shows the scholar's hand, is therefore welcomed with interest. The French translation put forth by the Bible Society of Paris is to be commended as a compendium of scholarly results. By means of the clever use of type of different sizes, and brackets, parentheses, asterisks, etc., the original text, as modified by different hands, is clearly indicated. The notes at the foot of each page, though short, are illuminating. Perhaps some day English and American Bible Societies will give us such texts.

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DIE APOSTELGESCHICHTE. KRITISCH-EXEGETISCHER KOMMENTAR ÜBER DAS NEUE TESTAMENT. Begründet von H. A. W. MEYER. Neunte Auflage bearbeitet von H. H. WENDT. Vandenhoeck u. Ruprecht. Göttingen. 1913. Pp. iv, 370. 8m.

The eighth edition of Wendt's commentary on Acts in the Meyer series was published in 1899. Since then, a mass of relevant literature has accumulated, including the valuable discussions of von Harnack. Loyal to his duty as an editor of a Meyer commentary, Wendt has read, marked, and inwardly digested that literature, or at least the best of it, with the result that he has been able to offer to the student of early church history an edition of Acts at once brought down to date and indispensable.

The external form of this, the ninth, edition has changed, but the main positions of the eighth edition as regards the text, purpose, authorship, date, and sources of Acts are again defended. In respect, however, of the chronology and the historical trustworthiness of the document, some adjustment of opinion is manifest. To illustrate: the readings of the Western text are still regarded, with a few exceptions (e.g., the "we" in 11 28), as secondary; the purpose of Acts is primarily historical and secondly unto edification, no apologetic tendencies in reference to the Roman government being discernible; the name of the author is unknown; and the date, since Acts betrays acquaintance with the *Antiquities* of Josephus, is to be set between 95 and 100 A.D. Nor has Wendt shifted his ground noticeably in the matter of sources. As in the eighth edition, so now, he maintains that the author had access to but one written source. Not that the document must have been actually in the hands of the author of Acts; he may have used it only as he remembered it from a previous reading or hearing (p. 24). This one written source, which is not simply a diary or a travel-document but a history of early Christian missions with a decided interest in Paul, furnishes the basis of the narrative of Acts about Stephen, the founding of the church at Antioch, the three missionary tours which started from that Syrian city, and the voyage to Rome. Since the document ended with the two years at Rome, and since the author of Acts had no trustworthy traditions about the outcome of the imprisonment, the book of Acts ends where the source ended. Wendt still believes that there are traces of the source in 2 43-47, 4 32-35, and 5 12-15, but he is no longer confident that these traces mark the beginning of the document. The author of the source is not improbably Luke, who was an eye-witness of some of the events narrated. The unknown author of Acts, when he comes to write his book, has at his

disposal, besides the information from that source, only a bundle of traditions of unequal worth.

But while Wendt's conclusions regarding the sources of Acts remain essentially unaltered, the reasons for them have been re-written and amplified (cf. especially pp. 21-37). The decisive criterion, we are now informed, for the detection of a written source in Acts is neither the literary character (language, style, etc.) of the work nor its historical trustworthiness, but the appearance in the text of numerous and important cases of unevenness, inconsistency, contradiction, evident misinterpretation, and the like, instances which are to be found not only in the first half but also in the second half of the book. In this connection it is interesting to note that Wendt disputes the contention of von Harnack that in 28 8-10, there is an indication that the "we" functioned as a physician; in fact, our editor dismisses the "medical language of St. Luke" with the dry remark that it were as easy to prove from the nautical expressions that the author of them was a sailor by profession as to prove from the medical expressions that he was a physician.

Turning now to the points in which Wendt has modified or changed his views, we observe that a study of the Delphi inscription has led him to put the arrival of Gallio in Corinth in the summer of 52 (Deissmann says 51). This fixed date compels him then to push back the Apostolic Conference from 52 (in his eighth edition) to 49. On the other hand, he still holds that Festus came into office in 61, so that the dates of the last five years of Paul's life remain as hitherto, 59-64. As regards the historical value of Acts, Wendt, apart from the preface of his new edition, entertains much the same opinions as those set forth in the edition of 1899. Two quotations will suffice. "The peculiar mingling of matter of unequal historical worth is a fact to which justice could not be done either by deriving the whole book, as tradition derives it, from the writer of the 'we' sections or by holding, as radical criticism holds, that the whole book is a writing influenced by ecclesiastical politics. The proper explanation of the phenomena of Acts is found only when one recognizes that the book contains an older narrative written by one who for a time was a companion of Paul, a narrative which a sub-apostolic writer has worked over, combining this valuable source with various sorts of traditional material" (p. 37). "Many of the long speeches of the book are free compositions of the author; not only the speeches of Peter but also some of the speeches of Paul (13 16 ff., 14 15 ff., 22 1 ff., 24 10 ff.)." In the preface, however, Wendt confesses himself a convert to Norden's opinion that the address at Athens

is wholly a composition of the author of Acts, who knew either the lost treatise of Apollonius—*On Sacrifices*—or else a biography of Apollonius in which the references to that treatise were more precise than in the extant *Life of Apollonius* by Philostratus. From one or other of these sources the author of Acts borrowed the theme of Paul's speech at Athens. Notwithstanding his acceptance of Norden's hypothesis, Wendt assures us that his general estimate of Acts is not affected, nor his particular view of the relation of Acts as a whole to its main source.

The quotations and references seem to have been carefully verified; the slight inaccuracy however in the quotation (17 23) from Philostratus holds over from the eighth edition. Furthermore, the English reader who still finds Alexander and Lumby in the list of the commentaries has a right to wonder why there is no mention of one or more of the following commentators: Knowling (1900), Rackham (1901), Bartlet (1901), Gilbert (1908), Furneaux (1912).

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DIE BERGREDE. HARE HERKOMST EN STREKKING. K. F. PROOST. J. Brandt & Zoon. Amsterdam. 1914. Pp. 163.

This is a Leyden dissertation for the doctorate in theology. It discusses the sources and original form of the Sermon on the Mount, the eschatology of the Synoptic Gospels and the eschatological character of the ethics of the Gospels, and the relation of the ethics of the Gospels to Jewish ethics; ending with a commentary on the Sermon on the Mount which is in the main a collection of Jewish parallels to the sayings of Jesus in the Sermon.

The author has an extensive knowledge of modern literature on the Synoptic problem, and especially on the Sermon on the Mount and of the eschatological controversy, and discusses the questions with sufficient independence. After an exposition and criticism of the theories of Wellhausen and Harnack, he comes to the conclusion that the supposed source "Q" is nothing more than a name for what Matthew and Luke have in common beyond Mark. In the other controversy he enrolls himself with the "eschatologists," and decides that the moral teachings of the Sermon on the Mount are an "interim ethics," binding until the coming of the Kingdom, and contain the conditions of entrance into the Kingdom.

In the comparison of the Sermon on the Mount with Jewish ethics, he deals more fairly with the Jewish side than many who have written on the subject; but his Jewish parallels are chiefly the shop-

worn quotations, gathered from authors whose bias he himself remarks. Bacher's works on the "Agada" do not seem to have been used at all.

Like many dissertators, Dr. Proost compels the reader to accompany him through his investigation, conducting us into blind alleys to point triumphantly at the very bottom to the sign "No Thoroughfare." In a great part of the volume we recognize that we are only reading revised note-books, excerpts and analyses, criticisms and observations, which have never been digested or assimilated.

For a *specimen eruditionis* there is an extraordinary number of misprints in the Greek; and some suspicion falls on the rabbinical erudition of a scholar who does not know what the Hebrew equivalents for "this world," "the world to come," are.

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THE EPISTLE OF PRIESTHOOD: STUDIES IN THE EPISTLE TO THE HEBREWS.
ALEXANDER NAIRNE. T. & T. Clark. 1913. Pp. 446.

The Professor of Hebrew in King's College, London, is the latest of many distinguished Old Testament scholars who have been attracted to the study of the Epistle to the Hebrews. Professor Nairne, however, while he makes excellent use of his special knowledge of the Old Testament background, is more concerned with the permanent religious message of the Epistle than with its treatment of Jewish ritual. The book is divided into two independent sections: (1) a discussion of the teaching of the Epistle, taken as a whole; (2) a detailed exposition, following the order of the chapters. This arrangement has several advantages; but the argument of Hebrews might have been set forth in truer perspective if the general discussion had gone hand in hand with regular exposition.

As regards the critical question, Professor Nairne holds that the Epistle was written at the beginning of the Roman war by a Hellenistic Jew, and is addressed not so much to a given church as to a little company of friends who were tempted to desert their new faith and make common cause with their nation. Confronted with a terrible crisis, they felt that the belief in Jesus as the Messiah was a minor issue; and their friend seeks to keep them within the church by pointing them to the larger and deeper implications of this belief. This he does by considering the life and death of Jesus in their "sacramental" significance. Those aspects of the Gospel history which the common mind was disposed to regard superficially are

brought into the light of the eternal. The earthly life of Jesus is interpreted by the idea of Incarnation; his death on the Cross, by that of an all-sufficing Priesthood. For Professor Nairne the whole secret of the Epistle to the Hebrews is to be sought in its varied applications of the "sacramental principle." Its author was less a theologian or philosopher than one of those minds to which all visible things become the symbols of unseen realities. "He finds a deep spiritual idea of priesthood, of bringing Godward, to be at the heart of all natural life from the beginning of the world, and he marshals his Lord's earthly life on those ascending lines which run up into the will of God. Here is indeed the sacrament of sacraments. In it the visible and the eternal are really one."¹ In the general discussion and the exposition alike Professor Nairne elaborates this conception, and tries to show how it governs the whole thought of the Epistle. The book is a strikingly fresh and original one, informed with a fine religious spirit, and illuminated here and there by real flashes of insight. It is written in a style that is always graceful and interesting, and is relieved, perhaps too frequently, by illustrations from a wide range of literature. From a theological point of view it is suggestive, but to our mind not a little provoking. Professor Nairne makes no real attempt to place the theology of Hebrews in its historical relation to Paulinism, Alexandrianism, Jewish speculation, primitive eschatology. He evades the difficult problems involved in the cardinal doctrine of the priestly intercession in the heavenly sanctuary. He has little to say about the conception of faith which is distinctive of this Epistle. In his account of the "sacramentalism" of Hebrews there is much that has never been better said; but we venture the observation that he clings too fondly to this term, and allows it to warp and obscure his thinking. It is hardly possible to dissociate the term from a certain ecclesiastical type of Christianity; and to describe the writer to the Hebrews as a "sacramentalist" is to identify him with modes of thought which belong to a much later time. Whether consciously or not, Professor Nairne has been at little pains to avoid this confusion. By the use of a misleading term he too often disguises the true character of the symbolism of Hebrews.

E. F. SCOTT.

QUEEN'S UNIVERSITY, KINGSTON, CANADA.

¹ P. 67.

THE WORKINGMAN'S CHRIST. CRAIG S. THOMS. Dodd, Mead, & Co. 1914. Pp. 292. \$1.25.

This book is symptomatic of the fact that the churches are waking up. A particular class of man, the workingman, has of late become the object of their special solicitude, and this first because the workingmen constitute the bulk of the population, and secondly, this preponderating section of the community is in a large measure not interested in the churches. The churches prevailingly have dealt with other-worldly, *post mortem*, interests; whereas for the workingman, the wage-earner, the man dependent for subsistence on his securing employment, the struggle for life is so intense that he has neither interest nor energy left for matters not of immediate concern.

The book is popular in its treatment and attractive in its arrangement. Its fourteen chapters are divided into three parts—"The Church and the Workingman," "Christ and the Workingman," "Christ's Programme." Each chapter is broken up into paragraphs provided with a caption, so that the book is inviting to read. The object of the book is to mediate between the churches and the unchurched. The author's sympathies are with both sides. While he has read the popular literature of the day on his subject, he is not wholly emancipated from traditionalism. However, he is headed right. Were he more thoroughgoing, he probably would not be so serviceable as a mediator. Like Milton's lion at the creation, he is half in and half out, "striving to set free his hinder parts from the earth's crust."

His broad churchmanship is shown when he says of the church on page 59, "Her forms and methods are not final, but must ever be changed to meet changing needs." He still hopes for the solution of the antinomy between capital and labor as the result of the Christianizing of the capitalist and the laborer; not understanding that the very fact of each being capitalist and laborer makes impossible the true Christianizing of either party. What he says on page 214—"The Captains of Industry must be socialized by being Christianized"—would be truer if it read, The Captains of Industry will be Christianized only as the result of their being socialized.

He is at his best when he says on page 95, "The workingman's battle is the battle of this century, his question the question of human rights, his problem the problem of democracy, and his claim to economic and social justice an expression of the mind of the Master"; and, page 123, "The ethics of Jesus can find their fullest expression only in a democracy." It is wearisome, however, in a

book professing to have the social point of view to find the time-worn dogma (p. 214), "To have a new society there must first be new men—men with a new heart." Is it not high time that the realization should begin to gain headway that the true and practicable way, and withal the Biblical way, of getting new men, is to take the old men and put them into new and favorable surroundings? No amount of exhortation to men to be good and brotherly and Christian has ever availed nor can avail on any large scale, when the very necessities of their circumstances and of their environment make it well nigh impossible, or at least extremely difficult, to be anything else but predatory and anti-social.

One of the best parts of the book is the concluding chapter—"Man as Creator"—because of its social implications, involving the co-operation of God and man to establish the Kingdom of God. "Man's greatest need is a cause big enough to spend his life for" (p. 288); "There is only one such cause—'Seek ye first the Kingdom of God and His righteousness'" (p. 291). When the church finally awakes to a realization of what the Gospel really is, to wit, the proclamation of the Cause of Jesus Christ, the invitation to all men to co-operate with God in that Cause, leaving their individual salvation and future welfare to come as a by-product, there will follow a revival such as the world has never known.

The book can only do good and should be widely read within the church and without.

CHARLES P. FAGNANI.

UNION THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

THEOLOGICAL SYMBOLICS. CHARLES AUGUSTUS BRIGGS. Charles Scribner's Sons. 1914. Pp. 429. \$2.50.

The times of dogmatic authority in the Protestant world have long passed, if they ever existed outside narrow limits. Indeed the study of dogma is not for the purpose of imposing old fixed forms upon new generations, but rather for opening up a broad view of the origins of church teaching. Students like Adolf Harnack have even had the general aim of undermining dogmatic authority; believing that the arising of theology, apart from its general acceptance as dogma, was responsible not only for the development but for the transformation of the first facts of belief and experience. But a positive purpose of this character has not been in the mind of most earnest students. There is no doubt that the fundamental study of the origin of theology, while weakening the sense of dogmatic au-

thority, does very significantly deepen the conviction of the genuineness of historical faith, and strengthen the respect for and interest in the religious convictions out of which the natural variations of theology have arisen. In other words, the historical study of religious beliefs instead of narrowing and hardening the views of the earnest student, is one of the most broadening and helpful of modern studies. The man who knows will have wide interests and cannot be a bigot.

After a long period of non-production in our English world, two important books on Creeds have recently appeared. At the end of 1911 W. A. Curtis, the young Professor of Theology in the University of Aberdeen, brought out his history in a book of 502 pages.² And Dr. Charles Augustus Briggs's book of 429 pages—*Theological Symbolics*³—was published early in 1914 by his daughter, ably assisted by President Francis Brown of Union Seminary, who also wrote an appreciative preface. The importance of a scholarly book on such a subject cannot be overestimated.

Both these books are by able scholars. Dr. Briggs spent his life in the study of the Bible and its doctrines, producing a long list of theological and historical works, and contributing many learned articles to encyclopaedias and theological journals. His hair whitened at his tasks. It is a pleasure to follow the lead of a thorough scholar, who makes one feel that no scrap of printed information has escaped him, and who can speak with confidence because he has himself actually been over many parts of the universal field. It was not mere self-appreciation which led Dr. Briggs once to say to a well-known Edinburgh publisher with whom he was negotiating for the publication of his *Psalms*, that he probably knew more about the subject than any other living scholar. This was no less true in many other fields. It was quite natural, therefore, in the present volume, that of some 115 foot-note references to modern theological and historical literature, 58 were to his own publications, covering almost the whole range of theological discussion.

Dr. Briggs's book, though bearing the title, *Theological Symbolics*, is confined quite strictly to the regular orthodox lines. It gives no heretical or non-Christian beliefs, ancient or modern, nor even of post-Reformation sects or denominational divisions. Dr. Briggs also definitely excludes from Symbolics any consideration of Christian Institutions; and he thinks that by such consideration Katten-

² A History of Creeds and Confessions of Faith in Christendom and Beyond, with Historical Tables. T. & T. Clark. 1911.

³ Charles Scribner's Sons. 1914.

busch and Loofs have overloaded their Symbolics, which might have been easily treated separately, as is done, for example, by Stanley and A. V. G. Allen. The main divisions of Dr. Briggs's book show the direction and limitations of his interests.

The first 120 pages are given to "Fundamental Symbolics," including an analytical study of the Apostles' Creed, the Nicene Creed, the Athanasian Creed, and the Faith of Chalcedon. Part Second, consisting of 130 pages, is given to "Particular Symbolics," in which he refers, in a brief and sketchy fashion, to the various Symbols of the Latin Church, the origin of the Reformation and its Symbols, the Symbols of the seventeenth century, Roman Catholic Symbols of the nineteenth century, and the Protestantism of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Part Third, of 162 pages, is devoted to "Comparative Symbolics," in which he takes up the consideration of the principles of the Reformation, the Sacraments, Doctrines of Faith and Morals, the Formula of Concord and its Opponents, the Synod of Dort and Arminianism, Old and New Calvinism, the Westminster Confession, the conflicts of British Christianity, and at the end only a bare half-dozen pages to the "Modern Consensus" (pp. 406-413). His study practically concludes with the Westminster Confession; so that the limits of his doctrinal study are found in the early Creeds recognized alike by Catholics and Reformers, and the main Catholic and Protestant forms, as they stood after the Reformation in Germany and Great Britain. This is a field certainly large enough for the limits of his book, though leaving out of consideration many interesting and important developments.

If we examine three of the simple requirements which a scholarly book of this kind must meet, they will furnish us a sufficient basis for judgment. It should be comprehensive—omitting nothing fundamental; absolutely historical—giving the necessary historical setting, and including the historical bibliography; analytical and comparative—the exegesis not only fundamental but above all things without personal bias. This is the one great field in which superficiality or partisanship can have no message of value.

Dr. Briggs, as already indicated, chose his task in the beaten path of historical orthodoxy, though his broad title certainly should not legitimately have left out of view the very virile theological work which does not receive or aspire to that category. It is a grave question whether one can ever really comprehend the heart of orthodox truth without also seeing to the full the thought which struggled against it, and not infrequently changed the character of its devel-

opment. Dr. Briggs has given careful attention to the historical setting, which is the best of all ways to arrive at an understanding of the real meaning and significance of Christianity. In his very full and admirable historical introductions he may have intended to give all the attention he considered necessary to variant thought, but it is more than probable that his temper of mind did not interest him in that direction. He found his scholarly instincts leading him deep into the old history.

In its bibliography Dr. Briggs's book is pre-eminent. No German volume of its kind surpasses it. No other book in English approaches it. No important scrap of bibliographical information in the field which it covers is found wanting. It is from this side that one is able to realize the thoroughness with which Dr. Briggs devoted his life to fundamental scholarly investigation. Dr. Briggs also goes deep into the doctrinal analysis of the creeds. This, of course, is the most difficult task confronting the theologian, to know how to subordinate the subordinate, and to make the great great. Professor Fisher, and especially Dr. Philip Schaff, had already done very broad work in this general interpretative field; and it is not mild praise to say that Dr. Briggs's work compares favorably here with theirs. But here is still the awaiting field, if one may confess it, for the still greater theologian yet to come. It is on its successful doing that the future good understanding between the different branches of Christendom is to depend. The intellectual temper of Dr. Briggs manifests itself quite clearly. In his deep respect for the ancient principles and forms of the teaching he often reminds one of the Bishop of Oxford.⁴ This attitude he never surrenders. It gives him reverence for many forms of thought which Liberal theology may have entirely dismissed. It is interesting to follow his earnest exposition and defence of the Virgin Birth of Christ, and Purgatory.

But when we come to the important question of ability to do justice to variant phases, and especially modern thought, Dr. Briggs shows his limitations. Here lies the weakness of such a distinctive personality as his. His few references to modern views indicate his inability to contribute anything of value in that direction. For example, he classes Kantian and Ritschlian thought together, as "reducing Christianity to a moral system" (p. 246), which, of course, is not really true even of Kant, and certainly not of Ritschl, who saw ethics springing out of religion. But this generalization is not so bad as another in which he classes Ritschl, along with Renan and

⁴The Basis of Anglican Fellowship in Faith and Organization, by Charles Gore, D.D., Bishop of Oxford. A. R. Mowbray & Co. Easter, 1914.

Baur, as putting forth "a series of efforts to get rid of the historic Christ and Apostolic Christianity." And he confidently assures us that "all these have been refuted by the great theologians of the last century. All have been driven from the field except the school of Ritschl, about which the opponents of the supernatural have rallied for a desperate stand against Apostolic Christianity" (p. 246). This is too trifling a treatment of such theologians as Herrmann, Kaftan, Kattenbusch, and such historians as Harnack and Loofs. All these men make the historic Christ the central point of their religious world. Only radical leaders like Troeltsch, after abandoning the position of Ritschl, attacked the uniqueness of Christ and the positiveness of Christianity. Yet it is Troeltsch who enjoys the distinction of using fresh arguments in strengthening the theistic position.

Dr. Briggs's book was earnestly written in the interests of Christian unity. Indeed, in his later years he was inspired by this enthusiasm, and even cherished hopes of nearer Catholic and Protestant reapproachment, with possible church union—which is a different matter. At least he has made his best contribution in this field.

In many important directions these books of Professor Curtis and Dr. Briggs supplement each other, and together make a notable scholarly contribution to the resources of the student of historical Christianity.

ALBERT TEMPLE SWING.

OBERLIN, OHIO.

THE INFLUENCE OF THE BIBLE ON CIVILIZATION. ERNST VON DOBSCHÜTZ, Professor of the New Testament in the University of Halle-Wittenberg. New York. Charles Scribner's Sons. Pp. 190. \$1.25.

In this popular sketch Professor Dobschütz has made available the results of his studies upon the attitude of the Christian Church toward the Bible at different periods, and of the influence of the Bible upon civilization at these epochs. The first chapter is a particularly clear and illuminating discussion of the process by which the church came to recognize the harmony of the Old and New Testaments and the authority of the entire book. What early scholars failed to see is that unity does not imply uniformity, and because they failed to see it the whole Bible was placed upon one level of authority, and the tendency to interpret the New Testament in the light of the Old was carried to an unwarrantable extreme. Modern historical criticism has made inevitable the distinctions that

would have saved the church from a pernicious attitude toward the Bible. Professor Dobschütz goes so far as to say: "The spiritualizing and allegorizing of real history"—the direct outcome of the attitude toward the Bible to which we have just referred—"is the greatest damage ever done to religion" (p. 20).

The chapters unfolding the influence of the Bible upon political, social, moral, and literary ideals abundantly repay study. In a brief compass the author has condensed and put into concrete form the story of an evolution with which every well-informed man should be familiar. The reasons which led the church to withhold the Scriptures from the laity are clearly set forth, and he brings this attitude of the Popes into closer connection than is usual with the increasing influence of the Albigensians. Professor Dobschütz' analysis of the Albigensian theology will be novel to those writers who have confused them with the Waldensians.

The influence of the art of printing, of historical criticism, and of new scientific theories upon the modern attitude toward the Scriptures has been, on the whole, in the opinion of Professor Dobschütz, to withdraw the Bible from general civilization and to restrict it to its own proper domain, religion (p. 181). Even in theology, he holds the Bible is the source of historical information, not the authoritative proof of doctrine. Prof. Dobschütz treats fairly the popular contention that if the Bible is not true from cover to cover, then it seems not to be trustworthy at all. The answer he makes is that this contention "confuses two different aspects which ought to be kept separate. The Bible is not a text-book . . . it is a book of Christian devotion. This was its original intention, and I venture to think that it is not a loss but a gain if the Bible is once more applied to its proper purpose" (p. 186). The true function of the Bible in regard to the church, he holds, is not to give it a rule for dogma, but to provide it with an historical orientation that will give it the right direction for the setting forth of doctrine (p. 188). The closing chapter, from which these positions are taken, will awaken the most dissent among conservative scholars. The difference between them and the author will touch his denials rather than his affirmations.

GEORGE E. HORR

THE NEWTON THEOLOGICAL INSTITUTION.

THE THREE RELIGIONS OF CHINA. W. E. SOOTHILL. Hodder & Stoughton. 1913. Pp. xii, 324.

This volume contains lectures given in Oxford in 1912 under the auspices of the Board for the Training of Missionaries, the establishment of which was one of the fruits of the Edinburgh Missionary Conference in 1910. The author, who spent thirty years in China, was formerly Principal of the Shansi Imperial University and is to be the President of the United Universities Central-China University.

Chapters are devoted to Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism, severally, dealing chiefly with the origin and the distinctive types of the three religions. These religions are not, however, like so many streams flowing each in its own proper channel, but have overflowed and mingled their waters, so that the common notions of the Chinese on religious subjects and their religious life are a fusion or confusion of ideas and practices derived from all these sources. The following chapters, accordingly, show how early and classical Chinese conceptions have developed, and how they have been modified by Taoism and Buddhism, under the heads: "The Idea of God"; "Man's Relationship to God and Approach to the Divine"; "Cosmological Ideas"; "The Soul, Ancestor Worship, Eschatology"; "Moral Ideals"; "Sin and its Consequences"; "The Official Cult, or Public Religion"; "Private Religion."

The treatment is well suited to the purpose of the lectures; the main features are clearly set out and illustrated, without being obscured by a multiplicity of details. The author does not follow Legge and Ross in their reconstruction of primitive monotheism, nor does he imitate De Groot in carrying back the dualism of Yin and Yang to the beginnings of Chinese religion or in finding the key to everything in the idea of "Tao." An admirable sanity pervades the whole discussion, and full justice is done to the higher elements in Chinese religion and morals, without disguising its animistic and polytheistic features.

Like several recent writers, Mr. Soothill is inclined to ascribe some of the characteristic developments of Mahayana Buddhism to Christian influence. He thinks that the notions of heaven and hell may have come from farther west than India and be associated with some branch of the Christian Church, and that the doctrine of salvation which Buddhism brought to China was not its own, but had been appropriated by it; especially that the doctrine of Amitabha, the Saviour, is a "Western accretion." "The influence of Buddhism on Western theology through Gnosticism, which is

only another word for Buddhism, has already been referred to [p. 86—Pfleiderer is the authority], and there can be little doubt that Western ideas of retribution and salvation, possibly Messianic, more probably Christian, are at the base of the teachings of the Mahayana system as found in China and Japan" (p. 262 f.).

That Gnosticism "is only another word for Buddhism" does not mean that Gnosticism is only Buddhism under another name, but that the author is trifling with an etymological parallel which is not parallel. As for Christian influence in Mahayana doctrine, the initial question is, Through what channel did an "essence of Christianity" reach India or China in the early centuries of our era from which everything specifically Christian had been eliminated?

One of the best things about this volume is the spirit in which it is written, and the incidental counsels to those who expect to be missionaries among the Chinese are as admirable in temper as they are wise in substance. The book may be commended not only to future missionaries and those particularly interested in missions, but to general readers, as the clearest and most comprehensive popular presentation of the subject that has appeared.

GEORGE F. MOORE.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

THE NEW PHILOSOPHY OF HENRI BERGSON. ÉDOUARD LEROY. Translated from the French by VINCENT BENSON, M.A. Henry Holt & Co. 1913. Pp. x, 235. \$1.25.

BERGSON AND THE MODERN SPIRIT: An Essay in Constructive Thought. GEORGE ROWLAND DODSON, Ph.D. American Unitarian Association, Boston. 1913. Pp. vi, 304. \$1.35.

M. LeRoy writes with the enthusiasm of a disciple, and at the same time with the conviction and mastery of one who has thought things out for himself. "It is after cool consideration," he says, "with full consciousness of the exact value of words, that we are able to pronounce the revolution which it [Bergson's work] effects equal in importance with that effected by Kant, or even by Socrates" (pp. 1-2). But he remarks in the Preface that he has not had the honor of being Bergson's pupil, and that when he became acquainted with Bergson's philosophy his own direct reflection had already produced in him similar trains of thought. The Preface contains also Bergson's acknowledgment of the author's "deep sympathy of thought" and "power of rethinking the subject in a personal and original manner" (p. vi). M. LeRoy is un-

doubtedly peculiarly qualified to expound the quintessence of Bergsonism, and this he has successfully accomplished in the present volume. It is to be recommended to any reader who requires a condensed and summary statement of the matter made with a persuasiveness which is exceeded only by the original texts themselves.

It becomes increasingly apparent that there is one crucial question which is decisive for the truth or falsity of the Bergsonian philosophy. Is there or is there not a clear and trustworthy experience in which a something that may be called process, change, activity, life, creation, continuity, or real time, is revealed as an unanalyzable datum? Those who oppose Bergson will be those who either find nothing of the sort, or always find some peculiar complex or manifold of different items in the context to which they are referred. Those who support Bergson must appeal to a unique experience, in which differences are somehow both given and not given: given because they may be explicated by analysis and are virtually referred to whenever the experience is described; not given because they are somehow coalesced or melted into one another. If this paradox is examined by logical methods, the opponent of Bergson must be successful. If, on the other hand, the advocate of Bergson appeals to an illumination which is more authoritative than logic, he withdraws the matter from discussion and retires into a conviction which will be undisturbed because it is wholly private. "The revelation," says M. LeRoy, "is overpowering, and once vouchsafed will never afterwards be forgotten." Never, perhaps, by M. LeRoy, or by any individual for whom the revelation was a profound personal experience; but in the annals of the impersonal enterprise of knowledge it will, I venture to say, never find a place.

There is nothing essentially incorrect in appealing to intuition; for if by this one means a direct inspection of matters under discussion or the peculiar importance attaching to perception as contrasted with discursive thought, it is the fundamental thesis of all empiricism. But Bergson's method is radical and, as I think, vicious, in that he attaches cognitive priority to the sort of immediacy that precedes analysis or that may be recovered only by forgetting analysis. It is to impute oracular validity to that "first fine care-less rapture" which precedes the serious effort to know. To know immediately is at least to exercise attention and discrimination, and to discover complexity where experience at first blush was confused or chaotic. "*Absolute* knowledge is found to be the result of *inte-*

gral experience" (p. 35). But the central fallacy of Bergsonism is to suppose that when we first experience that which upon further examination turns out to be multiple or infinite, we somehow experience all that such later examination could reveal. "We are aware of the elementary disturbances which constitute matter in the perceptible quality in which they suffer contraction, as we are aware of the beating of our heart in the general feeling that we have of living" (p. 35). But we are not aware of the beating of our heart until discrimination has emphasized it, brought it into view. Nor is it possible to envisage the totality of such discriminable aspects in any single immediate experience. Either they are ignored altogether, as is the case with ordinary unsophisticated experience, or they must be described in the summaries and formulas of science.

Dr. Dodson lays stress on the relations of Bergson to his contemporaries, and on the ethical and religious implications of his philosophy. As respects the first question, one may properly take exception to his references to William James. The statement that "the American philosopher follows the Frenchman in his theory, we may even say his demonstration, of the impossibility of knowing the fullness and richness of life through conceptual thought" (p. 222) is, to say the least, misleading, in view of the contents of James's *Reflex Action and Theism*, published in 1881. What the author means by saying that James "frankly admitted the valid criticisms offered against his original theory of pragmatism, and made so many concessions that practically nothing was left of it at last except the part of it that argument can never reach"—passes comprehension. Again, the author appears to believe that, according to James, "if we are to know the true from the false, there must be some reference to a reality outside our experience" (p. 212). I say "appears to believe," because in another passage (p. 207) the author expresses himself ambiguously. In any case he ignores James's conception of an experiential reality as this is set forth in the *Essays on Radical Empiricism*. The whole discussion of James, as well, I should say, as of Dewey, is careless and inadequate.

The question of the ethical and religious implications of Bergson's philosophy is, I suppose, inevitable, although I suspect that Bergson himself would be the first to condemn it as premature. As the question is discussed in the present volume, little more is accomplished than to show that Bergson does prove morally and spiritually stimulating to Dr. Dodson, and otherwise to bring to light the limitations and internal difficulties of Bergson's system as thus far set forth. We are told that ethical and religious beliefs may turn

out to be "primary instincts," and so to possess an authoritative-ness above that of the intellect which would discredit them (pp. 133-134). This might be the case if morality and religion were instinctive—and there is every reason to believe that they are not—or if instincts were beliefs which could be either true or false. The proposal to establish beliefs by claiming that they are in some loose sense "instinctive," can only prove that Bergsonism lends comfort to obscurantism through its limited but ill-guarded treatment of "instinct" as cognitive. As for the more fundamental question of the "purposiveness" of the world, Dr. Dodson finds it necessary to dissent from Bergson, and succeeds only in showing the opposition in Bergson of two notions, that of sheer impetus or *vis a tergo*, and that of direction, growth, or realization; and the further opposition between the unity of life and the extreme diversity of its fortunes. If Bergsonism means only that man and nature are continuous, or that man may be taken to be a product of nature by which nature herself may be judged, Bergsonism enjoys no religious advantage over any other evolutionary philosophy. If one requires a guarantee that nature is progressively dominated by life of the human sort, and that things are sure to move and move consistently in this direction, one will not find it in Bergson's philosophy. On the contrary, one will find that the somewhat sporadic and exceptional character of human life, and the essentially spontaneous and unpredictable character of all life, both argue against it.

M. LeRoy is on safer ground when he protests against estimating the ethical and religious possibilities of Bergson in terms of his present thought. It is characteristic of Bergson to take up one problem at a time, and it is also characteristic that each new book reveals something essentially new and unexpected. Hence though we must wait, we have good ground for hope. Though we may be confident that there will be a Bergsonian ethics or religion, it would scarcely be Bergsonian if we could predict it in advance.

RALPH BARTON PERRY.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

SCHLEIERMACHER: A Critical and Historical Study. W. B. SELBIE, M.A., D.D., Principal of Mansfield College, Oxford. E. P. Dutton & Co. 1913. Pp. ix, 272.

The announcement of a new work on Schleiermacher in English raises great expectations; all the more when the one who undertakes it is the Principal of Mansfield College. No book could be

more needed, and no source could be more appropriate. One must confess, however, to some disappointment that Dr. Selbie has conceived his task so narrowly. He confines his attention almost exclusively to Schleiermacher, the systematic theologian. Of the other aspects of this many-sided character, at once philosopher, moralist, man of letters, preacher, and patriot, we have but the briefest notice.

This restriction is perhaps natural in a book whose subject is professedly theological. The series in which Dr. Selbie's book appears has as its title, *The Great Theologies*, and under the circumstances the author can hardly be blamed for concentrating his attention upon Schleiermacher's significance as a theologian, especially when he is dealing with one who is confessedly the father of modern Protestant theology.

Yet theology is after all an effect of wider causes. For its understanding one must know not only the philosophical background but also the social and religious environment in the widest sense. This is particularly true of Schleiermacher, whose many-sided personality touched the life of his times at every point and from each drew something of value for his work. Dr. Selbie recognizes this fully in his introductory chapter, but he does not follow out its consequences in detail. As a result, his exposition of Schleiermacher's system assumes a technical character suggestive of the classroom, and its wider human aspects receive inadequate illustration.

This is due in part to the method which Dr. Selbie has followed. He confines himself closely to an exposition of Schleiermacher's teaching, using often his own words. But Schleiermacher is a German in habits of thought and feeling as well as in style, and needs translation not simply into English words but into English methods of thought and expression. The very fidelity with which our author confines himself to Schleiermacher's own language obscures rather than clarifies his subject-matter. Indeed the German atmosphere in which his hero moves affects Dr. Selbie's own style—words like *Vermittler* and *Romantiker* more than once finding their way into the English text (pp. 21, 83).

Of the eight chapters on Schleiermacher's theology two are given to an exposition of his philosophy of religion, and the remaining six to his system as such. The material of the former is derived from the *Reden* and follows the order of Schleiermacher's own treatment. In the latter, which is based largely upon the *Glaubenslehre*, Dr. Selbie has exercised greater freedom, using the familiar rubrics of the theological system: God, the Person of Christ, man and sin,

the work of Christ, the Christian life, the church. This arrangement is convenient for the theological student who desires to know what Schleiermacher taught topic by topic, but it is not adapted to give the reader the best introduction to the genesis of Schleiermacher's own thought or the relative importance of the different themes which he treated. For this we have to refer to other works of Schleiermacher, notably his *Kurze Darstellung des theologischen Studiums*. Dr. Selbie recognizes the importance of this, rightly saying that it lays the foundation of all future systems of theology. But he makes little use of it in his discussion, and the reader is left without information as to how it has come to pass that a book whose theoretical positions have been rejected with practical unanimity by Schleiermacher's successors, should have exercised so profound an influence.

If we were to criticise Dr. Selbie's book (apart from the formal matters already mentioned) it would be that in his discussion of his author he does not discriminate clearly enough between the fundamental structural questions on which Schleiermacher's work was epoch-making, and the more familiar theological material which he shares with other Christian teachers. One could wish that to the chapters he has given us he had added others dealing with such subjects as the Nature of Religion, the Essence of Christianity, and above all, theology itself; in which all the materials in Schleiermacher's work could have been grouped which deal with these fundamental questions, the genesis of his thought traced, the difference between his earlier and his later positions explained, his relations to his predecessors, his contemporaries, and his successors pointed out, and his distinctive contribution to theological science estimated. Dr. Selbie has furnished the materials for such a study, but he has not himself given it to us.

But criticism is ungracious in a field where there is so great a dearth of literature and every new book is to be welcomed. It is a reproach to our English theology that for so many years we have neglected the greatest of the modern Protestant theologians. Dr. Selbie has helped to wipe away this reproach by calling attention more clearly than before to the importance of the subject and the greatness of the need. It is to be hoped that his book will serve to prepare the way for the more exhaustive treatment of this great figure for which the world still waits.

WILLIAM ADAMS BROWN.

UNION THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

ETERNAL LIFE: A STUDY OF ITS IMPLICATIONS AND APPLICATIONS. BARON FREDRICH VON HÜGEL. T. & T. Clark. 1912. Pp. lii, 443.

This is a remarkable, most interesting, and very inspiring book. It appears from the preface that the work grew out of a request for an article upon "Eternal Life" for Dr. Hastings's *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*. Becoming too long for the *Encyclopaedia*, arrangement was made for its publication as a separate book. The author is a well-known student in Biblical criticism and philosophy. He was born in Florence in 1852, where his father was then the Austrian Ambassador. His mother was an English lady. A serious illness in childhood left him for many years the victim of ill health. He went to live in England in 1871, and later married an English wife. The fact that he is a member of the Roman Catholic Church makes his book, if possible, all the more interesting.

The subject of the book is not immortality, as a glance at the title might hastily lead one to infer. It is rather the deeper problem and the foundation of all valid religion, of which the hope of immortality may be considered a corollary. Eternal Life is here another name for God. Is there such Life behind all phenomena, infinite, adorable, the ultimate Reality, toward which every movement of human growth and aspiration instinctively reaches up, without which the unfathomable mystery of the world is inexplicable, but in the sublime thought of which man's mind finds satisfaction? If the Eternal Life is seen to be the Reality, if we may justly think of ourselves in relation to that Life as in a true sense its children, then all is well, the mystery of evil will somehow be found to come within the realm of the victorious goodness, and there will never be fear of death for those who have experienced the life of God.

With so great a subject, it is a delight to take as guide a genuine scholar richly equipped in the history of philosophy, distinctly constructive and positive in his treatment, but thoroughly critical and aware of every kind of difficulty, possessed of the best modern scientific openness of mind and a generous hospitality to the contributions of sincere thinkers of every school. In this volume of nearly five hundred pages there is not a paragraph of controversial material, or one which fails to carry at least the sympathetic respect of any reader interested in the discussion of religion.

The author's method of approach is broadly historical. He goes back to the earliest-known thinkers and makes their utterances tell the story of the coming of the consciousness of Eternal Life into the world. He traces the line of this light through a wide variety of experience, wherever genuine and memorable utterances give it

expression. He shows the Christian tradition, so far from being the only revelation of "the life of God in the soul of man," as rather the grand central movement of the stream of spiritual experience. He never antagonizes any thinker who has an aspect of truth to report. Thus, in his treatment of Spinoza, of Schopenhauer, of Nietzsche, of Bergson, he sets forth each one at his best, making clear account of his message and its value, and most interestingly uses the keen edge of his sympathetic criticism to show how the partial view of a one-sided or even inverted philosophy is a testimony to the necessity and reality of an all-round conception of religion. Even the cry of the pessimist is the mark of the hunger of the soul for the Living God. In all this there is no effect of ingenuity or of special pleading. It is rather the grasp of a comprehensive mind, accustomed to act in every direction, without a suspicion that truth can be hurt by the most fearless inquiry. Above all, the reader feels that he is in the company of a man who knows religion from within. Many a writer upon religion discusses the subject *ab extra*, as scientific theorists used to discuss aerial navigation, without ever having seen an air-ship. Here is a writer upon religion who, besides knowing everything that dubious theorizers can say to the contrary, actually knows the Eternal Life, as a man who has travelled in an *aéroplane* knows the conditions of the control of the air. In this respect Baron von Hügel's treatment of a variety of religious experiences, although only incidental to the main purpose of the book, seems vastly richer and more thorough and reasonable than William James's big book; who overbalances his pages with morbid examples, and always seems, even when most constructive, to be dealing with phenomena outside of his own personal knowledge.

In another interesting chapter on "Institutional Religion" we have a suggestive discussion of the church's seeming loss of ground as an institution. Being a Roman Catholic, the author here treats specially of the problems of his own church, and of the peculiar difficulties that attend it from the collision of its traditional modes of conduct—for instance, toward science, in the use of the Canon Law, in its unyielding claim of the right of persecution—with the strongest currents of modern thought. Frankly critical as he is, a thorough modernist in his knowledge of the conditions of our present world, he finds the cult and worship, especially the habit of adoration, the symbolism, the rich tradition of the Catholic Church, too precious and practically too useful to change his conviction of the essential divineness of the ancient organization. Moreover, he contrives to maintain a good hope that, as it has slowly learned some things in

the past—for example, to accept the Copernican astronomy—it will likewise develop so as to become worthy of the confidence of the world. This will be, not so much because of outward changes, as because of the absolute necessity in the life of man for the consciousness of the Infinite Life, and because the church will minister more and more effectively to this profound need. It is rather hard to believe that if Baron von Hügel had not been born into the Roman Communion, he would ever have been able to join it. For he seems to belong to the noble list of the free spirits who, taking their religion “at first hand,” can hardly bear the yoke of external authority.

One would like to quote many an eloquent and stirring passage from this unusual book. It is full of great utterances of religion, carrying their own weight and evidence. It is also rich in philosophical criticism, dominated by a faith and a philosophy so high that smaller and partial philosophies fall into their place as so many approximate efforts after that which indeed must transcend every endeavor of the mind of man.

CHARLES F. DOLE.

JAMAICA PLAIN.

RELIGION AND LIFE. ELWOOD WORCESTER, Ph.D. Harper & Brothers. 1914. Pp. 264. \$1.25.

Dr. Worcester divides into three parts his study of religion—its relation to the community, to Jesus, and to the individual soul. Of these the second will perhaps be found most valuable, for it shows much insight into the history and character of Jesus. Views of critical scholars, which with them are apt to stop at intellectual conclusions, Dr. Worcester develops upon their religious side, exhibiting in them food for meditation and growth. Thus the view, which Schweitzer has emphasized, that Jesus regarded the end of the world as near at hand, is shown by Dr. Worcester as moulding Jesus' plans and shaping his action.⁵ We may indeed question the author's interpretation of the crime of Judas. This he considers to have been not the indication to the authorities of the place where Jesus was to be found; not the pointing out to them of the individual; but the betrayal to them of Jesus' claim to be the Messiah, which—so he holds—had up to that time been carefully kept secret.

But whether we agree with the author in this or not, we welcome the clearness with which he connects the remarkable events in Jesus' career with the laws which govern all life. The majority of

⁵ P. 121 ff.

his miracles, for example, he holds to be the same in kind as the cures which are now regarded as psychical. His resurrection was the inevitable result of his character; while his appearance after his resurrection and the many alleged reappearances of men after death, cast much interpretative light on each other.⁶ The book shows penetration into many situations narrated in the Bible,⁷ and into the ways of character, human and Divine.

FREDERIC PALMER.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

THEODORE THORNTON MUNGER: *NEW ENGLAND MINISTER*. BENJAMIN W. BACON. Yale University Press. 1913. Pp. xxiv, 409. \$3.00.

This is a very sumptuous volume. Save for a most excruciating typographical error on page 115, extending over four lines, and reminding the reader of the careless proof-reading of his morning paper, the publishers have left nothing to be desired. The Press of the University has done its best to honor its erstwhile Fellow.

And yet it would seem to the reviewer that the book is a little too sumptuous for the record of a life so unassuming and tender as that of Dr. Munger. And the pages fit the binding; the style of the volume is very redundant. Two or three times we are reminded of the distinction between Congregationalism as a principle and Congregationalism as a "denomination"; quotations from addresses or documents are repeated in different chapters, and the theological situation in New England and American Congregationalism, out of which grew the demand for a denominational creed, is set before us more than once at wearisome length. Indeed, when we have closed the book, the situation in which Dr. Munger worked and which he attempted to relieve bulks larger to us than Dr. Munger himself.

The author, Dr. Bacon of Yale, is a very busy man and a most prolific writer, and the biography is to him evidently as much a labor of love as the sketch that Dr. Munger wrote of his father-in-law. We should not perhaps, therefore, apply to it the ordinary canons of criticism. But we cannot refrain from wishing that the book followed a less obvious outline and was less hurriedly written. Immediately after the preface we have a three-page chronology of the dates of Dr. Munger's life, and the book follows the chronological record quite closely. But the chronology has but little interest aside from the circle of Dr. Munger's closest friends;

⁶ P. 158.

⁷ The surprises of the hereafter, p. 45; Moses, p. 48 f.; Naaman, p. 222 f.

his outer life was very uneventful and his civic and national influence quite meagre. Disappointments in the relation between himself and his parishioners in his early pastorate, the publication of his notable books, *On the Threshold* and *The Freedom of Faith*, his settlements in North Adams and New Haven, are not exciting. The author interests us in Dr. Munger's carefully wrought-out decision to abide in the freedom of the Congregational ministry in spite of the attractiveness of the Episcopal order to a man of his aesthetic tastes, and in the important part he took in the spread of the "New Theology," but after all the greatest thing about Dr. Munger was the quality of his soul, and we wish that we might have caught a fuller vision of it through the medium of his writings. Little well-chosen snatches from his letters or his reminiscences scattered through the volume make us wish for more. Take, for example, such sentences as these: "The loose, not the anchored boat shows which way the tide turns." "We [Congregationalists] cluster about great preachers and call great audiences strong churches." "The rich men and their retainers withdrew from the congregation [of Center Church, Haverhill], leaving it poor in money but rich in patriotism. I regard that episode as the best part of my ministry." "[The sea] is the unfinished or undeveloped part of creation—without variety and hence limited in its suggestion." "Judgment is a continuous process and is merciful—being a gracious separation between good and evil. It is therefore represented as the office of the Christ." "Were these restraints removed, it [the Episcopal Church] would open a path that many would delight to walk in; but the paths in which Americans prefer to walk are those in which two can walk abreast within, as well as without, chancel bars."

After all, perhaps the best way to perpetuate the memory of a Christian minister is not through a biography but through an annotated edition of his most characteristic utterances and his most delightful letters. We wish that Dr. Bacon might give us such a volume of this Christlike and unselfish man.

THE REFORMATION IN GERMANY. HENRY C. VEDDER. The Macmillan Co. 1914. Pp. ii, 466. \$3.00.

According to Professor Vedder, "The economic interpretation of history has not yet been applied to the period of the Reformation, and that fact is the chief justification of this attempt to retell a story that has been so often told, and yet told inadequately" (p. ix). The reader's surprise at the first part of this statement is less than his

astonishment, on finishing the book, at the author's claim to write from the economic standpoint. Save for a few pages in the introduction, and a few words in one other place, there is nothing whatever on economics. All told, there is far less than in the standard political and church histories—*The Cambridge Modern History* and Lindsay, for example. Mr. Vedder professes to have outgrown the "great man" theory, and condemns the scholars who would explain the success of the Reformation by picturing Luther "as the colossus who bestrode Europe, by his towering personality dwarfing all men of his age" (p. xiii). This history, however, is little but a biography of Luther, and on page 367 we find him described in the very words previously condemned: "Luther bestrode Europe like a Colossus, dwarfing all men of his time," upon whom "he stamped his personality." Like the German scholars Thudichum and Wappler, Professor Vedder writes from the Baptist standpoint, but, though his sympathies are plainly with the Anabaptists, whom he believes to have been the only really evangelical sect of the time, he cannot be accused of unfairness.

In his foreword, Professor Vedder assures us that he has spent years of faithful study on the subject, and, of the vast literature, "is reasonably confident that he has missed little of substantial value" (p. x). Yet he does not know the Weimar edition of Luther's works, nor the edition of the letters by Enders and Kawerau, nor the new sources of the table-talk. He ignores the indispensable works of Denifle, Grisar, and Pastor, as well as the *Reichstagsakten* and *Nuntiaturberichte*. These are but conspicuous examples, for of the great number of special works, a very small proportion seems to have been consulted by him. Nor does he make good use of the sources he quotes. On page 59 he speaks of a letter by Cardinal Rovere of April 3, 1518; it should have been easy to discover, what has often been pointed out, that the letter is really by Riario, and of date 1520. A worse error of the same sort occurs on page 66. On pages 84 and 90 he speaks of a letter of Luther to the Pope, of March 3, 1519; though Köstlin (whom he quotes in his bibliography) has proved that the letter was really written in January but never sent. On pages 67–68 he describes at length the dispatch of a papal brief to Cajetan, its receipt, and its effect; and then in a note informs us that "Ranke has shown that there are insuperable difficulties in the way of accepting its genuineness"! The well-known saying of Luther about washing his hands in the papists' blood (Weimar ed., vi, 347; Erlangen ed. *Opera latina varii argumenti*, ii, 107) he quotes from Bax, remarking, "I have been unable to locate it in Luther's

writings." Jerome Ghinucci, Bishop of Ascoli, meets us in these pages as "Episcopus Asculanus" (p. 68); Brück as Brinck (p. 144); the names of the Zwickau prophets are given in a variety of incorrect forms (p. 183).

Whatever value the book might still have with these limitations is destroyed by the author's habitual and gross carelessness. A cursory reading revealed more than fifty errors of some importance, a list continually growing. For example, on page xvi there are five mistakes. First it is said that there were no fewer than fifteen editions, each edition of a thousand or less, of the German Bible prior to Luther's time, making in all not less than a hundred thousand copies! Further down, in a list of nine universities founded within "fifteen" (meaning "fifty") years, the dates of the founding of two are incorrect, and Mainz is confounded with "Metz." On page xxiii we are told that Dürer never drew Melancthon's likeness. On page 40 we learn that in 1514 "the Turks were threatening an invasion of Europe," which did indeed happen in 1529. On page 140 there are three mistakes, one in the date of the burning of the Pope's bull, one in the quotation from Luther on that occasion, and one in giving the number of students at Wittenberg. In note 2 to page 277 Bugenhagen and "Pomeranus" (for "Pomeranus") are spoken of as two different persons; Von der Planitz is metamorphosed into "John a Plaintz" and Erasmus Alber is simply called "Erasmus, not of Rotterdam." Of the numerous quotations in Latin hardly one is printed without some gross error. It is hard to see how the proof-reader of Macmillan could have let pass "*conitamus*" and "*videbamus*" (both p. 203, note 1). Cicero's letters to Atticus are quoted as his "letters to Athens," and given the wrong date, 90 B.C. (p. 201, note). A double snare is found in Erasmus's remark: "*Ego posui ovem gallinaceum, Lutherus exclusit pullum longe dissimillimum*," which is rendered: "I laid a cock's egg; Luther has hatched a pullet of a very different breed" (p. 229).

It is not pleasant to write a wholly unfavorable review, but if criticism is to do its duty to scholarship, work like this must not be allowed to pass untried by the fire.

PRESERVED SMITH.

POUGHKEEPSIE, N.Y.

THE PURITANS IN POWER. A STUDY IN THE HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH CHURCH FROM 1640 TO 1660. G. B. TATHAM, M.A., Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. Cambridge University Press. 1913. Pp. vi, 282. 7s. 6d.

Mr. Tatham's book contains a brief preface, eight chapters, and an appendix of three sections. The preface states his purpose: he has in mind "the immediate and material results of the Puritan revolution rather than the influence exercised upon religious thought, upon the future history of parties within the Church, or upon the relations of the Church to Dissent." The eight chapters are: The Prelude; The Parochial Clergy; The Sequestration Committees; The Regulation of Cambridge University; The Puritan Visitation of Oxford University; The Fate of the Ejected Clergy; Religious Freedom under the Puritans; Church Property. The Appendix includes: An Inventory of Prestwick Rectory; The Case of Sylvester Adams; The Seizure of College Plate at Cambridge. From the contents it will be noticed that Mr. Tatham has not attempted an exhaustive description of the various ideals and achievements of Puritanism, and that he has selected a few significant episodes within the period of Puritan ascendancy. It will also be seen that the choice is careful and illuminating. The vital problems of the period are the actual point of view of clergy and laity within this twenty years, the treatment of the vanquished by the victors, the temper of the universities and how it modified with the new government, the disposition of property, and the quality of religious toleration. The author has met each of these questions and has dealt with it carefully, equipped as he is with mature knowledge of sources and literature. He has shown himself singularly free from bias and devoted to a simple and honest display of the facts. More than this, he has made it clear that the Puritan success was based upon English feeling rather than upon mere party prejudice; he has been discriminating enough to perceive and to express the permanent value of both the Presbyterian and the Cromwellian aspects of the movement. It would be hardly correct to say that the book offers a contribution to the subject (except in so far as lucid description is always a contribution), for it is dealing with too familiar ground for such praise. But it is quite true to say that it is an attractive and scholarly presentation of material and results that are by no means widely known.

HENRY B. WASHBURN.

EPISCOPAL THEOLOGICAL SCHOOL, CAMBRIDGE.

ENGLISH SECTS. A HISTORY OF NONCONFORMITY. W. B. SELBIE. (The Home University Library of Modern Knowledge). Henry Holt & Co. Pp. 256. 50 cents.

In this small volume the learned Principal of Mansfield College has presented the salient facts of Nonconformist history with great clearness and a high degree of impartiality. The space at his disposal has made impossible any extensive characterization of leaders or elaborate discussion of movements, but the reader who comes to these pages will gain from them a distinct impression of the aims, vicissitudes, and present significance of these important elements in English religious life. As a brief introductory survey the work is likely to be useful.

WILLISTON WALKER.

YALE UNIVERSITY.

PRESENT DAY THEOLOGY. WASHINGTON GLADDEN. McClelland & Co. Columbus, Ohio. Pp. 220.

Stirred by obnoxious revival services conducted by a theologically illiterate evangelist, Dr. Gladden preached in his own church in Columbus a series of week-day sermons designed to overcome evil with good by a clear presentation of the views now entertained by leading preachers and theologians in different Protestant communions. Of Congregationalists, he quotes frequently from President King of Oberlin and Professor Stevens of Yale; of Presbyterians, from Professor Brown of Union; of Baptists, from Professor Clarke of Colgate; and of Episcopalians, from Phillips Brooks—with the manifest purpose of showing that the theology he advocates is no individual whimsey but is really representative of modern religious thinking. The sermons were hastily prepared and hurriedly printed, but they have a movement and fervor which would probably have been lacking in more studied and deliberate productions. If any one doubts whether the so-called new theology is preachable, he may be confidently commended to this volume of theology at pulpit temperature.

W. W. FENN.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

THE FIRST PRINCIPLES OF EVOLUTION. S. HERBERT, M.D. The Macmillan Company. 1913. Pp. 346. \$2.00.

It was a well-known geologist who said of Professor Dana's *Manual of Geology* that it contained "all that the Lord had ever made," but that "it would take the Lord himself to find it." Dr. Herbert's

book, however, while exceptionally broad in scope, is admirably arranged. It presents evolutionary thought from Heraclitus to Bergson and the various aspects of evolution from atomic to cosmic, from inorganic to "superorganic" evolution, all in admirable and logical order. In his preface the author states that the book is the outcome of a series of lectures given to a class of workingmen "and others." It must not be inferred, however, that the lecturer has "stooped" to his audience. While the book is intentionally "thoroughly superficial," Dr. Herbert has not hesitated to raise some of the more abstruse and controversial problems of speculative science.

To present "the problem of evolution comprehensively in all its aspects"—which the author states to be his purpose in writing the book—is a task of no small magnitude and one which few biologists would be willing to undertake. Dr. Herbert has been remarkably successful, notwithstanding the enormous difficulty of condensing so large a mass of material. While such a work is of necessity largely one of compilation, the writer seems at all times the master of his material. That at times the treatment of important problems should be fragmentary and disconnected is perhaps inevitable. The broad scope of the volume is indicated by the following summary: Evolution is discussed under three general headings—inorganic, organic, and superorganic. Under inorganic evolution the writer describes the hypothetical changes in the stellar universe and in the solar system. The alternative views of Kant-LaPlace and of Chamberlin-Moulton are well stated and the difficulties involved in the acceptance of either admitted. The stages in the geological history of the earth are then sketched briefly. Even atomic evolution, including the electronic theory of matter, receives consideration. The spontaneous generation of living substance is postulated, and Pflüger's theory of the origin of proteid substance suggested.

Organic evolution receives a somewhat conventional treatment, summarizing the various kinds of evidence which have convinced morphologists of the fact of the physical evolution of organisms. This is followed by a statement of the various hypotheses brought forward to explain evolution in terms of mechanism—the explanations of Darwin, Lamarck, DeVries, and their successors. Sexual selection is not ruled out of court. But the author concludes that biologists have still to discover "an unknown factor" in order to explain the progressive adaptation of organisms to their environment. Some theologians will derive much comfort from this admission of an open-minded biologist. But it is not likely, however,

that Dr. Herbert would be willing to admit that we are yet driven to assume a psychical or "vitalistic," much less a supernatural factor, in organic evolution.

Under superorganic evolution he discusses the phenomena of psychical, social, and religious (theological) evolution. Here as elsewhere in the book the treatment is consistently naturalistic. Moral evolution in animals and man receives a treatment similar to that given to the problem of the physical and racial origin of man. The book closes with a presentation of the evolutionary philosophy of Bergson. Dr. Herbert really appears to understand Bergson. A very valuable bibliography is added. The glossary of scientific terms will help the lay reader.

HERBERT V. NEAL.

TUFTS COLLEGE.

HYMNS OF THE EARLY CHURCH. Translated by Rev. JOHN BROWNLIE, D.D.
Morgan & Scott. London. 1913. Pp. 202.

This book contains about a hundred hymns "translated from Greek and Latin sources; together with translations from a later period; centos and suggestions from the Greek; and several original pieces."

Such a book, to be of value, should do one of two things: it should introduce us to a body of hymns hitherto known only to the student, with opportunities for careful comparison with the originals; or, if the author departs from the ideal of a close translation, it should offer free and beautiful renderings, making available for actual use in modern churches hymns hitherto not rendered into English, or but ill translated. Unfortunately, Dr. Brownlie's volume does neither. It is often impossible to say whether one is reading an "original piece" or a translation, for the originals are indicated in the most casual fashion. Sometimes the first line of the Greek or Latin is given, but elsewhere the reader is left to guess for himself the source whence Dr. Brownlie has drawn his inspiration. Nor have many of these translations such merit as to lead to their introduction for their own sake into modern hymn-books. There are, it is true, occasional striking lines and good stanzas, but the high level is seldom long maintained and there are not infrequent evidences of careless writing.

The volume illustrates, as others of its kind have done before, the difficulty of such translation. The ancient hymns represent a type of thought and a mode of expression far removed from our own, and not to be acclimated save by a writer who can add con-

scientious scholarship and genuine poetical gifts to his relish for the beauty and vigor of the hymnody of the early church. Otherwise, however much the translator may enjoy the performance of his pleasant task, his work is not likely to result in any permanent enrichment of the great treasure-house of song.

HENRY WILDER FOOTE.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

THE QUEST OF THE BEST. WILLIAM DE WITT HYDE. Thomas Y. Crowell Company. Pp. viii, 267. \$1.00.

In what the author describes as "Insights into Ethics," President Hyde sets before parents, teachers, and leaders of boys, some practical considerations as to the morals of youth. The book is the outcome of ethical discussions in class and in popular assemblies, and therefore is not a finished academic study; and the repeated plan of taking each thesis and applying it to twenty relations is a little cumbersome, and perhaps unfortunate. The result is not startlingly original; indeed, the author admits that its orthodoxy surprises himself. For example: natural badness is a stuff to be made over into goodness, of which it is the germ; artificial goodness falls short of the best; the best is the interest that fulfils all other interests in proportion to their worth; accepting anything less than the best is sin; and personal contact is the supreme mode of communicating moral power to youth.

In spite, however, of the familiar sound of these affirmations, the book should be of real and great value to the constituency it seeks. It gives the practical man an inkling of the larger principles of ethics which he often embodies unconsciously in his rule-of-thumb methods of conduct; and it sets before men who live in an age of moral extremes, the Aristotelian mean as the trembling equilibrium which ethics attains at the best. Not less valuable is the common-sense approach, the hopeful temper, and sympathetic mood of the book, and the hardy morality it inculcates. It should prove a most serviceable manual of practical use for the persons addressed in its pages.

GEORGE T. SMART.

NEWTON HIGHLANDS.

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MYSTICISM IN PRESENT-DAY RELIGION¹

RUFUS M. JONES

HAVERFORD, PA.

These opening years of the twentieth century have been marked by a profound revival of interest in Mysticism, though we are perhaps not yet justified in speaking of a distinct revival of Mysticism itself. This revival of interest in Mysticism can be traced to no one explanatory cause, but is due to a confluence of many contributory streams of influence. Our expanding historical knowledge has very freshly brought to light the important part which Mysticism has played in the religious life of the world, and especially in the nineteen centuries of Christian development. A group of psychological researches has aroused an immense interest in the inner life, and particularly in the deep-lying regions of the subconscious, where vast sources of hidden spiritual energy appear to lie. The prevailing tendencies in philosophy—common to many schools—to attack “in-

¹ Von Hügel, *The Mystical Element of Religion* (1906); *Eternal Life* (1912).

Evelyn Underhill, *Mysticism* (1911); *The Mystic Way* (1913).

W. K. Fleming, *Mysticism in Christianity* (1913).

W. H. Dyson, *Studies in Mysticism* (1913).

E. Lehmann, *Mysticism in Heathendom and Christendom* (translated by Hunt, 1910).

H. Delacroix, *Études d'histoire et de psychologie du mysticisme* (1906).

Joseph Zahn, *Einführung in die Christliche Mystik* (1906).

W. E. Hocking, *The Meaning of God in Human Experience* (1912).

Rufus M. Jones, *Studies in Mystical Religion* (1906); *Spiritual Reformers in the 16th and 17th Centuries* (1914).

tellectualism," to humble the claims and pretensions of "knowledge," and to exalt, on the other hand, intuition, first-hand experience, knowledge of acquaintance, appreciation, and valuation, have given aid and comfort to those who prefer the "heart" to the "head."

But beyond question, the present-day collapse of the traditional elements in religion has had by far the greatest influence in shifting to the inner way the direction of man's quest for God. Science has sternly shaken men awake from their childish dreams of a God above the sky or back of special creations. Every clue in the hand of science leads outward, or backward to bottomless infinities—not to a God who began the series. In like manner, exact, historical methods of research have shattered the old conceptions of "dispensations," divine interferences, and specially chosen races, and have forced us either to consider all history sacred or, as an alternative, to count all history secular. They have, further, robbed us of our easy faith in infallible sources of knowledge about God and the world and life and the hereafter. Finally, by an irresistible maturing of mind the world has outgrown the theory of the church which made *it* an infallible guarantor of truth concerning eternal realities and the dread issues of the life to come. Men have found themselves compelled to discover the sources of truth and the resources of life within themselves, or, failing in that momentous undertaking, to flounder about in the fog, strangers to unfailing lights and unsetting stars.

This present return to Mysticism is, however, in marked contrast to the mystical movement of the pre-Reformation epoch, or to that of the counter-Reformation in Spain, Italy, and France, or, finally, to that of the spiritual reformers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In all three of those characteristically different movements the leaders and exponents were themselves luminous

mystics who interpreted their own experiences, while today, on the other hand, very few first-hand prophets of mystical religion have appeared among us and our movement has been in the main confined to the historical and psychological interpretation of Mysticism as revealed in the autobiographies and expositions of dead prophets; though this may be, and probably is, the necessary preliminary stage to a far profounder *return* to a religion of the inner way.

The definitions of Mysticism which have been proposed by the recent writers are still somewhat vague and hazy and leave the way-faring man confused as to its real scope and nature. But one important point receives strong emphasis in the writings of the leading present-day interpreters of Mysticism, namely, that it is a heightened, intensified way of life, a distinct life-variation. Evelyn Underhill makes an unsatisfactory attempt at definition in her chapter on "The Characteristics of Mysticism," where she calls Mysticism in its pure form "the science of ultimates, the science of union with the Absolute;" and she says that "the end which the mystic sets before him on his pilgrimage is conscious union with a living Absolute."¹ But the moment Mysticism is called a "science of ultimates," or a science of anything else, it seems to be handed over to that very "intellectualism" against which it is a protest, and as soon as the goal of the soul's pilgrimage is declared to be union with an Absolute, it is difficult psychologically to see how it can still be "a *conscious* union." She is much more successful farther on in this chapter, where she contends that Mysticism is not an opinion, not a philosophy, not occult knowledge, but *an organic life-process*, something which the whole self does, a way to enhanced life; not merely admission to an overwhelming vision of Truth but rather an ordered movement toward higher levels

¹ *Mysticism*, p. 86.

of Reality, which is arrived at by a definite and arduous psychological process—the so-called Mystic Way.¹

In her second book, this “Mystic Way” is expounded and illustrated through concrete examples of persons who have lived by their “conviction of an over-world,” who have “sent exploring tentacles into the unseen” and have found the Reality their passionate souls sought after. These mystics she describes as persons who exhibit “a fortunate variation of the race,” persons who reveal an *élan vital*, an internal push which has carried life forward to a higher form and a higher destiny. “Under the spur of their vivid faculty of intuition,” she continues, “they gather up all their being and thrust it forward—the whole personality, not its sharp intellectual tip alone—on a new free path. Hence it is that they live and move in worlds to us unrealized; see other aspects of the many-levelled, many-colored world of Reality. Living with an intensity which is beyond the scope of ‘normal’ men, deeper and deeper layers of existence are revealed to them.”² On this theory of Mysticism as the emergence of a new type-level of life, she finds her supreme examples in the loftiest spiritual genuises of the race—in Jesus, in Paul, and in the author of the Johannine writings.

Von Hügel’s masterful studies of the problems of religion do not furnish any ready-made definitions, nor does he ever admit that there is a distinct and differentiated *mystic way* on which the soul can successfully make its pilgrimage home to God. For him all adequate religion involves three elements—the historical and institutional element; the analytic and speculative element; the emotional and volitional element, or experimental element. This third deep interior and unanalyzable element of

¹ *Mysticism*, pp. 96, 97.

² *The Mystic Way*, p. 12. The reader notes everywhere in Evelyn Underhill the profound influence both of Bergson and Eucken.

human personality is, he says, always in evidence, and bears as its deepest characteristic a sense of and hunger for the Infinite. Through all the deeper and nobler movements of our wondrously various inner life, he says, obscure but profoundly powerful instincts and impressions of God work and operate, by which man discovers God to be his deepest ideal, and at the same time his true congenital element and environment.¹ This experimental or mystic aspect of personality brings into function the deep-lying intuitions of the soul, the active surge of the will toward its ideal, the inner response of the finite to the infinite, and supplies to the religious life an element of religion which is rather felt than seen or reasoned about, is loved and lived rather than analyzed, is action and power rather than either external fact or intellectual verification.² The mission of the Mystics, then, "who are the great benefactors of our race," is, in Von Hügel's judgment, to bear personal and experimental testimony to the presence of the Infinite in man and to awaken men to the significance of this "operative consciousness."³ He finds, however, four tendencies in the Mystics which have lessened the full value of their ministry. They tend (1) to find their joy in recollective moments of the soul, and so to neglect or unduly to minimize the contact of mind and will with things of sense; (2) to rise above succession and clock-time and to approximate eternity, the one great Now, and thus to slight the importance of history; (3) to find their joy in pure receptivity, with a constant bent toward Quietism, and thus to ignore the truth that God can be apprehended only by the persistent and many-sided moral and spiritual activity of the whole self; and (4) to find their joy in so exalting the difference between the finite and infinite, between man's nature and God's, and in so in-

¹ *The Mystical Element of Religion*, Vol. II, pp. 346, 349.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 581.

³ *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 340.

sisting on the incomprehensibility of God as to cut away all ground for any experience or knowledge of what God is or is not.¹

Delacroix asserts that Mysticism is not tied to any one religion, people, or historic period, but is a native trait, springing out of certain fundamental tendencies of human nature.² The Mystics of the highest rank, he holds, have been persons possessed of creative power, of extraordinary psychological organization, of rare genius, and they have succeeded, without themselves knowing how, in expanding their being and in pushing out into a new dimension of life.³ These supreme spiritual geniuses have moments of absorption in God, when they seem to attain a union with the divine, but ecstasy was not their aim; their central ambition was rather to make of their souls divine instruments, places where the divine power could dwell and incarnate itself—in short, they aimed at nothing less than to become, in their measure, *Christs*, persons in whom own-self was annihilated and in whom God could reveal Himself.⁴ True Christian Mysticism is thus for Delacroix, not something pathological, not a state of self-initiated ecstasy, but a new level of life-power. "Christian Mysticism," he says, "substitutes for ecstasy a wider state, in which the permanent consciousness of God does not suspend practical activity, in which definite action and thought spring out of the inner deeps, in which the disappearance of the feeling of self-hood and the spontaneous and impersonal character of the thoughts and motor-tendencies impress the subject with the idea that these acts do not originate from him but from a divine Source, and that it is God who lives and acts within him."⁵ Mysticism, for Delacroix, is an organizing power, a higher variation of life.⁶ Hocking too

¹ The Mystical Element of Religion, Vol. III, pp. 284-287.

² Op. cit., p. i.

³ Ibid., p. iii.

⁴ Ibid., p. xiii.

⁵ Ibid., p. xi.

⁶ Ibid., pp. xviii, xix.

calls attention to *enhanced life* as a characteristic of Mysticism, though his main interest in Mysticism is plainly in its cognitive value. It is, he says, a way of recovering the natural vigor of the *whole-idea* (which ordinary consciousness and empirical pursuits break up and shatter), and thus it is a recovery of the full worth of life.¹ Mysticism, he says again, is "deed and not doctrine; it is a way of dealing with God; it is a process by which the central unity of the soul meets the Central Unity of the World."²

As soon, however, as we turn to the vast collections of first-hand "material" which the interpreters of Mysticism have gathered, we discover that there is a profound distinction to be made between the *mystical experience* and "Mysticism." The mystical experience which, indeed, is life at its highest level of inward unity, feels as though the usual insulations of the narrow individual life were broken through and as though actual contact were attained with an enfolding Presence, life-giving, joy-bringing, and light-supplying. All the deep-lying powers of the inward self, usually so divergent and conflicting—the foreground purposes defeated by background inhibitions and by doubts on the border—become liberated and unified into one conscious life, which is not merely intellectual nor merely volitional nor solely emotional, but an *undivided whole of experience*, intensely joyous, enriched with insight and pregnant with deeds of action.³

"Historical Mysticism," on the other hand, as is implied in Evelyn Underhill's first definition—"Mysticism is the science of ultimates, the science of union with the Absolute"—involves a certain metaphysical conception of God and carries, further, a doctrine of the "way" to union with Him. God, according to the metaphysi-

¹ Op. cit., p. 419.

² Ibid., pp. 354, 355.

³ This account of the mystical experience is quite similar to that given in the Introduction to my *Spiritual Reformers*; see especially pp. xx, xxi.

cal conception which underlies "historical mysticism" is absolute Reality, that which Is, Pure Being. In order to maintain the absoluteness of God, it seemed necessary to insist on His immutability and His oneness, as opposed to all duality or plurality or otherness. To find Him, therefore, the face of the seeker must be sternly turned away from all finite things, all transitory happenings, all passing states of mind, all that is *here* or *now*, all that can be seen or felt or known or named. The Absolute, by processes of elimination, seemed best conceived as "a nameless Nothing," "an undifferentiated One," "an abysmal Dark," "the Silent desert of the Godhead where no one is at home." All Christian Mysticism that came under Neoplatonic influences—and that includes pretty much the whole of Roman Catholic Mysticism from St. Augustine to Madame Guyon—is profoundly marked by this characterless Absolute at the centre—a God who is everything which finite things are not—and is consequently committed to a *via negativa* as the only way up to Him. This *negative way* is taken by many interpreters to be the real differentia of Mysticism, and the whole mystical process is thought of as the pilgrimage of "the alone to the Alone"—the merging of an abstract self with an abstract Absolute.

But this abstract and negative cast is by no means confined to Mysticism. It is involved in the very structure of all metaphysical thinking that follows the track of Eleatic, Platonic, and Neoplatonic philosophy. This great intellectual movement insisted that That which Is—*To ous*—is one, permanent, immutable, and free from all becoming. Mind, in order to know Reality, must itself be that Reality, and therefore if we human beings can rise from our world of shadows, from our cave-dwelling, and perceive That which Is, it is because there is something in the soul unsundered from that Reality which it

seeks. But this dialectic consummation is attained only by processes of rising above and sloughing off the finite and the mutable, so that the individual of necessity arrives at his goal with empty hands. This metaphysic lay at the heart of Mysticism no doubt, but it lay at the heart of all mediaeval dialectic as well, and Mysticism took the negative way because, for the fearless and venturesome seeker who was determined to cut all cables and swing clear out to sea with God, there was no other way. It has taken all the philosophical and spiritual travail of the centuries to discover the possibility of a concrete Infinite—a God of character, interrelated with us and with the world—and to find that the way to share in His immanent and comprehending Life is as much a way of affirmation as of negation. Mysticism will not be revived and become a powerful present-day force until it is liberated from its age-long alliance with classical philosophy and translated into the thought-terms of our time.

This tendency, to which I have alluded, to define Mysticism as a life-type, is a movement in the right direction, for all life-types conform to their changing environment. But unfortunately much of the work of present-day interpretation carries on consciously or unconsciously the abstract, dialectic, and negative features which doom Mysticism to remain an affair of books. Evelyn Underhill, whose work is everywhere characterized by wide knowledge of sources, profound insight, and rich experience, is, I feel, too much under the spell of the outworn thought-forms through which the great mystics whom she loves endeavored to utter themselves. Both of her books are committed to a well-marked, sharply-defined "mystic way." It is a *way* which many mystics of the past have taken, but it is esoteric and more or less artificial, not grounded in the inherent nature of the soul and not a universal highway for the

whole race of the saved. The "ladders" of mystical ascent, the carefully labelled stages of the way, are the creation of dialectic rather than of religious experience, and one feels how artificial they are when an attempt is made, as in *The Mystic Way*, to fit the mighty life-experiences of Christ and of St. Paul and of the author of the Fourth Gospel into these mystical model-forms and to make them follow the "purgative," the "illuminative" and the "unitive" stages.

The modern studies in this field have, I think, convincingly shown that Mysticism cannot safely be isolated and made a "way" either of knowledge or of life. Both life and knowledge are far too rich and many-leveled to be reduced to one elemental aspect of experience. There can be no doubt, to those who have been there, that there do come moments of mystical opening, fresh bubbleings of the stream of life, swift insights, the inrush of new energies, when the soul feels an irresistible surge of certainty. But it is as impossible to live by inarticulate experiences alone as it would be to live physically on ozone alone. The actual *content* of religious faith, the definite beliefs which give us marching direction, the concrete ideas which furnish body and filling to our religion, the whole structure of our thought of God and of the world and of man and of duty and of eternal destiny, are the slow accretions of racial experience and do not come to us by the secret door of mystical openings. In so far as mystics receive definite "openings," with concrete content, they are likely to be the product of group-influence. They are gestated by the literature on which the mystic has fed himself, or they are suggested by the social environment in which he is saturated, or they have subconsciously ripened within under the maturing guidance of expectation. It is always possible to show that the content of the mystic's insights has a history, as our ideals of right and wrong have and as our ideals in art

and literature have. What the mystic delivers to us as his positive contribution is an interpretation of his experience, not the experience itself; and what he brings to us is always heavily laden with the immemorial gains of the spiritual travails of men behind him. Mysticism, in its full historical meaning, is as much a slow accretion, a group-product, as is art or grammar or mathematics.

But the mystical experience itself as it bursts upon the soul is a unifying, fusing, intensifying inward event. It may not bring new facts, it may open no door to oracular communications, it may not be a gratuitous largess of knowledge; but it enables a soul to *see* what it knows, to seize by a sudden insight the long results of slow-footed experience, to get possession of regions of the self which are ordinarily beyond its hail, to fuse its truth with the heat of conviction and to flood its elemental beliefs with a new depth of feeling. This dynamic inward event is not dependent upon any peculiar stock of ideas and is not confined to what is usually called the purview of religion; it is the sudden transcendence of our usual fragmentary island of reality and the momentary discovery of the *whole* to which we belong. We can best help our age toward a real revival of Mysticism as an elemental aspect of religious life, not by formulating an esoteric "mystic way," not by clinging to the outgrown metaphysic to which Mysticism has been allied, but by emphasizing the reality of mystical experience, by insisting on its healthy and normal character, and by indicating ways in which such dynamic experiences can be fostered and realized.

THE ETHICAL VALUE OF ORIENTAL RELIGIONS UNDER THE ROMAN EMPIRE

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To estimate with any considerable degree of accuracy the moral value of the Oriental religions under the Roman Empire is a hard and perhaps an impossible task. The difficulties arise in part from the fact that these religions, like most others, did not aim primarily at developing what we understand by morality in the individual, but rather at establishing such relations with the gods as to give men security and prosperity here and hereafter; and in part the difficulties are due to the paucity of our data and our liability to error in the interpretation thereof. Yet a religion, like any other form of human expression, inevitably influences as well as reflects the conduct of the social group which cultivates it; that is to say, it cannot exist apart by itself. Therefore it is not an unprofitable thing to attempt to determine with such accuracy as may be attainable the relation to morality of the imported Oriental cults which were widely cultivated in the Occidental part of the Roman Empire between the first and the fourth centuries of our era. We confine our consideration to the Western half of the Empire, for there the evidence as to these exotic religions is most plentiful and it is possible to see them isolated, so to speak, from their native environment. It will be necessary, however, first to consider the moral and religious environment into which these cults entered.

The temper and the experiences of the Roman people down to the end of the third century B.C. tended on the

whole to develop self-control, fidelity to duty, a certain stern intolerance, and a strict discipline—virtues which we usually regard as distinctly Roman; virtues, moreover, which were never wholly lost even in the times of Rome's degeneracy. These virtues did not originate in the Roman religion, although that religion fostered certain characteristics, such as a regard for family obligations and a scrupulous care in the observance of duties toward the gods, on strict attention to which men believed the material safety and prosperity of the State depended. But beyond inculcating a sense of the obligation of social duty, of loyalty, and of reverence, Roman religion did not go; and it had no higher purpose than to secure the material prosperity of the family, the gens, and the State. The Greek religious ideas which were received into the commonwealth, even in their noblest form, did nothing more than lend a certain support to family and civic relations; and the influence of Greek mythology in general must have been bad. Whether believed or not, the tales of a god's amours could not but degrade, and the extreme was reached when such liaisons were chosen as subjects for dramatic representation, as in the *Amphitruo* of Plautus, or when a poet like Ovid could make Jupiter a model for human gallants in their vicious pursuits. Doubtless many a lover like Chaerea in Terence's *Eunuchus*, excused his wanton loves by appealing to the example of Supreme Jove. The period from the close of the Second Punic War (202 B.C.) to the end of the republic was a time of much demoralization and decay. The rapid increase of wealth and the growth of luxury, the acquisition of great numbers of slaves, the large freedom from external dangers, the loss of political vitality which made the State the prize for contending political bosses from the Gracchi to Octavian, above all, the rapid growth of a sceptical rationalism and the development of a selfish individualistic spirit, together with many other influences,

broke down the sense of social duty and of political obligation which had hitherto proved an effective and vital power in Roman life. The elder Cato was quite right in his belief that the Hellenism of his day was destroying the stern character of an earlier time. The new rationalistic spirit could not but despise the superstitions of the old Roman religion which still saw a fearful portent for the State in the birth of a two-headed calf, and it clearly recognized the fact that the beliefs of the fathers could not support the new ideas of morality and justice which were coming into existence. The Roman had a habit of judging institutions by their practical value to life; and measured by such pragmatic standards Roman religion could no longer claim the support of enlightened men. The educated might hold, with the famous Scaevola, that the traditional State religion was good for the mass of citizens; but on the whole the moral influence of that traditional religion was distinctly weak in the last hundred and fifty years of the republic; even the sacred rites of the family were neglected, and religious obligations had long been regarded as burdens which one would gladly avoid. The reforms of Augustus were unable to restore the influence which religion had once exercised. The belief in collective responsibility, according to which the sin of an individual brought punishment on all members of the social group, had been abandoned in favor of individual responsibility; the individual was the one who must reap the reward of his good or evil deeds. To this idea of individual responsibility neither the native Roman nor the imported Greek ideas of religion gave much support. Philosophy had become the moral guide in life.

The practical Romans at every period left metaphysical speculation to the Greeks, and found their chief philosophical interest in ethics. This is one of the reasons why, out of all the forms of philosophy which

Greece passed on to the West, Stoicism with its emphasis on a stern self-control and independence made the strongest appeal to the citizens of Rome. The central theme of the philosophy of the Porch, as the Romans knew it, was the art of living in obedience to nature, free from all control or influence of external circumstances. Furthermore, Stoicism inculcated a sense of duty, of responsibility, and for all its individualistic tendencies taught the subjection of the individual to common laws—things which appealed to the native instincts of the Roman. Epicureanism also had many devotees, especially in the last century of the republic; under the Empire its tenets naturally favored a safe policy of quietism and accommodation. Its ethics, like those of Stoicism, fostered the social virtues, though possibly with less earnestness and far-reaching influence than the system of its rival. As for Stoicism, we must remember that in the hands of Panaetius this philosophy had lost many of those uncompromising and doctrinaire characteristics which earlier marked it, and that by appropriation and accommodation it had developed into a universal philosophy for all mankind. There can be no doubt that it both strengthened the moral fibre of men when the few supports which religion had once given were weakened, and that it actually elevated and ennobled the moral concepts of its followers. In the first century of the Empire, when politics no longer offered any large field for action, when the extremes of extravagant luxury and hopeless poverty alike depressed society, and terror of the imperial power weighed heavy on all prominent or ambitious citizens, men sought support and peace in the resistant elements of the various eclectic systems of the day, above all in those of Stoicism, which had become almost exclusively a moral philosophy. It was not now busy with speculation, but concerned itself almost wholly with the art of living—

an art which was not to be learned from books in the closet, but from preachers in the market-place, and which was to be developed by constant and severe practice. Abstention from all that lies outside the will's control, daily advance toward the ideal, contemplation and realization of the divine nature, the practice of a kindly altruism, the captaincy of one's own soul—these are the teachings which Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius repeat over and over again. Philosophy with them had acquired a strong religious trend.

Along with this shift in the spirit of philosophy had come a change in social ideals. The rude soldier Vespasian on the imperial throne set the example of a simpler and less extravagant scale of living in Rome, to which financial exhaustion and sated appetite were already turning the higher classes; and the common condition of all citizens as subjects of the imperial power tended to lessen social differences and to give a visible support to the Stoic doctrine of the equality of men. This with the sister doctrine of the natural rights of men led toward that humanitarianism which begins to be marked in the second century.

These tendencies were the natural manifestations of those great movements of thought which had been going on around the Mediterranean for fully three centuries. The mighty political and social changes produced by the conquests of Alexander, and later by the extension of the Romans' power and by the establishment of the Roman Empire, had turned the individual back on himself and had made him seek peace and freedom for his soul in escape from the external world by means of philosophy; but neither the Epicurean ἀταραξία nor the sterner Stoic ἀπάθεια could satisfy all, and men were gradually drawn into new religious movements. There was a sense of estrangement from God, a desire to secure satisfactory relations with the divine, which

had found its outlet through the Greek Mysteries and which was bringing about a revival of Platonism and of Pythagoreanism. At the very beginning of the Empire thoughtful men were oppressed by a sense of weariness produced by the civil wars and by the social disasters which came in their train—a weariness which is unmistakably expressed by Horace, Livy, and Virgil. This feeling, united with that persistent belief that ultimately all the physical, political, and moral well-being of the State depended on the fulfilment of duties toward the gods, made welcome to many the moral and religious revival which the Emperor Augustus had attempted to bring about. The fact that the Emperor's efforts had small success did not affect the sentiments of the people. Scepticism gradually gave way to faith, and license was opposed by a revived moral sense. The moral ideal was intimately connected with religion; and this connection finds clear expression in the writings of the later Stoics. Seneca would teach his young friend, the Epicurean Lucilius, that only goodness can propitiate the gods and that service of the gods consists in imitating their righteous character; that worship is the devotion of a pious and upright will. Epictetus shows that in the generation between Seneca and himself philosophy had come still closer to religion. Obedience to heaven's law, happy submission to the divine will, joyful praise of God, more than once form the subjects of his lessons. It is true that the God of Epictetus does not differ very much from the Nature and Providence of the earlier Stoics; but his emphasis on the concept of the divine all-ruling power as a personal being was destined to have significant results. There is also in his teaching a sense of man's dependence on God which is far removed from the self-sufficiency of the earlier Stoic doctrine; and there was developing a religious mysticism also which was to find free expression in the second century. Philosophy

urged its moral aim as insistently as ever, but it no longer regarded man's reason and will as sufficient for his needs; it taught that to fulfil his duty and secure his freedom man must depend on divine aid. Thus even among the Stoics we find something like a union of philosophy and religion accomplished.

Now it was into this world whose social, moral, and religious ideas we have been sketching that the Oriental religions entered. The earliest of these was that of the Great Mother of the Gods, to whom the state was turned in 205 B.C. by the disasters of the Second Punic War. Her worship was of a wild and orgiastic nature, wholly unlike anything which the Romans had seen before on Italian soil, and we can well believe that the citizens were greatly shocked and disgusted by the processions and rites of the emasculated Phrygian priests who under the republic were imported to carry on this Asiatic worship. No citizens were allowed to join the priesthood for over two centuries and there is abundant evidence that the Romans on the whole shrank from the cult which the guardians of the Sibylline books had imposed on their trusting ignorance. Yet the worship of the goddess gained ground, so that it was the most important of all foreign cults under the republic; in spite of the repugnance which the excesses of her priests undoubtedly excited, it is clear that the Great Mother was always regarded with reverence and trust. Under the Empire she acquired new popularity. In the reign of the Emperor Claudius, apparently, the goddess was especially favored; new festivals were added to her worship, which was celebrated with great pomp; and Roman citizens were no longer barred from the priesthood. The Emperor Caligula had favored Isis, whose worship had already existed for a century in spite of all opposition. Close contact with the East and Eastern immigration brought many other Oriental divinities to the West—Syrian Baalim

under various names, Atargatis, the goddess of Bambyce, known to the West as "The Syrian Goddess," and her male consort Adad, conceived as the "Divine Sun"; and before the end of the first century the Persian Sun-god Mithras came, who was destined in the second and third centuries to exert a greater influence than any other. There were many others whose names need not be repeated here. With regard to the most of these divinities our data are so scanty that we are obliged to content ourselves with conclusions drawn by analogy from the cults with which we are acquainted. We must therefore confine ourselves mostly to the religions of the Great Mother, Isis, and Mithras.

The popularity and the spread of these cults were not due in the first instance to any superior morality which they inculcated, but rather to the emotional satisfaction which they gave, and the assurance of salvation which was offered to the individual. We have seen that in the native Roman as well as in the composite Greco-Roman religions of the republic scanty means were offered by which the individual could draw near to God and through emotional experience gain assurance of present security or of a happy future life. But these were the very things which the Oriental religions, like the Greek Mysteries, did offer in various forms and ways. The demand for such assurances in Rome itself had been early shown by the popularity of the Bacchic Mysteries, which had acquired so deep a hold on the people of Italy that when the attention of the authorities was called to them in 186 B.C., the senate did not dare to attempt to repress them completely, but only checked and regulated the celebrations. The Oriental cults then owed their popularity first of all probably to the orgiastic and mystic elements in their ritual rather than to a recognition of any moral value which they might possess. Indeed the possibilities for evil in these cults were many. The noc-

turnal celebrations with their accompaniments readily lent themselves to immoralities, as historic instances show. Intense excitement leading at times to self-mutilation, the Oriental excess of emotion, the obscene elements in the myths of Attis and the Great Mother, of Isis and Osiris—none of these tended to elevate morality or to inspire a noble code of ethics. Unquestionably too the exotic orgasms of these cults were employed by charlatans and impostors to secure their own base ends.

Yet no great religious conquest can be explained on emotional grounds alone, and undoubtedly the Oriental cults possessed elements which could furnish stronger moral stimulus and make greater moral demands than the traditional forms of religion in the western half of the Roman world. It is hardly necessary to point out that this is in no way disproved by the fact that the majority of the devotees of these gods down to the second century of our era belonged to the classes which were socially despised—foreigners, slaves, and freedmen—and that the apparent devotion of the demi-monde to Isis, for example, can no more be quoted against the character of the goddess's cult than can the devotion of the same class to the Virgin today. Yet it seems probable that until the empire these cults lagged behind the higher moral standards of the day, but that they eventually responded to the rising ethical demands so that by the second century of our era those elements within them which made for a higher morality had become effective. The coarser parts of the myths had long been allegorized and their symbolism was universally accepted; indeed even revolting tales were given an ethical significance by the subtle but not dishonest skill of the learned. The Emperor Julian wished to make the temples centres of religious instruction; and St. Augustine tells us how he had heard the ancient tales of mythology interpreted to the assembled peoples for their moral edification.

The germs of the moral development of these Oriental religions naturally lay in the nature of the religions themselves.

First, we must note the conception of the nature of God which now prevailed in the Oriental cults. Greek religious thought before the close of the fourth century B.C. had come to regard not only justice but goodness as essential attributes of divinity, although popular religion then, as always, lagged far behind the thought of the intellectual leaders. The philosophers of the Hellenistic and Roman periods—Stoics, later Platonists, and Eclectics—advanced to the idea of God as a divine providence, who at times was also conceived to be a personal divinity, filled with an infinite kindness toward men—one on whose grace humanity's life and happiness depend. The Eastern religions had come to conceive of their gods not only in this general fashion, but also regularly as gods who care for the individual.

In the eleventh book of his *Metamorphoses* Apuleius gives us valuable information on these points. To his hero Lucius the goddess Isis is the ever-present divine providence and source of salvation, the one who always saves and cares for mankind; like a mother she is patient with the immature prayers of her children, kind and pitiful toward men in their afflictions; in her good time she calls her chosen ones to the secrets of her service. Serapis likewise is represented by the rhetorician Aristides as everywhere and eternally present and active, at once kind and most fearful, but inclined to pity. The god's gracious pity toward men is indeed adduced as a reason why his devotees should exhibit the same character toward their fellows. Thus the religion of Serapis and Isis led toward that humanitarianism to which philosophy came by another road.

In the course of time even the Great Mother of the Gods ceased to be the wild Phrygian goddess, who con-

demned her scornful lover to his fate, and who found her joy in human blood. Long before the last century of her sway she had become the kindly mother of all Nature, while Attis became the Sun-god, the common symbol of all-embracing divinity. Inscriptions of the fourth century show that the Mother Goddess drew the devotion of the noblest and most intellectual pagans at Rome.

Furthermore, the Oriental gods claimed the whole of their devotee's life; they were not satisfied with occasional worship or with participation in other sacred rites. The concept of God as not only omnipresent and omniscient but also as ever caring for individuals—a belief to which the Stoic hardly attained—led to the ideal of the religious life as one constantly devoted to the contemplation of the divine. So Apuleius makes Lucius close his prayer of praise to Isis with the promise that he will always guard within his heart and there contemplate the sacred image of the goddess. As the characteristics of the goddess were now nobly conceived, such religious contemplation had its moral value.

Again, these religions laid stress on the necessity of removing moral pollution by penance and purificatory rites. Juvenal would regard Isis as a procuress, and he mocks at the women of his time who, naked and trembling, crawled on bleeding knees about the Campus Martius; but the very severity of the satirist's verses shows the influence of the goddess. Baneful as the Orientals undoubtedly sometimes were, the practices which call forth Juvenal's scorn were intended to purify the devotees of their sins and to restore them to divine favor. The doctrine of the dual nature of man, according to which the soul is noble and divine but the body base and evil—a doctrine introduced into Greek thought by the Orphics and adopted by Plato—had been reconciled with the Oriental ideas of opposing good and evil powers in the world. The Zoroastrian belief in the constant warfare

between good and evil, in the cosmic struggle for supremacy between the god of light, Ormazd, and Ahriman, the lord of darkness, was paralleled by the doctrine of the strife between Osiris and Typhon. Zoroastrianism had a strong moral motive from the first. When the practical synthesis of its ethical ideas with those of other religions was accomplished, and when religion adopted the Stoic view of man as a microcosm, these dualistic notions acquired a heightened ethical value.

Not only were penance and purification required of the devotee, but similar acts were necessary before one could be admitted to the company of consecrated worshippers. The would-be initiate into the mysteries of Isis had to refrain from animal food and wine for ten days and undergo purificatory baths and sprinklings before his initiation could begin. Similar requirements were made in other cults, the purpose of all being to cleanse the neophyte from sin and to prepare him for that union with the divinity which was to be granted him during initiation.

Yet neither such initial purification nor occasional penance was sufficient; for, as was said above, the Oriental gods required continual devotion on the part of their followers who wished to attain to full knowledge of the divine. Such knowledge, Plutarch points out, is the chief thing to be desired; but he adds that the goddess Isis grants this knowledge of the true doctrine only to those who, being initiate in her mysteries, continue in a life of sobriety, refraining from the pleasures of the senses and the passions, and who constantly perform in her temples the stern and rigorous service which she exacts. The devout Chaeronean dwells on the lesson that the purpose of these religious exercises is to secure that knowledge of the first and supreme being which the purified spirit alone can comprehend, and that only in constant association with divinity. Thus in the Oriental religions, as in

the prevailing philosophies under the Empire, advance toward perfection was made dependent on a life of religious exercise, and the ideal of purity included a certain asceticism.

Reference has already been made to the concept of the struggle between the good and evil powers in the cosmos. The conflict was emphasized more in Mithraism than in any contemporary religion. In it man's moral obligation was to range himself on the side of Ormazd against Ahriman that he might secure his own salvation as well as contribute to the general victory of the good. Although we lack satisfactory data, we may reasonably believe that the Mithraist was taught to imitate Mithras, not only as the companion, helper, and ally of the faithful, but also as the god of truth, justice, and purity. The devout believed that Mithras promised his followers victory over their human enemies and over their unseen foes, the powers of evil which constantly threaten human safety. The religion of Mithras was essentially a religion of soldiers. One of the grades of initiation was named "the soldier," and in fact devotion to the god was conceived as a military service; the neophyte, like the new recruit to the army, took an oath. The Isiac devotee was likewise enlisted in the goddess's sacred service. Indeed the term *miles* was a common designation for the devout in Oriental paganism; and it is a familiar fact that from the time of Paul the service of Christ was described in military figures.

Not least significant was the influence of the Eastern religions in turning the gaze of their devotees from this world to the next. The common goal for them was future security and happiness, with which safety and joy on earth might or might not be united. Roman and Greco-Roman religion had been concerned with prosperity here and now, and had taken practically no account of the next world. Greek philosophy too had for

the most part concentrated men's attention on this world. The effect of the Oriental religions was directly the opposite of this. The whole life of the *sacrati* was conducted not with reference to the sensible realities of the present existence, but as a preparation for the realization of ideal hopes in the life beyond this. Now any religion which shifts the view of its followers to the next world is certain to have a profound effect on ethical ideals, and in general to make its devotees think less highly of the present life; wealth, comfort, and immediate success become matters of less moment than the permanent welfare of the soul. Such was the influence exerted by the Oriental gods. Their devotees were ready, for example, to give of their wealth, counting such loss as gain. Dedications to all gods involving money expenditure are common enough; but apparently few shrines of the Greco-Roman gods were so rich in expensive votive offerings made by private individuals as those of the Oriental gods; such as, for example, a shrine of Isis at Acci in Spain, or that of Isis and Bubastis near Nemi in the Alban Hills. Toward the close of the fourth century, when the State's support had been withdrawn from pagan shrines, a pious devotee rebuilt the shrine of Mithras which his grandfather had founded at Rome on the spot where San Silvestro now stands, and added at the end of the recording inscription these lines:

"Damna piis meliora lucro; quis ditior illo est,
qui cum caelicolis parcus bona dividit heres?"

"But loss for the pious is better than gain; who richer than he,
Who saves his ancestral wealth and divides his goods with the gods?"

Symbolical poverty at least was cultivated. According to the anonymous *Carmen contra Paganos*, the devotee of the Great Mother, when about to descend into the pit that he might receive the bloody bath of the taurobolium,

put on a dress of rags and humbled himself as a beggar. This and other evidences show that the Oriental religions actually aroused in their followers a disregard for the things of this world as of little value in comparison with those of the next.

Thus we find that there were many elements in these Eastern religions which in the last three centuries of paganism at least made for righteousness. The concept of divinity as a kindly providence which cares for the individual and exacts the same good qualities from man, the unremitting devotion demanded of the devotees, the sense of moral pollution and a longing for moral purification, the shifting of men's eyes from the material gains of this world to the ideal rewards of the next—all these and many other things gave to the Oriental cults distinct and positive ethical and spiritual values. Furthermore, the self-restraint, the gentle asceticism, the obligation to strive unceasingly on the side of righteousness against the evil powers, which these religions imposed, are not to be neglected. Within the religious bodies, whose members were brothers (*fratres, consecrati*) the individual learned submission to the head of the society (*pater*), gained self-control and courage for his struggle against the evils of life. No one can read the evidence we possess and not be impressed by the earnestness and devotion of the faithful. That the Oriental religions actually contributed to the higher moral and spiritual life of the Roman Empire during the second, third, and fourth centuries is beyond question. With all the attacks which the protagonists of Christianity made on its opponents, they do not charge the devotees of these Oriental cults with moral degradation. Their silence is significant. As a matter of fact, the Pagans and Christians in the fourth century certainly held to similar standards of morality, and a change from one belief to the other did not require any great read-

justment of ethical principles. It is very true that the pagan religions from the East had their charlatans and quacks in abundance, that their noblest elements were often entangled in a mesh of magic, superstitions, and false beliefs; but Christianity too suffered from the same evils. Christianity triumphed because of its own inherent superiority to the other religions, not because its rivals were wholly evil and degrading. To fail to recognize the real moral value of Oriental Paganism is to fail to understand the first centuries of our era, and so to remain blind to the true nature of the world in which Christianity established its superior worth.

THE ATONEMENT AND THE MODERN PULPIT

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Interest in theology shows no signs of dying out in our time. The theology most frequently and eagerly discussed may be different from what it was a century ago; the conception of the relation between theology and the other sciences may have changed; and a number of interests have crowded in where theology was once supreme. The sermon is not now the sole or even the chief intellectual event of the week. We are for the most part much more interested in knowing a man's political or economic convictions than in discovering his views on inspiration or the Trinity. But if we may judge from the columns of reviews or the publishers' lists, theology is as much written, and presumably as much read, as ever.

This is especially true of the doctrine of the Atonement. In the last half-century no other doctrine has received more careful consideration. We have but to think of the names of Bushnell, Campbell, Dale, Simon, Lidgett, and Moberley. Those who are interested in theology as a whole, like Denney, show that they regard the Atonement as vital. It is vital for us all. If we take our theology seriously, we cannot afford to suspend our judgment here. We are bound to be partisans. Even in refusing to form a theory, we are accepting a theory. In fact, a doctrine that deals with any part of theology is bound to find itself as a doctrine of the Atonement. Every conviction about God's relation

to the world runs up into a conviction about what Christ has done for man.

Yet it will probably be the experience of most attendants at public worship that appeals to the Atonement in religious services are few and hesitating. References to the Cross, indeed, are perhaps more frequent than formerly. Christ, as living in Palestine and dying on Calvary, occupies a much larger place in our preaching than two or three generations back. The very influence of the Pauline presentation of the Gospel is strong enough to make us see the solemn shadow of the Cross of Christ stretching along every path trodden by His feet. But it would not be easy to decide as to what is gathered from most of these references by the ordinary hearer, or even as to what is meant at times by the preacher. The Cross appears to be regarded very often merely as the basis for a vague and emotional appeal for conversion or for a deeper consecration, like the pictures of the Stations of the Cross so popular in Catholic churches. On this point I find my own experience constantly confirmed by that of others. Sermons on the Atonement, like doctrinal sermons generally, are disappearing from our pulpits.

Similar reflections are suggested by the present-day use of hymns. Our hymn-books, indeed, are not lacking in hymns that deal with doctrine. Isaac Watts and Charles Wesley, the most fertile of our English hymn-writers, filled their hymns with doctrine as instinctively as they clung to the phraseology of the Scriptures; and no doctrine is expounded or alluded to more frequently than that of the Atonement. The most impressive of Newman's hymns is simply a poetical setting of the theology of the Atonement. But such hymns are rarely composed now. References to the Atonement in modern hymns are generally adapted to the older theological point of view. A sermon that

attempts to expound the Atonement from the standpoint of Lidgett or Moberley will find very little assistance in the hymn-book of any denomination.

Nor are the hymns which directly deal with the Atonement by any means the most popular. The experience of most modern organists seems to be that the hymns chiefly selected by preachers and welcomed by congregations express mystical experience, somewhat vague and poetic sentiment, or ideals of Christian service and character. Hymns on doctrine are becoming as rare in our worship as hymns which embody an appeal for instantaneous conversion or hymns which guide the thought to the other world.

This conclusion is roughly true of all the different churches; and nothing shows more clearly the distance we have travelled in the last century. With all the enthusiasm of the Evangelical Movement, the eighteenth century was as much the century of theological doctrine as was the seventeenth. The consuming passion for souls which we connect with the early evangelists inside and outside Methodism was based on very definite theological convictions; their sermons and their hymns dealt with nothing else. Without the doctrine, the appeal and the passion are alike unintelligible. It is true that a belief in the doctrine was not presupposed in the hearer; the appeal was directed primarily to his conscience. But it was worked out in accordance with a definite "scheme of salvation," which he was expected to accept; and as soon as he could recognize himself as a "sinner saved by grace," the work was regarded as done.

The difference of tone in our evangelistic appeals today is reflected in our treatises on the Atonement. There is a note of apologetic and even of apology. It seems to be taken for granted that the reader is hostile, or at any rate unconvinced; that he is a critic rather

than a student. He comes with difficulties which must be answered. Some time must be spent in clearing away his prejudices, or in persuading him that in the book before him he will find none of the mistakes of previous writers on the subject. The doctrine itself is on its trial.

Why has the change taken place? Is there something in the modern mind which naturally rejects what to the mind of earlier generations was central? In the following pages we wish to consider this question, especially as it affects the doctrine of the Atonement. Dr. Denney has made out a list of reasons for this want of sympathy.¹ He refers to the momentous development of physical science, to the idealist movement in philosophy, and to the modern devotion to historical study; and he reminds us that the modern mind will have everything based on experience, and "desires to have everything in religion ethically construed." All these factors tell against any readiness to welcome a doctrine of the Atonement; though, rightly understood, their effect, as Dr. Denney properly asserts, should be the reverse.

But there are other considerations which make the average man of today unwilling to attend to the doctrine. His impressions of the significance of physical science and the importance of the historical method will dispose him to turn from all theological presentations of truth; and whatever influence they exert on his attitude to the Atonement they will exert on his attitude also to miracles or to the idea of revelation. With regard to the Atonement, however, he has his special difficulties.

¹ Denney, J., *The Atonement and the Modern Mind* (London, 1903), Chap. I. "Sin has no place," as Sir Oliver Lodge has said, "in the vocabulary of science." In this connection we may note the words of an influential modern preacher, Dr. G. A. Johnston Ross: "Much of the religion of this generation is lacking in vivid apprehension of certain values formerly recognized in the Cross of our Lord and Saviour. In this matter there is a very deep cleavage between representative Christian experiences of this hour and those of, say, thirty years ago." He adds, "The faith which magnifies the unmerited and sin-destroying grace of God is the only religion."

He cannot understand, in the first place, that presentation of the wrath of God which seems to be inseparable from any interpretation of the Atonement which he knows.

"Nothing can be good in Him
Which evil is in me."

And it is in no desire (as is sometimes hinted) to escape from fear of the consequences of that wrath to himself, but from a genuine conviction as to its origin in an antiquated anthropomorphism, that he turns away perplexed even from the New Testament expressions. Nor does he fare much better with vicariousness and substitution. He knows enough of moral responsibility to sympathize with Ezekiel's axiom, "The soul that sinneth, *it* shall die"; and he cannot see how another's dying in his place can or ought to make any difference to him. Equally hard does he find the doctrine of imputed righteousness. He is not in the habit of imputing righteousness, as he understands the matter, to other people, however eagerly he may desire righteousness and encourage it in them. And he prefers that any righteousness in himself should be his own, rather than received in some mysterious way from another. The whole proceeding is apt to seem to him unreal and even unethical; and if he does not actually reject the doctrine, it fails to exert any influence on his thought or conduct. Religion to him is action, struggle, penitence, achievement.¹

Now it is an unhappy fate for a doctrine when it rouses antagonism or meets with neglect of this kind. A doctrine may make too large an ethical demand for the ordinary man, like that of entire sanctification; in this case select souls will feel its attraction all the more. Or it may pass the limits of intellectual comprehension,

¹ Such is, roughly, the view of Eucken; and it is not difficult, bearing in mind the foregoing, to understand the fascination of Eucken for the high-minded and the intellectual today—the men and women who, in the atmosphere of a century or even a generation ago, might have made eager and enthusiastic evangelical Christians.

like that of the Trinity; in which case it may still be respected. But when a doctrine collides with the plain man's conviction of what is right and just, it rouses the best rather than the worst elements in his nature against it; or else, by dividing his moral convictions against themselves, it leaves him in a condition of paralysis. His only refuge is to turn away from the doctrine altogether and try to forget its existence.

It will of course be urged that these difficulties can all be explained; that in the form in which they appear to the "man in the street" they result from a mistaken and now discredited presentation of the doctrine. They have been explained. No modern teacher of the doctrine has overlooked the necessity of such an explanation. Yet the two facts remain: first, that those whose duty it is to explain them seem unable to make themselves clear, or even to agree with one another as to the point of their explanations; and next, that whatever explanations are given, something seems to be left in the mind of the hearer which is untouched by them all.

The true reason of the refusal to find room for the doctrine lies deeper. The explanations fail to satisfy because the problems they set out to solve are not the real difficulties. Otherwise, how is it that after these years of reverent and eager study they have not ceased to exist? As a matter of fact, the fate of doctrines is not decided by arguments but by affinities. There are certain tides and currents in contemporary thought which have always to be reckoned with, however ingeniously the little boats of our syllogisms may be rowed or steered. The idea that the great act in which "God commends His love toward us" reveals an unintelligible wrath in the Deity, could never have escaped refutation if it were not for something which makes us impatient with the attempt to refute it and unwilling to listen to such an attempt. The truth of vicarious suffering, so deeply

implanted in all our human experience, could not have seemed for a moment to clash with the consciousness of moral responsibility in the mind of an intelligent thinker, if something had not prevented a majority of thinking people from giving any serious consideration to the subject as it appears in theology.

What is this underlying cause? Manifestly, it is one whose operation is comparatively recent. A century ago most people felt no need for explanations at all. Now few people will even pay attention to explanations. The reason is that we have experienced a change both of attitude and interest. Before, we looked back, at our sins; now, we look forward, to our needs or hopes. We are of the opinion, with Walt Whitman, that it is not a fine thing to lie awake at night and think of our sins. We can read of the heart-searchings of Bunyan's hero and admire the acute psychological analysis of his terrors; but we do not feel these terrors ourselves. It is seldom, even in mission services, that we hear of men crying for mercy. If we do, we can hardly understand it. The phenomena of a Welsh revival or a negro camp-meeting set us asking questions about the religious "crowd-consciousness." We may indeed be frightened as to the consequences of our sins; but even then we look towards the methods of the doctor rather than of the spiritual guide; we ask how we can shape the future rather than how we can annul the past. Here lies the great difference, in the sphere of religion, between the eighteenth century and the twentieth.

Nor is this altogether to the discredit of our own times. There can be no doubt that, for all its culture, the eighteenth century was much less respectable and moral than the twentieth. Its sins were distinctly grosser and more pagan. Heaven knows, there is enough of evil in our own days. The plague spots of our modern life have swollen into areas undreamt-of when New York and

London were no bigger than moderate-sized country towns. But that region in our social life in which the coarser evils cannot parade themselves is very much larger, relatively to those plague spots, than a century ago. The whole conception of the Atonement as a way of salvation from sins whose horror deserves instant death or eternal torment is therefore becoming, for many persons, increasingly difficult.

Further, religion has grown rather ashamed of its evangelical self-centredness. We shrink from being thought "other-worldly." We do not like to be convicted of being intent on saving our own souls. And we question whether any transaction in the past can be sufficient, of itself, to assure us about the future or justify us in regarding our ultimate happiness as placed beyond the reach of doubt. George Eliot and Dickens have done more to weaken the old evangelical attitude than most people are aware. But along with these influences has worked some dim sympathy with the words of Christ, that to save his soul a man must lose it. The old call for the salvation of the individual soul at all costs falls on puzzled ears.

Another wide-spread influence makes for this forward look. Our age has seen a very significant advance in humanitarianism. We are not satisfied with telling people who live in a slum that they are wicked. We want to get them out of the slum altogether, and even to destroy the slum. It is not enough for us to convict the drunkard of self-indulgence and callousness; we wish to close the saloon. We long for a clean earth around us to answer to the clean heaven above. Where our forefathers saw evil to denounce, we see suffering to sympathize with, to cure, and to prevent. This attitude is the direct result of the Evangelical Movement. The social problem was the discovery made by the men who were at the centre of that Movement. But by a

strange irony of fate, the daughter has been set against the mother. It may be true that behind each social disease lies a sin. The humanitarian thought of today finds it easier to remember that behind each social sin there lies a disease.¹

Yet this change of front cannot be attributed to any lack of moral seriousness, or any unwillingness to take into consideration the phenomenon of sin. On the contrary, we are inclined to turn from contemplating sin simply because we have taken it into consideration. For if we are to convict people of sin for the presence of social diseases, who are the persons to be convicted? the starving girl who fell into evil ways, or the well-fed youth who tempted her? the unskilled half-employed man who has tried his hand at some bungling crime, or the shareholders of the company which needs a large reserve of stagnant labor? In such a complicated society as ours it seems impossible to say with confidence, "Thou art the man." We feel safer when we put aside the thought of guilt altogether, and concentrate our attention on restoration.

Now, interest in the doctrine of the Atonement finds it very hard to make headway against such influences as these. The soil is unprepared for such seed. The difficulty is clear when we remember the large number of thoughtful and high-minded people who, though not antagonistic to religion, sit lightly to church membership, and give to the community what once the churches would have demanded and received. It is equally clear when we think of the professed adherents of the churches themselves. In the last few years social service has begun

¹The attitude of the more serious people in England to the problems raised by the war suggests a further illustration. There have been appeals for penitence and humiliation for the selfishness and materialism whose presence in this as in other countries has made such a war possible. That these sins exist, few would deny. But the appeals have been timid and somewhat half-hearted. People prefer rather to concentrate on the purpose to fight the war through and then to make another such war an impossibility.

to take a very strong hold upon the churches, and especially on their younger and more vigorous members. To many persons the Unions for Social Service in the different denominations seem the most hopeful thing about our modern church life. It is a relief to turn from long discussions on denominational orthodoxy or connexional finance to some eager attempt to make the churches forget what concerns their own prosperity and play the rôle of the Good Samaritan or answer the test of Matt. 25. But this again means to think less of doctrine and more of service; less of the Atonement as a cure for past sin than of some scheme which shall prevent misery or ignorance in the future.

In these days too there is a growing though vague desire for reunion. "We cannot yet think alike, or even perhaps as yet pray together. But let us work together and carry out in common those great gospel precepts of practical redemptive work over which, happily, no deep disagreement is possible, and we shall come closer still later on." Those who argue in this way know that they expose themselves to grave criticisms. One criticism at least they can ignore—that which springs from the belief that the church must stand well with the comfortable and rich, and that the modern preacher is not called upon to stir up strife, like an Amos or an Isaiah. The case is more serious when we are reminded that to seek reunion along this road will drain off the attention from the great matters of our doctrinal loyalties. This follows both from the wish to avoid calling further attention to our divergencies, and from the fact that enthusiasm for social service produces that forward look which leaves the Atonement neglected. Is reunion itself to be bought only at the price of doctrine?

A similar conclusion faces us when we think of the modern attitude of the churches to Foreign Missions. Foreign Missions used to be the stronghold of evangelical

fervor. And they never enjoyed more support from the churches as a whole than at the present time. But the reasons which prompt that support have changed entirely in the last two generations. Few of us believe that the unconverted heathen will be consigned at death to eternal punishment. The older view of the Atonement taught that a way of salvation has been provided in the death of Christ, if and when people will "accept" it, but that failure to accept it, voluntary or involuntary, means ruin. But in relation to Foreign Missions this view has lost its attractiveness, and no new one has been reached. At the same time, our ideas of the work needed on the foreign missionary field have been revolutionized by anthropological study and sympathy, and medical and educational skill. Social service has played proportionately a larger part in the mission field than at home. Sin and Atonement are categories of thought that are steadily dropping out of use.

The problem of the Atonement in the modern world is thus a very complicated one. It is not a matter that calls simply for correct theological statement. It appears to set itself against all the more hopeful and attractive currents of our social life and even of our religious aspiration. "Why keep us dwelling on the past, discussing how we can be reconciled to God or washed from our sins? We do not feel the stain of sin. We do not want to waste time over reconciliation. We wish to put right actual wrongs and help men to love where hitherto they have only hated." What should be our attitude to such a claim?

Some would reply, "You are underestimating the sense of sin and the need of faith. Without faith it is impossible to please God; and what is this faith but faith in Christ's atoning and sacrificial death for our sin? Until you have learnt to think rightly of the past, it is useless to reach forward to action in the future."

Such a reply will have great weight with some—with those who feel guilt as a paralyzing burden, and who can think of nothing else until they are assured that their own souls are saved and their own consciences clear. But these are not the majority. Recent investigations into the phenomena of youthful and adolescent conversion show that the larger number are influenced at the time of their change of heart by the desire to lead a useful or happy life, by social pressure, or conviction of sin, rather than by fear of death or hell as the results of sin.¹ Into a numbing or paralyzing “sense of sin,” most people cannot be argued. Even so, the reply suggested above would be necessary for a Christian if the New Testament were itself committed to the position of the backward look and if Christianity were a ministry of reconciliation and nothing more. But is this the case?

Even to question it seems audacious. Does not the Cross stand at the very centre of Gospels and Epistles alike? Has it not been central in the whole experience and preaching of Christianity? It has, and yet only as a means to an end; and this in a double sense. Christ’s death was the way to His resurrection; and in His own predictions and in the Pauline Epistles this connection is always recognized and emphasized.² And the end of that death and resurrection was that men might live.³ Life is more than an event or an experience. Christ did not die on Calvary or rise from the tomb in Joseph’s garden that we might be forgiven or feel ourselves liberated from the past. That both of these things should

¹ Starbuck (in *The Psychology of Religion*, p. 52) points out, for instance, that in one investigation fear was the main operative cause in fourteen per cent of the cases, remorse for sin in sixteen per cent, and other motives connected with some moral ideal—the influence of others, or altruistic service—in the remaining two-thirds.

² Mk. 8 31; Lk. 18 33; Rom. 4 24, 25; 8 34, etc.

³ Rom. 5 10, 6 11; Heb. 9 14; Rev. 1 5, 6, etc.

come about, indeed, was indispensable. But His purpose was that we should live the life of men and women who had been forgiven and were delivered from the prison house. It was much that the prison doors should be flung open and that we should hear the words, "Go forth; you are free." It was more that we should be able to *behave* as those who had passed from darkness to light.

This will be seen more plainly when we consider the functions and experiences of the early church. What were the differentiae of early Christianity? The thought of deliverance from the past was a common one in the period of the beginning of our era. All the results of the recent studies of the ancient Mysteries have made this clearer. In this respect, Christianity was only one of a number of rivals competing for popular favor, and in the mind of the general public perhaps the least respectable of them all. What distinguished Christianity from the rest was the result of the deliverance she promised.

The sense of deliverance was the prelude to entrance into a community; a community with a quite definite and explicit conviction as to its vocation. In the first place, this vocation was personal holiness. Theft, adultery, lasciviousness, pride, the quarrelsome disposition, and the idle or malicious tongue—all the evil things natural in a heathen society and especially among slaves and the classes contaminated by the contagion of slavery—these were to be sternly repressed and banished; and secondly, a new set of relations was to be cultivated both towards "insiders" and "outsiders." The adherents of the church saw in each other the members of one great family, whose actions and thoughts to one another were to be always "in the Lord"; and those who were "without" had to be treated with all honesty and good-will and forbearance, readiness to forgive and refusal to take advantage, as men who were themselves

intended to find their way into the warm and sacred fellowship. In other words, the church was set, not to cherish or encourage or even arouse an experience, but to make the world the scene of God's will. Its eyes were fixed on the future.

But how can we reconcile all this with the prevailing emphasis of the Pauline Epistles? We need not hesitate to admit the difficulty. St. Paul seems unable to escape the recollection of his own deliverance from "the body of this death," the corpse of his old evil self to which he had felt himself chained, or from the thought of Christ's sacrificial death. It is true that he does not often use sacrificial terms, like the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews. But the thought of the sacrifice is always before him. Even if he writes to Gentiles, he is still a Jew; and the Temple is always more familiar to him than the Agora or the Forum.

The difficulty, however, is more apparent than real. The technical language of our theology owes more to St. Paul than even to the Gospels. And St. Paul knew the sense of sin, the longing for forgiveness, and the horror of a misspent past, as few men know it today. But even of those who do know it, few know it like St. Paul. To him this horror was not for actual vices or crimes, the commission of what we should call today open sins. From the beginning, his passion had been for righteousness. His earlier life had been misspent because it had been wasted; because it had not resulted in the kind of righteousness he desired. And the deliverance which at last he found turned his dream into a reality and fulfilled in him that righteousness which before he had sought in vain. If St. Paul emphasized the Cross, it was because the Cross meant to him the indispensable condition for the life of loyalty, obedience, and triumph, which he could not describe better than as the life that was risen with Christ. As the grammarian

would say, St. Paul worked with a perfect tense instead of an aorist.

When we turn back from the Epistles to the Gospels, discussion seems hardly necessary. Whether we think of the Sermon on the Mount and the parables and longer discourses in the Synoptics, or the sermons in the Fourth Gospel, we are aware of the stress laid either on action of a quite concrete kind or on a principle of mutual love which necessitates concrete action for its achievement. There are whole regions of Christ's teaching which do not suggest that anything more than this is needful. On the other hand, no one can fail to observe the explicitness of Christ's demands for the service of the weak and helpless, the widow and the little child, the poor and the sick—a service which both the church and the State are beginning to see in a new light. Nor can any one mistake the importance in all His teaching of repentance and forgiveness; but the end of both of these is a new kind of activity. Action appropriate to repentance must be performed, or where is the repentance? If a new obedience does not follow forgiveness for disobedience, forgiveness itself is useless.

Much of the most recent study of the New Testament has led us to feel that where the ethical interest appears to be weak, its place has been taken by eschatological considerations. Eschatology implies the forward look, but one of a very different kind from that of which we have spoken. The world—that is, the present organization of society—is expected to come to an end at no distant time; but there is no evidence that, except by some individuals at Thessalonica and perhaps at Corinth, the early disciples modified their conduct because of this belief, any more than those who have professed similar beliefs in modern times. The result of the eschatological expectation was neither to discredit ethics in favor of the experience of an inner change nor to establish an

interimsethik of any kind, but to inspire conduct worthy of those who were continually waiting for the consummation of a more glorious citizenship.

It would thus appear, first, that the New Testament as a whole is in distinct harmony with the modern tendency of thought noted above, in so far as both underline the necessity of a certain type of activity as essential to Christianity; and secondly, that the presentation of the specific doctrine of the Atonement, as a whole, supports this view. In spite of various well-known passages, the Atonement is recognized as doing more than annulling the past. It fits us for playing our part in the present and the future. One very serious objection, however, would seem still to remain; namely, the sacrificial coloring inseparable from the New Testament exposition of the Atonement. It is beside the mark to urge that the actual language of sacrifice, outside of the Epistle to the Hebrews, is only employed sporadically. The New Testament is the work of Jews; and to Jews such phrases as "laying down one's life," "offering oneself as a ransom," "dying for men," could hardly be more explicit.

But, it will be urged, the Jewish sacrifices make directly against the view we have been considering. The sacrifice is an *opus operatum*; it is for sin; and when once it is duly performed, the offerer need have no further concern. If then we are to think of Christ as made a sacrifice for us, must we not fall back on the older evangelical conception once more? Such a question arises from a mistake as to the real nature of sacrifice, either in the Old Testament or in the earlier religion of mankind as a whole. At the bottom of all religion is the desire to approach to God, to be in harmony or fellowship with God or with the powers that are thought of as divine. Such fellowship may be desired for either honorable or selfish purposes. Unfortunately, it cannot in prac-

tice be maintained unbroken. That which breaks it, or renders man unable without danger to approach God, is, in the language of the Old Testament, sin. But sin does not mean simply a deliberate and "high-handed" disobedience to the known will of God. It may be the violation of some apparently unmeaning prohibition or "taboo." Indeed, certain Hebrew legal texts question the possibility of atonement by sacrifice for "high-handed" wrong-doing.¹ The point is that whenever a rupture of the relations between man and God has come about, it can only be healed by some formal and sacrificial shedding of blood. This is said to "atone for" the "sin."²

The original meaning of the root translated "atone" seems to be hardly recoverable. Equally difficult is it to decide exactly what the worshippers, at various stages in the history of sacrifice, understood by the word. But in early ritual what the worshipper understands or thinks is always a minor matter. What is important is the correctness of the ritual and its consequent efficacy with the Deity. And in any case, the sacrifice is distinctly a means to an end. What was desired by the worshipper was free access to his God and the removal of the sense of uncleanness felt before the sacrifice was offered, whether the offerer was a recovered leper or a woman after childbirth or a person who had not paid his voluntary or stated dues at the Temple punctually. The prescribed sacrifice was offered, and then he was free to resume the old relationship with God and with the community in general.

It must not be forgotten that the sacrifices are not all represented in the Old Testament as having this atoning efficacy. Before the exile, one of the oldest Semitic rituals, the "peace-offering," is generally a festal meal, in which God, the worshipper, and his friends and de-

¹ Num. 15 30; Deut. 17 12.

² Lev. 4 26, etc.; see also 12 7, 14 53.

pendants, as well as the officiating priest, all have their part—a feast which itself demands a preliminary sanctification.¹ The “burnt-offering”² is a solemn function of prayer or thanksgiving, wherein the victim was offered entire to God. The distinctive post-exilic sacrifices, however, the “sin-offering” and “guilt-offering,”³ have a definitely “atoning” significance. Yet even here the thought of the sacrificial animal as a substitute for the worshipper appears to be wanting. The important fact about the worshipper is that he is unclean and cannot himself approach God with impunity. The important fact about the sacrificial animal—ox, sheep, or goat—is that it is clean, and can go where the offerer cannot go till the offering has gone first. This is definitely true of the Paschal lamb, a very familiar type of Christ in the early church. The goat “for Azazel,” in the curious ritual of the Day of Atonement, is certainly unclean. But though this ritual was constantly in the mind of at least one New Testament writer, Christ is never regarded as driven away, like the doomed goat, into the wilderness, but, like the other goat in the ritual, as offered on the altar.⁴

In discussing the references to sacrifice in the New Testament, it is not out of place to refer to one small but not insignificant group of passages in which sacrificial terms are used, not of Christ, but of His followers. The Christian himself has a sacrifice to offer. It is not, of course, a sacrifice for sin, to enable him to regain a lost fellowship with God. That has been offered once for all on his behalf by Christ. The Christian’s priestly function

¹ 1 Sam. 16 5.

² Gen. 22 13; 1 K. 8 64.

³ Lev. 4 2 ff., 5 15 ff.

⁴ Ex. 12 5; Lev. 16 9 f. Of the sacrifices here enumerated, some were offered occasionally, when the “sin” of the offerer needed “atoning.” Others were periodical and at stated times and for the people as a whole; e.g., the daily sacrifices in the Temple and the sacrifice on the Day of Atonement. But these were as definitely purificatory and remedial as the others. The whole nation was regarded as having broken some of the prescriptions, either in the course of the day or in the year, and needing by one comprehensive and regular act to be brought back into communion.

is the offering of a devoted life, or even the carrying out of a single act of love, like a collection for the poorer brethren. Such passages, of course, have no direct bearing on the Christian view of Christ's death; but they show how the conception of sacrifice, instead of being confined to a single annulling act, tended to connect itself with a life of continuous activity and service in communion with God.¹

"The theme of all religion is redemption"; or, as a German scholar recently expanded these words of Kant, "Religion is the desire for communion with the Godhead along the road of release from the power of what is essentially evil." That is true. But it is only half the truth. When we recognize that the words do not contain the whole truth, we can do justice to the truth which they do contain. The theme of religion is communion with God in redemption. That is what people today are increasingly unable or unwilling to understand. But the theme of religion is also communion with God in obedience and service and the joyful struggle for an ideal. This statement, as we have seen, is in a position to find a readier acceptance today. And it is sound doctrine. It is rooted in the conception that underlay the venerable body of Jewish Temple ritual. It lies at the very heart of that prophetic teaching which so strangely neglects any specific doctrine of atonement. It is implied by the presentation of the Atonement in the New Testament.

But there is more in it than this. Let us emphasize religion as service, and we shall find ourselves able also to emphasize religion as redemption. To serve God,

¹ The one passage in the Old Testament which seems to speak quite explicitly of substitution is *Is. 53*. But even there it is not stated that the sufferer bore the sins of others instead of the sinners themselves. The guilt offering is properly, in the Levitical law, the compensation for the withholding of some due (*v. supra*) and the end of the servant's suffering is to "make many righteous"; i.e., to put them in the right with God, make them capable henceforth of living the good life.

you must serve man. "The true and undefiled practice of religion is to visit the fatherless and widow in their affliction, and to keep oneself unspotted from the world." Is this unspiritual? On the contrary, the attempt to carry it out will prepare the soil today, as nothing else can prepare it, for the preaching of religion as redemption. If I am told that I must repent and be reconciled to God, I say "No; I must act and serve." If I am told that I must act and serve, I agree; but I then discover how hard that same service really is. I find, perhaps for the first time, that something must be done of which I had previously never thought. It is when I desire to live and act in communion with God that I become conscious of the need of a sacrifice. I can recognize it, at this point, as a means and not an end, and I can therefore understand it.

Such a presentation of the doctrine will have its effect on the other difficulties that have troubled the modern mind with reference to the Atonement. Substitution and vicariousness seem to clash with the ethical sentiments of mankind only because we have been accustomed to view them from the self-regarding standpoint. Let us think of them in relation to our powers rather than our status, and their apparent injustice vanishes. To tell me that I am to be credited with a righteousness that I do not possess may naturally perplex me. To tell me that because of what some one else has done for me, I am able to do what was before impossible, is to give me another instance of a principle to which all experience bears witness. To put the matter in another way: if salvation is simply a privilege to be received and enjoyed, the Atonement may well seem a needless subtlety. Why could not God have given it to us at once, instead of telling us that we had gained the right to it, when we had done nothing of the kind? So people will still ask. But if salvation is also a responsibility,

the case is different. Unless I am to cease to be a person, God cannot make me able to do "at a clap" what was before out of my reach. A far more intimate and appealing process is necessary. The personality of some one else must invade my own, yet in such a way as to make my own personality more fully mine than it was before. Paradox as this may seem, it can be done, though it can be done only by the sacrifice that springs from another's purity and love.

A similar relief is afforded with regard to the question of the wrath of God. If God is simply interested in individuals, His anger seems as contrary to His love as to His justice. For how can He be angry with those whom He is said to love? and how, even if He does not love them while they are still unreconciled, can He be justly angry with them except in so far as they have deliberately rejected His offers of pardon? If, on the other hand, He is anxious—to put it crudely—that certain things should be done; if what He desires is the maintenance of certain relations by human beings with one another and with Him; then we can easily imagine a very real anger—we can use no other term—breaking out where those relations are sundered. But that anger, at a state of things against which His nature is bound to react, is in no way contrary to the warmest love to every individual man and woman, or to the justice which can recognize in the fullest way the varying responsibility of each; while, at the same time, such an anger must inevitably work for the formation or resumption of those relations and for the means by which this end is attained. That is to say, God's anger, rightly understood, is a direct motive for the commending of His love to us in the death of Christ.

The danger of the older Evangelicalism, as of so much popular Catholicism, was undoubtedly in the emphasis which it laid on the gloomier aspect of its faith.

To speak "as a dying man to dying men," and about the dying Man, was the ideal of the preacher. We have very naturally felt a rebound from that point of view. Our danger lies in the other direction. We are apt to forget both the immensity of the task of Christ and the horror of disobedience to the will of God. We do not "whine over our sins." We hardly think them worth a regret. The reasons for this change of mind have become clear to us, but the consequences may be disastrous. It is just the most eager and reverent minds which have felt the torture of sin most deeply. To forget this is to neglect the most striking facts of human experience, and to relinquish all hope of attaining the heights of spiritual achievement. Yet to attempt to cultivate or induce this sense is useless. It must come of itself or it had better not come at all. And it will come when we pass, in our thinking, from condition to function—when we turn our attention to what we ought to have done and have not done, rather than to what we are. Most of us are not good enough to feel this sense of sin. We shall feel it when, like St. Paul, we are consumed with a passion for righteousness and are overwhelmed to think how we have failed. But for such a passion there must be an ideal; and it is such an ideal which is forming itself with increasing clearness in the ethical and practical aspirations of the present age. The change that makes us fear that we are losing the power to repent is preparing us, in the providence of God, for repentance.

The Atonement therefore is not a doctrine which may be pressed by the theologian but forgotten by the preacher. It is needed in the pulpit as imperatively as ever. The human heart, at its best, has suffered alienation from God. There are barriers to be removed. There are stains to be cleansed away. Sin is a fact, and a fact as real and terrible among the respectable and church-going

classes as among the outcast and criminal. But let the preaching of the Atonement take its right place. Let it be content to follow the imperative of conduct—the law that men will be judged according to their works—and the ideals of the new life of communion with God and of the new heaven and the new earth wherein dwelleth righteousness. When this is done, the modern mind, now led by its qualities to think that the Atonement is unnecessary, will be forced by its defects to find in the Atonement the one thing needful.

RELIGIOUS RESERVE

EDWARD F. HAYWARD

NATICK, MASSACHUSETTS

Two difficulties especially beset religion as a working force among thoughtful people. One is to find an adequate terminology, which shall somewhat nearly approach in expressive power the infinitely illusive realities with which religion has to deal. The other is to guard such a terminology, when once it has been accepted, from a too literal and insistent use. Nothing is so repellent to cultivated minds, for instance, as the too frequent familiarities which men take with the name of deity. Especially is this the problem of the one who has to deal professionally with religion, and who with all his handling of divine reality must not lose that which most truly characterizes it, its reticence and reserve. It is his function to declare the being of God, and to make real to others the relations which that Being sustains toward men. All other accomplishments on his part will fail without this fundamental fitness for impressing men with a sense of some one infinitely good and enduring above the passing shows of daily living. The true minister of religion is one who has walked and talked and lived with God. Amidst human limitation and change, the fixed lights of the Spirit for him stand out clear. For him at least, intellectual doubt and moral reaction have not dimmed the eternal verities of righteousness, truth, and love. The world remains for him God's world, whatever men may have done to deteriorate it morally; and he continually seeks to renew in others

a consciousness of this essential worth of life and to spur them to a greater realization of it in themselves.

The very attempt to do this, however, invites the danger of weakening the impression by straining the symbols and overworking the assurances of the Spirit. Religious experience and religious speech have not always been able to find common ground. The depth and reality of the one cannot always be converted into the objective power and effectiveness of the other. Even if the listener gets no sense of this impending danger, the speaker himself will feel it; and fortunate will be a clergyman, if he wholly escapes those Monday reactions which act upon the sensitive conscience as a warning that the safe limit of assertiveness has in his case already been passed.

It is not an edifying experience to hear a devout and conscientious minister of religion, healthy in body and mind, confess on Monday morning that the modesty and restfulness of agnosticism look attractive to him. All working ministers of religion must have felt at times this momentary appeal of materialism, and often the more so in proportion to the fineness of their spiritual insight and the general trustworthiness of their faith. Beyond a point, to make religious verities real to others is not to increase their reality to oneself, simply because so much more can be felt here than can be expressed, and because expression must ever bear such a delicate and often reactionary relation to the deeper experience of the mind and heart.

There is this, however, to be said, that a normal, unforced exercise of spiritual faculty for the purpose of increasing recognition of and reverence toward God, both for ourselves and for others, has no after-effects to fear. Speaking to and for each other is as natural and necessary here as elsewhere, where speechlessness may be at the risk of thoughtlessness, and where the

pressure of externalism upon our lives is so insistent and so distracting. In writing frankly to his friend, Dr. Bellows, Dr. Dewey finds in him a certain "want of spiritual depth and vitality." "Your nature," he says, "runs to social communions, to visible movements (to outwardness, in short), more than to the central depths within"; and he questions whether his friend has, in the same measure that he has other things, "that deep heart's rest, that quiet, profound, all-sufficing satisfaction in the infinite resource, in silent and solitary communion with God, settling and sinking into the soul, as into the still waters and the ocean depths."

And yet, with his love of expression and his faculty for definite, tangible results, Dr. Bellows was a much-needed force in the religious life of his time. Such men are quickeners of the moral sense. They stir the depths in others, however it may be with themselves, and make us see the dangers which beset all individualistic conceptions of duty, all piety of the merely contemplative sort. Without them and their arrestive word, current religion would become a stagnating pool, instead of a clear running stream which has the ocean ever in view. The religious life can no more afford to be anti-social than can the intellectual or the physical. The broad basis of our inspirational life is in our human relations, and we cannot hope to realize our thought of God if we cut ourselves off too much from our fellow-men. "So long," says Dr. John Tauler, "as thou hast a whole and undivided love towards all men, a share of the virtues and divine influences bestowed upon all flows out unto thee through them. But I tell thee, if thou dost sever any one from this universal love, thou wilt not receive the precious benefits of the outflowings of this love."

However guarded and sparing our anthropomorphism may have to be, we cannot altogether do without it. The very language of the religious emotions is a redeeming

element in our daily speech, which without some such lift and suggestiveness would greatly suffer in depth and richness of meaning. It is very noticeable in our language how large a part the word which stands for deity has to play. There is no department of literature, no field of oratory, no form of social intercourse, in which the thought and the name of God do not at least occasionally occur. No one can appeal to men, hoping to move them deeply and to call their whole nature into play, without making some use of the terminology of religion. There is so much that we can refer to no other source and suggest by no other means, that sometimes it is necessary for us to say *God*; and even if it does not stand for something vital to our inner consciousness, the word does at least convey that impression of the possible and unknown which is seldom if ever wholly absent from men's minds. The atheist himself, in the absence of any adequate substitute, has to fall back at times upon common social usage and repeat the word which throughout the world has a recognized value and a definite utility.

The facts of life and the necessities of speech seem to require the term God; and yet there is no word which makes such quick and certain reprisals upon him who overdoes its use. The Hebrews recognized this condition when they carefully removed their word for God from the commoner and more familiar usages of daily speech. Yahweh was a Power to be looked up to and feared, but not to be loved or taken liberties with. Nor was there at any time an effort to comprehend either his action or his character. "Who by searching can find out God?" The ways of Yahweh were indeed past discovery, nor had man even in his loftiest prophetic flight come near enough to understand his providence or realize his love. Any possible gain which might come from intimate personal communion with him would be more than offset by the attendant loss of dignity and

commanding power over the imagination of men. It was not so much the heart that was to be touched by the motives of religion as it was the will which was to be swayed; and this was felt to be better accomplished by preserving the natural distance at which God stands to man. And so the Hebrews resorted to circumlocution or to suggestive terms, when reference to their national deity was unavoidable.

A modern approximation of this position is found in the attitude which Goethe maintained toward religion. The poet was eighty-two years of age when Eckermann thus speaks of him: "He is far from supposing that he truly apprehends the Highest Being. All his oral and written utterances have inculcated the belief that God is an inscrutable Existence, whereof man has but approximate glimpses and presentiments. All nature and we human beings are, nevertheless, so penetrated with the divine element, that it sustains us, that in it we live, work, and be (are); that we sorrow and rejoice through the operation of eternal laws, which we fulfil and which are fulfilled in us, whether we perceive them or not. He is firmly convinced that the Divine Power is everywhere manifested and that the Divine Love is everywhere active."

There was something peculiarly offensive to a mind like Goethe's in the professional assumption and complacency with which the priestly class try to realize this power to the average intelligence and the average conscience of mankind. In another conversation with another individual he is reported as saying, "With the people and especially with the clergymen, who have him daily on their tongues, God becomes a phrase, a mere name, which they utter without any accompanying idea. But if they were penetrated by His greatness, they would rather be dumb, and for very reverence would not dare to name Him." This is a sweeping criticism, and indi-

cates in a sufficiently aggressive manner the dangers which Christianity invited in abandoning the safe reserves of Judaism. The moment that Jesus proclaimed a Heavenly Father in place of the mere governmental deity of his ancestors, he opened the door to a brood of religious monstrosities, and affected for worse as well as better the vocabulary of religious worship. It is not always that the earthly father succeeds in keeping the children that he loves in a proper attitude of intelligent respect and reasonable obedience, but it has proved a much more difficult task to teach a daily oneness and communion with God without infringing on the manifest reticence of deity and the proper humility of man.

So long as the Hebrew or the Puritan idea of fatherhood prevailed, the full danger did not appear; for parental affection, according to this conception, concealed its tenderness under an aspect of law and order and exacted from its dependents merely a silent and unquestioning obedience. But with the freer modern interpretation of fatherhood, which invites confidence and permits familiarity, it has not been so easy to eliminate the vices of anthropomorphism from private feeling and public worship. To go into the ordinary prayer-meeting or to attend many of our church services on Sundays, is to get the impression too often that the note of filial trust and devout affection is being decidedly forced in the interest of popular effectiveness. The tone of prayer and exhortation becomes at times offensively flippant, not to say irreverent. Deity is not only argued with and condescendingly enlightened as to human affairs, but even joked with and, as it were, patted on the shoulder. The assumption seems to be throughout that God looks upon His creatures with an alternating mixture of facetiousness and affectionate tolerance, and is to be exploited by them for possible blessings in the manner most likely to render Him complacent and generous. It

is as if long familiarity with the filial attitude had begotten a subtle sort of disrespect, as if, the weaknesses of Deity having been found out, the establishment of pleasant relations between the Divine and the human had become all too fatally simple and easy.

Somewhat the same result is reached by the modern turning from the sterner side of the Divine character to its softer and more attractive aspects. Walter Bagehot has warned us that "we must not be invited to approach the Holy of Holies without being made aware, painfully aware, what holiness is; we must know our own unworthiness ere we are fit to approach or imagine an infinite Perfection. The most nauseous of false religions," he tells us, "is that which affects a fulsome fondness for a Being not to be thought of without awe or spoken of without reluctance." The significant fact here is that it is the secular mind which thus recalls us to the severe and chastening phases of the character of God, without which religion ceases to be a real power for righteousness in the world. Mere speculative detachment never yet advanced the soul a step on its way to spiritual certitude or moral freedom. "It is not hard to know God, provided one will not force oneself to define Him," says Joubert. And again, "'Fear God' has made many men pious; the proof of the existence of God has made many men atheists."

Nor have the more enlightened methods of religious approach in our day always escaped the temptation to abuse the confidence which has been reposed in them. Indeed, the difficulty is present in nearly every form of stated worship—except that silent one of the Friends, which has thus far shown little adaptation to modern religious needs—that a free and familiar use of the name of deity shall degenerate into what Goethe calls a "mere habit of speech," as little available for purposes of spiritual communion as for those of practical religious effec-

tiveness. All this goes with that abomination, the professional tone, and with that air and manner and dress which are known as priestly; the more of which one succeeds in acquiring, the farther off the unaffected religious consciousness feels him to be from the simplicity of Christ and the real nature of God. The parrot-like repetition of what should be a sacred symbol not only weakens the truth for which it stands, but it tends at last to bring about a revulsion of feeling in the mind of speaker and listener alike.

The line which separates one who is familiar with deity from one who is *too* familiar is often so tenuous that it is not strange if sometimes devout people content themselves with the opposite extreme of a wholly impersonal approach in their worship of the True and Good. But this would be to only repeat the error of materialism, and to lose some of the finest fruits of religious experience. "Where spiritualism," says Joubert—and by spiritualism he means merely the spiritual consciousness—"where spiritualism employs the words *God, creation, will, divine laws*, the materialist is perpetually obliged to make use of abstract terms, such as *nature, existence, effects*. He feeds his mind on ghosts, without features, without color, without beauty."

This may indeed be preferable to the unconscious materialism of over-dogmatic statement, but the soul will never be nourished by spiritual negations or mere generalities of faith. "Take away belief in the self-conscious personality of God," says Tennyson, "and you take away the backbone of the world. On God and Godlikeness we build our trust." Even an ethical culturist like William M. Salter holds "that one of the needs of our time is some kind of constructive thinking that shall enable us to see and feel the Divine in the world once more, that shall again put us in the attitude of worship, and again lift us and make us strong in a strength

not our own." And yet we are told that Tennyson "dreaded the dogmatism of sects and rash definitions of God." "I dare hardly name His name," he would say; and accordingly in *The Ancient Sage* we remember he called Him the Nameless.

It has been said that "people treat it [the divine name] as if that incomprehensible and most high Being, who is even beyond the reach of thought, were only their equal. Otherwise they would not say the *Lord* God, the *dear* God, and the *good* God." It was Cotton Mather who remarked of Parson Brock, "He dwelt as near heaven as any man upon the earth. I scarce ever knew any man so familiar with the *great* God as our dear Servant Brock." There was an old fisherman on Star Island who used, as a pious duty, to ferry the people across from Appledore and Londoners whenever Parson Brock held divine service. His boat, however, became lost in a storm; and he resented what he considered to be shabby treatment on the part of Providence in view of the services which he had rendered to the cause of religion in the past. Cotton Mather tells us that Parson Brock met the old man's complaint with these words: "Go home contented, good sir. I will mention it to the Lord, and you may expect to find your boat tomorrow." Sure enough, the next day the boat was brought up from the bottom of the sea on the fluke of a vessel's anchor; and another help to unwholesome piety seemed to be afforded.

The gifted Lavater, the friend of Goethe, according to Lewes formed for himself even in childhood "a peculiar and intimate relationship with God, which made him look upon his playfellows with scorn and pity, because they did not share his 'need and use of God.' He prayed for wonders, and wonders came. God corrected his school exercises, and brought to light his virtuous deeds." Out in Denver, Colorado, home of advanced thought which is nothing if not able to "make good"

every time, there is an editorial writer (Thomas J. Shelton, in *The Christian* magazine) who apparently never feels the necessity of adding to his faith, humility. On the cover of a recent number of his magazine, *The Christian*, he has this confident approach to divine realities in the name of Friendship: "Make friends with Mammon. Money is a great friend. It all belongs to you. Make friends with it. . . . Above all, make friends in your mind. Shake hands with your thoughts. Call all your thoughts good. . . . Eternal friendship with everything! Shake, Old Universe! Let us all shake hands with God."

Considering the depth and poignancy of human need, and how in many a time of stress the Divine Sufficiency seems to hide from us and to disappoint our expectations, such exaggeration may not be wholly inexplicable to a patient and pitiful mind. Even the moral side of the Divine Character, so necessary for our guidance, has been providentially withdrawn from our commoner observation in order that that primary condition of human virtue, disinterestedness, might not be impaired. Man must still be able to shun the evil because it is intrinsically bad, and not because either the weight of universal public opinion or the punishment of God is too plainly in evidence against it. Convictions of duty and conceptions of religion vary among men apparently for this purpose, that, as Bagehot has shown, the freedom of our action and the purity of our virtue may not be destroyed.

In that masterly essay of Bagehot's on *The Ignorance of Man*, than which I know of few more stimulating deliverances of the human spirit, the part which this necessary ignorance of man plays in his development is fully indicated and the possible value of "a latent Providence, a confused life, a puzzling universe" made plain. And if, having no moral difficulties to trouble us, we are still oppressed by our intellectual inadequacy of proof, let us listen to "the shrewdest man of the world

who ever lived"—Lord Bacon—when he says, "If we begin in certainties, we shall end in doubts; if we begin in doubts, we shall end in certainties."

As it is the life of God which affects our life, so it must be in most part that we approach him in living ways. Any denial of this supreme reality of existence, be it by thought, word, or deed, must be fatal; none more fatal than that by speech. When some philosopher shall do for blasphemy what Professor Royce has done for loyalty—blasphemy which, in denying God, denies the sources of our life and strength—we shall understand why Jesus spoke as he did against this impiety. But to claim a certain knowledge of God is not necessarily to assert that such knowledge is always communicable to others. Least of all is it always communicable by word of mouth. Our confidence and affection here happily have other means of demonstration than the spoken word. If we are at one with God, there will be the witness of our whole walk and conversation. Definite and formal confession will seldom be needed, the eloquent *life* being generally chary of verbal expression.

The same law should govern us with respect to that other great religious word, the name of Christ, which has greatly suffered in the common usage of the churches. The reverent admirer and would-be follower of Jesus often comes to share in Emerson's reaction against that "noxious exaggeration," which applies to person and name alike. And yet the life, the character of Christ, have an almost unlimited adaptability to human need. The *name* has, indeed, been made to serve many conflicting purposes, and many times historical accuracy has been sacrificed to immediate and superficial effects. But there is something here which is better caught and preserved by reticence than by unrestrained assertion, a deep heart of meaning and power into which one grows by silent meditation, by obedience, and by the quiet

reserves of faith. By this name, so dear and so influential in the better life of Christendom, we still must conquer. What we need is to hold the word up to its best; by moderating the frequency and modulating the tone with which we mention the name of Jesus, to avert the danger of reactionary sentiment which has not disappeared since Emerson's day.

Religion must doubtless be looked at from two points of view. As an instrument of practical effectiveness among men, and as a private and personal experience, it may at times call for varying methods of expression. The essentially illusive quality, the somewhat rare and remote character of the emotion, however, always remain. And always there remains also a certain pity that so high a sentiment should ever need to be taken out of the inner circle, the more intimate and secret enclosures of our life, to suffer public exposure and the indiscriminate handling of a professional cult. Religion is so essentially a private and personal concern, and so much remains for faith and trust to do in even its most confident assertions, that the sense of its reality cannot but suffer from the rude touch of familiarity. Not even science has done as much to weaken spiritual certainty in our day as the dogmatism of theology and the unwarranted assumptions of the elect.

The very existence of such a word as agnosticism, together with the fact to which it corresponds, is an indication of this unfortunate tendency. We know that an age which coins such a word and gives it currency must have succeeded an age of over-assertiveness in theology. To have staked all on a complete and infallible system of doctrines and to have attempted an actual topography of heaven, was to invite inevitable reactions such as we have seen.

The human mind, indeed, is all too easily antagonized in these concerns of the spirit. Its devotional appetite

can be forced, or it can be over-indulged, to the point where indifference to stated worship sets in. The object to be sought in any wise ordering of religious observance is, of course, to create and satisfy a healthy spiritual hunger without inducing revulsion or satiety. In proportion to the elevation and intensity of the emotions involved will always be the difficulty of the task. A church, for instance, which can do its work, and show a people, reverent, peaceable, and pure, and at the same time not infringe the threefold character of Sunday as a day of religion, rest, and recreation, has found the better part of public worship. Rest and recreation may be helpful conditions of religion, by freeing its observances from strain and correcting any tendency to over-insistence, both of which threaten the effectiveness of the church in an age of clear seeing and thinking such as ours.

Even of individuals it is true that we most value them for their reserves; and God has infinitely blessed us in what He has held back from our knowledge and denied to our utterance. Fully as much by the divine reserves as by the divine revelations does He humble our conscience and energize our will.

Let there then be prophets of the divine reticence, teachers who make clear that eye hath not seen nor ear heard nor hath it entered into the heart of man what God hath prepared for them that love him. For purposes of dogma we know little about God. Spiritually, however, He stands to us for certain transcendent facts and forces of life; for the realities of communion, for enlightenment to see and inspiration to do, for inward strength and hope and courage. All this and more we must ever associate with the Sacred Name. That name will never cease to stand for a great constructive possibility of experience, even though the best part of our deliverance concerning it remains what we do not say. The

age-long effort to feel after God, in faltering words, if haply we may find Him in experimental fact, will go on as of yore. But let us hope that it will proceed with less of unhealthy extravagance and extreme than in the past. To seek here, as Jesus said, is to find. To draw near in reverence and humility is at least to feel dimly the mighty influences of the Spirit. The work of the mystic is not yet done in life. The quietist has his office still, to purify our vision and revive our faith. Perhaps we shall never get farther along in our religious progress than the attitude and spirit of the German divine, who after many hours of labor in his Master's service, always closed the day with the one prayer, "All is as ever, Lord, between me and Thee."

THE CONTRIBUTION OF PROFESSOR ROYCE TO CHRISTIAN THOUGHT

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Theology is constantly recognizing, more fully and more freely, the closeness of its relation to philosophy. Starting though they do from different impulses—theology attempting to interpret experience and philosophy to attain knowledge—they converge upon a common field. No great theologian but influences philosophy, no great philosopher but affects theology.

Of American philosophers since Edwards, no one has made so rich, profound, and extensive a contribution to religious thought as Josiah Royce.

I

It is impossible to understand Professor Royce's philosophy without realizing its close relation, from the very start, to the problems of *religion*, or rather of theology. It is not without significance that the title of his earliest volume is *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy* and that of his latest, *The Problem of Christianity*. That the religious interest was uppermost in the awakening of this puissant mind is left without a shadow of doubt by an unequivocal statement in the preface of the first volume, as follows: "The religious problems have been chosen for the present study because they drove the author to philosophy, and because they, of all human

interests, deserve our best efforts and our utmost loyalty.”¹

The note of loyalty, as well as that of religious interest, thus early struck, emerges later as the keynote of his ethical teaching.

One does not read far in this first fresh and vigorous volume, written at the age of thirty, before realizing that it came from the reaction of a deeply reverent and penetrative mind, trained in a home of piety and a church of power, against the religious conceptions then prevalent in practically all, even the freest and broadest, American churches. The author sees that religion cannot be true to itself without asking “how the highest thought of man stands related to our highest needs and what in things answers to our best ideals.”

“Here are questions of tremendous importance to us and to the world. We are sluggards or cowards if, pretending to be philosophic students and genuine seekers of truth, we do not attempt to do something with these questions. We are worse than cowards if, attempting to consider them, we do so otherwise than reverently, fearlessly, and honestly.”²

In particular, it was the limitation of *the idea of God* then prevalent in both orthodox and liberal churches which aroused his concern, and it is with this doctrine that the book is mainly occupied. Very clear and imperative rings his challenge to those who are content with “their own little contemptible private notion and dim feeling of a God.” “Take heed,” he writes, “lest your object of worship be only your own little pet infinite, that is sublime to you mainly because it is yours.”³

The Being whose existence depends upon the traditional arguments “aptly compared to medieval artillery

¹ *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, p. v.

² *Ibid.*, p. 5.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 13. The quotations are from the First Edition.

on a modern battle-field," the God "who is constantly producing noteworthy effects and so getting himself into the newspapers," is, in his unfettered, critical judgment worse than none. In place of such a god the author prefers to conceive of God as "Universal Thought," and as such he essays to interpret Him.

The pathway by which he reaches the certainty that there is such a Being is the study of the nature of error. The argument drawn from the possibility of error is, in brief, as follows:

"That there is error is indubitable. What is, however, an error? The substance of our whole reasoning about the nature of error amounted to the result that in and of itself alone, no single judgment is or can be an error. Only as actually included in a higher thought, that gives to the first its completed object, and compares it therewith, is the first thought an error."¹

This "Inclusive Thought" is none other than God. Everything else may be doubted except this.

"They reckon ill that leave me out;
When me they fly, I am the wings;
I am the doubter and the doubt."²

The All-Thinker is also the All-Enfolder, the Infinite Spirit, Universal Will. Yet His inmost essence is Thought.

"Not heart nor love, though these also are in it and of it. Thought it is, and all things are for Thought, and in it we live and move."

II

In Professor Royce's next book, a fascinating and penetrative review of modern philosophy, entitled *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy*, published in 1892, he moves forward toward a fuller conception of the Divine

¹ Ibid., p. 431.

² Ibid., p. 434.

Being as containing not only Thought but Worth—the values of the “world of appreciation.” This advance in his interpretation of God came to complete and signal expression in the philosophical discussion at the University of California in 1895—perhaps the most noteworthy that has occurred in America. The chief contributions to this discussion were published in the volume, *The Conception of God*. In the brilliant address with which Professor Royce opened the discussion, he presented the conception of God as embodied in the attribute of Omniscience. God is the Absolute, Organized Experience, “related to our experience as an organic whole to its fragments.”¹ The existence of such an Absolute Experience is proved—and here we have the proof from the nature of error in another form—by the fact that the very denial of it is an appeal to it as vindicator of the denial; for nothing can be true or false except it be such to an Inclusive Experience. “The very effort to deny an absolute experience involves, then, the actual assertion of such an absolute experience.”²

Without lingering upon this subtle form of proof—a stronghold of philosophical argument which the forces of scepticism find it easier to go around than to demolish—is it impertinent to ask: What is gained by proving that there is a Universal Experience? That is easily granted without proof. The thing needing proof is that this Universal Experience is God.

Professor Royce claimed for this conception of God that it was “distinctly theistic and not pantheistic.”³

“For my own part, then, while I wish to be no slave of any tradition, I am certainly disposed to insist that what the faith of our fathers has genuinely meant by God, is, despite all the blindness and all the unessential accidents of religious tradition, identical with the inevitable outcome of a reflective philosophy.”⁴

¹ *The Conception of God*, p. 44.

² *Ibid.*, p. 43.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 49.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 50.

Against this assumption Professor Howison, who represented the distinctly personalistic point of view in the discussion, protested, declaring that such a representation of God "is not the conception of a Being that we can adore at all. The fault of it at the bar of the religious reason is, that by force of the argument leading to it all the contradictions and tragic discords belonging to experience must be taken up directly into the life of the Absolute; they are His experiences as well as ours, and must be left in Him at once both dissolved and undissolved, unharmonized as well as harmonized, stilled and yet raging, atoned for and yet unatoned."¹

Under the searching criticism of Professor Howison, who insisted that the conception of the Divine Being as Absolute Experience is not only unworshipful but inimical to God's ethical nature and also that it contradicts the freedom of the individual, Professor Royce wrote a supplementary essay upon *The Absolute and the Individual*, which is included in the same volume. In this he lays stress upon the process of individuation which takes place in the Absolute, endeavoring to show that the Absolute "has room for ethical individuality without detriment to its true unity."²

In seeking to accomplish this end, Professor Royce—whether consistently or not we will not here pause to discuss—defines God both as a self-conscious individual and as "the only ultimately real because the only absolutely whole individual."³ This Whole Individual embraces every individual ego, each individual's plan being "identically a part of God's own attentively selected and universal plan."⁴ The language reminds one of a certain Protestant theologian not now in so high repute as formerly.

¹ Ibid., p. 123.

² Ibid., p. 137.

³ Ibid., p. 272.

⁴ Ibid., p. 292.

III

The Absolutism thus outlined reaches its full expression and defence in Professor Royce's greatest and most profound work—on the whole probably the most thorough and sustained work of American philosophy—the Gifford Lectures, *The World and the Individual*. If I venture not only to characterize but to criticise this masterpiece of philosophical thought, it is not without a reverent sense of the original power and imperishable worth of this burning bush of high and holy thinking which so few turn aside to see.

Just as "Universal Thought," becoming suffused with feeling and reality, gave place in Professor Royce's conception of God to "Universal Experience," so "Universal Experience" has here become purified and uplifted into Universal Selfhood. Will has become more central than Thought, and Moral Purpose than Experience. In a word, the conception of God has advanced in the Gifford Lectures distinctly toward that of a Person.

Nowhere perhaps, unless it be in Fichte's works, has the nature of personality and its relation to God been so richly and sympathetically unfolded as in these two volumes—*The World and the Individual*. And yet the task so splendidly assailed is in itself more than a labor of Hercules, and the want of success in establishing the main thesis cannot but be felt by the reader. To show how the One can be the One and yet the many, the Self a Self and yet the selves—this is indeed a "stickit" problem even for a mind possessed of all the subtlety as well as the sincerity, the power as well as the persuasiveness, of the author of these extraordinary volumes.

These lectures, however, constitute a rich mine of philosophic theory. Several truths essential to our

understanding of the interpretation of personality and of knowledge, stand out in them with a definiteness and completeness of statement seldom reached in the literature of philosophy. Such, for instance, is the remarkable exposition of the distinctness and yet the relatedness of the "World of Description" and the "World of Appreciation." Professor Royce has, in these volumes, together with his analyses of consciousness in *Studies in Good and Evil*, given us an insight into the nature and meaning of the self which constitutes a most valuable contribution to the understanding of personality, and thus of Christianity as the religion of personality.

Sensitive as he is to the inner autonomy and worth of the finite selves, Professor Royce nevertheless does them an essential injustice. He endeavors to conserve their selfhood while encompassing them all within both the purview and the activity of an All-Inclusive Self. With extraordinary resourcefulness and patience he pursues the task of the adjustment of these contrasted selves, seeking to guarantee to the finite selves a freedom that will save them from the paralysis of determinism, and to the Inclusive Self a transcendence that will save him from the responsibility of the evil committed by the finite selves.

These antinomies of selfhood are, indeed, by no means peculiar to the philosophical premises of Professor Royce. Snares and pitfalls beset every theory that tries to explain with accuracy the relationship of God and man. And yet Professor Royce's monism serves to aggravate the difficulties to the highest degree. The personal God of theism is at least free from complicity with the materialities and imperfections and misdeeds of the finite selves. He may indeed seem too separate and remote from the finite selves to enable us to say with so much realism as does Professor Royce of his Absolute, "In whom we live and move and have our being."

Nevertheless, the immanence which a Perfect Person may have in imperfect, finite persons through the operation of sympathy—"grace," as the old theologians called it,—may be a truer immanence than this all-inclusive absorptionism.

At all events Professor Royce's discussion of the relations of the Self to the selves concludes with an unresolved problem. In the end, all the participants suffer from this universal Absolutism. The individual finite self suffers because he is so nearly swallowed in the Whole. To be sure, each of us possesses, according to Professor Royce, a "uniqueness of meaning" which gives him a certain worth and significance to the Universal Self; but *for himself* and *to himself* he is a zero. The conception of God suffers too in this monism, because He is, after all, not a true Person, but only the Aggregate of persons. It is in vain—is it not?—that Professor Royce assigns personality to such a Being, though defining it in these comprehensive words:

"Now from our point of view, God is a Person. Temporally viewed, His life is that of the entire realm of consciousness in so far as, in its temporal efforts toward perfection, this consciousness of the universe passes from instant to instant of the temporal order, from act to act, from experience to experience, from stage to stage. Eternally viewed, however, God's life is the infinite whole that includes this endless temporal process, and that consciously surveys it as one life. God is thus a Person, because, for our view, He is self-conscious, and because the Self of which He is conscious is a self whose eternal perfection is attained through the totality of these ethically significant temporal strivings, these processes of evolution, these linked activities of finite selves."¹

This conception of God as eternally and consciously surveying his life as one, rescues Professor Royce's Deity from being a mere symbol for the evolutionary

¹ Vol. II, p. 418.

process, or the mere totality of the striving selves. Yet can He be both the perfection and the process, both the strivings and their beholder?

IV

The Gifford Lectures were published in 1901. Between this time and the publication of his remaining books a marked change of direction, or at least of emphasis, appears in Professor Royce's thought. It is a change away from the speculative and abstract toward the ethical, the practical, and the social. A more deeply human interest pervades his later work, a closer touch with the more immediate needs of his fellow-men and of his time.

How far this was due to the stirring crusade of Pragmatism which began about this time, especially to the acute and telling thrusts at Absolutism made by Professor James, how far to the general change in the temper and interest of the age, and how far to the natural development of his own ever vital and progressive thought, it is hard to say. A rare and beautiful catholicity of mind is one of Professor Royce's finest traits. Whatever pains he may have felt from the stings and arrows of his outrageous pragmatic foes, he has manifested no resentment, made no efforts to defend Absolutism—doubtless thinking that it is able to defend itself—and without deflecting from his own course—only pausing at Professor James' death to pay him such tribute as only a great thinker can give to a comrade—he has quietly appropriated whatever was relevant in the criticism aimed against Absolutism and moved steadily on his way in the development of his own philosophy.

Now emerges in the symphony of his teaching that ethical and spiritual note destined to take its place as

the recognized and resonant refrain of his whole teaching, the principle of *Loyalty*. Here at length appeared in clear radiance a truth fundamental in the structure and quality of his thinking which all the world could grasp. It is as the "philosopher of loyalty" that Professor Royce will be most widely known. The volumes which embody this new attitude are, *The Philosophy of Loyalty* (1908); *William James and Other Essays* (1911); *The Sources of Religious Insight* (1912); and *The Problem of Christianity* (1913).

In his *Philosophy of Loyalty*, with all its noble idealism and ethical realism, a self-refuting note was incidentally struck which it remained for the author himself tacitly to correct in his later work. I refer to the possibly unethical and irrational implication of the principle of loyalty which is there put forth, *i. e.*, insufficient discrimination as to the cause to which loyalty devotes itself. "Loyalty to loyalty" means, when carried to its logical conclusion, that the loyalty of the criminal to the gang, of an obstinate man to an opinion, of the patriot to his country "right or wrong," are all covered by the aegis of a virtue that may thus be distorted into a sanction of the most selfish and disastrous ills. Loyalty to a worthy cause, unselfish, pure, rational—as of course the author intended—alone is good and great. Professor Royce fastened upon such a cause, incomparable in its worth and beneficence, when, in his latest philosophical book, he took up again definitely the subject out of which his thinking had originally sprung and about which it had ever been revolving—Christianity. The Manchester College Lectures upon *The Problem of Christianity*, delivered at Oxford in the spring of 1913, touch the problem to the quick.

"The Problem of Christianity." Ever to the philosopher Christianity is too much a problem and too little a solution. And yet it could never be an adequate solution,

did it not also offer an ever insistent problem. Professor Royce solves the problem in terms of Loyalty. The terms are true—though perhaps Love comes even nearer than Loyalty to the heart of Christianity¹—but is his object of loyalty the real one? The Beloved Community is the *loyal* community. Yes, but to what is it loyal? To itself, says Professor Royce, and no one would wish to contradict him. But what is the secret of its loyalty? Who created the Community? Loyalty does not spring objectless and motiveless from the void. The Community is loyal to itself because loyal first to one who created it and holds it together.

It is difficult to understand how Professor Royce could have so far failed to recognize the potency of the Christ personality as the cohesive centre of the Church. It is true he makes a place for the Indwelling Christ—the Spirit of the Community—but not for the incarnation of the Spirit in Jesus. It was the incarnate Word who gave origin and impetus, concreteness and unity, to the early church. Nor has the personality, thus vital at the outset, however obscured, ever been lost in the subsequent life of the Church. In answer to the question, Who was the founder of Christianity? Professor Royce replies, Not Jesus, nor Paul; we first find the essence of it in the Pauline churches. In other words, he leaves the question of its founder unanswered. To leave it unanswered is to leave the problem of Christianity unanswered.

V

What is the conception of God in the Oxford Lectures? The answer cannot be a definite one, for there is no distinct and clearly apprehensible teaching upon this topic, either in the Bross Lectures upon *The Sources of*

¹ Loyalty represents the *will* side of love; love includes both spontaneous and volitional elements.

Religious Insight or in *The Problem of Christianity*. The very term "God," so frequent and so pregnant with meaning in earlier volumes, is rarely found in the later. Not that the author has rejected his former point of view. Indeed, in the lecture on the *Doctrine of Signs*, the theory of "Absolute Voluntarism" is strongly reaffirmed. Yet the emphasis has changed. Manifestly the conception of God has passed into a new stage of development. Is it a more potent conception, or not?

Throughout *The Problem of Christianity* a distinction is made between the Community and the Spirit of the Community, and at one point at least a third distinction is suggested—namely, that of "Charity itself, the love of the Community by all its members, and of the members by the Community."¹ Definitively or inferentially, the reader is led to associate God with each and all of these—the Community, the Spirit of the Community, and the Love of the Community. Here is a striking correspondence—though Professor Royce does not himself point it out, and possibly does not himself recognize it—with the threefold trinitarian distinction, God the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.

In the Community there is thus always, even when viewed as the Universal Community, or Humanity, something spiritual and ideal. This it is which sets Professor Royce's Community-loyalty far apart from and above Positivism and every other form of the worship of Humanity. It is never the Community in its empirical nature or its mass aspect, that Professor Royce presents to us as divine and worthy of devoted loyalty, but always the Community as an *Ideal* in process of realization. This Ideal Community, we are led to infer, is practically what we have all along been ignorantly worshipping. Whom therefore we have ignorantly worshipped, He, or It, is declared unto us.

¹ Op. cit., p. 192.

The actual Community corresponding to this burning inner ideal, Professor Royce admits, nowhere exists. The Community, though a Community of memory, is still more a Community of hope, of expectation.¹ The Church is an invisible ideal rather than an actual institution.

"For the true Church is still a sort of ideal challenge to the faithful, rather than an already finished institution—a call upon men for a heavenly quest, rather than a present possession of humanity. 'Create me'—this is the word that the Church, viewed as an idea, addresses to mankind."²

Thus does this "institutionalist," as he is amusingly termed by Canon Inge in the *Hibbert Journal*,³ describe the Church. Institutional he is only in the sense of one who cries, "Ring in the *Church* that is to be."

It is impossible not to feel that this divinity of the Community is, in effect, a form of the doctrine of Divine Immanence, and that it only lacks the supplementary truth of transcendence to become a fresh and illuminating expression of Christian Theism. And yet true and complete transcendence is never predicated of God by Professor Royce. The Community has indeed a kind of *immanent* transcendence, so to speak. It transcends itself, holding within itself ever the seed of its own perfection. But this possibility of perfection is never conceived as coming from Above, from the Father of lights. If, instead of being simply the Spirit of the Community, this Spirit were only conceived as the Spirit *in* the Community, having its source *above* the Community, we should be able to recognize at once the Holy Spirit, the Indwelling Christ of Christian experience; but this distinction Professor Royce does not permit us to make.

¹ II, p. 51.

² I, p. 54.

³ July, 1914.

Very closely does this untrammelled thinker approximate to the theistic conception, especially in the fascinating lecture on *The Realm of Grace*. But always he stops just short of it and retreats to his stronghold of a society of individuals, a community which he prefers to call *superpersonal*—although he is willing to call it a person, “if by person you mean a live unity of will, of love, and of deed.”¹ No one surely would object to that definition of person, if only again that unity is in and of and for itself as well as in and for others. In other words, to be a person the Divine Person must, like the human, be an entelechy—an end in Himself. That is, according to Christian theology, God is not only immanent but transcendent.² According to this conception a society having a composite consciousness cannot be in the full sense a person, nor a person a society.

Universal Thought, Universal Experience, Universal Selfhood—this, roughly speaking, is Professor Royce’s ladder to perfection. Manifestly it is a progressive approach to that which for Christian theology is most essential in Deity—Personality. And yet the goal is never reached. For this Universal Person is not only an incomplete Person but worse, since there is limitation and evil in Him—the limitation and evil of all the selves composing Him.

In *The Problem of Christianity* Professor Royce partly overcomes this objection by identifying God, not with universal humanity but with those groups, or that inclusive Group, which includes the best in the human persons—the “Universal Community.” But even so, not one of these groups alone, nor all together, can be re-

¹ I, p. 352.

² It is unfortunate that, as Professor George F. Moore has pointed out to the writer, the term *immanence*, in its exact derivative sense, precludes transcendence. That which *remains in* a thing obviously cannot transcend it. Yet what can the theologian do in such a case but assert that meanings transcend terms?

garded as having perfect or fulfilled personality. Limitation and evil exist in even the highest, the Christian Community.

There is no such thing, then, in fine, as Fulfilled Personality, the Perfect Person, according to Professor Royce—except in idea. If one is content with this conclusion, as satisfying either the intellect or the heart, he has here the highest formulation of his creed. But let him not infer that this is the only God rationally defensible. For out of the intuitive insight of the soul, out of the deeper implications of the moral nature, out of the teleology of the universe, natural and spiritual, there arises a conviction of the reality of a Perfect Person, high and lifted up, yet whose Presence fills the temple of humanity. This conviction of God has possessed the major mind of humanity in all the thinking ages, including our own. It has appealed more strongly than any other to reason as well as to faith.

VI

In the second series of the Manchester Lectures, dealing with the metaphysical aspect of Christianity, Professor Royce brings forward a conception in which Philosophy and Christianity throw light upon each other and to whose elucidation he has been giving further attention in a recent course of lectures at the University of California—namely, the principle of *interpretation*, involved in what he has termed the *Triadic Theory of Knowledge*.

The Community is a community of interpretation. Its most useful member is the interpreter. Knowledge of self and of others is interpretative knowledge. The most serviceable function in the life of the Community is that of interpretation or mediation. Christianity is

a religion of interpretation. It is a "Doctrine of Signs."

This is no new principle, to be sure, in Royce's thinking. It runs through all his work. Its deepest and most searching application to Christianity had already been made in the last of three addresses upon *What is Vital in Christianity*, given at the Phillips Brooks House at Harvard University in the spring of 1909, and published in *The Harvard Theological Review* and later in the volume, *William James and Other Essays*. In the last of these addresses, having shown the shallowness of that conception of Christianity which regards it as a culmination of cosmic evolutionism and leaves on one side its ministry of reconciliation, in words that touch the deeps of human experience the speaker concluded thus, concerning the meaning of comradeship in sorrow:

"God wins perfection through expressing Himself in a finite life and triumphing over and through its finitude. And our sorrow is God's sorrow. God means to express Himself by winning us through the very triumph over evil to unity with the perfect life, and therefore our fulfilment, like our existence, is due to the sorrow and the triumph of God Himself. These two theses express, I believe, what is vital in Christianity."

This truth finds still ampler expression in the lectures on *Time and Guilt* and *Atonement* in the first series of the Oxford Lectures.

It has thus been given to Professor Royce to recall to the mind of our time, from the vantage-ground of philosophy, one of the great realities of Christian faith, too far overlooked in the hasty superficialism of present-day theology—the doctrine of Atonement.

Yet here once more Professor Royce pauses upon the hither side of a great truth as Christian theology has, in its larger insights, conceived it. Not merely from

within the community but from *above* comes interpretation. Incarnation, according to Christianity, means, not simply that the Spirit of the Community incarnates itself, but that the Spirit that created the Community is also its Savior, entering into a lower order of spiritual life than its own to inform and redeem it.

"As individuals we are lost," says Professor Royce, and we assent. We are saved, he affirms, by coming into right relation with the Community. Yes, we answer, but by coming into right relationship not primarily with the Community, but with the Spirit of the Community, with God, and through Him into relation with the Community. In other words, the primary and fundamental redemptive relationship is that between the soul and God—mediated by the Community. In this conception the only dyadic relation which is "dangerous" is, as a friend of mine has remarked, not that between a pair of persons as such, but that which has not become "triadic" through the presence of the Universal Interpreter who was in Christ—yes, and in every loving member of the Community in the degree of his sacrificial spirit—reconciling the world unto Himself, and thus to itself. It is such a God, "above all and through all and in you all" who alone satisfies our need,

"That we may lift from out of dust
A voice as unto Him that hears,
A cry above the conquer'd years
To One that with us works, and trust."

VII

In an all too rapid and inadequate way we have endeavored to follow the course of Professor Royce's thought as it relates to Christianity, from the clear cold springs of its earlier critical and speculative beginnings along the deepening and broadening channel of

its profound study of the nature of God and the relationship of the One and the Many, to the later period of its calm and fertilizing flow into the fields of great social interests, where it encircles the broad meadows of human fellowship, waters the roots of loyalty, and interprets some of the deeper truths of Christianity.

It is quite too cheap and professional for the philosopher to dispose of this original and resourceful contribution to philosophy as a form of Hegelianism. It will not stay within these limitations. Or for the theologian to set it down as an insidious form of scepticism or pantheism. It is far too genuinely informed with the spirit of the article, "I believe in the Holy Ghost; the holy Catholic Church; the Communion of Saints." Throughout the later volumes indeed, barring the philosophical phraseology, the very spirit of Christianity, as Paul interprets it, is reflected. In the entire literature concerning Paul, it may be said in passing, few have interpreted his mind with so keen and sympathetic a discernment as has this unconventionalized Christian.

Whatever further amplification or modification this fertile and inexhaustible mind may give to his philosophy, it stands before us as a noble and impressive whole, demanding to be evaluated and put to usury. It would be a grave loss not to honor with criticism as well as with application to life, a philosophy of so large and vital significance. It is ripe for interpretation, for testing, and for food—food for the many as well as for the few.

It is somewhat strange in view of the position which Professor Royce holds in the philosophical world, the deep and extensive influence he has exercised as a teacher, the originality and scope of his contribution to the literature of philosophy, that so few attempts have been made either to expound or to estimate his philosophy as a whole—especially from the view-point of theology.

Eucken and Bergson have in Royce a worthy American compeer in the great task of spiritualizing life. His philosophy, like theirs, makes for the regnancy of the Ideal. It is a deeply religious philosophy. As time throws it into perspective it will be seen how truly great a philosophy it is—great in its success, greater still in unfulfilled endeavor. For it may well be that we have in Royceanism the last and most splendid—yet futile—effort to construct an enduring temple of Monism. The structure as such is not only incomplete but insecure—not so much from assault from without as from a general abandonment of the monistic position and from self-criticism. For the very dialectic of the philosophy itself, the inner strife of its contending principles, refusing to submit to a foreordained synthesis, has adjudged itself and led to that extraordinary self-expansion in Professor Royce's system which has brought his thought ever closer to the throbbing human interests and problems of our time and made him so great an "interpreter." In other words, Professor Royce has tacitly passed judgment upon his own system by constantly surpassing it. It is true that his whole work has a marked unity of purpose and movement, but it is the unity of a development that is too large to be self-fulfilled.

It is this very self-transcendence, therefore, this constant advance, that gives us the assurance that in this philosophy we have that which no closed system can rival—a philosophy full of fructifying ideas, bound together by a constantly enlarging conception of the world, the self, and God. We of the theological guild, who are too easily content with conventional ideas, have much to learn from the philosophy of Professor Royce, and, whatever the degree of our dissent, should be eager to acknowledge our large indebtedness to him.

SIR OLIVER LODGE'S BRITISH ASSOCIATION
ADDRESS

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The list of Sir Oliver Lodge's writings is long and varied, ranging from school text-books in elementary science through *The Ether of Space*, *School Reform*, *Life and Matter*, *Reason and Belief*, to *The Survival of Man*. With most of these writings I have no direct acquaintance, but on the mere evidence of their titles one may with reasonable safety venture certain particulars toward an estimation of their author. He must have intellectual vigor, he must have an instinct for vital questions, he must have the power of popular exposition, and, finally, he cannot be overcautious in the formation and expression of his opinions. All of these particulars would, I believe, be found also in any consensus of judgment that his fellows in science might pass upon his scientific work. This, if not unmixed praise, is much to say for a man, and it may be added that in general he speaks out from a sense of well-being natural to one of cheerful and sturdy temper who has achieved fame, station, ten children, and the confident hope of immortality for all of us. Is it then to be wondered at that he says things which multitudes are glad to hear, and holds a position almost unique in the esteem and confidence of the public at large?

It is more than likely, however, that Lodge would stand better with his fellow-scientists today if his reputation were less general and popular; for his efforts in religious-philosophic discussion and psychical experimentation have distracted him from physics, and they have created against him in the minds of many a feeling akin to distrust—not of course touching his sincerity, but touching

the soundness of his judgment. This feeling may be in some measure deserved by the readiness with which he seems to have fallen a victim to certain impostors; but, on the other hand, it is possible that the majority of scientific men today are a little too sceptical, a little in danger of denying on *a priori* grounds the verity of certain alleged phenomena exploited in psychical research and very widely accepted as matters of fact. To this question I shall return in the course of this paper. Meanwhile it can be said that, whatever the sympathies or prejudices of scientific men in general regarding matters psychical or spiritual, it was only fair that the British Association, after the Presidency of Professor Schäfer and his *Address* in support of the purely mechanistic theory of life, should choose Lodge, an especial champion of the spiritistic theory, to utter a counter-blast.

The title *Continuity*, which Lodge's *Address* bears, was shrewdly chosen; for under it he had warrant for the discussion of questions now rife in various fields of science and in philosophy as well. Moreover, the word *Continuity* is a good battle-cry for the conservative. Who does not shrink instinctively from the suggestion of ruin and chaos conveyed by the description *Discontinuity*, which the opposing cause must bear? And yet, undoubtedly, during the last decade or two there has been a movement, in more than one field of profound research or speculation, away from theories which express and celebrate the aspect of uniformity in the operations of nature toward theories which look for, and make the most of, failures of such uniformity. Thus in biology we have seen the "mutation theory" of De Vries, a theory of the sudden, apparently spontaneous, appearance of new species of plants or animals, as descendants of other species, challenging the Darwinian theory of evolution by insensible gradations of change. In physics we have had, if not a recrudescence of Newton's "corpuscular

theory" of light, at least a determined assault on the long and serenely established doctrine of light-waves moving through an all-pervading ether. We have the now almost universally accepted idea of electrons, or definite units, thus far to us indivisible, of electricity. We have Planck's *quantum* conception, according to which the energy of individual molecules comes and goes in quantities of a fixed size, or in multiples thereof, as money circulates in pieces of a definite lower limit. Bergson, the most popular of philosophers, tells us, I believe, that what looks like perfectly continuous existence is really an unending process of extinction and re-creation, that the stone post by the roadside is no more the same stone post that was there a thousandth of a second ago than one pea is the same pea as another that looks exactly like it. Indeed, without further illustration we may sum up current tendencies of thought by saying, in Lodge's own words, "So far from Nature not making jumps (*nihil per saltum*), it becomes doubtful if she does anything else."

In only two of the many quarters where the contest between Continuity and Discontinuity is active does this *Address* seriously engage the field of the much debated light-bearing ether and the field of human personality. With the problems of these two fields Lodge has long been familiarly occupied.

The conception of an inter-stellar medium, which may be called *the ether*, has appeared to be a necessary one ever since the undulatory theory of light was framed and generally accepted in the early part of the nineteenth century; but this conception has always involved properties and relations of the ether difficult to reconcile with the particulars of our knowledge concerning ordinary matter. One of the most troublesome questions raised by it has been whether, for example, the ether close to our earth moves through space with the earth or remains at rest with respect thereto, or effects some compromise

of behavior, as water does through which a solid travels. To answer this question, if possible, Professor Michelson, then of Cleveland but now of Chicago, undertook many years ago, at first alone but afterwards with the help of Professor Morley, also at that time in Cleveland, an experiment to determine whether the time required for light to travel a certain measured distance in the direction of the earth's orbital motion, around the sun, is perceptibly different from the time required for it to travel a like measured distance at right angles with this direction. If the ether through which this light travels is carried along with the earth and at the same velocity, so that there is no relative motion of this ether with respect to the earth near it, we should expect the time required, in the two cases above-described, to be equal. But if the earth in its orbital motion rushes past or through the adjacent ether, as a railroad train rushes through the air close by it, we should expect the time required, in the two cases mentioned, to be different, very much as we should expect the time required for sound to travel a mile in the direction of the wind to be different from the time required for it to travel a mile across the wind or in still air.

The theory of the Michelson-Morley experiment was really more complicated than the simple idea of it here given would indicate; for we have no very accurate and sensitive means of making directly the desired comparison of times. On the other hand, we have extremely effective and precise methods of comparing the times required by light to go forward and back on two equal paths at right angles with each other. But will this serve? Do we not, in taking the time of travel forward and back, eliminate the effect of the relative motion of the earth and the ether, if such relative motion exists? To illuminate this question by analogy, let us suppose that a messenger is required to go from a carriage which

is moving at a uniform rate on a straight road to another carriage moving at the same rate on the same road, but a certain distance behind, and then to return to the first carriage. Will the time required by the messenger, who is supposed to travel with a fixed speed, be the same in the end as if the two carriages were at rest? Evidently not; for if the carriages are moving faster than the messenger can go, he will not be able to overtake the first carriage at all; and if they travel almost as fast as he does, he will lose much more time than he gains by their motion. Now the velocity of light, the messenger, is very much greater than the velocity of the two stations on the earth between which it is sent back and forth; but some slight effect of the assumed relative motion of the earth and the ether might be expected to remain, what is called an effect of the second order. This is what Michelson and Morley looked for; then Morley and Miller, all at Adelbert College or at the Case School in Cleveland. They did not find it, though they did their work so well that no one thinks it worth while to try their experiment again. If the effect looked for is to be found, it must be found in some other way, and no more promising way has yet been devised.

Are we then to conclude that there is no relative motion of the kind imagined, and that the ether near the earth is carried along with it, without relative slip? There are serious objections to this theory of the matter. It would be tedious to detail them or even to enumerate them. I will mention only one, which is based on experiments made by Lodge himself and is set forth by him in brief as follows: "The experiments are described in the *Philosophical Transactions* of the Royal Society for 1893 and 1897, and the conclusion is that when a mass of steel or iron is spinning so fast that it is likely to fly to pieces, and when light is sent by mirrors round and round many times in its immediate neighborhood—so

close as to be actually grazing the spinning disks in some instances—not the slightest effect of acceleration is manifested by the beam of light, however delicately it is tested by means of interference bands. Interference is arranged between beams which have travelled half with and half against the motion, for many yards; but, after spurious results are allowed for, there is no shift of the bands; proving that the velocity is not affected by so much as one-tenth of one per cent. of the velocity of the moving matter. Practically we may say that the ether of space is never carried forward—presumably not even by a planet.”

Here we have two directly opposing inferences from experiments—1st, *The ether adjacent to a moving body of ordinary matter must have the same velocity as this body;* 2d, *The ether adjacent to such a body is entirely unaffected by the motion of the body and remains at rest.*

In such a head-on collision of propositions, each supported by admirable experimental evidence, some disruption of old ideas must occur. Conservatives, among whom Lodge is prominent, retain their faith in the veritable existence of a light-bearing ether, which is to be considered at rest in the universe, except for motions within itself; that is, the ether, as a whole, is supposed to have no progressive motion through space. Accordingly the motion, with respect to the ether, of ordinary bodies, is to be taken as their real, or absolute, motion. To account for the failure of the Michelson-Morley attempt to detect such absolute motion it is sufficient to suppose that, when any body which has been at rest with respect to the ether is set into motion in any particular direction, its dimension parallel to this motion is slightly diminished and its dimensions at right angles with the motion are slightly increased, the ratio of change being the same for all kinds of bodies which have thus far been tested in this respect.

This suggestion of change of dimensions, in consequence of motion through the ether, was made independently by Lorentz in Holland and by Fitzgerald in England, twenty-two or more years ago, in order to account for the negative result of the Michelson experiment; but it is not now retained simply for this purpose. Lodge, after giving a graphic account of the way in which the idea came to and came from Fitzgerald, in Lodge's study at Liverpool, adds: "And is such a hypothesis gratuitous? Not at all: in the light of the electrical theory of matter [which Lorentz especially has developed] such an effect ought to occur. The amount required by the experiment, and given by the theory, is equivalent to the shrinkage of the earth's diameter by rather less than three inches in the line of its orbital motion through the ether of space."

It is plain enough that even the conservatives have submitted, during the last twenty-five years, to a very important change of ideas with respect to the relations of the ether and ordinary matter, but nothing short of a revolution will satisfy certain turbulent spirits. These prefer to believe not only that relative motion of the ether and ordinary matter cannot be discovered, but that it does not exist; that, in short, the ether is a fiction, and they propose to get on without it in their theory of the universe. The result is the doctrine of Relativity, in its most pronounced form. The prime mover in this assault upon the established order of thought was Einstein, an official in the Swiss Patent Office. In various aspects the agitation in favor of Relativity may be compared with another movement, also of Swiss origin, revolution toward the initiative and referendum in politics.

Relativity in its thorough-going form involves the interdependence of time and space, and its exponents speak of time as a "fourth dimension." Since the fourth

dimension seems to most of us a kind of fairyland and not a real place to live in, I make haste to say that some writers put this proposition into a comparatively homely and unalarming shape. Thus Professor R. D. Carmichael, who has written a good little book¹ on Relativity, says: "I have no intention of asserting that time is a fourth dimension of space in the sense in which we ordinarily employ the word 'dimension'; such a statement would have no meaning. I wish to point out rather that it is in some measure connected with space, and that in many formulæ it must enter, as it would if it were essentially and only a fourth dimension." But even so the conception is too formidable to be approached more closely in this paper. It will be enough, perhaps, if I state what is to me the most startling result arrived at in this effort to get on without the ether—namely, the conclusion that there is no such thing as a *now*, or *the present instant*, for the physical universe as a whole. In the words of Professor Carmichael, "There is no such thing as the absolute simultaneity of events happening at different places." This demonstration is likely to be regarded as a marvellous triumph of the theory of Relativity or as a *reductio ad absurdum*, according to the philosophical predilections of the inquirer. Lodge is far from standing alone in his unwillingness to accept it and in his preference for the conception of a luminiferous ether, modified as this conception has been modified by Lorentz and others during the past two or three decades.

This matter of the ether and of relativity is so important, in philosophy as well as in science, that I have not felt free to dismiss it with a mere allusion, but it may well be that the chief interest of Lodge's *Address* for most readers of this *Review*, will attach to that part

¹ The Theory of Relativity, John Wiley & Sons, 1918. Science, February 18, 1914, contains an interesting review, by Professor Edwin B. Wilson, of this book.

which treats of the problem of human existence and of the revelations, if they really are such, of psychical research. In one respect this part may prove disappointing. Whether taught caution by some rather mortifying experiences in giving credence to seers and wonder-workers, afterwards proved impostors, or solemnly impressed by the responsibility of his official position, Lodge speaks, in this notable summing up of his observations and reflections, with a dignity and a moderation not always to be found in his habitual utterances. He brings forward nothing new in the form of occult phenomena; in fact, he goes into no details, relates no incidents, and avoids the technical language of psychical research.

In this policy, though sacrificing perhaps a certain piquancy of interest which may have been looked for in his *Address*, he was doubtless well advised. If it be true, as I have heard it intimated, that he was urged to be altogether silent on this occasion concerning matters psychical, we must respect his refusal to comply, in view of his own opinion of the overwhelming importance of this subject in its present state of development. But it is plain enough that he would have gained nothing for the cause he advocated by insisting upon presenting it *in extenso* before an unsympathetic and impatient audience.

In describing the audience thus I have in mind the members proper of the British Association and not the general public which may have furnished most of the hearers. I assume too that, as a whole, British scientific men are not very different from American scientific men in their opinions and prejudices concerning the questions investigated by the Society for Psychical Research. Avoiding the deeper mysteries and keeping to what many intelligent people regard as the almost commonplace phenomenon of telepathy—communication between minds by other means than the ordinary senses—one

upon inquiry finds the leaders of scientific thought in America profoundly sceptical, perhaps even disposed on *a priori* grounds to deny the existence of the alleged action. I suspect that in any distinguished scientific company in our country a member suggesting the verity of telepathy as an open question worthy of some attention would be generally regarded as showing unfortunate mental symptoms.

That Lodge is thoroughly conscious of a general lack of sympathy, among his British colleagues in science, for his psychical opinions and beliefs, appears plainly enough in the following statement, admirable in form and temper, which is made near the end of the *Address*:

"In justice to myself and my co-workers I must risk annoying my present hearers, not only by leaving on record our conviction that occurrences now regarded as occult can be examined and reduced to order by the methods of science carefully and persistently applied, but by going further and saying, with the utmost brevity, that already the facts so examined have convinced me that memory and affection are not limited to that association with matter by which alone they can manifest themselves here and now, and that personality persists beyond bodily death. The evidence—nothing new or sensational, but cumulative and demanding prolonged serious study—to my mind goes to prove that discarnate intelligence, under certain conditions, may interact with us on the material side, thus indirectly coming within our scientific ken; and that gradually we may hope to attain some understanding of the nature of a larger, perhaps etherial, existence, and of the conditions regulating intercourse across the chasm. A body of responsible investigators has even now landed on the treacherous but promising shores of a new continent.

"Yes, and there is more to say than that. The methods of science are not the only way, though they

are our way, of being piloted to truth. '*Uno itinere non potest pervenire ad tam grande secretum.*'"

Whatever the prepossessions of the scientific man, he can hardly quarrel with or criticise the speaker for this brief and dignified declaration of his faith, and it may well be supposed that most readers of the *Theological Review* would be glad to have some presentation and examination of the evidence which has led to the conviction so impressively uttered. Now I do not profess to have made an exhaustive or even a very extensive study of the literature in this field of inquiry, but what I have done should, I think, be told here.

I was an active member of the American Society for Psychical Research for a year or two after its foundation in 1884, and for a time conducted much of its correspondence; but before long I became convinced that the prospect of valuable discoveries through the work of this Society was too small to warrant my continuing in such work to the neglect of my proper engagements. Accordingly I resigned my membership, though retaining a certain interest in the undertakings of those who continued their efforts, and even feeling a sense of indebtedness to them for their persistence. I once had, at the instance of William James, an extended sitting, stenographically reported, with the famous "trance-medium," Mrs. Piper. I read with much care the pamphlet which James wrote in regard to the evidence, obtained through Mrs. Piper, as to the continued existence after death of Richard Hodgson. I have studied with perhaps equal care Lodge's discussion¹ of the "evidential matter which purports to come from deceased members of the S. P. R., among others from the late Mr. Myers." It would be quite out of place here to go into

¹ *Evidences of Classical Scholarship and of Cross-Correspondence in Some New Automatic Writings*, reprinted in pamphlet form from the proceedings of the S. P. R. for June, 1911.

details regarding such evidence, and I shall do very little more than state the impression made upon me by these two documents. William James seems to me far more critical in his examination of testimony than Lodge is, and far more reserved in his final estimate of its value. The latter believes himself to be critical here, and in a certain sense he is so; but he is critical of the quality rather than doubtful of the source of the communications purporting to come from Myers. Thus on February 10, 1910, having just received through the automatic writer, Mrs. Willett,¹ certain messages which he could not at first understand, in answer to his question, "What does the word Lethe suggest to you?" he writes a letter which begins as follows: "Well Myers, but I want more from you about Lethe and its suggestions than that," etc.

It seems to me probable that both James and Lodge have underestimated the "normal" intelligence, acuteness, and knowledge of the women with whom, as trance-mediums or as automatic writers, they, as investigators of psychic phenomena, have had to do. It would have been very difficult for anyone to impose upon William James by pretence of wit or knowledge; but to pass as a dullard or as an ignoramus in his presence, while keeping the ears and eyes open and the mouth shut, might not perhaps have been so hard.

The most valuable parts of the *Address*, in my opinion, are those in which the speaker makes, as in a passage already quoted, a plea for openness of mind; for openness not merely by way of the avenues of logic and hard reason but by that of sympathy and direct perception, by way of what James called *vision*. Inseparable from this plea is the protest against the mechanistic view of life professed in the *Address* of 1912 by Professor Schäfer. More quotations may well be made here:

¹ An assumed name, I believe.

"The laws of nature are a diagrammatic frame-work abstracted out of the full comprehensiveness of reality." "No mathematician could calculate the orbit of a common house-fly." "To explain the Psychical in terms of Physics and Chemistry is simply impossible." "Do they account for our own feeling of joy and exaltation, for our sense of beauty, for the manifest beauty existing throughout nature? Do not these things suggest something higher and nobler and more joyous, something for the sake of which all the struggle for existence goes on?" "Where full consciousness has entered, new powers arise, and the faculties and desires of the conscious parts of the scheme have an effect upon the whole." "It is not guided from outside but from within, and the guiding power is immanent at every instant." "Of this guiding power we are a small but not wholly insignificant portion."

These thoughts are, to be sure, not new, but they are well expressed. Their importance lies not so much in the authority of the particular speaker who utters them as in the fact that they would be subscribed to, probably, by the great majority of mature-minded scientific men. For these opinions have no necessary connection with the revelations or messages which may come through the machinery of Psychical Research. They are, rather, the product of general human experience and reflection, summed up by what James would have called the dramatic sense for the truth of a situation, the integrating impression of reality or at least of probability. If scientific men are popularly believed to be of different mind from other men in this respect, it is, I think, merely because scientific men, being inclined and trained to precision and responsibility of speech, refuse to repeat creeds which other men urge upon them while saying, in effect, that the exact meaning of these professions is unimportant.

In my opinion Lodge could have spoken the best parts of his *Address* with more effect if he had never been concerned with Psychical Research in its formal shape. What revelations of spiritual import and inspiration may or may not sometime reach us through the avenues which he and his co-workers in this undertaking are striving to open, I shall not here venture to predict; but so far as the matter thus far received goes, even if we accept the interpretation which the investigators themselves put upon it, I find it the opposite of cheering. The impression which I get of the present condition of the personality of Myers, if I take the "messages" at their face value, is that of a dismal state of separation, exile, or incarceration, as one pleases, but in either case not an existence to be desired for one's self or for one's fellows. As support for religious belief, unless the mere expectation of continuing personality, on any terms, after death is regarded as essentially religious and precious, I see no value in these present disclosures, if they indeed are such, of a life after death. There is in them, so far as I am acquainted with them, no suggestion that the spirit has, in any happy sense, returned unto God who gave it. Evil indeed would be the day when those who have felt themselves to be in communion, inarticulate but effectual, with God and with those who are returned to Him, should abandon this mode of intercourse for any thus far indicated by attempts to establish more palpable relations with spirits clad in "ethereal" bodies.¹

¹ Professor George F. Moore tells us in his *History of Religions* that "neither in the Old Testament nor in the New is 'spirit' equivalent to 'immaterial.'" I suppose that a like statement would be true concerning the popular conception of spirit or "spirits" in all ages; but it is nevertheless a curious spectacle to see men of science, like Lodge and Crookes and their followers in matters psychical, holding the view that we approach the spiritual by the mere refinement or attenuation of matter.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE SECOND EPISTLE OF THE APOSTLE PAUL TO THE CORINTHIANS. ALLAN MENZIES, D.D. The Macmillan Co. 1912. Pp. lvii, 111. \$2.00.

Professor Menzies has rendered a great service to all English-speaking students of the Bible by the publication of his brief commentary on Second Corinthians. While helps for the interpretation of most other New Testament writings have continued to multiply, this important Epistle has received little attention; and yet it is surely here if anywhere that the ordinary reader will welcome all the expert guidance that the best scholarship can give him.

In another regard also the appearance of this commentary is most timely. It has become quite the fashion in England and America to approve the hypothesis which separates chapters 10-13 from the rest of Second Corinthians, and regards them as part of a painful letter that had been previously written by the apostle to the same community (2 3 *π.*; 7 8 *π.*). Of late so many writers have expressed themselves as in accord with this view that it seemed in the way of gaining currency without serious opposition as a reasonably well established conclusion. There was need that the case for the integrity of the Epistle be worthily presented again and brought up to date. This has been done by Professor Menzies in his introduction and notes.

The main arguments for dividing the Epistle have been derived from the abrupt change of tone and subject at 10 1 and from supposed references in chapters 10-13 to passages in the earlier part of the letter (13 1, 2, 10, cf. 2 1-4; 13 2, cf. 1 23; 10 6, cf. 2 9). As for the first point, Professor Menzies maintains that chapters 10-13 do not differ so radically from what has preceded as is often assumed. There is abundant evidence that the apostle is confronted by the same opponents throughout the entire letter. The innuendoes of these intruders are echoed unmistakably in 1-9 (1 24; 2 17; 3 1, 5-10; 4 2, 4; 5 13, 16; 7 2) and are more clearly stated when a point is reached in 10-13, where he is compelled to measure himself with them in anticipation of the encounter face to face. By the opening words of chapter 10 he intimates "that he is now to speak of things personal to himself, with which Timothy is not concerned"

(p. 69). He then proceeds in 10 1-6 with the topic of "his impending visit to Corinth, distinctly announced in 9 4, 5, and sketches the manner in which he expects it to turn out to various sets of people" (p. 69). The second point is so far conceded as to admit that the passages in question may be so interpreted as to support a theory of division, but they can also be understood as constituent parts of one letter and are so explained by Professor Menzies.

In favor of the unity of the Epistle much emphasis is rightly placed upon the fact that chapters 10-13 are full of the theme of Paul's impending arrival at Corinth, whereas the painful letter was written in place of a contemplated visit and perhaps excused the apostle's failure to come as expected (1 23-2 13; 1 15; 7 5-15). It may be added that there is nowhere any indication that a further message or report is looked for from his readers before he sees them. The entire Epistle is composed from the point of view of an approaching visit to the church.

It is further argued by Professor Menzies that chapters 10-13 do not meet the requirements of a letter that was written with tears. They seem to him to reflect rather "the consciousness of achievement and of power" (p. xxxvi). To assume that anguish of heart and tears were more particularly characteristic of the portion that has not been preserved is hazardous. Under such circumstances the painful letter would closely resemble our present Second Corinthians in being made up of two markedly differing parts. The theory of division is compelled in any case to lean heavily upon a missing fragment whose proportions can have fallen little short of those of a full letter. It contained practically all the explanations and allusions that are absolutely indispensable as a background for 1-9. Nor can one ever forget that we have as yet no manuscript authority or Patristic evidence for the dismemberment of our present letter.¹ If there was an early editing of epistolary material, Professor Menzies thinks that we must conclude that "the most difficult and the severest passages surely have been selected, and then joined together, to be kept" (p. xxxvii).

The evidence for the unity of the letter afforded by the allusions to Titus (8 16-22; 12 16-18) deserves even more emphasis than it has received in the work before us. In the first place, the striking resemblance in phraseology between the passages points to the same time of writing. Professor Menzies lays stress on the fact that in 12 18 we have only a casual reference to Titus, the responsible

¹ For Professor Menzies' discussion of Professor Kennedy's argument regarding this point, see *The Expositor*, Eighth Series, p. 372 ff. (October, 1913).

leader of the deputation, and to his immediate associate. This is quite in order, coming as it does after the full, formal introduction and authentication in 8 16-24. But the same could not be said if the order of the passages is inverted. He interprets the first two verbs in 12 18, as well as those in 8 17, 18, 22, as epistolary aorists and refers them to the mission which the delegates are about to undertake. Should one prefer to regard them as historical aorists, recalling facts that are now already past, then the argument of Professor Menzies will need to be recast, but it will not be weakened. In any event, most agree that Paul is looking backward when he asks, "Did Titus take advantage of you?" If the apostle could make such an appeal in what is held to be a part of the painful letter, then Titus must have been active in Corinth at some earlier time. Of this we have no evidence. On the contrary, the statement in 7 14 seems to indicate that he was unacquainted with the Corinthians until his mission as bearer of the painful letter. Accordingly, a further hypothesis becomes necessary if we divide the Epistle; namely, that of an earlier and unrecorded activity of Titus at Corinth. If, however, we follow Professor Menzies, the question in 12 18 and the allusion in 8 6 are to be understood as recalling what Titus was able to accomplish on behalf of the collection after the unexpectedly happy outcome of his difficult mission.

It has been charged that Professor Menzies underestimates the force of the argument for the inversion of the two parts of Second Corinthians. If this is true, it can be said, on the other hand, that he might have strengthened the cause of the integrity of the Epistle, and doubtless he would have done so had the plan of his commentary permitted a full discussion of textual details. He does not press certain arguments of secondary importance. For example, he would allow that the charge that Paul sought to terrify his converts by his letters (10 1, 9-11) might be made on the basis of Galatians, and possibly other Epistles, as well as in the light of the painful letter. It still remains true, however, that such an accusation would be particularly in place after *the one* letter, regarding which the apostle himself had so much misgiving. Furthermore, it is natural to think that Paul's adversaries in seeking to discredit him would refer to letters that were well known, rather than to those that had been addressed to other churches and that quite likely were unknown in Corinth at this time.

Professor Menzies does not omit to call attention to the strong feeling underlying the earlier chapters of the letter. It is too often assumed that all is here bathed in an atmosphere of calmness and

reconciliation. In truth, the only question that is distinctly said to have been satisfactorily settled is that touching the punishment of the offender (7 11 ff.). Paul had hoped, apparently not without some misgiving, that the church would support his demands in this instance, and he has not been disappointed. When he speaks enthusiastically of the satisfaction that has come to him through the loyalty and obedience of his readers, he is probably thinking of their action in this particular case of discipline. There is abundant evidence in 1-9 that other issues are still unsettled and that the general situation leaves much to be desired (cf. 7 16; 1 13, 14; 2 6; 6 12, 13; 7 2). Again, it is not always recognized with sufficient clearness and consistency that the question settled in 1-7 concerns an offending member of the church, and that chapters 10-13 are taken up largely with false apostles who have come in from without and who are seeking in the basest way to discredit Paul. Apart from this threatened defection, although perhaps not unconnected with it, there is another grave delinquency that must receive attention. The same situation may be alluded to in 6 14-7 2, which is kept by Professor Menzies in its present context. The repeated warnings of the apostle against heathen vices had not been taken with sufficient seriousness by some within the church. It is now stated in no uncertain way that such moral defects cannot be further tolerated. In times past it has sometimes been erroneously supposed that such a situation cannot have existed when 1-9 was written, because of the unstinted praise which is there bestowed upon the church. It must, however, be borne in mind first, that there was greatest reason for cordially recognizing the loyalty that had been so signally manifested, and, secondly, that Paul is wont to bestow all possible commendation even when there is much in a church of which he disapproves (cf. 1 Cor. 1 5, 6). We may note too that in accordance with the apostle's custom in other letters, praise and blame are not here apportioned to any considerable extent, but that all his message is addressed to the church as a whole.

The opponents from without who are seeking to unsettle the loyalty of the Corinthians are identified by Professor Menzies with Greek-speaking Jewish Christians of the Dispersion. "It is not surprising if, even when circumcision ceased to be urged by Jewish Christians, they still regarded Paul's version of Christianity with deep dislike, and strove to draw his converts away from him" (p. xxxii). Our Epistle is believed to afford evidence that they had a particular aversion to Paul's Christology. A considerable section of Professor Menzies' introduction (pp. li-lviii) is devoted to the apostle's

teaching regarding the person of Christ and to the contrasted views of his opponents.

Particular mention should be made of the English translation of the Epistle, which has been prepared with unusual care and which is printed at the top of the right page opposite the Greek text which appears at the left. The notes given below on both pages are concerned mainly with the development of thought.

The commentary is bound to prove helpful and suggestive to all readers; but its brevity and popular character will often make the student of exegesis wish that the author would supplement it with a volume prepared on a different plan which should make possible a more adequate treatment of the many obscurities and difficulties that beset the interpretation of the Epistle.

WARREN J. MOULTON.

BANGOR THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

THE NEW TESTAMENT, WESTMINSTER VERSION. Vol. III. Part I. The Epistles to the Thessalonians. Rev. CUTHBERT LATTEY, S.J. Longmans, Green, & Co. 1913. Pp. xxiv, 21. 40 cents.

This translation, which is based mainly on the Greek text of Westcott and Hort, aims at intelligibility by using phraseology which is neither modern nor obsolete. It is more literal than that of Rutherford or Moffatt, and more dignified than that of the Twentieth Century New Testament. Concise notes accompany the translation and a brief but excellent introduction precedes it. If the standard of excellence set by the present work is maintained in the forthcoming volumes, the success of the Westminster Version is assured.

J. E. FRAME.

UNION THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY, NEW YORK.

A CRITICAL AND EXEGETICAL COMMENTARY ON THE BOOKS OF EZRA AND NEHEMIAH. (International Critical Commentary Series.) LORING W. BATTEN, Ph.D., S.T.D. Charles Scribner's Sons. 1913. Pp. xvi, 384. \$3.00.

One of the latest of a goodly number of volumes, with the appearance of which within the last few years the International Critical Commentary is approaching completion, is Professor L. W. Batten's Ezra and Nehemiah. Professor Batten's acquaintance with these two books is of long standing, his first work upon them being published in 1901 in the English version of Guthe's notes in the SBOT.

The present volume is clearly the result of much thought and arduous labor. Fifteen pages of prefatory matter are followed by fifty-four pages of introduction; pages 55-380 constitute the body of the book; two indexes, covering two pages, form the conclusion.

Professor Batten presents a warm plea for a very conservative position. His attempt to reconstruct in chronological sequence a series of source-fragments containing more or less trustworthy historical information, is rather alluring: for the time of Cyrus, Ezra 1; for Darius I, Ezra 2 70-4 3 and 4 24b-6 18 (a duplicate account of the building of the temple); for Xerxes, Ezra 4 4-6; for Artaxerxes I, Ezra 4 7-24a and Neh. 1-7, 11-13 (the Nehemiah memoirs); for Artaxerxes II, Ezra 7-10; Neh. 8-10 (containing the Ezra memoirs). Professor Torrey's notable work upon Esdras A is utilized, and at one or two points slightly improved upon.

But Professor Batten's own argument is much impaired by serious inaccuracies and errors in matters of detail. As a matter of history, what Semite, of the time of Cyrus or later, would have thought of dating Cyrus' first year in 559 rather than in 539? Is it really so certain that Cyrus was a Zoroastrian? In matters of archaeology much uncertainty is manifested. "Strap-hinges" will hardly do for the city-gates of Neh. 3 6. A similar *faux pas* has completely vitiated an attempt at textual criticism in Ezra 9 2. "הַסֵּנֶן הַמֵּאֵת", *magistratus iniquitatus*, the officer of lawlessness," need surely only to be printed out together before his eyes to make Professor Batten himself withdraw the suggestion. Finally, the proof-reading has been very lax. Especially unkindly have Greek accents and breathings dealt with Professor Batten. Though he made no attempt at a critically severe reading in this respect, the eyes of the reviewer were disturbed by from one to half a dozen errors of this nature on nearly every page containing Greek words. Perhaps many of these faults may be corrected in a new edition.

MARTIN SPRENGLING.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

STUDIES IN JEWISH LITERATURE ISSUED IN HONOR OF PROFESSOR KAUFMANN KOHLER. GEORG REIMER. Berlin. 1913. Pp. viii, 301.

This volume was presented to Dr. Kohler by colleagues, pupils, and friends, on the occasion of his seventieth birthday, May 10, 1913. It is a fitting tribute to one who for many years has been one of the leaders of Reform Judaism, and one of the foremost exponents of Jewish scholarship in this country.

Dr. Kohler came to America in 1869, and after serving congregations in Detroit, Chicago, and New York, became in 1903 president of the Hebrew Union College in Cincinnati, where he has also given courses in homiletics, theology, and Hellenistic literature. A biographical sketch appropriately begins the volume, followed by an appreciation of his work as a reformer (by Rabbi David Philipson, of Cincinnati), and a review by Professor Neumark of his *Grundriss einer systematischen Theologie des Judentums*. A bibliography of his publications extends to more than five hundred numbers, not counting separately his many and important contributions to the *Jewish Encyclopedia*, of which he was from the beginning an editor.

The papers contributed to the volume—in English and German, with two short texts in Hebrew—range over a wide variety of subjects. We can only name a few which are most likely to appeal to unprofessional readers. Thus, Israel Abrahams writes on "The Decalogue in Art"; H. G. Enelow has an instructive essay on the "Struggle for Inwardness in Judaism" (*Kawwānā*); Professor Grossmann discusses "Principles of Religious Instruction in Jewish Schools"; Professor Lauterbach takes up again the question of "Sadducees and Pharisees." There is an article on "Levirate Marriage," by Mattuck, and one by Samuel Krauss on *Die Ehe zwischen Onkel und Nichte*. Studies of a more technical kind are contributed by Bacher (whose recent death is a great loss to Jewish learning), Goldziher, Poznanski, and Schechter.

The scholar is to be congratulated whom such a company delight to honor.

GEORGE F. MOORE.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

EARLY ZOROASTRIANISM. The Hibbert Lectures, Second Series. 1912. JAMES HOPE MOULTON. Williams & Norgate. 1913. Pp. xx, 468.

Although delivered two years ago, these lectures, the publication of which was delayed for over a year, may be said to be the latest word in the field of Avestan philology, where harvests ripen slowly. It is indeed somewhat remarkable that whereas every year sees the production of one or more volumes on the life and teaching of Buddha, studies in regard to the history and doctrines of Zoroaster should be so sporadic. Yet the importance of Zoroastrianism for Christianity is, if anything, greater than that of Buddhism.

The present volume consists of lectures which take up special sides of Zoroastrianism; it is in no sense a complete history or discussion of the tenets of the faith, such as Professor Jackson's works

published in the *Grundriss* and in *Zoroaster*. One might even say that it is no book for a beginner; yet that would not be quite fair, since the clearness with which Professor Moulton states his several theses makes it possible for any historical scholar to follow him and obtain an intelligent understanding of the problems involved. But in sum, the author is dealing with special problems rather than with an historical whole. His solution of these problems makes his work one of the most fundamental books on Zoroastrianism published in the last two decades.

At the outset Professor Moulton attacks the whole theory of Darmesteter, whose revolutionary views made a sensation twenty years ago. If few scholars now believe, as Darmesteter taught, that Zoroastrianism is really Philoism, the Gathas owing their chief thought to Philo of Alexandria, it is yet well to have the reasons for this disbelief plainly set forth. These are in brief that the conception of the Amshaspand is in itself not identical with Philo's *λόγος θεός* and that it is far older, so that the logos could not have been the source; also that the form of the Gathas (especially the metre) is not such that it could have been a late invention. Further, Professor Moulton argues (with Geldner, Jackson, and Bartholomae) that Zoroaster is no mythical person but an historical character, whom the author ascribes to a somewhat earlier period than does Professor Jackson. As to date and place there will always be discussion. Professor Moulton regards 660 B.C. as a "minimum date" for the prophet "and his Gathas," while giving strong reasons for believing that the date may be earlier by some generations. He assigns the Yashts to the later Achæmenian age, and the prose Avesta (in particular the Vendidad) to a period "after Alexander." A prime argument for an earlier Zoroaster lies in the necessity for time sufficient to account for the development between Gathas and Yashts, in which latter the apotheosis of Zoroaster stands opposed to the Gathic view. The most important fact brought out in the following discussion of the date is that the cult of Ahura Mazda (Ormuzd) was probably hereditary in aristocratic circles long before Zoroaster. In regard to the place where the prophet began his work, Professor Moulton believes it to have been in Bactria rather than in the West. He urges that the esoteric teaching of Zoroaster (the doctrine of the Pure Thought, etc.) remained for centuries far from the main stream of its history and spread westwards only when adopted by the Magi.

The most original hypothesis in this volume relates to the Magi themselves. In Professor Moulton's opinion, it was they who in

the Sassanian revival made Parsism what it is today. Ahriman, the "enemy spirit," is a title devised by them; Zoroaster knew only the Druj (Lie). The Magi, in the author's opinion, were an indigenous tribe of shamans who led the non-Aryan population of Media, tried and failed to obtain political power in the revolution of Gaumata, but finally secured religious supremacy. The earliest evidence of their activity as a sacred tribe is in Ezekiel 8 16. They were neither Aryan nor Semitic (note, for example, the method of disposing of the dead). They had characteristics, such as next-of-kin marriages and astrology, which never made headway in Parsism. To them, he thinks, is due the ritual, the composition of the Vendidad; it was they who popularized Zoroastrianism. It is probable that this new theory of the origin and influence of Magism upon Zoroastrianism will not be allowed to pass without protest; but it presents a new view very forcibly and explains ingeniously many otherwise inexplicable facts.

To the student of Christianity the paragraphs on the relation of Babylon and Parsism will be of great interest. Professor Moulton discusses and dismisses as "without any real foundation" the religious influence of Babylon. We think he is quite right in protesting against Meyer's extreme view; but it is also an exaggeration to "dismiss all round the notion that Parsism owes anything material to the religion of the powerful culture on her west." In regard to corresponding concepts in the religion of Israel and Zoroaster, borrowing is admitted in some features of apocalyptic imagery and angelology, but otherwise Professor Moulton is very conservative, one might almost say orthodox: "Ahriman and Satan are only superficially connected." The Incarnation "cannot be discussed" in these lectures; which is a pity. It is true that "accidental coincidence" will account for many strange phenomena; but it is also true that coincidence need not be accidental. Perhaps in this regard, as in that of the relation between Buddhism and Christianity, where proofs fail faith must avail. After all, it is not today a very important matter whether the devil was invented in one country or in another, and other theological questions now more burning than Satan may also become in time merely historical problems. Professor Moulton's own attitude is that of a candid and cool inquirer, who has inquired to good purpose. We do not agree with every conclusion he draws, but we believe that he has made an important contribution to our knowledge of Zoroastrianism.

E. WASHBURN HOPKINS.

YALE UNIVERSITY.

THE CHRISTIAN LIFE IN THE MODERN WORLD. The sixth series of John Calvin McNair lectures at the University of North Carolina in 1913, expanded and revised. FRANCIS GREENWOOD PEABODY. The Macmillan Co. 1914. Pp. 234. \$1.25.

The latest volume by Professor Peabody may be safely counted as perhaps his best. And by best I mean most timely, helpful, and suggestive. The author already has given us books of value and distinctive merit dealing with the approach to the social question, and the bearing of the teachings of Jesus on the social problem and on the Christian character. In this present volume, however, he considers a more practical, personal, and perplexing question. And that pressing and perplexing question is this: Can the modern man in the modern world remain a Christian? That is to say, can he be identified with its great events, participate in its multitudinous and materialistic movements, and still shape his life according to the Gospel teachings?

Professor Peabody puts the question very squarely. In his opening chapter on the practicability of the Christian life he inquires: "Amid the brutal competitions of modern industry, can trade be administered and profit be made in ways which are consistent with Christian discipleship? Amid the plottings of national politics and the collisions of international interests, can we fairly speak of a Christian civilization? . . . On what terms is it possible to live a Christian life in the modern world? Must not one take his choice between the two? Is the Christian religion a practicable faith among the inevitable conditions of modern efficiency and happiness; or is it the survival of an idealism which, however beautiful it may once have been, has become impracticable today?"

In answering these questions in the affirmative, and in pleading for the practicability of the Christian ideals when properly understood, Professor Peabody writes with his customary grace and familiar wealth of illustration and allusion. Indeed, he writes with such a balanced smoothness that one almost feels him to be superficial; while to read him is so easy and delightful that you wonder if you are not being gently led away from serious obstacles and insurmountable difficulties by a form of verbal witchery and rhetorical ingenuity. The author's point of view or method of approach is one with which his readers long have been familiar and which he has followed with consistency and skill. In the last of his incomparable addresses in the Harvard College Chapel he pleaded for what he called "the comprehensiveness of Christianity." In the course of that culminating talk to the students he reminded them of how a

distinguished American politician in a heated campaign telegraphed on one occasion to his friends, "Claim everything." And "that," he adds, "in a much profounder sense, is precisely the summons which Christianity makes on life."

Now of the expansiveness of Christianity there can be no doubt. It has almost "infinite flexibility," as our author well reminds us. "The Christian religion is much larger than many of its critics and some of its defenders have supposed. It assumes many forms, but is exhausted by none. Its fragmentary utterances may become impracticable guides, while its total view of life, its general law of conduct, may have permanent practicability. . . . Personality, character, spirituality, idealism, vision, communion with God, have in them a quality of timelessness, and are capable of expansion, transmission, and utilization in all the varied conditions of a changing world." Yet this process unquestionably can be carried much too far.

In spite of tendencies like these, however, too much emphasis can hardly be laid upon the value of Professor Peabody's service in freeing Christianity from what is merely temporary, occasional, and incidental, and in bringing forward the universal, spiritual, and permanent features of the Gospel. He claims very justly that "a fact may be distorted quite as easily by false perspective as by false definition. The truth of history, as of nature, is the proportion and relation of facts." In pursuance of this principle, we have in this volume a masterful separation of the transient from the permanent and the local from the universal in the Gospel teachings. Professor Peabody protests against the tendency to confuse oriental imagery with universal principles, while he points out that too great literalism distorts the record by mistaking the by-products of the teaching for the main contents.

There are many pungent passages in the book to which attention wisely may be called, as for instance this, in writing of the business world: "If business is not reformed, it is likely to be transformed. The alternative to a violent economic revolution is an accelerated, economic evolution. If capital is to escape confiscation, it must accept consecration. If the present industrial order does not serve, it must surrender." Of Jesus we are happily reminded that "his purpose was not revolution, but revelation. He was primarily concerned not with the distribution of goods, but with the inspiration of goodness. He was not a socialist, but a Saviour. His purpose was not to make rules, but to make men." Of the Gospels we are told that they form "not a text-book of mechanics, but a

source of power"; while "the New Testament is not a book of laws, but a book of life."

Opinion probably will differ as to the comparative value of the various chapters, which deal respectively with the Family, the Business World, the Making and Spending of Money, the Modern State, and the Christian Church. In some respects the last two, perhaps, as presenting wider issues, have the greatest interest and value. Writing before the present European war broke out, Professor Peabody pleads for a renaissance of national idealism, declaring with a conviction which since then has been terribly justified: "The whole creation of government travaileth in pain until now, waiting for the manifestation of the Christian State."

When he comes to consider, in his closing chapter, the Christian life and the Christian Church, his foot is on his native heath. He points with equal pertinence to the failure of Christian teachers to perceive the social bearing of the Christian message, and to the hesitancy of the Christian Church in fearlessly applying it; while those who repudiate the name are giving application to the message. "Here then," he writes, "is a curious situation. The methods and ideals which have been most characteristic of the Christian life are appropriated by many who refuse to accept the Christian name. Fraternity, social justice, co-operation, sacrifice, the bearing of others' burdens—the very words which are expressive of Christian discipleship are inscribed on the banners of new schemes and dreams; and organizations of philanthropy, co-operative industry, trades-unionism, and socialism, go sailing buoyantly down the river of the age, while the Christian Church looks on from the bank and sees its own insignia on those alien flags."

In closing this inadequate review of a most helpful, stimulating, and suggestive book, a word may, perhaps, be said of its dedicatory lines. Professor Peabody has prefaced nearly all of his recent books by sonnets or verses of a tender and touching character, addressed for the most part to members of his family. Such expressions of poetic feeling give evidence of more material of the kind which the world would rejoice to receive in collected form.

PAUL REVERE FROTHINGHAM.

Boston.

THE RELIGIOUS REVOLUTION OF TO-DAY. JAMES T. SHOTWELL. The Houghton Mifflin Co. 1913. Pp. x, 102. \$1.10.

This book contains four lectures delivered at Amherst in 1913 upon the William Brewster Clark foundation. The Founders supply a "foreword" indicating their desire to assist in the solution of such problems of personal conduct and public policy as have been complicated by recent scientific progress; and the lectures should be judged in the light of this statement. The reader will find himself wondering, however, as to the impression made by Professor Shotwell upon intelligent undergraduates; since it is to be presumed that some portion of his audience was recruited from the student body. Upon the fact of revolution he is clear and emphatic throughout the first two lectures. His thesis is that the progress of civilization has been also a process of secularization. He does not argue this thesis without qualification, to be sure; indeed, reasons are cited why we should hesitate to accept it, since religion has a vitality which must be reckoned with. But when in his later lectures Professor Shotwell essays to reckon with it, he does so with far less vigor and concreteness than mark his treatment of the process of secularization. In the earlier lectures his appeal is to history and the experience of every day; in the later it is rather to psychology, and too often to that variety of psychology which beclouds what it aims to elucidate. This is not to say that no clear and positive conclusions are reached; but rather to indicate how elementary and vague they seem in contrast with the negative conclusions.

The book is learned, eloquent, and, it must be added, confused and incomplete. The confusion arises partly from the fact that its argument is nowhere indicated with sufficient clearness and succinctness; and partly from Professor Shotwell's disinclination to define his terms exactly. To quote the definitions which he suggests would probably do him injustice; yet he fails adequately to state any substitutes. "Myth" and "taboo" are his favorite characterizations of religion in the earlier chapters; and it is our growing freedom from their control which he calls "secularization." Conscience is "the intrusion of society into our own affairs." Faith is admitted to be "the most potent source of religious vitality," but "taken historically, it is hardly more than the science of habit." Later on he comes to a more positive definition of religion in terms of emotion in face of mystery. "It is the total emotional appreciation of both stimuli and reactions; and we may give it the name *religion* so soon as that appreciation is registered in consciousness." This is an interesting and probably a valid observation upon relig-

ion, but it is scarcely adequate as a definition, and its inadequacy suggests another element of weakness in Professor Shotwell's book. He is keenly alive to the vitality of those activities and influences which he calls "secular," but seems quite oblivious of the high spirit of adventure in religion. He emphasizes almost exclusively the positive features of one and the negative features of the other. Science is pictured as building our civilization, while Religion stands apart engaged in cherishing what the author repeatedly calls, "the un-understood." The book would have gained greatly had it taken account of the fact that fundamental in the religion of the Old Testament is man's commission to subdue the earth; while in the forefront of the New stands the promise of a Spirit who shall lead men into all the truth. The science of Christianity is a study in dynamics rather than statics.

EDWARD M. CHAPMAN.

OLD LYME, CONNECTICUT.

OUR GROWING CREED; OR THE EVANGELICAL FAITH AS DEVELOPED AND REAFFIRMED BY CURRENT THOUGHT. WILLIAM D. McLAREN, M.A. T. & T. Clark. 1912. Pp. xxxvi, 537. 9s.

One hesitates to express an honest conviction in regard to this book, owing to the conflict between kindly feeling for the author and the conviction that his work will bring no contribution to the problems in which he is so deeply interested. For this is evidently the distillation of the whole intellectual life of one who can be seen, between the lines, to be saintly. And yet he lays upon the rack the Articles of the Westminster Confession, and never hears their shrieks. He is convinced that theologic belief must be ever growing; yet he cannot persuade himself that its outworn clothes will not be made still to fit by a little pulling and stretching. There are too few today who have his courage to demand that thinking shall result in a complete body of divinity. Yet it is not likely that the system which he sets forth here will be that of the future.

C. GEORGE CURRIE.

PHILADELPHIA.

RELIGIONS AND RELIGION: A STUDY OF THE SCIENCE OF RELIGION, PURE AND APPLIED. JAMES HOPE MOULTON, Professor in Manchester University. New York. Methodist Book Concern.

This book is the forty-third Fernley Lecture; and perhaps the terms of the lectureship require the printing of the lecture. But the lecture has not succeeded in getting itself metamorphosed into a book. The author seems conscious of its defects, but instead of correcting them, he chose to publish them. He properly characterizes his work by saying, "The absorbing demands of my work upon the Hibbert Lectures, from which I have to snatch a few weeks' intervals [!] to write, *currente calamo*, upon the great theme of this little book, will help to account for defects" (page viii); and again, "Meanwhile I will pursue my avowedly desultory treatment" (page 105).

The impression which the book makes is dependent chiefly upon four fixed points, among which the thought wanders: J. G. Frazer's volumes of research, the author's studies of Zoroastrianism (including a long citation from his speech at a meeting of London Parsis), the Historical Catalogue of Printed Bibles (denominated "the most powerful apologetic ever written"), and the Report of Commission IV of the Edinburgh Conference—"the Missionary Message." As these points are quite far apart and as they become visible only once in so often, the impression of the book is a good deal of a blur.

The purpose of the book is to show that the study of Comparative Religions proves that the Christian religion is the crown and completion of all others, and that soil has been prepared so well for it that it would be wasteful not to sow the Christian seed everywhere. First the author shows that the study of Comparative Religion, so far from discrediting the Christian documents, helps us to frame a theory of the "divers manners in which God has made Himself known." The reviewer confesses that he does not apprehend the author's framing of this theory, for he has not been able to find it. Then the author, by a hint or so, indicates that Christianity has absorbed the best of the ancient religions; but instead of going on to say that it will probably absorb the best of the prevailing religions of the East, he proceeds to assert that there is nothing to indicate that the "primacy of Jesus and the resurrection" will ever be threatened by Buddhism or Mohammedanism. Another instance of the muddiness of the author's thought is that after asserting that the good and bad in religion are alike passed on, he proceeds to declare that "only three religions have any ambition to become

world forces," and that of these Christianity has made the widest appeal! A final chapter is an appeal for "the Christ that is to be"; though the author has succeeded no better than Tennyson in elucidating the meaning of that famous phrase. He defends the idea that Jesus authorized the spread of the gospel among the nations, and after a rather wooden survey of its large opportunities among them, calls for greater devotion to its promulgation.

There are suggestive thoughts and citations in the volume, but it is ineffective as an argument, slipshod in construction, ordinary in style.

AMBROSE W. VERNON.

BROOKLINE.

A CENTURY'S CHANGE IN RELIGION. GEORGE HARRIS. The Houghton Mifflin Co. 1914.

MODERN THEOLOGY AND THE PREACHING OF THE GOSPEL. WILLIAM ADAMS BROWN. Charles Scribner's Sons. 1914.

Dr. Harris's title is more comprehensive than his book, which deals with only one religion, the Christian, and with that mainly as represented in Congregational churches between the Hudson and the sea. Indeed, it would not be unjust to say that Dr. Harris has revealed the changes of his own mind with respect to religion from the time when, as a little boy, he stood proudly by his father's side during the long prayer (p. 198), or, facing the choir during the singing, watched the curved top of the bass viol swaying back and forth (p. 201), until now, when, as sometime professor in Andover Theological Seminary and President Emeritus of Amherst College, he passes autumnal years fruitful in friends and honors. Undoubtedly this limitation of view is responsible for some statements which are quite too sweeping. It is not true of all parts of the country that theatres are closed on Sunday (p. 212), or that everlasting punishment is seldom, if ever, mentioned now; that the word "hell" seldom crosses the lips of any preacher (p. 170); nor is it true that in all churches the people participate in saying the Lord's Prayer, in responsive reading of psalms, and in repetition of the Apostles' Creed (p. 50). Beyond the Hudson, west and south, there are also people, and even New England has churches which do not repeat the Apostles' Creed.

Although Dr. Harris does not say so in terms, the impression made by his fascinating pages is that the fundamental change has been from the ideal of a group of individuals held together, man with man

and man with God, by external law, to that of a family, united brother to brother and son to Father, by the inwardness of love; which altered ideal has penetratingly transformed both the doctrine and the practice of religion. That the essentials abide, he is well assured; but, apparently, the essentials are the doctrines which have survived in his own mind and in the forms which they have there assumed. That the change has been an improvement rather than a deterioration is the witness of his own experience. The principal significance of the book, then, lies just in the fact that it records the progress in religious thought and life of a veteran scholar trained to prove all things and hold fast that which is good, who, having known both the old and the new, unhesitatingly declares that the new is better.

Notwithstanding such testimony, borne not by Dr. Harris alone but by an increasing multitude, there still exists a feeling that the new theology has not the preaching power of the old. To this Professor Brown addresses himself in his book, *Modern Theology and the Preaching of the Gospel*. His method is to describe the needs satisfied by earlier theology, and then show how these needs are met by Christian doctrines in their modern forms. The task was well conceived and has been admirably performed. Many a thoughtful minister will be grateful to Professor Brown for opening a way from study to pulpit by showing how modern thoughts concerning the Bible, God, the Deity of Christ, Salvation, and the Church may be made homiletically effective.

W. W. FENN.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF ENGLISH THEOLOGY IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY, 1800-1860. VERNON F. STORR, Fellow of University College, Oxford, Canon of Winchester Cathedral. Longmans, Green, & Co. 1914. Pp. viii, 486. \$3.50.

There is a large place for a work on the development of English theology during the last century. Principal Tulloch's admirable sketch—*Movements of Religious Thought*—is far too brief and has long been out of print. Benn's *History of English Rationalism in the Nineteenth Century* covers the ground, but was written to support a thesis; and Hunt's *Religious Thought in England* is *memoirs pour servir* rather than history. A knowledge of the factors that have influenced English religious thinking during this period and of the resultant point of view is vital not only to the technical theo-

logian but to any one who desires a sympathetic relationship with the thought of his age upon the matters of deepest concern.

The writer who enters this field confronts a task of unusual difficulty. A variety of forces have been at work, and some of the most potent have had only an indirect bearing upon religious thought. The fact is that the movement has been like the drifting of an island from arctic to temperate zones. Fauna and flora have undergone gradual changes which at any one moment seemed trivial, but in their sum, after a considerable period, were startling.

Canon Storr was evidently confronted at the very start with a problem of treatment. He had to choose between the task of an analyst and that of interpreter. The main defect of his work lies in the ambiguity of his aim. Whole sections are as rigidly chronicles as the pages of Hunt; others are as interpretative as those of Tulloch. The result is a certain lack of unity of method. Would it not be possible to treat the entire epoch from an interior point of view, with a result as illuminative as, for example, Professor Seelye's *Expansion of England*? This uncertainty of purpose is reflected in the method of composition. Every page bears witness to the fact that the work in its present form has been a growth, and it frequently happens that the author's fine and large insights, which should have afforded the regulative principle of an extended paragraph or chapter, are reached incidentally at the close of a discussion or in another connection. For example, the suggestion on page 160 that the Deist controversy of the eighteenth century was conducted on inadequate premises by men who had little sense of history and who imperfectly understood the issues involved in the antithesis of natural and supernatural, might well have been made the basis of the critique of Deism in the long chapter devoted to that topic.

To pass from criticisms that may partake of the nature of fault-finding, Canon Storr has given us in these pages a clear and detailed account of the forces at work during the first half of the century to modify religious thought. He is fully acquainted with the material, he sees clearly the issues involved in particular controversies, and his analysis of certain situations is singularly discreet and penetrating. Inevitably the treatment of an epoch like this will be colored by the author's personal bias. The guise of judicial impartiality under which Benn wrote did not in the least conceal his partisanship. Canon Storr does not leave it uncertain that his sympathies are with a generous interpretation of the historic Christian faith; but, for the most part, his representations of the positions

of others are so fair and candid that it would not be easy for the adherents of any school to convict him of prejudice. If Canon Storr's second volume fulfils the promise of the first, he will have made a most useful addition to our English theological literature.

GEORGE E. HORB.

THE NEWTON THEOLOGICAL INSTITUTION.

THE ASSUMPTION OF THE RELIGIOUS DRESS IN MONASTICISM. CEREMONIES FOR THE ASSUMPTION OF THE DRESS IN THE MONASTICISM OF THE GREEK CHURCH. STUDIES IN HISTORY AND ARCHAEOLOGY. NICHOLAS PALMOV. Tchokoloff, Kiev. 1914. Pp. xv, 420.

By the publication of this learned work (of which only one hundred and sixty copies were printed), Professor Nicholas Palmov, of the Ecclesiastical Academy of Kiev, has filled a gap in the history of Oriental monachism, and has rendered accessible certain Greek liturgical texts of considerable importance for the history of the liturgy.

The work is divided into four sections. The first, which is in some sense an historical introduction to the three which follow it, treats of the origin of the ceremonies for the taking of the habit. Oriental monachism had its birth in Egypt, from which country Byzantium received it. Accordingly, those who desire to fathom the origins of the liturgical ceremonies of Oriental monachism must direct their researches at the outset toward Egyptian monachism, and seek the solution of the liturgical problems they set before themselves in the rituals of the old Egyptian monasteries.

Historical documents attest that the rules to be followed and the ceremonies to be performed in receiving into the monasteries those who presented themselves to embrace the monastic life, were already fixed in the monastery of St. Pachomius the Great. The candidates were minutely interrogated, and put to the test to see whether they were really capable of practising the austerities and the rude mortifications of Oriental asceticism, and afterwards were admitted to assume the monastic garb. This does not, however, imply the existence of a special ceremonial for admission to the monastery. This ritual, the ceremonial which we find in the liturgical documents of the Byzantine Church, is later than St. Pachomius. Nevertheless, the practice followed in the Egyptian monasteries must have had a great influence in the formation of the Byzantine ritual of monachism.

At what time this ritual was composed is not definitely known. Neither in the *Regula Patris nostri Pachomii* nor in the *De Institutis Coenobiorum* of Johannes Cassianus do we find any trace of a form of monastic vows by which the candidate renounces the world. In his second canonical epistle to Amphilochius, St. Basil declares that he knows nothing of the existence of formulas (ἀνδρῶν ὁμολογίαν) by which the members of the monastic families pledge themselves to celibacy. Professor Palmov supposes accordingly that St. Basil, a zealous propagator and patron of the monastic life, was the first to require of candidates for the monastic life the reading of a formula professing monastic vows. This new custom was speedily followed by the redaction of a ceremonial for the taking of the habit. In the writings of the pseudo-Areopagite, which go back to the first half of the fifth century, we find the rules to be followed in the taking of the habit already fixed.

The most important liturgical document relative to this ceremony is contained in the Euchologion of St. Mark, a precious literary treasure of the eighth or ninth century, belonging to the Barberini collection of Greek manuscripts now in the Vatican Library. In this manuscript two rituals are found. The first is complete and detailed; it contains the prayers for the first stage of initiation into monachism (πρῶτον σχῆμα, μικρὸν σχῆμα, or σχῆμα τοῦ μανδύατου), and then the rites and prayers for the higher degree of monachism (μέγα σχῆμα, ἀγγελικὸν σχῆμα). The second ritual contains but the single prayer beginning, Κύριε, ὁδὸς ἡμῶν, ὁ ἀξιόσους σου εἶναι κ.τ.ε.

In connection with the distinction between the μικρὸν σχῆμα and the μέγα σχῆμα in the Euchologion of St. Mark, Professor Palmov investigates an interesting controversy about the baptismal value of monastic vows, a controversy raised and conducted with much vigor by St. Theodore of the Studium, who maintained that the profession of the monastic life is a sacrament of perfection, μυστήριον μοναχικῆς τελειώσεως; in other words, a baptism. Consequently, it is not permissible to repeat the same ceremony for the same candidate for the monastic life. It follows that the distinction between the simple taking of the habit (μικρόν) and the solemn taking of the habit has no foundation in the tradition of the Fathers and the doctrine of the Church.

The theory that the monastic profession is a second baptism had no success in the East. The Euchologia, beginning with that of St. Mark, continued to set forth the rituals for the two monastic investitures, deeming that St. Theodore of the Studium went far in his eagerness to give to a voluntary promise to observe

the evangelical counsels the value and the moral efficacy of a sacrament.

After this historical part, Professor Palmov studies the liturgical peculiarities of the rituals in question. The Greek liturgical codices exhibit many variations in the reproduction of the formularies of the *μικρὸν σχῆμα*—a fact which makes it very difficult to classify them. To obviate this difficulty of classification, Palmov decided to compare them with the formularies of the *μέγα σχῆμα*, which is more ancient. Accordingly, the second part of the work is devoted to this *σχῆμα*, and the third to the *μικρὸν σχῆμα*, while the fourth treats of the *πρόσχημα*, or ceremony preparatory to the simple investiture, consisting in the delivery to the candidate for the monastic life of the habit and of the *kamilavki* (the hat worn by the Oriental clergy).

According to Palmov, the *μικρὸν σχῆμα* goes back to the time of Theodore of the Studium (d. 826), and the *πρόσχημα* was added in the fourteenth century. This last form of initiation into the monastic life underwent changes in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. In our day, there is an evident tendency in the orthodox churches to give it the same value as the *μικρὸν σχῆμα*. Those who are received into the monastery with the forms of the *πρόσχημα* are called *rasophori* or *rakendyte*. In the orthodox churches the monastic habit is now given to priests or members of the clergy who, while renouncing marriage, do not wish to live in a monastery, but to devote their activities to pastoral labors. The *πρόσχημα*, then, would be for Professor Palmov the form most suitable to a new type of monachism to be introduced into the Eastern Church. In this he only expresses the wish of Eugene Golubinsky, the great historian of the Russian Church, who thought desirable the adoption of a new form of monachism, in which the monks should not be totally separated from the world and deprived of all participation in the life of society.

The appendix contains extracts from Greek liturgical codices in which the prayers of the monastic rituals are inserted. The most important extracts are from the Euchologion of St. Mark (Cod. Barberini Graec. 336), and the Euchologion No. 474 of the Ruminantsov Museum in Moscow (tenth to eleventh century).

The several parts of the book evince the author's profound knowledge of the Greek liturgy, a knowledge acquired in great part through the study and collation of unpublished Greek sources.

AURELIO PALMIERI.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY LIBRARY.

THE PAPACY AND MODERN TIMES. CANON WILLIAM BARRY. (Home University Library.) Williams & Norgate. 1911. Pp. 252.

In this book Dr. Barry has contributed to the Home University Library a brilliant essay. It is not "Church History" in any proper sense of the word, as the author himself announces. It is rather "a political sketch," the manifest intention of which is to explain how it is that "the twentieth of September, 1870, when I saw the Italian army enter Rome, forms a landmark in the story of Western Europe, and by consequence in the development of modern society on both sides of the Atlantic." In the prologue, which forms the first chapter, the author surveys the history and political influence of the papacy from early days down to the Captivity at Avignon. In the following chapters he discusses the inter-relationship of papal and civil policy, giving particular emphasis to the evident crises of history as they appear in the period of the Reforming Councils, at the moment of the Thirty Years' War, in the reigns of Philip II and Louis XIV and Napoleon, in the era of the Italian Risorgimento, and in the promise of American civil and religious liberty. The book is full of learning. The author not only knows familiarly the tendencies of the past, but he is also the friend of the men who guided either for good or for evil the direction that Church and State were to take. His story is marked by keen insight and suggestive interpretation—signs of the historian. To the writer nothing is insignificant; everything emerges from the past and enters the future. His narrative is full of imagination chastened by careful study. For him the Roman Church embodies the spirit of Imperial Rome; it must always stand for universalism in religion.

However, one must not accept the teaching of the book without hesitation. Dr. Barry, with the modesty of a true scholar, warns his readers that "these highest things always admit of an interpretation according to the mind that views them." Dr. Barry's mind is of the class which deplores those episodes of the past that have made for the limitation of the older forms of the Roman Church, and which can see no Providence in the withdrawal of the Pope from the Quirinal to the Vatican. He can hardly draw the conclusion suggested by his own pregnant implication that in America the right relationship of Church and State exists. In other words, remarkably balanced though the essay may be, the author falls into the error so common to writers of the other religious camp: he is unconsciously and consciously a strong partisan. In the interests of knowledge, the little book is of far greater value for the student

familiar with the general outline of the papacy than for the average man whom the Home University Library intends to reach.

HENRY B. WASHBURN.

EPISCOPAL THEOLOGICAL SCHOOL, CAMBRIDGE.

THE VATICAN: THE CENTER OF GOVERNMENT OF THE CATHOLIC WORLD.

The Rt. Rev. EDMOND CANON HUGUES DE RAGNAU. D. Appleton & Co. 1913. Pp. 453. \$4.00.

Let no one expect to find in this beautifully printed volume any satisfactory description of the Vatican. It gives only a brief account, very much in the style of Italian guide-books. Neither let any one look for any full and intelligent study of the government of the Roman Catholic Church as centered in the Vatican. A scrappy account of the Pope and his office, his chief collaborators and the Roman Curia, nearly all of which might be compiled from easily accessible English sources, occupy, together with a few pages on the Vatican, less than one-fourth of the book (pp. 1-92). The second section of the book, comprising more than one-half, begins with a chapter on the "Organization of the Catholic World" (pp. 97-175), of some general interest as showing how well the system has been worked out. This is followed by a rambling chapter (pp. 176-288) on the "Politico-Religious History of Catholicism," a survey of the relation of the Roman Church to various countries and their governments, principally in the nineteenth century. As history this chapter is at times amusing. The chapter on the "Catholic Faith" (pp. 299-346) is a fairly clear and well-written statement, not of the faith of the Church, but of the place of the Church as the guardian of the faith, illustrated by its dealings with recent dogmatic problems. The third section of the book is a compilation on Catholicism and education. Here some interesting and apparently trust-worthy facts have been collected, in part from sources not accessible in English. "What the Catholic Church teaches" (pp. 394-433) gives a list of the various subjects on which instruction should be given in a Catholic university; but the chapter is stuffed out by a long irrelevant account (pp. 402-426) of the books of the Bible, with some quaint but probably ecclesiastically "correct" statements regarding their dates, authors, and general contents. The book concludes with a very brief description of the "Spiritual and Practical Sides of Catholicism," containing among other things a number of points of Canon Law bearing more directly on private life.

At first sight the reader is at a loss how to characterize such a book, with its feeble grasp of history, its absurdly distorted perspective, and its miscellaneous collection of material compiled chiefly from indifferent manuals. He ought, however, not to quarrel with the book until he is quite sure of the author's real purpose. In spite of the title, that purpose, one can well believe, is not to give an account of the "Vatican: the Center of Government of the Catholic World." The Vatican is for the author but a symbol. His real purpose must have been to produce a work of edification, based upon a contemplation of the Church as a divine system of world-wide activity. Everywhere, accordingly, the Roman Church is shown as always the leader of every form of spiritual progress, religious, moral, and intellectual, as subject to persecution by the powers of evil yet constantly triumphant, as traduced by Protestants and other unbelievers yet forcing its enemies to admit its claims. By its devotion, its faith, its all-embracing programme, by its very numbers, it is made to impress the devout soul. This is, doubtless, a worthy end. Possibly, in attaining it, "omissions," "exaggerated effects," and "suppressions"—faults the author finds in non-Catholic works on history—are necessary and to be tolerated by the faithful for the sake of the edification. The Church and its work are objects of faith and not merely of sight. Many of the hard realities of this present world with its intractable history may be overlooked in the more brilliant vision.

Unfortunately for the author and his purpose of edification, his literary ability is very limited, and his unctuous style, reminiscent of second-rate French devotional works, fails to transmute a crude compilation into a satisfactory picture. The unconscionable padding betrays the amateur and makes the book burdensome to read. The author's grasp of the situation is so feeble that he often misses making a good point. The book contains much many Protestants might well take to heart, but it is so mixed with false, inaccurate, and distorted statements that it will often repel where it might well attract. It stands in the way of a much better book which almost any man with scholarly instincts but as great loyalty to the Roman Church and devotion to its aims, could produce, provided he had a fair amount of literary taste and skill and more knowledge of actual religious conditions than is allowed to filter through "*la bonne presse*," the tone of which is admirably reproduced in this volume.

JOSEPH CULLEN AYER, Jr.

PHILADELPHIA DIVINITY SCHOOL.

EPITOME THEOLOGIAE MORALIS VON C. TELCH. OENIPONTE TYPIS ET SUMPTIBUS FEL. RAUCH (L. PUSTET). Ratisbonae, Romae, Neo Eboraci et Cincinnati apud Fredericum Pustet. Pp. xxxii, 539.

Dr. Telch is professor of Moral Theology and Canon Law in Joseph College, Columbus, Ohio. In this book, small in size but of 539 closely printed pages, he has made an epitome of the larger and more exhaustive work of Noldin, a recognized authority within the Roman Church. The author has succeeded in giving a simple, clear, and instructive presentation of Roman teaching on matters constantly brought to the attention of confessors and intelligent laymen. The volume should prove useful to either the Protestant or the Romanist who wants a compendium of the conclusions of Romanism on questions relative to pastoral care, social morals, liturgics, etc.

HENRY B. WASHBURN.

EPISCOPAL THEOLOGICAL SCHOOL, CAMBRIDGE.

PRAYING FOR THE DEAD. AN HISTORICAL REVIEW OF THE PRACTICE. R. J. EDMOND BOGGIS. Longmans, Green, & Co. 1913. Pp. 272. \$1.25.

The author holds that the impulse to pray for departed friends is of high antiquity and universal; and in this book he gathers the evidence, from early Egyptian tombs to the present day. He gives numerous quotations to show that the practice was continued in the Church of England after the Reformation by many who were regarded as entirely orthodox; and he emphasizes the truth underlying the doctrine of purgatory. His position throughout is that of a High Churchman; and his main thesis is that prayer for those in the other world is as legitimate and efficacious as for those in this.

FREDERIC PALMER.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

DIE CHRISTOLOGIE DES HEILIGEN IGNATIUS VON ANTIOCHIEN. Professor MICHAEL RACKL. (The fourteenth number of the *Freiburger Theologische Studien*.) Herdersche Verlagshandlung, Freiburg im Breisgau. 1914. Pp. 418. \$2.20.

This volume is a valuable contribution to the literature dealing with the Ignatian Letters and their bearing upon the development of Christian theology. Nearly one-fourth of the book deals with the genuineness of these epistles. The remainder is occupied with

an exposition of the Ignatian Christology and a consideration of the bearing of this teaching upon subsequent thought.

In his defence of the genuineness of these letters Dr. Rackl, after reviewing the long debate, undertakes the successful demolition of Völter's arguments against them. He denies that Ignatius' Roman letter is a "tendency forgery," or that the remaining six are to be ascribed to Peregrinus Proteus about 150. He asserts rather that there is no early Christian literature so incontestably vouched for as are the Ignatian letters by Polycarp, a testimony which cannot be overthrown on the ground of interpolation.

In the constructive exposition of Ignatian Christology Rackl first considers the Docetic heresy, against which Ignatius elaborates his arguments for the "true" humanity of Jesus. Docetism, he asserts, arose in an honest effort of certain Christians to overcome "the offence of the cross." It therefore posited the unreality of Jesus' earthly life, especially his sufferings and death. In squarely meeting this heresy and affirming, on scriptural grounds, the real humanity of Jesus, Ignatius rendered a most valuable service to the church.

But Ignatius also stood unequivocally for Jesus' divinity. He is the Messiah (*ὁ χριστός*). *Θεός* is repeatedly applied to him, not in a "subjective" (von der Goltz), or an "ethical" (Schultz), but rather in "an objective, metaphysical sense." He is the "unbegotten, eternal creator." Yet Ignatius is not a Patri-passionist. He applies to Christ the philosophical term *ἀγέννητος*, involving, in Christian writers, absolute eternity, a conception also implied in the ascription *ἄχρονος*. Christ is also represented as absolute in power and knowledge. Prayer is to be directed to him. Divine virtues are attributed to him. He is the centre and heart of Ignatius' own mystical experience, as also of that of the Church. Ignatius is not a subordinationist. The terms "Son of God" and "Word of God" imply rather Christ's inner divine relationship to God. The union of humanity and divinity in Jesus Ignatius treated as a fact rather than a problem.

Ignatius employed both Old and New Testaments. In Christology he agrees with the Synoptics as to facts, and with the Pauline and Johannine writings as to interpretation of the life of Jesus. His advance beyond the New Testament is merely one of verbal formulation.

Rackl affirms Ignatius' consistent orthodoxy as regards the person of Christ, both from the standpoint of apostolic teaching and of catholic theology. On the one hand Ignatius echoes the lan-

guage and the thought of the Old Roman Symbol, and on the other the speculative conceptions and the philosophical terminology of Nicaea.

In conclusion, we may seriously ask whether our author has not read too largely the philosophical conceptions of a later age into the profoundly religious language of our second-century author.

HENRY HAMMERSLEY WALKER.

CHICAGO THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

SAINT AUGUSTINE. LOUIS BERTRAND. Translated by VINCENT O'SULLIVAN. D. Appleton & Co. 1914. Pp. viii, 396. \$3.00.

This is a remarkably fine portrait of "the great heart and the great intellect" of Augustine. It is brilliant in description, critical as well as appreciative in spirit, rich in fine spiritual observations on the man and his epoch. Where is there a life or an historical setting surpassing the romantic wandering career of Augustine in interest or instructiveness? The metamorphosis of a gay dissolute youth into the "grand old Bishop" with his stalwart faith, the epic of the inner life of a soul, is the high theme. Bertrand's work is not a scholastic review of Augustine's writings, but the "sole aim is to study Augustine's soul." The human interest is put first. The author follows "this peerless man" through the stages of *infantia*, *pueritia*, *adolescentia*, *vir paganus*, *vir christianus*, especially the merging of the Platonist into the Christian monk, and the succeeding work of the Bishop of Hippo. Particularly valuable are the pen pictures of the cities where Augustine lived: Thagasta, Madaura, Carthage, Rome, Milan, and Hippo. These recover for the reader somewhat of Augustine's world, what he must have seen, heard, and felt. The play of environmental influences upon the many-sided personality of the strangely modern Augustine is depicted with insight and critical independence. The style is vivid and fascinating. The book reads very well, and is as instructive as it is readable.

Where the human interest is foremost, we do not look for labored discussions of theological problems. The author has used Augustine's writings only where the "ardent soul pulsates" in them. Still the work is of great value for understanding Augustine's doctrinal position. Much nonsense has been written about the greatest theologian of the Western Church, largely because his writings have been studied in detachment from his biography, from his practical problems, and the impressions upon him of the age. This is the

perennial vice of the dogmatic method. The man and the *Zeitgeist* alone make the doctrines intelligible.

A good illustration is found in the views of Augustine on the State. He has often been berated for his low estimate of the State. "What are your empires but magnificent robberies?" Well, this savage onslaught of his on the State appears, in the light of Bertrand's chapter, "The City of Gold" to be no more than the naked truth about Roman administration of the provinces, at least in the later history of the Empire. They were continuously ransacked and plundered to feed, adorn, and gratify the insatiable hunger, vanity, and lust of Rome. Roman avarice and the mailed fist had made the Mistress of the World a dazzling *aurata Roma*. *Acies stupet igne metalli*, said Claudian. And the provinces paid for it. Small wonder provincials were asking themselves whether this Empire was worth all the blood and money that it cost. Nevertheless, since Augustine knew nothing better to take its place, and also knew that without a minimum of safety all spiritual effort is futile, he strove mightily to strengthen the unity of the Church and to deserve the active support of the government. He believed that Catholic unity, the Roman Empire, and civilization belonged together and were mutually interdependent. The same reasoning applies to his appeal to force in suppressing the lawless and violent Donatists, to his inhuman doctrine of grace and predestination, to his ideas of church authority and other peculiarities of his system. The "time's abuse" accounts in most cases for those features of his theology most offensive to the modern mind. Nowhere else is the brilliant success and incomparable superiority of the historical method over the dogmatic more apparent than in the study and interpretation of this master-mind of the Western Church—so human, so modern, so incomparably great in spiritual effort and achievement.

Bertrand's book supplies a long-felt want. It is not too much to say, "no historical, theological, or biographical collection can be considered complete without it."

GEORGE C. CELL.

BOSTON UNIVERSITY.

THE SPIRITUAL MESSAGE OF DANTE. Rt. Rev. W. BOYD-CARPENTER.
Harvard University Press. 1914. Pp. xii, 250. \$1.50.

"The study of Dante is the literary phenomenon of England and America at the present time"; this was the judgment expressed by the Hon. James Bryce in his Lowell Institute lectures some years

ago. The uniqueness of Dante's personality, the arresting beauty of his speech, the invigorating energy of his passion for righteousness, the truthfulness and wonder of his vivid pictures, are drawing an ever enlarging number of minds within the circle of his power. This latest volume from the able and versatile pen of Dr. Carpenter will not fail to instruct and inspire many readers. The author confesses that he does not attempt to make a comprehensive statement of the spiritual message of Dante, but essays the humbler task of expressing "thoughts on religious experience as exemplified by Dante's poem." That the poet often thought of himself as standing in the succession of the chosen prophets, intrusted by the Infinite Goodness with a message to mankind which he must not fail to make manifest, is evident from many passages in his writings. Although Dante's spiritual teaching is not exhaustively interpreted in this volume, the author sets forth in a thorough and convincing manner the very heart of that message—that "love is over all life." He is intent upon freeing the minds of his readers from the popular notion that Dante was a volcano of wrath and malignity in a constant state of eruption, by portraying the poet in his true character as a lover and a supreme prophet of love. Love first kindled his genius; his life was dedicated to a very wonderful vision of a marvelous way of celebrating love; as he entered hell he was persuaded that love ordained its retributions; love must be set in order if the stained soul would be purified; and finally he discovers that love, changeless, infinite, resistless, binds all the leaves scattered throughout the universe into one volume. This lucid delineation of Dante's true character and essential philosophy is a real and much needed service.

The reviewer, however, cannot but feel that the author finds love more prominent in the *Inferno* than the facts will warrant. Is the *Inferno* a "revelation that at root evil is defection from love"? That is the teaching of the *Purgatorio*. There evil dispositions are shown to grow out of love distorted, defective, and excessive; but in the *Inferno* the poet treats of deeds in their relationship to the inexorable righteousness, sins being estimated by their effects on society. Hence treachery is punished in the lowest pit, and Brutus and Judas are in the mouths of Lucifer. Neither his theme, his material, nor perhaps his disposition in those days, induced him to trace the sins of those dreadful circles to their effect on the "capacities of love."

It may further be questioned whether Bishop Carpenter in his treatment of love conveys precisely the meaning to his readers

which was in the poet's mind. Dante, the scholar, had a passion for truth. He loved with the mind. He adopted the psychology of his day, which made the affections of the heart depend on the perceptions of the mind. "Thou shouldest know," says Beatrice, "that all have delight in proportion as their vision penetrates into truth in which every understanding is at rest. Hence may be seen how beatitude is founded on the act that sees, not on that which loves, which follows after." Hell is to lose the good of the intellect; in Purgatory love is set in order by fixing the attention on the true nature of the virtue to be achieved; in Heaven one moves upward by beholding the beauty of truth enkindled along the stairway of the eternal palace. The nine hierarchies of angels gaze into the Point of Light, and their love is generated and measured by the intensity of their vision. The empyrean is "pure light, light intellectual, full of love." We moderns emphasize the emotional element in love, but Dante laid stress upon its close associations with the perceptions of the mind. To us God is the pitying Father; to Dante he is the revealing, intolerable Light. Dante's mysticism was seated in his intellect and not in his heart. Love in his thought had an intellectual quality which is not so prominent in ours. While Dr. Carpenter clearly states the commanding importance of love in Dante's philosophy, he does not give to his readers quite the same impression of the nature of love which is felt by the readers of the *Divine Comedy*.

These slight criticisms, however, should not blind us to the great merits of a volume of ripe scholarship, rich in spiritual insights, which accurately and vigorously describes the soul-tragedy and victory of one whom Lowell called "the highest spiritual nature that has expressed itself in rhythmical form."

CHARLES ALLEN DINSMORE.

WATERBURY, CONN.

TRAITÉ DES HÉRÉTIQUES; À SAVOIR, SI ON LES DOIT PERSÉCUTER, ET COMMENT ON SE DOIT CONDUIRE AVEC EUX, SELON L'AVIS, OPINION, ET SENTENCE, DE PLUSIEURS AUTEURS, TANT ANCIENS, QUE MODERNES. PAR SÉBASTIEN CASTELLION. Édition nouvelle, publiée par les soins de A. OLIVET, pasteur de l'Église de Genève. Préface de E. Choisy, professeur à l'Université de Genève. Genève, A. Jullien. 1913. Pp. x, 198. 3fr.

This famous treatise in behalf of a more merciful handling of "heretics," and in favor of a toleration for which the age in general was not ready, was occasioned by the burning of Servetus. Only

three copies of the original French edition are known. Whether Castellion was its sole author is perhaps doubtful, but to him is due the largest credit for an utterance so prophetic of the future, if so unpopular in his own day. It must always stand as one of the milestones in the progress of religious liberty; and it is well that it has been given a fitting reproduction.

WILLISTON WALKER.

YALE UNIVERSITY.

THE RISE OF THE MODERN SPIRIT IN EUROPE. GEORGE S. BUTZ, Ph.D.
Sherman, French, & Co. 1912. Pp. 293. \$1.25.

This is a series of lectures on the social, scientific, and literary aspects of the Age of the Renaissance, whose chief merit is its clearness and convenience of arrangement, and its excellence of proportion. It will prove a useful manual for college courses "primarily for undergraduates," and may be profitably employed to supplement the ordinary narrative histories of the field with which it deals. Dr. Butz's work, however, is far too superficial to be of much value for more advanced students. It contains few new ideas, is based on secondary authorities, and despite the over-laudatory foreword of Rev. George W. Richards, it can make little claim to critical scholarship. The judgments are often too far-reaching to inspire confidence. To call Alexander VI, bad as he indubitably was, "perhaps the very worst character in all history" (page 172), demands a courage not altogether enviable. There is much mixed metaphor. Ulrich von Hutten "dashes off a quiverful of philippics." The book is marred throughout by many careless mistakes and misprints: "Ezzalino da Romano," page 154; "Chevaleur Bayard," page 156; "*litterae humanieres*," page 154, are characteristic examples. On the other hand, the work is a significant illustration of the recent growth of the broader conception of history as a record of human achievement of all sorts, economic, artistic, scientific, and literary, as well as political and constitutional. It covers a very wide range, and though it never penetrates beneath the surface, it has the merit of giving the reader an adequate impression of the wonderful versatility which characterizes the age with which it deals.

ROGER B. MERRIMAN.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

A LIFE OF JOHN COSIN, BISHOP OF DURHAM, 1660-1672. P. H. OSMUND.
A. R. Mowbray & Co. 1913. Pp. xii, 376. 8s. 6d.

Peter Smart, maintaining the Low Church side in a sermon against John Cosin and other High Churchmen, accused them of "altar decking, cope wearing, organ playing, piping and singing, crossing of cushions and kissing of clouts, oft starting up and squatting down, nodding of heads, and whirling about till their noses stand eastward, setting basons on the altar, candlesticks and crucifixes, burning wax candles in excessive number when and where is no use of lights; and, what is worst of all, gilding of angels and garnishing of images, and setting them aloft." Cosin liked these things as much as Smart disliked them. He suffered for these preferences when the Puritans came to power, being driven into exile in France, where he served as an English court-chaplain, with little appreciation and less salary. His biographer recalls the sufferings of the Anglican clergy during that period. They were worse, he says, than those which were afterwards the lot of the Nonconformists, and help to explain the energy with which the Puritan parsons were evicted at the Restoration.

Cosin came back less disposed than ever to conciliate those with whom he disagreed, and against all compromise with Presbyterians. He is a type of the honest, dogmatic, overbearing, conscientious prelates, who by their stiff, unimaginative partisanship made dissent so considerable a factor in the religious life of England.

He was a leader in the liturgical revision which made the Prayer Book of 1662, and he composed the first of the two Ember Collects, the Collect for the Third Sunday in Advent, for St. Stephen's Day, for the Sixth Sunday after Epiphany, and for Easter Even. It is pleasant to find in these devout prayers the heart of the man, which was hidden from many of his contemporaries under his thick ecclesiastical cloak.

GEORGE HODGES.

EPISCOPAL THEOLOGICAL SCHOOL, CAMBRIDGE.

RELIGION AND FREE WILL. W. BENETT. The Clarendon Press. 1913.
Pp. 345. 7s. 6d.

This book is original, and so suggestive and so condensed in its manner of expression that any short report, even though prepared with care, can hardly avoid being to some extent unfair. It is probably the ablest pragmatic defence ever made of the view that religion is

an emotional and irrational belief which admits of no scientific explanation and commits suicide when it uses rationalistic weapons in self-defence. Dogma, ritual, and priesthood are all necessary to it, though all are liable to abuse. Without dogma, religion inevitably degenerates into a primitive or degraded form. All who cherish the ideal of a rational or purely spiritual and undogmatic religion follow a will o' the wisp.

The main idea of the book is that evolution is a progression of equally necessary opposites. Love and hatred, like the wheat and the tares, must grow together to the end of the world. The ethical optimum is never the mean, but is always a slight lead of one maximum over another. Hatred can never be too strong, provided it is slightly overbalanced and controlled by love. A triumph too complete of love over hatred, of activity over inertia, of the scientific spirit over "the unquantified emotional tendencies of ethics and religion," would be the doom of evolution. "No improvement, in the sense of a rectification of the proportions between good and evil to the advantage of the good, is ever possible." The elimination of evil is not even to be desired, since it is a "necessity to all life that both the conflicting principles should be in active existence."

What is the end of evolution? A survey of its history discloses none. The only conceivable end within the world of experience is pleasure, and one can accept that standard only by giving up his conscience and religion. Yet we cannot escape believing in a final end, for without it there would be no values, "and nothing in life is more certain than the existence of values." Ethical thinking therefore necessarily postulates a transcendental personality and its future existence in a transcendental world. Postulation, however, is not proof, and ethics cannot dispense with religion, which brings definite assurance. A non-religious ethical culture is therefore a vain thing. The ethical values must be reinforced by the religious values, for the good and evil principles are so nearly neck and neck "and the conflict of ideals is so close that to yield odds is to ensure defeat."

While we can never form a clear conception of the transcendental end, our ethical judgments tell us the direction in which it lies, and this is all we need to know. Good is whatever tends in that direction. The province of science is clearly delimited very much after Bergson's fashion. Science deals solely with concepts derived from sensation; it enables us to perfect our instruments and to deal successfully with the physical world, but it is not applicable to internal experience and has nothing to do with values. Consequently, there can never

be a science of ethics. No attempt is made to prove the freedom of the will. The concept is merely defined with great clearness, and the practical results of the substitution of a belief in universal determinism for a belief in free will are set forth. These may be surmised from the statement that free will, conscience, justice, and freedom form one organic connection. When one goes, all go. The last chapter contains an illuminating discussion of punishment, and shows that the substitution of expedience for justice in the treatment of criminals leads to dangerous lenity in times of peace and to equally dangerous excesses of severity at other times.

GEORGE R. DODSON.

ST. LOUIS, MO.

THE FAITH OF JAPAN. TASUKU HARADA, President of The Doshisha. The Macmillan Co. 1914. Pp. xvi, 190. \$1.25.

It must be confessed that really thoughtful people not otherwise acquainted with Japan have been and are turned away from deeper study through a sort of contempt for a people who, they think, can give no better contribution to thought and life than a thin superficiality of picturesqueness. To all such disappointed persons, as well as to those of us who suspect that a people made of such gossamer material could hardly have accomplished what the Japanese have done, this book by Dr. Harada will be a welcomed pocket-companion for several reasons: first, it simplifies the interpretation of a more or less confused and confusing subject. Secondly, it is understandable, for the most part, by men or women who have the equivalent of a High School trained mind. Thirdly, it covers the ground in a work-a-day manner in a small volume. With this little book, and with *The Evolution of New Japan*, by J. H. Longford, Professor of Japanese, King's College, London, the average busy men or women can have an intelligent knowledge of modern Japan at the cost of less than two dollars and a few hours of time—distinct advantages in these strenuous days.

In his preface President Harada says of his course of lectures: "Their governing purpose has been not so much a scholar's effort to make the elements of a people's faith clear to scholars, as a Christian's endeavor to interpret the spirit of that faith unto Christians of another race." It is here we feel like offering a suggestion to the writer for the second edition (which we hope will soon be called

for), and that is, to forget the student entirely and expand just a little some of the points now covered by a single sentence. He would thereby make his little book a *vade mecum* to a much wider circle of readers and so increase its enlightening usefulness.

To illustrate, on p. 94 are the following sentences: "He [Honen, 'the real founder of the Jodo sect' of Buddhists] proclaimed salvation for all mankind not by meditation, nor by ritual, nor even by the repetition of a Buddha's name with understanding of its meaning." Then follows this quotation: "It is nothing but the repetition of the name of Buddha Amida with faith in his boundless mercy, whereby we may be born in the Happiest Land of Jodo or the Buddha." The students who first heard these lectures may have understood these two sentences in their relation to each other; but to the ordinary reader, unacquainted with the peculiar tenets of the "Jodo sect of Buddhists" under the leadership of "Honen," there seems to be a contradiction which might easily have been avoided and the whole sentence made plain by a simple statement to the effect that "Honen" preached salvation by an act of repetition of the name of "Buddha Amida", not with understanding, but with faith; not blind faith, but a kind of mystic faith that one can be said to have in a friend whom the person does not fully understand and seeks no question of understanding. As a matter of fact, the "Jodo sect of Buddhists" are among the best of the various bodies of Buddhists in Japan, and their lives are far more consistent with the faith they hold, because it springs from a sense of genuine gratitude toward Buddha Amida, since he has, as Honen preached, boundless mercy upon them. Among the Japanese the sense of gratitude is especially strong where it involves loyalty to one to whom a person has been in the relationship of servant or attendant or pupil.

Perhaps the same end might have been attained and the two sentences have been perfectly clear were the second one worded somewhat as follows: "He proclaimed salvation which would be granted to all mankind on condition not of meditation nor of ritual, not even of an intelligent understanding of the Buddha's name, but on the mere repetition of the words, 'Buddha Amida,' whether understood or not by the believer, but with faith that there was mercy."

We shall let the book speak for itself by giving the subjects of the eight chapters with some additions.

Chapter I, The Introduction, presents a Historical Sketch of the Religious life of Japan under the three forms prior to the advent of Protestant Christianity. Chapter II gives the conception of

Deity called Kami,¹ with an illuminating description of what Buddhism, Shintoism, and Confucianism are, and what are their inter-relations. Chapter III is a most suggestive account of Michi, The Way of Life, which means more than the way of living. As one Japanese Shinto writer puts it: "The teaching of the Sages is to teach a man to become a man, not to become a Chinese"; and another: "The Way is the way of Heaven and earth. The Way of the sages of China and the Way of the Gods and men of Japan are alike the Way of the God of Heaven and of earth. The Way of the God of Heaven is one. To name it Confucian, Buddhist, or Taoist, and introduce those names to foreign lands, is the work of those who themselves know not the Way." Chapter IV tells of Satori, The Law of Enlightenment. In Chapter V, devoted to Sukui, the Doctrine of Salvation, one may find a striking proof of the solidarity of human experience and thought in the fact that in Buddhism as developed in Japan there are the two opposing schools of belief how salvation is found, as in Jewish and Christian thinking: the Holy Path of works, Self-help, and the Pure Land Path, the Other-Power-help way. Chapter VI, on Chugi, The Spirit of Loyalty, will enlighten the average reader's curiosity more perhaps than any other in the book, treating, as it does, of "the Alpha and Omega of Bushido, the Way of the Samurai." Dr. Harada's presentation of this elusive subject does not suffer when compared with much larger and longer attempts to make us understand this not complicated though little comprehended and hence often misunderstood subject, especially by us Westerners. Chapter VII is upon Mirai, The idea of Future Life, and reveals the greatest weakness in the faith of Japan; namely, no sure confidence, such as inspired the Hebrew poet when he jubilantly sang, "I shall behold Thy face in righteousness: I shall be satisfied when I awake with Thy likeness." Chapter VIII, The Faith: Old and New, fitly ends this unusually satisfying volume, and should be read as a whole, at least at a second reading; indeed, if possible, most readers would do well to read the entire book consecutively, at least once, for only so will they get out of the work the full help it can give them in understanding a people who have the grace and gumption to understand us about twenty-five times better than we do them.

C. M. CADY.

Y. M. C. A. LIBRARY, BOSTON.

¹ In Romanizing Japanese words, consonants have their usual English sounds ("g" is always hard) and vowels have the Italian. Each vowel (except the diphthongs "ai" and "ei") makes a syllable alone or with the preceding consonant, and the word is supposed to be unaccented.

THE SAVIOUR OF THE WORLD. Sermons preached in the Chapel of Princeton Theological Seminary. BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD, D.D. Hodder & Stoughton. Pp. viii, 270. \$1.25.

Most contemporary preachers are bent on adapting Christian truth to the changed intellectual and social conditions of modern life, and theologians seek to aid them and to defend Christianity by manipulating traditional doctrines into adaptable forms; but behind all this endeavor lies an assumption which should not pass unchallenged. Why should Christianity seek to adapt itself to the modern world, instead of laboring to adapt the world to itself? Is its task to be conformed to this world, and not rather to transform it? Is modern thought the standard of Christian truth, and not the reverse? Is not the whole undertaking an implicit denial of Christianity as a revelation of truth? Amidst all the talk about kernel and husk, while the noise of the hammers is in our ears and nut-picks are becoming fashionable theological tools, it is refreshing to hear a clear, strong voice affirming the earlier world-conquering mission of Christian doctrine. Dr. Warfield believes in the unchanging character of Christian truth because it proceeds from God Himself; modern thought is but a transient phase of human thinking and is destined to disappear, while revealed truth must abide, as eternal as God Himself. Hence these sermons are not rooted in "experience" but in the Bible. They are exegetical in character, and the exegesis is that of a thorough scholar, even though other scholars equally thorough may reach different conclusions. They are logical, calling for continuous thinking and well repaying it. It stirs our admiration to read straight Calvinistic doctrine—election, limited atonement, substitution—unflinchingly declared by one who as thinker and scholar needeth not to be ashamed, and who has the preacher's power. For these sermons are instinct with vital energy and carry throughout the urgency of sincere conviction.

W. W. FENN.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

UNIVERSITY SERMONS. HENRY SLOAN COFFIN, D.D. Yale University Press. Pp. 256. \$1.50.

This volume contains fifteen sermons preached to students in the chapels of several American universities, by one of the most popular of the younger generation of college preachers. The excellence of these sermons will cause them to be widely welcomed. They are vigorous, straightforward, and hard-hitting; colloquial

and direct rather than literary; illuminated by story and anecdote and touched with an occasional gleam of humor. They are admirable specimens of what is not, perhaps, the highest type of preaching, but a type nevertheless very appealing to young men and women, even if, like most good preaching, it is better heard than read. It is difficult to choose among them; but perhaps the best three are the sermons on "Three Stages in Religious Experience," on "Unexpected Sympathy," and on "Religion—a Load or a Lift?" The volume throughout is an excellent example of practical, direct preaching.

HENRY WILDER FOOTE.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

THE BOOK OF COMMON PRAYER AMONG THE NATIONS OF THE WORLD.
A History of Translations of the Prayer Book. W. MUSS-ARNOLT.
Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge. London. 1914. Pp. xxii,
478.

Dr. Josiah H. Benton, of the Boston Public Library, has one of the most complete collections in the world of issues and translations of the Prayer Book of the Church of England and of the Protestant Episcopal Church of America. Dr. William Muss-Arnolt has prepared a sumptuous Catalogue of the collection, and also an elaborate record of the translations of the Prayer Book into the 146 different languages into which it has been translated. The Catalogue is privately printed.

FREDERIC PALMER.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

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JOHANNES WEISS: IN MEMORIAM

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The death of Johannes Weiss, Professor of New Testament Exegesis in the University of Heidelberg, which took place last August, is a loss to sound learning which ought not to pass uncommemorated, even in the midst of the clash of arms and of national rivalry; and when it was suggested to me that I should write on the subject for *The Harvard Theological Review*, I was very glad to do so. In some ways, it is true, I cannot regard myself as an altogether suitable person. I did not know Professor Weiss personally and I have not read all his numerous contributions to New Testament studies; so I shall not attempt any balanced estimate of his work. What I chiefly desire to do is to put on record the outstanding and permanent sense of respect and gratitude which all supporters of what Schweitzer calls "thorough-going eschatology" must feel towards the author of the *Predigt Jesu vom Reiche Gottes*.

Johannes Weiss was born at Kiel at the end of 1863, where his father, Bernhard Weiss, who is still alive in extreme old age, was himself Professor of New Testament Exegesis. In 1890 Johannes Weiss became Professor at Göttingen; in 1895 he moved to Marburg, and from 1908

was Professor in Heidelberg. He was thus less than fifty-one when he died; yet the article to his name in *Wer Ist's?* enumerates more than twenty separate works of his on New Testament subjects, all marked by the learning and the scientific method that we expect and find in the modern German professor.

But it will not be for his really remarkable industry that Johannes Weiss will be chiefly remembered. Nor again is it for special skill or tact in exegesis. Personally indeed I am very grateful for Weiss's study on the composition of *Acts* (published 1897), for it appeared at a time when the reconstruction and consideration of lost sources seemed almost the only occupation of the up-to-date New Testament investigator. Weiss of course recognized previously existing sources in *Acts* and regarded them as the most important element in the book. But he also saw that the final author or editor who gave *Acts* its present form, was no mechanical compiler, and therefore the first necessary step to the study of the book was not a reconstruction, however ingenious, of the sources, but an intelligent comprehension of the author's point of view, as revealed by his completed work. Put bluntly in this way, it sounds almost an obvious truism, but it did not seem quite so obvious in 1897; so that I am pleased to have the opportunity of expressing my debt to Weiss for what I learned from him on this subject.

What distinguished Johannes Weiss from his learned contemporaries was the clearness and vigor with which he set forth the difference between the Gospel Message announced by Jesus and modern religious aspirations for the amelioration of mankind. The essential point of his work is to be found in the first paragraph of the later (1900) edition of the *Predigt Jesu*. "As a pupil of Albrecht Ritschl," says Weiss, "I learnt the importance of the idea of the Kingdom of God, which is the centre

of his theology; and I am still of opinion that Ritschl's system, especially this central idea, is, when properly understood, the most suitable to awaken and sustain for our generation the sound and healthy religious life that we need. But I have long been troubled with a conviction that Ritschl's idea of the Kingdom of God and 'the Kingdom of God' in the Message of Jesus are two very different things."

Here, as I say, you have the essential point. The important thing is that Johannes Weiss was the first modern New Testament scholar of first-rate professorial rank to see it. To bring men into living contact with Jesus Christ is no doubt in all the centuries the chief aim of the Christian teacher, but during the nineteenth century this task had been attempted in a new way. It had seemed that the real Jesus had been hidden from sight under coverings of dogma and ecclesiastical tradition. Behind these trappings it was assumed that there existed not merely a human Personality, but one whose religion was freed from all external and particularistic elements. In the process of unwrapping, much of the traditional Figure had disappeared, for reasons of varied cogency; but it was found that what remained after critical analysis still invincibly belonged to its own time and place. The preaching of Jesus, of the reconstructed historical Jesus, still is occupied with Palestinian conditions of nineteen hundred years ago; the external and particularistic elements refuse to be eliminated. For a long while the remedy most in favor was to regard more and more of the traditional material as unhistorical and secondary. This was especially the case with what we are now accustomed to call the eschatological elements, that is, all that starts from the belief in the intervention of God to deliver His people in the near future. "Amen, I say to you, there are some standing here who will not taste death till they see the Kingdom of God

come in power"—that is only one of a whole series of sayings of Jesus which announce the near coming of a New Age.

Johannes Weiss ventured to sketch a portrait of Jesus in which these sayings, so far from being treated as unauthentic or explained away, are taken as the central nucleus of the Gospel Message. That is his great and lasting achievement.

The first edition of the *Predigt Jesu*, the edition of 1892, is in many ways the more impressive. It is a simple tract of 68 pages and does not attempt any detailed treatment of all the Gospel Sayings. But the central point is touched on page 17, when he declares that the decisive fact in the controversy whether the Kingdom of God was regarded by Jesus as present or future, is to be found in the phrase "Thy Kingdom Come." Whatever may be the case with this or that Saying of ambiguous interpretation, in the Lord's Prayer the Kingdom is regarded as future, and it is God, not man, whose work it will be to bring it in.

The second edition of the *Predigt Jesu* appeared in 1900 as a book of 214 pages. In a sense it is an *Auseinandersetzung* with opponents of the former edition of eight years previously. And to a certain extent it suffers as an artistic production; it is less of a tract, less calculated to convince heedless Liberals of the strength of the eschatological view. But I do not think it was written for that purpose; indeed it is hardly a work of controversy at all. It reads to me like a work written to express the author's considered opinions, written to clear his own views by expressing them in black and white. And therefore it is full of wise sayings, which reward those who will read it carefully with their New Testament in their hands, to see (like the Berœans of old) whether these things be so. I cannot better conclude this imperfect but grateful tribute to the memory of a regretted

fellow-worker than by giving a few extracts from this second edition of Weiss's *Predigt Jesu*:

1. That now and then Jesus should have recognized signs of the present working of God's power, so that for the enlightened eye the Kingdom of God might in moments of insight be spoken of as present, is not surprising. That springs from the very nature of religion. "No active religion can permanently live on hope alone, just as on the other hand an element of hope must always be present in religion" (page 99).

2. Does not the parable of the seed growing secretly (Mk. 4 26 ff.) imply a present Kingdom, gradually developing? No, says Weiss: "The parable is an exhortation to patient waiting; it does not give an answer to the theological question, 'How does the Kingdom of God come?' but to the burning, impatient cry, 'When will it come? Can we not do something to make it come more quickly?'" And Weiss goes on to suggest that it has the same reference as Matt. 11 12 (according to his interpretation of that dark saying), that is, that it is directed against the *Basarai*, the violent Zealots who wish to force the Kingdom (page 85).

3. Weiss has also a wise caution called out by the difficult thought of Mk. 10 5; for it is difficult, though the wording is so familiar. He says: "To be a child is just one of the things that cannot be willed and striven for—it is a gift of God. A man either has a childlike nature or he has not. To be deliberately childlike (*gewollte Kindlichkeit*) is the most unchildlike parody" (page 133).

4. That the summing up of the Law into love to God and one's neighbor is not directly eschatological is acknowledged by Weiss, but he points out at the same time that the Gospel tradition itself does not claim this as a point at issue between our Lord and the teaching of the Scribes (page 137). I must also draw attention to his excellent remarks on "Render unto Caesar," though I

can hardly imagine that the interpretation which Weiss rejects has often been seriously taught (page 125).

5. However this may be, in dealing with Lk. 14 26 Weiss has to touch a problem which is serious for all modern Christians in all countries. "Among the things which may hinder a man from coming into the Kingdom of God, Jesus included the ties of family life. On this subject we find some of His most uncompromising and to us least sympathetic utterances" (page 142). It would take too long to quote Weiss's remarks in full upon this most important topic. But it is clear how much better an account the thoroughgoing eschatologist can give of the command to forsake home and parents and children, than can be done by one who has to turn the ethics of our Gospels into rules for a permanent and evolutionist civilization. "These heroic words [about hating one's father and mother and one's own life] can only be understood from the point of view that all things of this world, however high and divine they may be in themselves, have lost their value now that the world itself is perishing and the Judgment is imminent" (page 143).

6. I conclude with a longer quotation: "We must seriously consider whether the Messianic and Eschatological elements were really only a temporary and unessential factor in the preaching of Jesus, which does not affect its kernel. Did He take up the work of the Baptist in order presently to follow His own path, or was He really the inaugurator of a Messianic movement? Was His preaching of the Kingdom of God only the accidental form into which He pours as into old bottles the new wine of another vintage, or was He seriously in earnest when He announces the Kingdom of God as a new epoch in the world? Was He only an ethical and religious reformer, who accepted the part of Prophet and Messiah only as an accommodation, or

was He really convinced that He was standing at the decisive parting of the ages and that He had been chosen by God to be the bearer of salvation? The answer to these questions will be given by the whole of this investigation of ours. But at least we can say this beforehand, that our best and oldest tradition declares over and over again that Jesus understood the movement which He initiated to be Messianic in the fullest sense of the word, and that He held Himself to be the Chosen of God, the One who was more than a Prophet. Simply to set all this mass of tradition aside, or to interpret it as we please by getting rid of all that is Messianic, is a highly arbitrary proceeding, which is not to be excused merely because it cannot be plausibly attempted without ingenuity and a thorough acquaintance with the sources" (pages 64, 65).

Once more, let me express my gratitude to Johannes Weiss. His name will not be forgotten by students of the rise of Christianity, either in Britain or in Germany.

THE PERMANENT SIGNIFICANCE OF MIRACLE FOR RELIGION

THE DUDLEIAN LECTURE FOR 1915 AT HARVARD
UNIVERSITY

WILLIAM ADAMS BROWN

UNION THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY, NEW YORK

A few days ago, meeting one of my scientific friends, I happened to mention the fact that I was going to Harvard to deliver the Duddleian Lecture, and that I had chosen as my subject "The Permanent Significance of Miracle for Religion." "It is a good subject," he said, "but you have left out the most important word. It ought to read 'The Lack of Permanent Significance of Miracle for Religion.'"

The remark reflects a mood which was more common twenty-five years ago than today. It was the age of triumphant science. On all sides men had banded themselves together to subdue the exceptional and the unforeseen, and to organize the territory which had hitherto been abandoned to chance or unreason under the all-embracing generalizations of the schools. Law was a word to conjure with. It not only commanded the reason; it fired the emotion. Men stood under the spell and glamour of the great magician whose wonder-working wand had unlocked so many doors. In view of the achievements of the past no obstacle seemed adamant, no secret impenetrable.

To men of this temper miracle had little interest. It was a synonym for all that was superstitious and out of date. The man who attempted to defend miracle stamped himself at once as an advocate of outworn

dogma—a Canute committed to the hopeless task of bidding the tide stand still. It was not so much that his hearers did not believe in miracles, though that was true of large circles of intelligent persons, as that they were no longer interested in them. They looked upon them as belonging to a past generation, without significance for men whose faces, like their own, were turned toward the future.

A change has come over the spirit of our dream. The confidence, so much in evidence among the scientists of the last generation, is less noticeable today. We are still bent on our task of conquest, but we realize better than we did how vast is the territory to be subdued. We are more modest than we were; readier to confess that the exceptional dies hard, and that there are elements which enter into the explanation of even the simplest things of which we are not yet—of which indeed we may perhaps never become—masters. And with this insight our mood has changed. The phenomena that explain the miracle-faith have reasserted their claim upon our attention. Our men of science no longer think it beneath their dignity to tell or to listen to ghost stories, and the records of visions, voices, prophecies, mediums, appearances from the dead, fill ponderous tomes over which professors, philosophers, and statesmen burn the midnight oil.

Nor is it merely that we have grown more catholic in our attitude toward the facts to be studied. A change is apparent in the philosophy from which we approach them. We are not so sure as we were that law is a term big enough to include the final fact about the universe. We have a shrewd suspicion that we have been carrying our simplification too far. Pluralism—but yesterday a hopelessly discredited—one might almost say, a pre-historic philosophy—now numbers the most respectable among its adherents. Professor William James has a

good word to speak for chance. He sees no ground for believing that contingency will ever be banished from the universe, and when pressed with the charge that this is to throw up the sponge and admit that after all miracles do happen he cannot, nor indeed does he greatly desire to, deny it.¹ In choice we ourselves initiate new lines of development, alter existing situations, determine the future according to our will. Why then should we deny a like power to God?

This change of mood finds systematic expression in Bergson. He is the philosopher of the unexpected; his fundamental dogma, the fact that the future cannot be predicted from the past. This is a world in which new things are coming to pass. Evolution is the law of life; but evolution is essentially creative. It is the forward push of energies as yet unrealized into a future that is unforeseen. Far from science having the right to speak the last word about the constitution of the universe, it is only our abstraction from a far more immediate and indescribable experience. It is through intuition, not reason, that we come closest to the nature of things, and for intuition, the novel and the inexplicable is the most frequent and familiar of experiences.

The effects of this changed attitude are reflected in contemporary theology. Whereas in the past the proof of miracle was the great task of apologetic, and to its accomplishment all the energies of theological science were marshalled, today it is passed over lightly as relatively unimportant. But this does not mean that the conception of miracle has been abandoned. On the contrary, it has been extended to cover phases of experience not included in the older discussions. Bushnell's thesis that miracle is a permanent constituent of the universe is widely accepted. To Ritschl miracle

¹ *The Will to Believe*, p. 182, cf. p. 175.

is a recurring experience. "Every one," he tells us, "will meet the miraculous in his own experience, and, in view of this, it is entirely unnecessary to stumble at the miracles which others have experienced" (*Instruction*, I, 17, note 3).

Such being the situation, I have been led to wonder whether the time were not ripe for a fresh discussion of the whole question of miracle. A generation ago men were arguing that miracles were impossible. Today we are told that all life is miraculous. Is it not worth while to ask ourselves how we can account for so radical a divergence of opinion? May there not be some fresh viewpoint from which to approach the problem, which will shed light on what would otherwise be an insoluble riddle?

Such, at least, is the question which I propose for our consideration. My theme is the permanent significance of miracle for religion. We shall ask ourselves first how men have come to believe in miracle at all; secondly, what issue is at stake in the belief; thirdly, what place it is likely to hold in the religion of the future.

Observe the form of the question. It is not metaphysical, but psychological. We shall not ask whether miracles happen, but why men believe that they happen, and what consequences for good or for evil follow from this belief. I do not mean that the former question is unimportant. On the contrary, I believe that it is highly important, but only that it is not first in order. We theorize because we have first experienced, and it is this preliminary inquiry as to the experience which accounts for the miracle-belief—an inquiry which, as I shall hope to show before I am through, is not without its bearing on the larger question—to which I invite you today.

I

At the outset a definition is in order. By miracle, for the purpose of the present discussion, we shall understand an exceptional event, or quality in an event, in nature or in human life, the significance of which religious faith finds in the self-revealing activity of Deity. It is a strange fact with a divine meaning—a luminous surprise.

This definition may be criticised from two different points of view. It may be criticised either as too narrow or as too broad. The anthropologist will criticise it as too narrow. He will object to the restriction of the term, miracle, to acts which have a religious meaning. By miracle, as he understands it, is meant any act of a spirit, whether good or bad, meaning or unmeaning. It is a part of the primitive world-view which peoples the universe with a host of wonder-working spirits and attributes to their activity whatever it cannot understand. Of this wider field of the miraculous, miracle in the religious sense is only one among many examples.

The metaphysician, on the other hand, will find fault with our definition because it is too broad. A miracle, as he understands it, is an event inexplicable by natural law. It is not coextensive with the religious experience, but a name we give to a certain part of it, or, better still, to an explanation which theologians have given to a certain part of it. Miracle, in the metaphysical sense of the term, is an event which transcends reason, something which science is unable to bring under law.

We shall have occasion in the course of our discussion to refer to both these conceptions and to show their relation to the special subject of our study. But our present interest is a different one. We wish to understand the significance of miracle for religion, and it is fitting therefore that we should emphasize in our definition the

characteristics which bring this significance to expression. These characteristics are two: In the first place, a sense of surprise—the believer is conscious of the presence of a reality which defies rational explanation. In the second place, a sense of meaning—he discovers in this reality some reference of practical significance for his life. This combination of awe and enlightenment is common to the earliest and the latest believer in miracle, and, in spite of all intellectual differences, makes them kindred spirits.

If it be objected that this use of the term is misleading in that it is open to confusion with the other meanings to which reference has been made, the answer is that the difficulty is inevitable in the case of any word which has gathered associations in the course of history. Words are not rigid things condemned from their birth to a single meaning. They may have many connotations, all alike legitimate. Words stand for emotions as well as ideas. They record experiences as well as express beliefs, and one must be careful that in his effort at intellectual clearness he does not obscure those more deep-seated connections of sentiment and interest in which the continuity of life is found.

Such a continuity of experience the word, miracle, recalls. It expresses the fact that in religion man believes himself to be in communication with an unseen Spirit who deals with him directly in ways which admit of recognition. We shall use the term as a convenient phrase to include the sum total of these communications, real or imagined. To repeat our definition: by miracle, for the purpose of the present discussion, we shall understand an exceptional event or quality in an event in nature or in human life, the significance of which religious faith finds in the self-revealing activity of Deity.

Miracle in this sense is as old as religion and as universal. As far back as we can go we find men confronted

with strange phenomena and interpreting them as messages of the gods. Whatever impressed the imagination as extraordinary or unusual, whether in the larger arena of nature or in the narrower sphere of the individual life—the lightning, the earthquake, the pestilence, the meteor, a dream, a sickness, an accident, a recovery—was at least raw material for the miracle-faith. Every religion ancient enough to have a history has its wonder stories, its divine healings, its heavenly visitants. Christianity, bringing its own marvels, enters a field already tenanted. The chief difficulty of the missionary when he tells his converts of God's wonderful dealings with his people in the past is not the scepticism which disbelieves them, but the credulity which takes them as a matter of course.

Scarcely less striking than the antiquity of the belief is its persistence. It has outlived the passing of many philosophies; it has been killed many times, only to come to life again. Like every other practical conviction which has lasted long enough to make itself a place in history, its expression has been affected by the changing intellectual background. The view of the world held by the dogmatic theologians who formulated the traditional apologetic was not the same as that of the unreflective thinkers whose world was still inhabited by the spirits of brook and cloud and tree; and this in turn differs from that of modern pluralists like James or pragmatists like Ritschl. But outlasting all changes of philosophical theory, we find a recurring experience which is characterized by the union of qualities already described—the sense of wonder, and the sense of meaning—and which brings to the man who has it the conviction that in it God is dealing with him in some immediate and significant way. This conviction it is that we wish to trace to its source, in order that we may estimate its value.

II

Where then shall we look for the roots of so ancient and widespread a belief? This is our first question. What accounts for the origin of the miracle-faith and what explains its persistence?

To our surprise, we find that it has no single or simple answer. Miracle, in the religious sense in which we are studying it, has meant different things at different times and answered different needs for different people. In order to understand the genesis of the belief we have to analyze it into its elements and trace each to its source. Among these elements we find four which recur from age to age and manifest themselves with varying intensity: the sense of wonder, the consciousness of enlightenment, the experience of reinforcement, the longing for certainty.

And first, wonder. We have called miracle a strange fact with a meaning, a luminous surprise. Surprise is indeed the most obvious and the most persistent characteristic of the miracle-belief. We see something startling, arresting, attention-compelling; something that transcends our previous experience, that, think as we will, we cannot reduce to the level of the commonplace and the conventional; something therefore which we have either to dismiss altogether, as wholly unrelated to our present world of interests and activities, or else to approach from some different angle and assign some new and hitherto undreamed-of meaning. Take away the sense of surprise, relate the new experience to what has gone before, as one more example of a well-tried category, bring it, as we say, under law, and the quality which constitutes it miracle would disappear, as the morning star fades and at last is extinguished altogether before the incoming tide of dawn.

Clearly then a primary explanation of man's belief in miracle is to be found in the fact that he is a being capable of surprise, and that the world is full of things that surprise him. Could we exhaust our resources either of new things to be experienced or of new interest to bring to the experience of them, we should outgrow miracle. But so long as these last, its possibility at least is always present.

This explains the persistence of the miracle-belief, in spite of the growth of science. However fast knowledge grows, curiosity grows faster. It finds new material to feed on. Its centre of interest shifts. The things that surprised our ancestors no longer surprise us, or at least not for the same reason, and in the same way; but that is because we have found new things that seem to us more wonderful still. They lived in the immediate present, and each strange experience that came to them was something isolated and independent. When it thundered, a spirit was angry; when it lightened, he was throwing his spear. When they dreamed, they saw the vanished dead face to face and received first-hand messages from realms otherwise inaccessible. But to us contacts appear of which they little dreamed. These isolated occurrences have been shown by science to be parts of a system of occurrences that succeed one another in orderly and predictable fashion. Nature is to us no longer the home of independent and contending spirits. It is a system of forces and relations acting according to principles which we are able in part to catalogue, and believe we shall be able in the future to catalogue more exhaustively still. But for all that, the world is none the less wonderful to us and surprise has not been banished. It has only shifted its hiding-place. The strange thing to us is not so much the event itself as the setting in which it occurs, the consequences which follow from it, and above all the re-

action which it calls forth in the experience of the beholder.

This is what we meant by including in our definition of miracle not merely events but qualities of events. This points to the value-element which is always present in the miracle-belief. It is not simply the fact that something has happened which constitutes a miracle, but something that makes a particular kind of impression, namely, the impression of novelty and uniqueness. And this impression may be present quite as strongly in the case of events which belong to the natural series as of those which we have not yet been able to bring under law—a sunrise, for example, or a birth, or the look in a woman's eyes.

Take, for example, that old puzzle that has baffled scientists so long—the origin of life. Suppose we were able to solve it in the sense in which science understands solution. Suppose we should hit upon the combination of elements for which hitherto we have been searching in vain, whose union would enable us to make the transition from the inorganic to the organic. What should we have accomplished? From the point of view of our practical powers much, but from the point of view of our ultimate understanding nothing at all. How comes it that elements which in isolation remain helpless and inert, receive through contact the mysterious property we call life? What is the origin of the new thing that we experience, of which the scientist's formula is only the shorthand record? Suppose we could be there and see what happened with our own eyes when the contact was made, would it seem any less marvellous, any less inexplicable, any less fitted, in short, to call forth the emotions of wonder and awe which have been the parent of the miracle-faith in every age?

I have taken the simplest illustration. Your own thought can follow into all its ramifications the path

along which it points. When we have explained protoplasm we are only at the beginning of our task. There remain consciousness, species, personality, character, individuality in all its variations, and the endless combinations to which their contact one with another and with physical nature lead. There is history, with its drama of races and of nations; there is art; there is science; there is literature; there is religion—all challenging our interest and awaiting an explanation. Carry our science as far as we please, test and re-test our generalizations in the light of advancing knowledge and enlarging experience, and we need have no fear that we shall exhaust our capital of novelties or render surprise an obsolete attitude. So far as it grows out of our sense of wonder, the roots of the miracle-faith are with us still.

It is evident then that one root of the miracle-belief is the limitation of our knowledge. It is the fact that the things to be experienced so far exceed in number and in range the things that we have experienced in the past; that however much we may have discovered and however much we may have learned, there remains always the boundless sea of the undiscovered and the unexplored, from which new messengers are continually coming to rouse our curiosity and remind us of our ignorance.

But true as this is as far as it goes, it is not a complete statement. If the miracle-faith were no more than a reminder of our limitation, it would be the most depressing of experiences; whereas we know on the contrary that it exalts and inspires. I have spoken of wonder as if it were a confession of weakness. It would be quite as true to call it a prophecy of greatness. Wonder is a window opening upward. It is man's consciousness of kinship to a greater. You cannot surprise a stone—or for that matter (so far as we know) a jelly-fish. But man is always asking why. He is conscious of capacity for appreciating the greatest, and he is never satisfied in

the presence of an unexplained mystery. The unexpected is more than a disturbance. It is a challenge, and miracle is man's way of finding a meaning in what would otherwise be inexplicable.

This second characteristic also appears in our definition. I have called miracle a strange fact with a *meaning*, a *luminous* surprise. It is only when we fix our attention upon this enlightening quality that we appreciate its true significance.

Let us return for a moment in imagination to the pre-scientific conditions of which we were speaking a moment ago. Suppose ourselves wandering with one of our primitive ancestors through the primeval forest into which he had plunged in search of game. I have no doubt he would see and hear many things which seemed to him strange and wonderful, many things which he could not understand, but this would not constitute them miracle in the sense in which we are discussing it here. They would be at most raw material out of which miracle could be made.

But suddenly he stops and looks about him. He has heard some sound or seen some sight which to us is not more significant than the others but which carries to him some secret meaning. It arrests his attention, and, what is more significant, it affects his conduct. He decides that today is not a lucky day for hunting and turns his steps homeward. A miracle has happened, and he will be wise to heed the warning it was meant to give.

What is the difference between these two classes of strange events which constitutes one a miracle while the other is not? It is the introduction of the element of insight. The first is merely a wonder. He looks at it and passes on. The second is not simply a wonder, but a sign; a spirit has spoken and he has heard and understood.

This distinction is of fundamental importance for the whole question of miracle. It marks the dividing line between the scientific and the religious interest. The scientific man is interested in the cause of the event, the religious man in its meaning. When the scientist has shown that you cannot account for what has happened by natural law (or that you can, as the case may be), his interest is at an end. But the interest of the religious man is only beginning. What has this strange event to tell men which is significant for their life? What message does it bring from the gods?

This illustrates a point about the miracle-belief to which we have already had occasion to refer in another connection, namely, the shifting character of the objects with which it is associated. For primitive man the significant things are the things which happen outside of him—the sounds he hears, the sights he sees, the objects he encounters. With ripening experience and maturing judgment attention turns inward, and the earthquake and the fire are succeeded by the still small voice. Where outward events retain their significance as miraculous, it is because they are associated with some outstanding personality or occur in some unique historic setting. But for later as for earlier ages the world remains vocal, and unsuspected meanings disclose themselves to the man who is on the alert to catch the fleeting messages which are flashed to him across the encompassing night.

It is evident then that in order to explain miracle you must add to man's inherent disposition to ask questions his faith in the existence of some one who is able to answer them. The miracle-belief is a striking witness to man's persistent refusal to believe himself alone in the universe. It is one form—not the only one, but one of the oldest and the most familiar—of that teleological interpretation of life which finds the

ultimate cause of things in a rational will in some sense akin to our own.

But there is something to be added before our account is complete. We have spoken of the miracle-belief as having its roots in man's sense of wonder, and in his consciousness of enlightenment; but there is another factor still which needs to be taken into account which it is not so easy to define in a single word. Perhaps reinforcement comes as near as any other term to describing what I have in mind. In miracle man is conscious of some new accession of vitality and power. It is not simply that his questions have been answered, but that his resources have been enlarged. Some hidden spring of energy has been tapped; the marvel of creation has been repeated before his eyes.

It is here only that we reach the heart of the miracle-belief. Miracle is the way in which man confesses his faith in a God who can do things, and is doing them. The questions of religion are never theoretical merely. They spring from a practical interest. Conscious of a hundred needs, outward and inward—the need of healing, of comfort, of forgiveness, of renewal, of enfranchisement—man looks about him for some source of help adequate to his necessity. Is there, or is there not, some power that can meet this need, heal his sickness, assuage his sorrow, blot out his guilt, renew his vitality, lift him above the limitations of his environment, however leaden the weights that drag him down? Is God, or is He not, alive and free, able to meet present needs as well as the needs of the past, to act here and to act today? Miracle answers this question in the affirmative. It is the point at which God touches man directly in the present. It expresses the creative aspect of religion.

Here again we find wide differences in the form this creative energy is believed to take. When life is simple

and need largely physical, miracle is sought and is found without—in the rain that saves the harvest, in the pestilence that destroys the enemy, in healing for the body, or water smitten from the rock; but where the conscience awakes and man, convicted of sin, realizes that his worst foe and his most formidable dangers are within, the centre of interest shifts from the body to the soul. The miracles *par excellence* become regeneration and conversion, and the prayer in which the miracle-faith finds its most fitting expression is that of the Psalmist, "Create in me a clean heart, O God, and renew a right spirit within me."

With the rise of historic religions like Judaism and Christianity the miracle-faith takes on a new significance. It is no longer a matter of individual concern primarily, but of social interest. It expresses God's activity in history, and evidences His presence and control in those crises of the national life when great issues have to be faced and new steps taken of permanent significance for mankind. The miracles of Israel's history are associated with great national figures like Moses and Elijah, and those of Christianity cluster about the person of the founder, his birth, his baptism, his public ministry, his resurrection. So in the great climax which lies ahead, when human history shall reach its consummation and the Kingdom of God be ushered in, God will again intervene in direct activity and miracle will inaugurate the final advent of the Redeemer.

It is this wider social reference which explains the concentration of attention in the older apologetic upon the limited group of miracles recorded in the Bible to the exclusion of those continuing evidences of God's creative and renewing activity which are furnished by our daily experiences. It is not that these are less divine, or that they are less truly miraculous in the sense in which we have been using the term, but that they have a different

function in the divine economy. It is a great mistake to speak as though the Protestant confined God's supernatural activity to the past, while the Catholic admitted a continuing activity in the present. To Calvin and the Westminster divines regeneration was as truly an exercise of creative power as the raising of Christ from the dead. Both alike were inexplicable by natural law. The difference was that the first had significance primarily for the man who experienced it, whereas the second had a unique function in the life of the race. It was God's demonstration in terms that could not be successfully challenged of the messiahship of Jesus, and hence of his divine authority and sufficiency for the religion he came to establish.

This reference to the probative significance of the resurrection suggests the last of the four roots of the miracle-belief, namely, man's desire for certainty. Miracle, in the more developed form, at least, is not simply a wonderful event with a meaning in which God intervenes for man's reinforcement and enlightenment, but an event in which this divine activity is so patently manifest as to admit no possibility of doubt as to its author. As distinct from those flashes of insight which come and go, miracle has permanent evidential value. It brings us face to face with God in so direct and firsthand a fashion that there is no possibility of our being mistaken as to His identity.

This too is the expression of a continuing human interest. Later in its appearance than the other aspects of the miracle-belief to which we have referred, coming to full self-consciousness only after life's disillusioning experiences have banished the simple faith of childhood and installed in its room the spirit that questions, the desire for certainty remains as one of the most deep-seated and enduring of our human aspirations. Face to face with the insecurities of life—its unanswered questions, its haunting doubts—we long for some refuge from

which we cannot be dislodged, some guarantee that the end to which we have consecrated our lives is rooted in the eternal.

There are many forms which the quest for certainty has taken. Some men have sought certainty without, in the authority of infallible church or infallible teacher. Others have hoped to reach their goal by the path of reason, and turned to science for the finality they despaired of finding in church or Bible. And still others have looked inward, and in the intuitions of the soul discovered an inner fortress to which they could retire, confident that they could never be dislodged. In that indescribable experience, carrying within itself its own sanction, in which the artist finds his assurance of beauty, and the patriot his loyalty, and the man of the world his sense of honor, the saint has met his God. "Thou hast formed us for thyself, O God, and our soul is restless till it finds its rest in Thee." In these often quoted words, typical of the mystic's experience in every age, Augustine points us to what is at once the most direct, the most accessible, and the most successful of all the paths to certainty.

Of this mystical intuition of God the miracle-faith in its historic Christian form is one of the most notable examples. It is not only in the closet that man has met God face to face, but on the wider stage of nature and of history. In great institutions like the Catholic Church, reaching back into the remote past and claiming worldwide authority; in great classics, like the Bible, bringing to an age grown careless or inert the consciousness of an undying responsibility and an immortal hope; in great events like those commemorated by Christmas and Easter, marking an epoch in the life of mankind and the source of continuing inspiration for future generations; in great personalities like the founder of the Christian religion, speaking as never man spake, and winging his

words past all the barriers of convention and tradition to the inner citadel of the conscience and the will—in these and such as these God has evidenced His presence in the movement of history, and brought to doubting and unstable spirits the certainty and assurance of which they were in quest.

This mystical element in the miracle-belief is obscured by the traditional definition with its emphasis upon the relation of miracle to natural law. The difficulty with this definition is not that it emphasizes the immediacy of the divine activity in miracle, but that it shifts the grounds of our certainty from intuition to logic and so sets the apologist an impossible task. Nature is not an independent power over against God which acts as a cause among causes. It is only our name for certain observed sequences in the order of phenomena. To prove that an event is a miracle in the sense in which the old apologetic claimed to prove it, it would be necessary not merely to show that it had not been possible to assign it its place in any observed sequence, but that it never would be possible to do so in the future, which manifestly cannot be done. It was inevitable that science should accept the challenge thus given and answer the claim of religion to have demonstrated its miracles with a “not proven.”

But such a method altogether misconceives the real ground of the religious man's belief in miracle. It is not that he can prove of some particular event that it can never be brought under law—a proof which in the nature of the case involves an appeal to the future which precludes present certainty—but that he has had an experience which irresistibly suggests the thought of God. Somewhere in this world of chance and change he has discovered God at work and recognized His handi-craft. Now the assurance comes to him through the impression of power, as in great natural cataclysms

like the earthquake or the tornado; now through the impression of mystery, as in those creative processes which bring us face to face with the wonder-worker we call life; and again in some inner quality, no less inexorable because gentle and gracious in its appeal, such as the love which melts us when we contemplate the cross of Christ, or the joy that thrills us in his invitation to a share in his kingly task of service. But whatever the nature of the appeal, it is always grounded in some antecedent conception of the divine, and as such carries with it its own certainty.

It is clear that if this be a correct account of the genesis of the miracle-belief, there can be no such thing as a final proof of miracle. The experience by which it is justified is a recurring experience. It repeats itself over and over again in the life of the individual, as he faces the old fact in the light of his new environment. It repeats itself over and over again on a larger scale in the life of the race, as the impression of the individual in his solitude is confirmed by the new experiences of those who succeed him.

No one knew this better than the old theologians. They were not so simple as to suppose that you could demonstrate God by logic. Unique as the Bible might be, separate from all other books in the manner of its composition, one could be assured of this fact only because of an immediate witness of the Spirit, bearing witness with his heart here and now that it was the word of God. And Christ might be separated from all his brethren in birth, endowment, and resurrection, and yet his deity could be proved to others only as they experienced for themselves the regenerating and enfranchising influence of his Spirit. In this sense it is true, as has often been said, that it takes a miracle to prove a miracle, and the final proof of the right of the great miracles to hold their central place on the stage

of history is the fact that they have been and continue still to be the parents of an innumerable progeny.

These then are the four roots of the miracle-faith: the sense of wonder, the consciousness of enlightenment, the experience of reinforcement, the longing for certainty; and as long as events occur which arouse this sense, produce this consciousness, induce this experience, and satisfy this longing, we must expect to find men believing in miracles.

III

We have considered the origin of the miracle-belief, we have analyzed the elements which enter into it. We are ready now to sum up the conclusions to which our study seems to point. What may we gather from our analysis of the psychology of miracle as to the place which it is likely to hold in the religious faith of the future? Is miracle something that we shall outgrow and leave behind, or must we give it a permanent place in our definition of religion?

It is clear that our study points to the latter conclusion. Miracle belongs to religion because it belongs to experience. It is the expression in religion of that creative aspect of things which meets us wherever we touch life, and most clearly of all in personality. The evidence for miracle is the same as that which leads us to believe in personality in any form, whether in ourselves, in others, or in the great unseen Spirit at the heart of things, whose nature we are constrained to believe is in some true sense akin to ours. So long as we believe in persons anywhere or for any reason, we shall continue to believe in miracle, for by a person we mean essentially a miracle-worker. Personality means initiative, enterprise, but at the same time interpretation and fellowship. A person is a being who is able not simply to

bring new things to pass, but at the same time to make the new he does or inspires the bond that links him to some kindred spirit. And the contact that unites these two poles of the life of spirit and fuses them into a single experience is miracle.

So stated, miracle is a part of the larger question of theism, and in the last analysis stands or falls with it. If you could disprove the existence of a personal God, you would disprove miracle. So long as faith in such a God exists miracle will remain, for miracle is the way in which the personal God communicates His will to man.

But if miracle is thus a correlate of our conception of personality, it is evident that our theory of miracle will be affected by whatever modifies our conception of personality. Where we emphasize initiative at the expense of interpretation, we shall magnify the arbitrary element in miracle; where fellowship seems to us most important, we shall lay chief stress on meaning.

This changing emphasis appears clearly in the history of the miracle-belief and explains much that would otherwise be perplexing. It explains, for example, why the miracles of the savage seem to us such isolated and unmeaning phenomena. The reason is that he had not yet realized the social significance of personality. Initiative was his test of greatness; fellowship was as yet an undiscovered art. A Peruvian king is reported to have said of the sun that he could not be a god, because if he were, he would not repeat the same course day after day. The remark is eminently characteristic. To primitive psychology arbitrary power appears inherently excellent, and the stranger and the more unusual a thing is, the more it contradicts convention and defies public opinion, the more divine it seems. Consistency may be a virtue for the subject, but inconsistency is the glory of the sovereign. To do as you please without giving a reason is the supreme prerogative of Deity.

Again, the connection of miracle with personality enables us to see what was the original contribution of Christianity to the miracle-faith. This was not so much the assurance that God was able to work miracles, as a new insight into the character of the miracle-worker. When Jesus refused the Jews' demand for a sign and concentrated attention upon his preaching as the true evidence of his messiahship, he shifted the basis of faith from the unmoral to the moral; and the reason was that he had come to believe in a God who was Father as well as sovereign, and so needed for His full self-expression other language than that of power.

Once more, it is the inconsistency in their conception of personality which explains why the older theologians emphasize the arbitrary aspect of miracle even after they have come to perceive its social significance. They realize as the savage could not the moral values of the soul. They have learned from Jesus to believe in justice and mercy and brotherly love, but they have not yet outgrown the older belief that power pure and simple is the supreme mark of greatness, and the final test of right. "God made you," says Calvin. "Why then criticise him? Shall the creature pass judgment on the Creator?" So they put the two side by side, consistency and inconsistency; justice with its laws on which you can count, and grace which knows no law but the divine good pleasure. On the one side, nature with its uniformity; on the other the supernatural which no man can predict. Both are expressions of personality, both are alike divine; but the supernatural—and this is the characteristic thing—seems somehow more divine than the natural.

It is here that our difficulty with the older treatment of miracle begins. It is not an intellectual but a moral difficulty. It is not that we believe that the occurrence of arbitrary acts is impossible, but that they would not mean to us what they meant to Calvin even if their

occurrence could be proved. To us consistency is the highest virtue for a moral being; and the greater a person is, the more consistent we should expect him to be. We do not overlook the transcendence of God and expect to banish mystery from his dealings with man. On the contrary, the more our knowledge grows, the more we are convinced of our littleness and limitation. But we believe that in the measure that God reveals Himself, the mystery is diminished and we are admitted into an understanding of his purpose.

It is clear then that if we are to retain the conception of miracle, we must extend it more widely than was done in the traditional apologetic. It is not simply a question of proving that at certain rare intervals of time God intervenes in the world for man's salvation, but of recovering again for the consciousness of our time faith in a living God actively at work in our world for the realization of moral ends. The division of territory which underlay the older treatment of the supernatural is no longer possible for us. We recognize the interests which explain it, but we feel that they must find their gratification in a different way. Our world is a universe—at least, our Ideal for the world is a universe—and all that it contains must somehow fall into place as parts of a single consistent system.

Holding this ideal, two possible attitudes are open to us corresponding to two different philosophies of life. According to one of these, there can be no room in the world for miracle because there is nothing in experience which cannot in the last analysis be reduced to the terms of mathematical science. The appearances to the contrary are deceptive appearances. This is true even of those experiences of choice on which man has based his consciousness of freedom. Inexplicable as these seem by their antecedents, they are in reality no exception to the universal law of necessity. To those who take this

view, the ethical interest which leads us to pick and choose, to prefer and reject, to desire and to value, to approve and disapprove, in short, to make our world what we would have it, is not the mark of strength but of weakness. The truly wise man is the contemplative sage whose thought rises above the contingencies in which most men's lives are lived, to those unchanging principles which are equally valid in every possible world.

But for most of us such a solution of life's problems is profoundly unsatisfying. We cannot be content to be mere onlookers at the drama of the universe, nor do we believe we were meant to be. We are conscious of energies that impel us to activity, and of ideals that set the goal to which our effort shall be directed. We measure our past by our future, and it seems to us that we have moved forward in the direction toward which we wish to go. And what we believe of ourselves we believe to be true *a fortiori* of the unseen actor who has fashioned star and sun and sea, whose footsteps we can trace in history, and whose voice we hear speaking in the silence of the soul. He too is working toward an end, as we are; and He too, measuring the present by the past, notes progress in the accomplishment of His plan. As we find in our own experience no inconsistency between law and freedom; as we too, using materials given to us according to principles we cannot change, are yet able to bring new things to pass and glory in our creation, so with God. And the forward steps in His onward march, the stages in that creative evolution which is the law of the divine life, are what religion knows as miracle.

There is room then for a new treatment of the whole question of miracle which shall restore it to its place in the theistic argument in a form which is consistent with the principles which govern the rest of our intellectual life; a treatment which shall emphasize the creative aspect of religion, its venturesomeness and originality, without

losing the steadying influence which has come to us through the discovery of law—above all, a treatment which shall make Jesus' ideal of character its supreme standard of value and put the final test of certainty where he put it: for the individual in the appeal of the Christ-like God to the spirit of man His child, and for society in the new impulse given and contribution made to that forward movement of the race whose aim is common service inspired by common love.

THE FUNCTION OF THE EDUCATED AND OF THE UNEDUCATED MINISTRY

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In one sense of the word there is of course no place in the ministry for the uneducated man. The preacher who is so ignorant as to be illiterate—illiterate in that he does not read and study and observe—is not to be thought of as a candidate for the ministry. If, on the other hand, we think of the educated minister as the student who has been graduated from college and from theological seminary, we rather narrowly limit our definition of education. Many men of unusual success in the ministry have preferred to take graduate work along certain specific lines rather than to pursue the course in the seminary. In this they may have been mistaken, but of course they belong by pre-eminent right in the ranks of the educated. Moreover, the fact of actually receiving a degree is not the chief essential. Perhaps for our purpose we may define the educated minister as one who has in a reputable college, university, or seminary mastered the point of view of the scholar, attained some success in the use of scholarly methods, and acquired scholarly habits. For our purpose the uneducated minister is one who has not received his training at such an institution. We assume, however, in our use of the word “uneducated” that the minister has studious habits, and that he does the best he can to make good by incessant effort the lack of early institutional training; otherwise we can hardly see what place he has in the ministry. We may be permitted further to

drop from our consideration both the occasional pulpit "genius," who comes to popular power without formal mental training, and also that bearer of scholastic degrees who is remarkable chiefly for his dulness.

That in the discussion of the theme before us we are dealing with a real problem is obvious. The idea for which we stand and for which we must stand is that the minister should be graduated from college and from theological seminary. As a matter of fact, however, good pulpits in every denomination are filled by men whose technical educational training has been of the slightest, frontier communities are served by preachers who have never been near college, and important Christian bodies like the Church of England are pleading for a greater place for lay preaching. If all the theological schools now in the United States were to be crowded to their utmost capacity, they could not fill with their graduates all the pulpits becoming vacant year by year in the United States. In addition, there is more and more of a conviction that there will always be a place for some preachers who are not in the strict institutional sense educated. The present writer feels that with the abundant collegiate opportunities today only the rarest circumstances should justify the reception of a man into the ministry who is not at least a college graduate; but he faces the fact that there are many who insist that some of the most effective preaching has been done, for example, by laymen whose only training has been in the business career.

We may best approach our theme by considering some phrases in which the common-sense of men has marked out a line between the educated and the uneducated. Some familiar expressions draw the line between the functions of the technically educated and those of the uneducated for human activities in general. It may be that the examination of these phrases will throw light upon the problem before us.

First of all, we have in common speech a distinction between the expert in a particular field and the layman in that field. We hear constantly about reliance upon the expert, and we hear with equal frequency of the need of balancing the skilled knowledge of the expert with the good sense and poise of the ordinary layman. In his very suggestive book on *Public Opinion and Popular Government* President Lowell discusses the spheres of the expert and of the layman in governmental activities. There are some spheres that manifestly belong to the expert. It would be folly for the layman to try to pass upon the merits of a system of water supply, or upon a scheme of municipal sanitation, or upon a bill for the regulation of currency issues. But there are positions of great importance in public life which are better filled by men who are not specialists or who are more than specialists. President Lowell enumerates as the qualities desirable in those who are to occupy public positions which do not call for expert knowledge, quickness of apprehension, breadth of sympathy, and soundness of judgment.

In this distinction between the expert and the man of more general knowledge we have a suggestion of some importance for the question before us. In those phases of ministerial effort which require expert knowledge it is hard to see how we can get along without the aid of the theological school. In the phases which require quickness of apprehension, width of sympathy, and soundness of judgment the formal education may not be so complete. Today we require more of a minister than that he shall be a good preacher or teacher. He must be, as we say, a man among men. There is in one of the Colorado mining camps today a minister who has had more influence upon the miners during the recent months of coal strike than perhaps any other minister in Colorado. He has been better able to hold the miners back from

violence than any other man in the fields. Yet this man has had very little formal education. In his earlier years he was a machinist in Scotland and he has passed all his life since among the day-laborers. He is able to see the meaning of a situation quickly, can sympathize with both employers and employed, and very rarely makes even a slight mistake in judgment. While this particular preacher might not make a very good technical showing before an examining board of a theological seminary, he is simply invaluable in his present position. In reality he is an educated man. Out of a salary of seven hundred dollars he buys and reads such books as Dewey's *How We Think*, Dods' *The Bible; Its Nature and Origin*, Rauschenbusch's *Christianity and the Social Crisis*, Peabody's *Jesus Christ and the Social Question*. It is true that these books are in the course of study prescribed for him by the ministerial organization to which he belongs, but he pursues the studies with such eagerness and success as to pass a good examination in the books.

The lack of at least some measure of expert knowledge becomes most apparent when the untrained men begin to discourse on themes which involve the modern methods of Biblical study. With the attacks on such methods by the untrained men we are all familiar, but the advocacy of the methods and the attempted use of them by untrained men is almost as distressing. It is quite significant that a large part of the reckless and foolish utterances concerning modern Biblical study comes from students of theological seminaries where the critical problems are not frankly faced and thought through, or from men who have tried to work their way through these problems by themselves. The student trained in a school where the modern methods are fully and freely taught is apt to be the true conservative when he gets out to his work. For one thing, he is more apt to see the actual scope of the

critical method and to preserve the correct emphasis. And it is rather a dangerous exercise for the minister to try to master modern methods by himself. He may lose all sense of perspective. In nothing is a theological education more valuable than in the correction of the critical temper by the community-spirit in the school. It is a fair question as to whether a man ought to try to do much with critical methods except in a decidedly human atmosphere which is lit by at least an occasional ray of humor. The writer of this article recalls a young man who went from an Eastern college of high grade into the pastorate of a church without having studied the higher criticism for an hour. It was back in the days when Goldwin Smith was saying that the Old Testament is the millstone about Christianity's neck. In conversation with the writer the young minister announced that as a result of his studies he had concluded that Christianity must strike the Old Testament from the Scriptures altogether! A course in the Old Testament under an expert would not necessarily have made an expert of this particular student, but it would have saved him from some excesses which have marred an otherwise excellent ministry.

It is well known that the great State universities of the Middle West cannot in harmony with their character as parts of the public educational system take direct hold of the problem of religious instruction. It was the custom for many years to leave the religious instruction in these schools largely to the Young Men's Christian Association secretaries. These were for the most part young college graduates with no particular training in theological thinking. They were, with marvellously few exceptions, splendid men who exerted great influence on the life of those with whom they came in touch. The wholesomeness of their character was and is contagious. The Y. M. C. A. college secretary is very

likely to have all the qualities which President Lowell enumerated as making for the strength of the man who is serviceable to the community by his general intelligence,—quickness of apprehension, width of sympathy, and soundness of judgment. One of the ways the secretary showed this soundness of judgment was in calling in the help of someone else when dealing with students perplexed by the teachings in biology and history and social science—the students, for example, trying to harmonize the child's view of the Bible which they brought with them to college with the man's view of everything else which their studies were giving them. But the secretary could not always be calling on someone outside for help; so that the churches have been more and more placing college pastors with the best technical training at the seats of the State universities. These fields, which, by the way, are among the most promising before American Protestantism, are being cultivated today with a sound understanding of the difference in the function of the man of general aptitudes and of the expert, with an increasingly wise use of each type and with an unusually large measure of success.

We would not have it imagined that this line drawn between expert and lay can always be drawn between the formally educated and those whose education has not been institutional. In some fields the expert knowledge can be gained only by actual experience. Some spheres of practical church activity are so new that the theological schools have not until very recently been able to offer systematic courses covering such activities. The writer happens to be connected with the Methodist Episcopal Church. The best two churches to his knowledge in that denomination so far as general community influence is concerned—churches that enter as positive factors into educational, industrial, and civic affairs in addition to what are more technically thought of as religious

activities—are both presided over by ministers who did not complete a seminary course. One of these ministers was graduated from college and went to his field after one year in the seminary. The other was graduated from college and took elaborate courses in post-graduate social science in a university. In their student days nothing was offered in theological schools which would have dealt with the questions which they have been so successful in solving. On the other hand, we do not mean that quickness of apprehension, width of sympathy, and soundness of judgment are the sole property of men who have been self-educated. It would be hard to find a definition of the aim of college education which would be more apt than that of increasing quickness of apprehension, width of sympathy, and soundness of judgment. All that we mean is that these qualities are more likely to be obtained by self-instruction and by large experience in the world than is specialized expert knowledge in a particular field. It will be recalled that so high an authority as President Eliot gave it as his belief that the faithful and considerate reading of a certain set of books, a set which could be contained in a five-foot shelf, would give any man the essentials of a liberal education. But the reading of a five-foot shelf of books might not make a man an expert in any direction.

A second line of division drawn in popular speech between forms of activity which require differing degrees of academic training is that between the extensive and the intensive. The expression has become current through the present day movement toward better farming methods. As the land of the nation has become more and more densely populated there has arisen an increased demand that we get more from the land than ever before. So that the young man who once would have gone West "to take up land," now goes to the agri-

cultural department of the university to find how to produce more from the land which he already holds. The distinction between extensive and intensive is of value at least in suggestiveness in many fields besides agriculture.

There are some preachers of large popular qualities—using the word “popular” in the very best sense—whose education has been of the most general character. Such men have ordinarily been wide readers, have moved among all classes of persons, and have developed the power to discern the mind of the masses with a certainty amounting almost to intuition. They are popular not necessarily in the sense of pleasing the people but in the sense of understanding the people and of interpreting the people to themselves. They meet Gladstone’s definition of an orator in that they send back upon their hearers in shower what they take from their hearers in cloud. Now this may be, very often is, most powerful preaching. The denomination suffers which has not some such men. But the preaching belongs to what we might call the extensive type. It is adapted to large audiences, and no large audience remains the same for any length of time. Such men impress immense numbers in the course of a year and impress them for good. But there is apt to be a sameness about the preaching. One sitting under the ministry of such a preacher year in and year out might miss a certain instructional quality in the message. The hearer might feel that vast human aspirations and longings and struggles were being focussed in the preaching week by week to his marked spiritual profit, but he might not hear much that would specifically touch upon particular difficulties on which he would crave light. But we need these capacious pulpit channels of human interest and feeling and thought wherever we can find them. As long as they point toward the loftiest and best we must keep them open by every encouragement

in our power. We must judge such ministers by their success in helping the multitudes, and not put on any airs of superiority toward them if they do not set as much store by formal training as we would like to have done by the accredited prophets of the church.

But there is another type of prophet—the man who after prolonged study and reflection and musing instructs his people in the truth of the kingdom. This prophet does not minister to such crowds as does the other, but his influence—if not on his immediate day then on the day to come—is even more potent than that of his more conspicuous brother. This minister's spirit of self-sacrifice shows itself in the extent to which he is willing to give himself to patient search for truth. His audiences may be comparatively small; they may consist through the years of chiefly the same persons. In the long run, however, his influence reaches out to the multitudes and becomes part of their thinking, even though they are not aware of the source of the spiritual stream. It is not too much to say that there is slight chance of a man's becoming a prophet of this latter type without the advantage of the start given by good academic and professional training. The starting-place for the true advance in thinking is from the best which the student can receive in the schools of his day.

This distinction between extensive and intensive appears very clearly in the difference between evangelistic effort and Christian nurture. Every minister who achieves substantial results must be in some manner and in some degree evangelistic. The kingdom will make no advance if there is not evangelism. Evangelistic skill is rare, and seems not to be as dependent upon academic religious instruction as are some other forms of religious activity. The reason for this is often that the evangelist is a man of some striking religious experience. He has perhaps been a transgressor and has

found his way back to right living; or he is of that particular emotional temperament which is marked by crises. Now there are multitudes of persons in the world who are transgressors and multitudes who are of the constitution fitted to come to sharp inner crisis. What such persons need is just to hear the good news; and when an evangelist can tell forcefully the story of his own experience he will surely bring some others to like experience with his own. Here is a great field for lay preaching in our time. There are men who can tell from their own experience, without violating the religious proprieties or good taste, how to find the way into a new life. To say that there is no place for such preachers is to speak out of blindness. But not every one is fitted for such evangelistic appeal. Some ministers are of such temperament as not to have known a striking experience which compels the attention of men in its very telling. Some have never been outbreking transgressors. These preachers can speak persuasively to some about the entrance into the kingdom of God, but they are not equipped for attracting those to whom the popular evangelist makes his appeal.

But when the evangelist untrained in theological thinking begins to expound theology confusion is at the door. We speak often of the distinction between religion and theology, but we sometimes forget how closely the two are interwoven. The evangelist himself may hold a particular theory of Biblical inspiration or of atonement and may not discriminate between his theory and his experience. He is not an authority on theology as he is an authority on human repentance. In many regions of the country today an extreme form of premillenarianism is being taught by teachers who are admittedly successful as evangelists. Premillenarianism may be right or wrong, but it cannot be at present anything but a matter of speculative theology. It

surely is not possible for a preacher to speak with the same authority on premillenarianism as on the need of repentance.

We would not leave the impression that the untrained are to look upon evangelism as their particular field. The trained scholar may be even more successful in popular evangelism than the untrained preacher; but we do mean that if a preacher will stick close to life and experience, he can be a winner of men of certain temperamental types or of certain types of moral career without having been formally trained for the ministry. When we enter the sphere of Christian nurture, however, we require a different order of ability. Here we demand all possible light on different types of character and different methods of presenting the truth. As an instance, think how much of psychological data is being placed in the hands of the ministry today as an equipment for winning and holding lives for the Christian religion. The church has come to see that it is Christian duty to hold children fast from the beginning, so that devout scholars have studied the child-life as never before. Moreover, we have come to see that the growing life is most apt to fall away from the church at the period between sixteen and twenty years of age, and the teachers have worked out for the minister a careful set of conclusions as to adolescent psychology. Again, it is becoming manifest that middle life brings its peculiar temptations, and life at that period is being scientifically studied. Now this does not mean that men are to be saved by psychology, but psychology is the study of life, after all. It is hard to see how a conscientious minister, anxious to hold his parishioners for the kingdom of God, can afford to neglect any light upon human life which he can gain from any source whatever. But the difficulty is that the untrained man does not always know how to use rightly the instruments which modern scientific study places at his disposal.

In the pastoral activities there is an extensive work of great value. There is the minister who is somewhat of a hail-fellow-well-met, who meets an almost incredible number of persons in the course of a week and does them good with a hearty greeting. It will not be wise to minimize the importance of such pastoral attention. In some fields, especially in the larger cities, this minister's word of cheer is the only vitally human hail which many persons hear from the beginning of the week to the end. There is, however, a type of service which this man may never render—the work of deep spiritual counsel and of religious guidance through hard stresses. For this sort of service the more highly trained the minister the better. All that he knows and all that he can get from the best institutional influences of his time, all that he has learned in the severest study, will not be too much if he is to help human lives at some bitter crises. Happy the church that has for pastor a well-trained man who is willing to place his full ability at the service of the lives that need serious counsel in times of religious or other strain. Such pastors increase in power through the years. The only minister who stands large chance of being forceful through the long run is the thoroughly educated man. Almost any congregation will bear with shortcomings and inadequacies in a young man, for there is magnetic charm about youth. But after a while the charm of youth wears off, and the shortcomings seem intolerable. The only charm that endures in a minister is the charm of a cultivated spirit which brings all its wealth to bear in helpfulness toward human beings. Except in very rare instances the pastorates of the untrained preacher will be short. Denominations which have some system of centralized administration can carry him through a succession of short pastorates with success, but they can hardly expect from him the intensive work required in a long pastorate.

Still another suggestive distinction worked out into common phrase is that between work which is negative and that which is positive, or that which is destructive and that which is constructive. Some forms of negative and destructive work in every field are valuable. When we see the need of assault upon evils in the social sphere today we realize that there is a task of destructive character which almost every prophet is called upon to undertake. The attack upon industrial and political and social abuses is destructive work and yet is important. The ground must be cleared for the new building.

In this realm of social advance it would seem that we have a sphere where formal academic training does not always seem to be a requisite. True, the universities of our land today are not apt to be lacking in radicalism; but the most telling service in the attack upon evils is often rendered by men who have no wide knowledge beyond that of the distressing facts which they describe. Reform comes through public opinion. The power generated for reform is that of aroused public sentiment; but, public opinion being what it is, carefully balanced statements do not arouse the public mind as do the fiery invectives of the orator-agitator. We are speaking now of the way things are, not of how they ought to be. It does not require any especial skill to ring an alarm bell—and alarm bells are often needed. Now, better have these alarms rung by men whose earnestness is genuine, coming out of first-hand acquaintance with the evils, than to have the earnestness assumed by men who of set purpose omit all qualifications and modifications. We need in the pulpit today that boldness of speech which comes out of experience at first hand with the sufferings of those who are not getting half a chance under present social conditions. Such sufferers never will get their chance unless the prophets cry aloud as unsparingly as did the prophets of old.

A minister need not be a graduate of a seminary or college to see an evil and to call attention to it with vigor and directness. But even the task of destruction on a large scale demands thorough training. The soldier's work is destructive, and the individual soldier can fight furiously without academic training. All he absolutely needs beyond a downright fighting spirit is a knowledge of how to shoot. But in the higher realms of strategy only the educated leader can be depended upon. Only one or two soldiers came to positions of important general command in the American Civil War who had not been to West Point. The minister who expects to attain the largest effectiveness in the attack on social evils must have more than fighting spirit.

When we pass to the constructive aspect, of course any thought of success in social improvement without trained leadership is out of the question. It would be ridiculous if it were not so tragic to see groups of well-meaning ministerial enthusiasts for social reform come together to agree upon plans, and then show by their speech that they know nothing of the literature of such reform movements, nothing of the history of social progress, nothing of political economy or of the theory of the State. Let the minister call attention to social evils with all his power; but before he begins to offer advice as to how to deal positively, and constructively, let him take a few stiff courses in economics and the more serious social sciences, or let him read the solidier writers on such themes as trades-unionism and socialism. The result may be that his pulpit utterances on these themes will be few and well considered, and that he will exert his chief influence in these directions through organizations which try to deal with the details of social improvement in expert and intelligent fashion.

As a final distinction drawn in popular speech we would instance that between theology and religion, which is

the application to the sphere of religion of the distinction between theory and life. We have often heard of the persons who "love flowers but who care nothing for botany," and there is, of course, deep significance in the distinction. The supreme qualification for success in the ministry is spiritual life, and the life may have come to great power and fruitage without help from schools. We lay more and more stress upon the contagion of life itself, and we are willing to place any religious life in any position which will lead to the spread of the life. Light is not to be kept in a corner. The preacher must be of value, in the last analysis, because of what he is. We said at the beginning that there is no place in the ministry for the man who is uneducated in the sense that he is ignorant. But for the man whose education has been in the school of life and who in that life has come to profound knowledge of life on the religious side there is large place, especially if he have the gift of communicating himself.

But it is entirely possible so to draw the distinction between botany and flowers and between theology and religion as to suggest that botany and theology are not particularly worth while. Theology correctly understood is an instrument for the enrichment and deepening of religious life; and the fact that a man is trained in theological thinking ought not to imply that he is any the less abounding in religious life. The better the theology, the better the life—just as it is true that the better the religious life of a time, the better the theology. The man whose education has been chiefly in life itself must contribute to theology chiefly indirectly. He can create the type of life out of which the theology arises. But the task of shaping the theology in the best statements will quite likely continue to be in the future as it has been in the past the task of the trained thinker. We deplore the tendency in many quarters to minimize

the importance of theological thinking. It is true that the criticisms have for the most part been against that hard-and-fast dogmatism which took theology as an end in itself. That type has passed. But theological thinking ought not to be neglected, for it is a veritable means of grace and life. Even the botanists have improved on some types of flowers, and have helped mightily in teaching us to appreciate all types of flowers. There is room for the preacher who, as we say, knows life at first hand. There is room also for him who so works over the data which come out of life as to give us better control of life in the service of God and man.

In drawing this paper to a close it may be permissible to remark that it would be almost hopeless to try to find a preacher not academically trained who has not at one time or other expressed regret at his early lack of educational opportunity. For if education amounts to anything, it means that the educated man is more alive than he would have been without the education; and preaching in the end depends upon the abundance of the life of the preacher.

EVOLUTION AND THE OTHER WORLD¹

PAUL ELMER MORE

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What special students of so-called psychic phenomena will think of Mr. Henry Holt's two generous volumes I do not know, but to me, and no doubt to many like me, they are quite the most important and significant, as they are the most entertaining, exposition of the subject. This is indeed something more than a dead book; it is a life—as it were the voice of a friend confiding to us through the hours of a long winter night the lessons, still mingled with hesitations and questions, of his ripe experience. The publicity of high spirits may abound; but there are pages also which will reveal their full meaning only to those who know the author as a friend in the literal sense of the word, passages, for those who understand, of almost sacred privacy. So, for instance, the minute account of the spectacle unfolding at sunrise to the eyes of the watcher at the author's summer home has its place and weight for all readers as an argument that, as these lovely things are far beyond "our ancestors' universe of darkness and silence," so there may be infinite ranges of perception still to be discovered by mankind; but to one who has entered that hospitable "gate, open to all who care to come," and with the kindly guidance of his host has seen the sunlight falling from mountain top to valley and from valley to lake, the printed words will be something more than the speech of a book to its unseen audience. These

¹ On the Cosmic Relations, 2 vols. Henry Holt. Houghton Mifflin Co., 1914. Vol. I, pp. xii, 512. Vol. II, pp. 477. \$5.00.

matters I should like to dwell on for their pleasantness and their wisdom; but, like a bad talker, I must use all my time in contradiction. For I need not defer saying that Mr. Holt's work seems to me to consist of two elements strangely compounded. Besides the appealing sagacity of the man of the world, inquisitive, sceptical of dogma, tolerant of all things except impertinence, resting finally in balance and measure—besides this sagacity of experience to which I bow, there is also in the book a philosophy of a more formal sort, to which, from the deepest knowledge of my heart, I am bound to demur.

Mr. Holt is avowedly of the school of "Lyell, Darwin, Spencer, Huxley, and their friends," who swept away "the flood of associations on which the old faiths depended"; he is a Spencerian *à outrance*. Such a state of mind might be set down as merely belated; but Mr. Holt is anything rather than tardy in his views. My quarrel with him is because, while adhering to the letter of evolution in its strict mechanical form, he would open his mind to the flood of spiritual associations with no sense of the incongruity of such a position. I do not mean to imply that there is anything singular in this procedure, unless it be in the peculiar frankness and honesty of Mr. Holt's ideas. On the contrary, however individual some of his conclusions may appear, he has been borne onward on one of the great tides of the intellect. In the exaltation and lust of conquest that came with the Victorian demonstration of evolution, men's heads were a little turned, and whatever reservations they might make in deference to the Unknowable and the outlying realms of mystery, they were really and pugnaciously convinced that here was the word of truth which should silence the riddling questions of man's soul, as certainly as the Copernican system had led to the untangling of the orbits of the planets. The

comparison of Darwin or Spencer with Copernicus became in fact one of the commonplaces of the wise and the unwise.

But this assurance of science was bought at a terrible price. It meant that every appearance of spontaneity in the universe must be subdued to a law of inflexible regularity, and that the soul of man was held to be no more than a momentary centre of molecular force in the vast abyss of matter. Naturally, the imagination of endless space and of the infinite mechanism of time, when the first enthusiasm of assertion calmed down, seemed to the human spirit a chill substitute for its intuitions of independent existence. In many thoughtful minds it even awoke a kind of horror, and the supreme word of Spencer himself, the codicil, so to speak, to his evolutionary testament, is an ever memorable confession of that feeling:

“The thought of this blank form of existence which, explored in all directions as far as imagination can reach, has, beyond that, an unexplored region compared with which the part which imagination has traversed is but infinitesimal—the thought of a Space compared with which our immeasurable sidereal system dwindles to a point, is a thought too overwhelming to be dwelt upon. Of late years the consciousness that without origin or cause infinite Space has ever existed and must ever exist, produces in me a feeling from which I shrink.”

Now it is nothing to our purpose here to say that the notion of infinite space or of any cosmic mechanism is as purely a piece of self-engendering logic as was Anselm's or any other Schoolman's ontological proof of the being of God. The point is that the hearts of men are never very brave before the truth, or what they deem the truth, when their own deeper desires are thwarted. “The chief component of mind,” as Spencer observes, “is feeling,” and it is an “enormous error” to suppose that reason, whether right or wrong, will long endure

the attack of our emotions. And so the revulsion from the cruder dogmas of Victorian materialism has been swift and sure. In many ways, whether in open rebellion against science or ostentatiously under its banner, men have turned their eyes once more to

“that true world within the world we see,
Whereof our world is but the bounding shore”—

calling it “true,” perhaps, because faith is greater than perception.

Now, outrageous as such a statement may sound, I confess that the conversion of the professional student of science, as, for example, that of Sir Oliver Lodge, has little meaning for me; the very character of his work in investigation seems to have a restricting effect on his mind, so that his sense of the relative value of evidence in other than his own narrow field is likely to be feeble or distorted. But there is deep meaning in the fact that a wary man of the world, who has been imbued with the mechanical theorems of evolution, should yet find this philosophy inadequate to his inner life, and should devote the dearly purchased leisure of his later years to the study of phenomena which, if genuine, must break asunder all the links of Huxley’s causal chain and shatter into bits the steadfast cosmic machine of Spencer. For what have cause or calculation to do there where Mr. Holt would take us, even “beyond the region of congruities”? If any one paragraph may be selected as giving the central motive of Mr. Holt’s book, it is, I take it, this:

“Certain it is that without an abiding consciousness that the known mass of phenomena is not all, and that behind them is a cause transcending our imaginations, life loses some of its best emotions, the imagination grows arid, and the moral impulses shrink. While what we know, and the increasing of it, can more than occupy all our working powers, they work all the better for an occasional dream of greater and less troubled things.”

These two bulky volumes, in fact, are essentially the confession of a strong inquisitive mind seeking, under compulsion, to reach some assurance in that "dream of greater and less troubled things." Mr. Holt is one of those who admit that wisdom has come to them by way of sudden conversion. The first warning fell when he was still a young man: "It came," he says, "with the blaze of light, but the light was from the natural sunset which, however, seemed that evening not confined to the far-off clouds, but to pervade the whole atmosphere and all other things, including me, and to be pervaded by energy and mind and sympathy." This, if I interpret his story correctly, was of the preliminary and general sort not unknown in conversions of the more orthodox kind, and needed to be fixed and directed by a later experience. He was turned finally to the new way by a figure and admonition, as he firmly believes, from the other world—an epiphany so dear that he can only hint at it in pious reticence. He had already seen a little of what the commoner sort of mediums can do in furniture-smashing and mind-reading, but now he who—I cannot forbear the gentle reproach—can find small time for Plato, is impelled to give year upon year to the forty-one volumes of the *Proceedings and Journal of the Society for Psychical Research*. It is not strange that, after this long confinement and the completion of his great work, his "desire to get back to the studies of our usual life is like the desire to get from the fog into the sunlight"; but to some of us his report from that realm of fog is strange indeed, passing strange.

A considerable part of his book consists of extracts from the publications of the S. P. R., supplemented by a few hitherto unprinted documents and furnished with a running comment. For the form in which this material is given us we are bound to be grateful. The selection includes matter of a later date than that in

the *Human Personality* of Mr. Frederic Myers, and is constructed in such a spirit of freedom and fairness as to justify the reader in feeling that he would gain little by wading through the enormous mass of the sources. Nor is Mr. Holt's tone repellently dogmatic. He admits that he himself is still groping in these obscure regions, and he does not hesitate to point out the paradoxical and often contradictory nature of the evidence. The rôle of fraud and collusion in the manifestations he does reject as insignificant and impertinent; and in this most of us are ready to follow him. No doubt there has been a vast amount of deliberate deception in the table-turning and other so-called mediumistic phenomena, but the residue of facts which cannot be accounted for by the ordinary faculties of man is large and presses for explanation. What shall we do with them?

Now a complete Spencerian, and indeed any one who marches under the exclusive flag of science, is bound to hold that these phenomena have their proper place in the scheme of evolution, and so Mr. Holt is at great pains to connect them with the development of man's perceptive powers. I have referred to his eloquent account of the joy of our larger contact with the visible world as compared with the dark and limited horizon of the amœba, from whom man is supposed to be descended. And so analogy suggests to him, as it has suggested to others, that our sensitiveness to "super-usual" phenomena is but the beginning of a new faculty, comparable to the spot on the tegument of the primitive organisms which reacted to a ray of light, and that in time this faculty will be trained to respond to the fulness of the spiritual world as the human eye has grown to embrace the wonders of material vision. The dimness and confusion of psychic perception now are due to our inexperience, and all our knowledge of evolution warrants the hope

that some day our children's children shall see with a wide-open inner eye, and shall be able *veras audire et reddere voces*.

Meanwhile all is not darkness. Beyond the incidents of telepathy and telekinesis, which many of the most sceptical of us are beginning to accept, there are those—not the sentimentalists of the old sort, but highly educated men and women—who believe that we already have abundant evidence of true communication with denizens of the other world. Mr. Holt wavers a little when he comes to theorize on these things, but at bottom his conviction is pretty firm that in some way, sometimes obscurely and deceptively, sometimes clearly and commandingly, the dead speak to us through what material mediums they can employ. The “subliminal self” he rejects as a meaningless fiction. In its place he assumes what he calls the Cosmic Soul—the great reservoir from which our mind or spirit emanates, gathers strength and personality by the discipline of life, and then in due time returns to its source, remaining at once a part of the whole and a separate individuality. I can best set forth his views of this delicate matter by quoting three short paragraphs from different parts of the book:

“... Indications of a consciousness aware of everything that is going on or has gone on, at least within the sphere of its activity, and which includes and reaches far outside of our activity and our knowledge. All individual consciousnesses seem to be, in some mysterious way, not only themselves, but part of that universal consciousness; for we get from it not only wondrous dream-images of all kinds, but mysterious impressions from individual consciousnesses other than our own, which with our own are part of it.”

“But though perhaps we flow back into this constantly increasing aggregate of mind—the Cosmic Soul—it seems much more obviously to flow into us, at times and in degrees that vary enormously, as we vary. Into the least sensitive or receptive it does not go perceptibly beyond the ordinary psychoses of daily life; into others it seems to penetrate in ways to which we hardly know how to assign limits.

Will it not presumably, as evolution goes on, flow more and more into all of us?"

"It looks too as if these possibilities might be the supreme justification for the evolution of the universe. There may be justification enough in birds and flowers, in the play of lambs and children, in sex, in love, in the maternity around which so much of the world's worship has centred, in knowledge, in wisdom, even as they have been ordinarily understood; but a new significance, a new joy, a new glory over and beyond them all sometimes seems to have been lately promised by that as yet dim conception of the Cosmic Soul."

In my small reading in this field I know of no other expression so clear and persuasive of the "dream of greater and less troubled things" which may come to a strong mind from spiritualism. Nothing certainly in Frederic Myers's elegant and learned exposition of the subject has ever given me the same shock, so to speak, of veracious experience. Now in one way there is nothing new in these conclusions. It would be hard to distinguish between this Cosmic Soul and that all-embracing Mind with which the Stoic Emperor sought to think in common, as we breathe with the circumambient air (*μηκέτι μόνον συμπνέειν τῷ περιέχοντι ἀέρι, ἀλλ' ἤδη καὶ συμφορονεῖν τῷ περιέχοντι πάντα νοεῶν*); hard to see how it differs essentially from the *anima mundi* of certain mediæval philosophers, or from the Deity of certain half-panteistic divines—and indeed Mr. Holt does not shrink from calling it by the sacred name of God. Even the attempt to furnish such a belief with a scientific sanction is not altogether unknown, for the Stoic creed was the direct outgrowth of an age of science; but the peculiar kind of confirmation which the devotees of psychical research claim for their hopes from the analogies of evolution is emphatically a new thing. I suspect that the adherence of many "tough-minded" men (as William James would call them), so different from the credulity of the earlier spiritualists, is due in large measure to the illusion of these analogies.

Illusion, I say, for I cannot see one particle of justification for these claims. The publications of the S. P. R. are sufficient evidence that psychic phenomena in these latter years have received a kind of study unknown in the past, and they have manifestly been dislocated into what may seem to be the region of science by the imposition of a classification decked out with the proper furnishing of Greek names. But in essential matters I cannot see the slightest proof of advance in our communication with the other world since the remotest records of history. I can only hint at one or two reasons for my belief, and leave the argument to the reader to fill out as he may. Mr. Holt gives several cases of supposed levitation, but is rather doubtful of the facts. Well, if one will turn to the ancient religious books of India, he will find that the power of raising the body into the air is universally taken for granted as an every-day event. A saint who could not practise levitation was a mere novice in the higher life. Did the holy men of India really float before the eyes of innumerable observers in this uncanny fashion, and did some of the mediæval mystics enjoy the same sort of privilege? I do not know; but I am sure that the evidence for the tradition is as good as any of the tales accepted by the S. P. R. Again, the trance life was developed by the ancient Buddhists, and its various stages were analyzed by them with an apparatus of scientific terminology which makes the modern séance seem in comparison the amusement of a spiritual kindergarten. So too the knowledge of the other world obtained by these reputable gentlemen was incomparably superior in scope and precision to any light of recent years. It would be idle to refer to the records of similar powers through the classical and middle ages and in later times, without filling these pages with examples. Those who are looking for entertainment from this subject may be directed to Defoe's *Duncan Campbell*, where,

by the way, they will learn that when English was still a living speech, telepathy was merely "a sympathy with souls." And as there is no warrant for asserting any progress in these psychic phenomena, so the hope that some faculty of the soul, now in its primitive state, will develop to wondrous capabilities, is a pure assumption, and cannot be confirmed by analogy with physical evolution. Myers virtually conceded this when he said that the "actual possession and control of human organisms by departed spirits . . . carries us back to the most outrageously savage group among the superstitions of the early world." Yet with that sublime indifference to consistency which is the universal mark of pseudo-science, he is ready almost in the same breath to base the certainty of religious faith on our presumed evolution in this direction: "Assuredly this deepening response of man's spirit to the Cosmos deepening round him must be affected by all the signals which now are glimmering out of night to tell him of his inmost nature and his endless fate. Who can think that either Science or Revelation has spoken as yet more than a first half-comprehended word? But if in truth souls departed call to us, it is to them that we shall listen most of all." Alas for the blind hopes and the dark minds of men! How long ago the great evolutionary poet of Rome uttered those words, and these:

*"Denique si vocem rerum natura repente
mittat et hoc alicui nostrum sic increpet ipsa,
'quid tibi tanto operest, mortalis, quod nimis aegris
luctibus indulges? quid mortem congemis ac fles?'"*

That was, and still shall be, the only true consolation, not ignoble indeed, from Nature's voice in the law of evolution. No, these phenomena that transcend the scheme of calculable physical forces, wherever they belong, do not fall within the province of science, and

Huxley, though he may have gone too far in denouncing them as gross imposture, was entirely justified as the apostle of evolution in declaring that, even if proved true, they would have no interest for him.

Nor, with the best will in the world, can I see that in themselves they offer any hope of less troubled things in the future. After balancing the evidence with open mind I am bound to say that, in my judgment, it seems to weigh strongly, overwhelmingly, against the hypothesis of communication with the dead. The bulk of the supposed messages from spiritual "controls" are palpably within the natural powers of the medium. Of the few that show knowledge beyond the reach of the medium the majority are easily explained by chance or telepathy, and those that seem to evade this kind of explanation are so extremely rare as scarcely to count at all against the mass of negative arguments; the only safe logic in these exceptional cases is to assume that we are ignorant of some of the circumstances. It is obviously impossible within the compass of an essay to marshal the negative arguments, but one or two of them may be indicated.

In the first place, then, the prearranged tests of a crucial character have failed. "Myers shows lack of memory of languages," says Mr. Holt, "but apparently only where his medium doesn't know them; but there's that envelope which he left with Sir Oliver Lodge for the express purpose of giving its contents, and he gave something else! It seems a hopeless muddle of contradictions." I should rather call it a very clear argument. The muddle of contradictions is in the stories which the spirits of wise men and women are believed to send us of life beyond the grave. They say one thing today and the very opposite thing tomorrow. When they do not talk nonsense, they commonly talk platitudes. So far as my reading goes, there has never come

one single word about the future state, though it be a George Eliot or a Walter Scott who speaks, which goes beyond the imagination of a commonplace or vulgar medium, though, as a matter of fact, some of the unprofessional mediums are refined, intelligent people, when their minds are awake. This, for instance, is the kind of education that follows us into the other world (George Eliot *loquitur*):

“I being fond, very fond of writers of ancient history, etc., felt a strong desire to see Dante, Aristotle, and several others; Shakespeare, if such a spirit existed. As I stood thinking of him, a spirit instantly appeared, who speaking said, ‘I am Bacon.’ . . . As Bacon neared me, he began to speak, and quoted to me the following words, ‘You have questioned my reality. Question it no more. I am Shakespeare.’”

Nor can I at all follow Mr. Holt in finding an argument for direct possession in the dramatic power of a Mrs. Piper—“more exact and comprehensive,” he thinks, “(not more poetic, of course) than that of Shakespeare or Sophocles.” I simply cannot see that this power of speaking for various persons surpasses what should be expected from such a medium in the trance state; there seems to me nothing at all miraculous or “super-usual” in it.

Even if it were left a matter of taste, and as such *non disputandum*, to me belief in the genuineness of these “controls” would simply add a new terror to death. Shall there be no escape in this broad universe from folly and ignorance? The believers apologize for the prevalence of these qualities by appealing to the difficulty of establishing communication between those in the spirit and those in the body. I cannot see that the defence applies. If the communication is established, as they say it is, why should it be harder to give us a bit of real information about the new life than to utter contradictory platitudes? Charles Eliot Norton once had a

sitting with Mrs. Piper in the home of William James, and this was the conclusion of his report: "As to the origin of many of the phantasmagorias of her trance dreams, I formed a very distinct opinion, but many experiments would be required to test its correctness, *and these I shall never make.*" I hold Mr. Norton's taste to be a deeper wisdom than the unregulated "open-mindedness" of his friend. When the last balance is made up, I even suspect that Mr. James will have been found among the disintegrating and deteriorating forces of the age.

For in its sum this movement, to which Mr. James lent the prestige of his great name, seems to me to lie in a backward direction towards disintegration. As it is not science, so it is not religion. Here is the significant fact. The physical phenomena produced by mediums and "sensitives" are invariably, whether genuine or fraudulent, the work of disorganization and destruction. I have yet to hear of anything constructed or brought into order by the forces of telekinesis, or what not; but I hear of tables foolishly rising into the air, of bells inanely ringing, of guitars smashed, and furniture generally hurled about the room. The literature of the subject has a capital name for the perpetrator of these absurd freaks—the Poltergeist, or demon of confusion; and certainly if there is any god of this world, it is he. Nor does his sway end with material objects, but so far as there is anything super-normal in the spiritual phenomena, here too his mischievous will would seem to be displayed. I do not mean by this that the human soul is chained to a dull mechanic exercise; the word "normal" is not necessarily synonymous with creeping routine. It is possible that in the dream-state there may come to the liberated soul intimations and visions that in one sense quite surpass its normal range, and in deep slumber we may enjoy a foretaste

of a divine repose that is by no means the same as sluggish death. I have gone far enough in the old Hindu mysticism to hold my mind open to such beliefs without waiting for confirmation from the reports of modern instances. And these images of the beloved dead that appear to men privately and in secret utter warnings and exhortations of a kind

“to shake our dispositions
With thoughts beyond the reaches of our souls”—

these, though they be called the creation of fantasy, may yet speak from the deeper wisdom of the heart, piercing with magic voice through the crust of diurnal circumstance. Nevertheless, even here is danger. The critic of literature is bound to protest against identifying the inspiration of genius too closely with the automatic creations of the dream state. That leads straight to the super-romantic exaltation of Coleridge's *Kubla Khan* as the supreme type of poetry, and to a belittlement of the higher organizing imagination and of the reflective use of experience in art. Of this sort of criticism we have seen vastly too much for a hundred years and more. In like manner we know how the ready hearkening to “airy tongues that syllable men's names” has in the past brought many a sturdy mind to credulity and dilapidation. These things we may say with no lack of deference to those admired names that have thought, and still think, otherwise.

If I might add another conjecture to the many that have been thrown out to explain these mysteries, I should say that there may well exist a great reservoir of free mental and spiritual energy out of which some selective agency within us has drawn together the stuff of its being and created what we call our personality, and that in the same way the universe has its centripetal will—a deity, a God, men name it—which shapes about itself

a sphere of order and harmony and divine purpose, amid the purposeless fluctuations of what Plato called *ἀνάγκη*, fate. If this were so, then the strangely haphazard and insignificant communications that reach the mind in the trance state, would be no divine intimations passing between our soul and the Cosmic Soul, or World Soul, properly speaking, but would be the result of suspending the inhibitive force of personality and opening the soul to the influx of those uncontrolled and unassimilated influences which stray, as it were, from the fringe and loose ends of the unseen realm. Glimpses of beauty may come to the soul by chance in those moments, and miraculous divinations from the ragged edge of things, but the outcome at last, if the mind becomes inured to the medium it works in, is mental disorganization and spiritual confusion. I remember many years ago hearing a Presbyterian evangelist, who had once been a professional spiritualist, discourse on the experiences of his unreformed days. Most of the supernatural phenomena he denounced as pure imposture; but with great earnestness he declared that there was a residue of mystery which the mediums themselves could not explain, and he warned his hearers to keep their eyes and ears from meddling with what was manifestly the direct work of the devil. Well, let us cry peace to the devil. That august personage is probably too busily engaged in graver pursuits to be diverted to the amusements of the *séance*. But if mythology is to be called in, let us ask rather in wonder why a scholar such as Frederic Myers, who had drunk so deep of the well of Hippocrene, should have turned his attention from Apollo to the Poltergeist? Not here, in the close atmosphere of trance and convulsion—

“Not here, O Apollo!
Are haunts meet for thee;
But where Helicon breaks down
In cliff to the sea.”

How then, we ask, has a scholar like Myers or an experienced man of the world like Mr. Holt brought himself to seek comfort in looking at what one of them at least does not hesitate to call "a photograph of chaos and old night"? I suspect it is largely through the glamour of a word, the much-repeating of the mystic syllables of "science." The specious analogy with evolution has a power, like charity, to cover the evils of many an inconsistency; and it is probable also that the grandiose achievements of science in the sphere of material motion and change have confirmed the revolt from everything in religion that bears a true or fancied resemblance to quietism. It is, in fact, perilously easy to infer from a philosophy of natural selection that repose and stability are the marks of death and that life and growth are the product of purposeless activity. Hence, in part, the widespread tendency to honor the tumult rather than the strength of the soul; and hence, perhaps, the readiness of men of great intellectual ability to put the Poltergeist in the place of the old-fashioned God of Providence, whose commands were in the form of prohibitions. It is a strange obsession, a stranger faith! If there is any divinity to be learned from these conclusions of pseudoscience, it should seem to be the admonition to close the ears of the spirit to those random calls, whencesoever they come, and to listen once more for the still small voice, that was heard thousands of years ago and is the same today as yesterday. The whisper of the Cosmic Soul so heard may be only our own soul speaking in the silences of the flesh—I am not concerned to explain these things—but its message is clear and certain. "God," it says, as the great philosopher declared, "is a being simple and true both in act and in word; neither doth He Himself suffer change nor doth He deceive others by fantasies or messages or by the sending of signs whether to the waking or to the sleeping." This is the

same voice that proclaims the hope of immortality in the presence of that within us which amid birth and decay knows itself independent of these and a partaker of the divine nature; that announces the final grace of happiness in a peace that passes understanding; and speaks in the life of Socrates and Jesus and ten thousand other witnesses—but if there, then not in the words of Spencer or William James. Why, if a man needs the consolations of religion, should he seek further than that? Why, if he believes that a verbal revelation is possible, should he discard the sacred books of mankind for the fumbling reports of the Society for Psychical Research? And why, in the name of conscience, why, if a living medium is demanded, is it more reasonable to suppose that the mystery of life speaks through Mrs. Piper than through the Bishop of Rome?

And so, “having laid hands on father Parmenides,” I recoil at my own temerity. The truth is, in whatever spirit you may take up this book on the *Cosmic Relations*, its arguments will impose themselves on you in one way or another by the sheer weight of the personality behind them. At least I am sure that, in the very act of criticising, ignorantly perhaps, its avowedly tentative explanations of psychic phenomena and the Cosmic Soul, I have felt myself fortified in my position by a something within it that is not tentative at all, but spoken with the authority of certain experience. There are pages here that any attentive reader will mark for their pungent expression of knowledge accumulated from many phases of life; for the privileged few there are passages of intimate, almost sacred self-revelation; and then there are other pages for the world in which the S. P. R. is forgotten and the author speaks of immortality and the reasonableness of faith in a way that must arrest the mind of the sceptical materialist and bring courage to the timid believer. If, as I am bound to think, much of the specific theory

of the book is drawn from the false usurpations of science, the real motive power behind the arguments is a well-fortified assurance of those greater and less troubled things for which we used to look in places and minds withdrawn from the world. Not many things of recent years are of more significance than that deep intuitions of religion should reach us unmistakably from this source and in the manner of this book.

THREE NOTABLE DREAMS

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I have been a dreamer from my earliest childhood. My dreams have been of all kinds, from the most fantastic and grotesque to those that were orderly and coherent; but I have never had any others like those which I am about to describe. My ordinary dreams often take the form of short stories or adventures of various kinds; among them is one recurrent dream in which I find myself in some house in the Middle West, very hospitably entertained by hosts to whom I am an unwelcome guest. I try to go home, but eastward-bound trains are difficult to reach and the baggage-express is never available. Such experiences seem to have no important meaning. Commonly they fade with the coming of daylight and make no definite or deep impression on the mind.

Set apart from all such commonplace dreams are three visions of the night which came in quick succession, and left me, on awaking in the morning, deeply impressed with a sense of the supernatural. I have no belief that they were revelations having any source outside of my own mind and experience; but they gave me a clue to the understanding of those things that happened of old when in a dream some important revelation was made to a patriarch or prophet; and, whatever their source, they wrought a change in my thought and feeling concerning the reality and nature of the future life that still abides and after five years makes the thought of an incorporeal existence seem perfectly natu-

ral and very attractive. They have also made me understand some events in ancient history, and have given a new meaning to the belief that dreams were the favorite channels through which the divine wisdom flowed into human life.

What I have to relate happened in this wise: being in a hospital five years ago, recovering from a desperate illness, I awoke three mornings in succession with the memory of dreams vivid and ineffaceable. The three dreams were all of the same class and in structure and substance entirely unlike any that have come to me before or since. They were visual representations of passages of Scripture and some other materials skilfully selected and put together so as to make a rational and intelligible presentation of the meaning they were intended to convey. One peculiarity of them all was that time and space were identical, so that to go back in time was exactly similar to a movement in space. Figures of speech became visual realities, and without the aid of sound, knowledge was conveyed to the mind at every moment. As the Psalmist wrote about the utterances of the day and night, "There is no speech nor language, their voice is not heard"; so I found it when exploring the universe, except in one case, which I am about to describe.

My first dream began with a vision. I was looking into the distance in a vast hall which I knew to be one of the "corridors of time." It extended from me to the beginning of the Christian Era. When I see pictures of ancient halls, temples, crypts, and cloisters I am often reminded of my dream, although I never see anything more grand and imposing than this vast "corridor." It was filled with dusky light and shade, and seemed to be exceedingly dry and salubrious. As I gazed in wonder, suddenly all the air became vibrant with the tones of a strong musical voice saying, "Be of good cheer; I have

overcome the world." I answered, "I am of good cheer; for I also have overcome the world." Then I awoke, and behold, it was a dream. But the impression left reminded me of Wordsworth's vision of the morning, after which he says, "On I walked in thankful blessedness, which yet survives."

The second dream came on the following morning. It was remarkable for the skill with which passages from the twenty-third Psalm and the twenty-first and twenty-second chapters of the Book of Revelation were fitted together and then the completed whole visualized in a picture of extraordinary beauty. In my dream I stood on the bank of a river which stretched across a grassy plain for two or three miles. It was deep and still, "clear as crystal." The turf under my feet was green and soft. I was in green pastures beside still waters. The river flowing down through the landscape towards me was a broad band of silver; and at its source there was a city of such splendor and beauty as no painter could put on canvas. It seemed like one of Turner's Venetian pictures, only much more splendid because, as recorded in the twenty-first and twenty-second chapters of the Book of Revelation, the city from foundation to topmost stone was in all its parts of gold and jewels, representing everything that was rare and beautiful, so that walls and gates and roofs, "transparent as glass," reflected the light which was in itself the glory of God. This light which glorified the landscape was unlike sunshine because it was not yellow, and unlike the light of the moon because, although it had a silver radiance, it was at the same time softer and more intense than sunshine or moonlight upon natural landscapes. The river was the "water of life, clear as crystal, proceeding out of the throne of God in the midst of the street thereof." On each side of the river was planted the tree of life, giving rare beauty to the landscape. As in wonder I

watched and communed with myself, I saw on the left of the river a deeply shaded highway. It ran between the tree of life on the right and an elevated woodland at the left. As I mused, I said, "This is the valley of the shadow of death"; and then I asked myself, "What is it that casts a shadow over the valley of death? Why certainly, it is the tree of life; without that there could be no death and no shade." The thought was wonderfully comforting, and I awoke from my dream cheered and exhilarated by the picture my subtle fancy had shaped out of biblical phrases.

My next dream, which caused me to awake on the third morning exclaiming to my nurse, "It was glorious," was unlike anything I had ever seen or imagined. When it began, I seemed to be standing on the verge of things solid and tangible. Before me, quite above the level line of vision, before a white background, were the figures 8,000,000,000. The figures were intensely black, and to me signified the fact that motion in the fields of light before me was at the rate of eight billion miles a second. At my left, near at hand, was a white casket; on the raised cover were the figures 5,000,000, which signified that the capacity of the casket was 5,000,000, but whether souls or bodies I did not know. Moved by some silent impulse, I crept into the casket; the cover came down; and, as it closed with a snap, the casket suddenly vanished, together with all that was corporeal in myself, and I, a disembodied intelligence, was looking out into a boundless universe in which nothing was to be seen or felt but oceans of light and infinite energy. I had no organs by which to see or hear or think, but my intelligence included everything. All that we know upon the earth by the use of our senses I could know as forms of thought; and so far as motion was concerned, I had only to think of any part of the universe, however distant, and instantly I was there. At one point, as I

swept through space where nothing was visible but waves of yellow light, recalling the description of the creation when wisdom was present, I was conscious, without seeing it, that we were passing over the "habitable parts of the earth." Soon after, in a vast distance of time and space, which were identical, I heard sublime strains of music and was instantly present "when the morning stars sang together and all the sons of God shouted for joy." When I awoke, cheered and exhilarated by my dream, thoughts that had accumulated in my studies of physiological psychology and various speculations about the nature of mind, soul, and spirit, and the possibilities of the continuation of intelligence when the physical organs of the body were destroyed, crowded upon my mind and made me reflect, with a certainty that five years later, at the threshold of my eightieth year, I have never wholly lost, that consciousness in human beings is a fact to be accounted for, and that, in spite of all the physical facts which are cited to disprove the thesis, we may still assert that consciousness does something.

Many have taken in hand in our time to discuss theories of dreams and to account for the curious combinations made by the unconscious sleeper through some sleepless faculty of the mind; but nothing that I have ever heard or read in explanation of the act of dreaming furnishes me with an explanation of the skill shown in the selection and putting together in rational and beautiful forms of the scraps of sacred literature which had never been worked over in this way in my conscious moods. The sudden disappearance of all physical things in my last dream was probably a reminiscence of Shakespeare's wonderful description of the changes in Prospero's vision which would leave not a rack behind.

Occasionally I dream of attempting to preach, but nothing ever comes right. There are books in the form of Bibles and hymn books but nothing inside of them

which can be used in the pulpit. The desk is always unstable, and, after many vain attempts to conduct a service in a decorous manner, the audience always fades away. People who dream about their daily tasks commonly have similar experiences; nothing happens as it ought to happen, and the mind seems to be under the control of some perverse faculty. But in my three notable dreams everything was orderly, rational, beautiful, and consistent. He who can explain them will have found a clue to some of the mysteries of the human mind and to some of the phenomena of occultism and inspiration and revelation as they present themselves in the annals of religion.

RECENT CHURCH UNION MOVEMENTS IN CANADA

DANIEL JAMES FRASER

MONTREAL

Three recent movements in Canada towards a clearer expression of Christian unity have special significance—the co-operation of the Theological Colleges affiliated to McGill University, the organization of the Church Unity League, and the negotiations for the organic union of the Congregational, Methodist, and Presbyterian Communion.

(1) Montreal College Co-operation. The latest calendar of the co-operating Theological Colleges contains this general statement: "Four Theological Colleges are affiliated to McGill University, namely, the Congregational, the Diocesan, the Presbyterian, and the Wesleyan. Ever since their foundation these Colleges have taken advantage of the classes in the University for training their students in the Arts subjects required of candidates for the ministry, and the results have been so satisfactory as to encourage the idea of extending the sphere of co-operation.

"Early in the year 1912 careful investigation was made by representatives of the four Colleges into the requirements of their several theological curricula with a view to ascertaining what subjects, if any, could be taken in common classes. As a result of prolonged consideration and negotiation it was unanimously agreed that a large portion of the work which had hitherto been done separately by each of the Colleges could be taken profitably in joint classes without prejudice to the principles

of the Communion represented and with increased efficiency in the work.

"The authorities of the four Colleges accordingly offered for the session of 1912-1913 a series of intercollegiate lecture courses from which each College might select according to the requirements of its own curriculum. The co-operative plan which was inaugurated in October, 1912 . . . has been abundantly justified by the results."

This movement has no immediate connection with any proposed plan of organic church union and does not involve even a "federation" of the Colleges participating. Each College still retains its individuality, its autonomy—appointing its own professors and conferring its own degrees—and its responsibility to the church which it represents. Nor does it involve any change in the relation—loosely defined as "affiliation"—of the Theological Colleges to McGill University. It is simply the co-operation on the ground of expediency of four independent self-governing Divinity Schools. It is an outward expression of the mutual good-will which is a tradition of this collegiate group, a witness to the public of the non-sectarian character of theological scholarship, and an effort to avoid the waste of overlapping, for example, in class-work and library equipment. What the future has in store for the movement—in the way of union or federation or of larger recognition by the University of theological courses in its requirements for degrees—is a thing of pure conjecture. No plans have been officially considered by any of the authorities concerned. It is possible that the study of theology in a scientific spirit will, as a result of its manifestation in the co-operative movement, affect the constituencies of both the Colleges and the University; but whatever happens will likely be the result of normal growth, not of arbitrary manufacture.

That there is real co-operation is evident from two considerations. First, the Colleges offer intercollegiate courses in such a wide range of subjects as Old and New Testament Literature and Exegesis, Church History, History of Doctrine, Patristics, Comparative Religion, Philosophy and Psychology of Religion, Christian Ethics, Systematic Theology, Homiletics, and Pastoral Training including Pedagogics and Sociology. Secondly, while the four Colleges require on the part of all their students in the three years of theological study 168 hours per week in the joint classes, they reserve for denominational teaching only 17 hours. With the exception of the Diocesan (Anglican), the Colleges reserve no subjects in the first and second years and only one subject each in the third year. Even this small reservation is made in no sectarian spirit, for it is practically necessary that students take up in separate classes the "rules and forms of procedure" of their several Communion.

This educational co-operation which involves 16 professors and about 200 students is now completing its third year and seems to have safely passed the experimental stage. The enthusiastic financial support of the movement by the laity of all the Churches, the comparative ease with which it was inaugurated, and the unbroken harmony of its internal progress, indicate that Canada is good soil for the seed of unity. This conclusion is confirmed by the success of more recent attempts at similar co-operation by the groups of Divinity Schools affiliated to the provincial Universities of Saskatchewan, Alberta, and British Columbia.

(2) The Church Unity League. Early in 1913 an appeal on behalf of Christian Unity, prepared by a few Anglican clergymen, was sent to the clergy and laity of the Church of England in Canada, inviting signatures for its presentation to the House of Bishops. The appeal referred *inter alia* to the deliverance of the Lam-

beth Conference (1908) on Church Unity, the summons of the Edinburgh Conference (1911), and the necessity of recognizing in some definite way the manifest Christian experience of the Reformed Non-Episcopal Churches. For promoting the cause of unity two practical steps were recommended—the admission of ministers of other churches, under certain restrictions and by rightful authority, to the pulpits of the Church of England, and permission to members of other communions on occasion to communicate in the Church of England. The appeal was approved and signed by nearly 300 clergymen and about 1,000 laymen.

This encyclical at once drew forth the following pronouncement from the (ten) Bishops of Eastern Canada: “While earnestly desirous of promoting the visible unity of the Church, they [the Bishops] deeply regret the publication of the circular in question, believing that such unauthorized action will inevitably hinder rather than promote the cause of real and lasting unity.

“While recognizing the right of every Churchman to hold and maintain his own views in things non-essential, they regard the specific proposals of the circular as calculated to subvert the Church’s historic order, to imperil her internal harmony, and to retard the progress of her legitimate work.

“They admonish the brethren, clergy and laity alike, not to act precipitately and to beware lest in their desire to come closer to their brethren in non-episcopal Communion they weaken the bonds by which the Church of England in Canada is united to the Anglican Communion throughout the world.”

In spite of this admonition, however, and within a month of its deliverance, the signatories of the appeal met and organized “The Church Unity League”; the objects of which are: “(a) to promote by all constitutional means the cause of Christian Unity, and (b) to examine

and set forth by meetings, sermons, and literature the grounds upon which our divisions rest, and to discover the lines of demarcation between those things that are always and everywhere essential and those that are expedient." No mention is made in the Constitution of the two practical suggestions in the original appeal which were disapproved by the Bishops, and the method of campaign is evidently that of prayer and conference with the representatives of other churches. Even this quiet propaganda, however, is not to be despised, for mutual understanding is a fundamental requisite of friendly co-operation, and the scientific study of the origins of our present forms and especially of the early Church forms is the surest way to dispose of the divine-right idea, which is one of the most serious obstacles to union. It is manifestly inconsistent that we pray for unity and piously deplore our "unhappy divisions," while we cherish dogmatic prepossessions—or obsessions—of Episcopacy or Presbytery as constituting the *esse* of the Christian Church. A multitude of Church Unity Leagues throughout Canada, following the method of honest study, friendly conference, and common intercession can hardly fail to be a wonderful influence in promoting interdenominational comity and co-operation.

(3) Of all recent church union movements in Canada, however, there stands out pre-eminently the proposed plan for the organic union of the Congregational, Methodist, and Presbyterian Communions. The beginnings of the movement go back to 1902 and were almost casual in their nature. The late Principal Patrick, of Manitoba College, with two other delegates, conveyed the greetings of the Presbyterian General Assembly to the General Conference of the Methodist Church then in session at Winnipeg. Without consulting either of his colleagues, Dr. Patrick, a Scotchman of two years' residence in Canada, decided on the spur of the moment to press the

subject of organic union. In response to his appeal the Conference appointed a Committee on Union to meet with representatives of the Congregational and Presbyterian Churches. The Congregational Union, which as early as 1887 had affirmed the readiness of its churches to enter into any movement in the direction of union "consistent with what they believe to be the New Testament principle of righteousness and freedom," and the Presbyterian General Assembly, which since 1899 had had a "special Committee on co-operation with other churches," accepted the Methodist invitation; and since 1903 joint meetings of the official representatives of these three churches have frequently been held.

The idea of union was no novel one to any of the negotiating churches. "The Congregational Union of Canada" is a title that speaks for itself. "The Methodist Church of Canada," which dates in its present form from 1884, is the result of two or three previous unions between such bodies as the Wesleyan Methodists, the Methodist New Connexion, the Methodist Episcopal, the Primitive Methodists, and the Bible Christians. "The Presbyterian Church in Canada" is the result of six unions whose history can be traced intelligently only by an expert student of the manifold divisions of Scottish Christianity. As early as 1817 the Associate or Burgher Presbytery of Truro united with the General Associate or Anti-Burgher Presbytery of Pictou—an action by the way that was almost immediately imitated by the parent sects in Scotland. Later on Presbyteries that stood for the principle of voluntarism joined forces with those that conformed to establishment, United Secession and Relief Churches buried their obsolete differences, Free and United Presbyterian bodies abandoned the folly of perpetuating in this new land Scottish traditions that are meaningless here, until in 1875 was consummated the union of all its parts in "The

Presbyterian Church in Canada." None of the three Communions, therefore, inherited prepossessions unfavorable to the idea of organic union.

In 1908 there resulted from the negotiations a series of documents as a proposed Basis of Union under the five heads, Doctrine, Polity, Ministry, Administration, and Law. The last two do not concern our purpose here. Under "Ministry" the matter of greatest interest is "The Relations of a Minister to the Doctrines of the Church." In the Congregational Church no creed-subscription is required from a candidate for the ministry. Before his ordination he makes a statement of his belief to a Council or Association of local congregations, and the living faith of the church in the community is made the test of his doctrinal fitness for the office. In the Methodist Church the candidate is examined at an early stage of his student career in the Sermons and Notes of John Wesley and the Twenty-five Articles which are selections from the Anglican Thirty-nine. His ordination vows are connected with experience and practice rather than doctrinal beliefs. In the Presbyterian Church there is required an apparently rigid subscription to the Westminster Confession as a subordinate standard. "Do you believe the Westminster Confession of Faith, as adopted by this Church in the Basis of Union, to be founded on and agreeable to the Word of God, and in your teaching will you faithfully adhere thereto?" Various methods of casuistry are resorted to in order to mitigate the severity of this ordination test. The phrase "as adopted by this Church in the Basis of Union" sometimes affords relief, for it is commonly understood that there was a tacit understanding in 1875 between the Old Kirk liberals and the Canada Presbyterian conservatives that large liberty should be allowed in interpreting the Confession, and it was partly on this ground that the heresy-

charge against the late D. J. Macdonnell of Toronto was dropped. Again it is represented that only acceptance of the system of theology embodied in the Confession is required and that departure from many detailed statements is not forbidden. Moreover, the tolerant spirit of the Presbyterian Church is evident from the fact that the General Assembly has never disciplined a Professor or minister in the interests of orthodoxy. At the same time many a sensitive candidate for ordination finds himself in an embarrassing position. If he gives unqualified assent to the prescribed questions, he doubts his loyalty to absolute intellectual integrity; and if he gives a qualified assent, he seems to cast reflection on the sincerity or enlightenment of his "fathers and brethren." For many years there has been widespread dissatisfaction with a subscription that worries consciences even that are not finical at the solemn moment of ordination, that involves the appearance at least of lowering one's moral standard for entrance to the ministry and that gives to many outsiders the impression either of obscurantism or insincerity.

The compromise effected in the proposed Basis would seem to meet fairly well the needs of all the Churches. "Candidates shall be examined in the statement of Doctrine of the United Church and shall before ordination satisfy the examining body that they are in essential agreement therewith, and that as ministers of the Church they accept the statement as in substance agreeable to the teaching of the Holy Scriptures." The questions at ordination which bear on this are: "Are you persuaded that the Holy Scriptures contain sufficiently all doctrines required for eternal salvation in our Lord Jesus Christ? And are you resolved out of the said Scriptures to instruct the people committed to your charge and to teach nothing which is not agreeable thereto?" The terms of this subscription would

seem to allow standing-room in the ministry of the United Church for men of differing attitudes to questions of inspiration, infallibility, and inerrancy of the Bible.

The statement of "Polity" is practically Presbyterian. This was to be expected, for it involves least compromise. The Congregationalists of Canada have never followed the system of Independency and are not really more Congregational than either of the other negotiating churches. With all due deference to Presbytery, the congregations of the Presbyterian Church have practical autonomy, and the same is true, perhaps to a slightly lesser degree, of the Methodist congregations. Moreover, the Wesleyans of Canada follow the Presbyterian order of government as their colleagues in the United States follow the Episcopal. Evidently then to the satisfaction of all, the professed aim of the Joint Committee on the question of Polity has been realized, namely, to "provide substantial congregational freedom and at the same time secure the benefits of a strong connexional tie and co-operative efficiency."

The statement of "Doctrine" contains twenty articles, and both in form and content is a palpable compromise. The form indeed seems to involve on the part of the Congregationalists not so much compromise as capitulation. They pressed earnestly for a brief and simple creed, but received scant sympathy from the overwhelming majority; and solely in the interest of union, which for the time being was the supreme interest, they yielded what they regarded almost as a sacred trust, knowing as they did that many in the other Com-munions sympathized with their view and hoping that ultimately that reasonable view would prevail. Their disappointment is expressed in subsequent resolutions placed on the records of their Union. "We believe that any summary of Christian doctrine of the United

Church should be simpler than the proposed statement and should lay greater emphasis on Christian experience and conduct. . . . We consider that the distinctive elements we are called upon to contribute are simplicity of creed, liberty of terms of subscription, and local responsibility of the individual church. . . . We regret that nothing has been done in the direction of a simpler creedal statement, but express the hope that the door is not yet closed against the possibility of such action."

The statement places in the forefront the doctrine of the Trinity. "We worship Him in the unity of the Godhead and the mystery of the Holy Trinity, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, three Persons, of the same substance, equal in power and glory." The United Church, then, according to A. V. G. Allen in his *Christian Institutions* (page 327), will be a branch of the "catholic" Church in the authoritative sense of the term. "According to this decree (of 380 A.D.) the Nicene Doctrine of the co-equality of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost is declared to be the Catholic Faith. Those who accept this faith are alone to enjoy the privilege of being known as Catholics. . . . Efforts to appropriate this renowned historical designation in the interests of some restricted view of the Church, whether of its usage or its organization, whether in ancient days or in our own, have no value and certainly no prestige compared with the definition which gave a new foundation for Christian society." Like the reformers, then, of the sixteenth century, the compilers of this Basis, not necessarily with a conscious intention, have preserved the ancient technical charter of catholicity. The catholicity of the United Church, in the popular sense of the term, must be judged by Article XIV: "We acknowledge as a part, more or less pure, of this universal brotherhood, every particular Church throughout the world which

professes faith in Jesus Christ and obedience to Him as Divine Lord and Saviour."

The traditional difference between the Presbyterian and Methodist Churches on the problem of determinism and free will has always been one largely of emphasis. The metaphysical dispute has practically disappeared from modern religious discussion, and from the pulpits of both Churches is preached on occasion the scriptural doctrine of election as a missionary vocation, an election not to privilege but to service, not to be exclusively saved but to save others. The Calvinistic bold doctrine of absolute predestination and the Arminian doctrine of foreordination based on foreknowledge find no place in this proposed Basis, and Article VI leaves a member still free to grapple with the everlasting philosophical antinomy: "We believe that God in His own good pleasure gave His Son a people, an innumerable multitude chosen in Christ unto holiness, service, and salvation." Or again, Article III: "We believe that the eternal, wise, holy, and loving purpose of God embraces all events, so that while the freedom of man is not taken away nor is God the author of sin, yet in His providence He makes all things work together in the fulfilment of His sovereign design and the manifestation of His Glory." The wording of these articles, however, reveals that the compilers had the old dispute in the background of their minds.

There are evidences that the compilers did not always find it an easy task to "mediate" between the traditional and scientific theologies. Take, for instance, Article V: "Of the Sin of Man." Its prescientific account of the origin of sin, its pathological view of human nature, and its crude statement of human solidarity, represent a distinct victory for the traditionalists. "We believe that our first parents, being tempted, chose evil, and so fell away from God and came under the power of sin, the

penalty of which is eternal death; and that by reason of this disobedience all men are born with a sinful nature, that we have broken God's law, and that no man can be saved but by His grace."

As a further indication of the theological temper of the compilers, take Article VII: "We believe in and confess the Lord Jesus Christ, the only mediator between God and Man, who, being the Eternal Son of God, for us men and our salvation became truly man, being conceived of the Holy Spirit and born of the Virgin Mary, yet without sin. . . . For our redemption He fulfilled all righteousness, offered Himself a perfect sacrifice on the cross, satisfied divine justice, and made propitiation for the sins of the whole world."

These documents were sent down in 1909 to the members of the three Churches for acceptance, rejection, or suggestion of changes. A few negligible suggestions of minor changes were made, and the result of the voting was as follows:

	<i>Congregational</i>	<i>Methodist (Members and adherents)</i>	<i>Presbyterian (Members only)</i>
Number of qualified voters . . .	11,253	344,590	297,619
Percentage voting	33	78	55
Percentage of those voting who favored union	71	87	69
Percentage of qualified voters who expressly favored union . . .	26	68	38

The Congregational Union and the Methodist General Conference declared their willingness to go forward immediately to the consummation of the proposed organic union; but the Presbyterian General Assembly, in view of the strong minority and in keeping with its previous assurance that "a union to be real and lasting must carry the consent of the entire membership," invited the other Churches to continue negotiations in the hope of being able within a few years to reach a definite

conclusion. This invitation was accepted; and meantime a statement of the whole case is being sent down to the members of the Presbyterian Church for their final decision on the present proposal. A favorable vote, however, approaching anything like unanimity, is rendered improbable by the recent formation and aggressive activity of a committee for "the preservation and continuance of the Presbyterian Church in Canada"—a committee that already has a membership of 126 ministers and 448 laymen.

The real opposition, then, to the proposed organic union comes from the Presbyterians, and a brief analysis of their opposition may shed some light on the situation. Allowance must be made, of course, for a large number of qualified voters who are indifferent to ecclesiastical and theological questions. They are willing to take the word of their "spiritual advisers" on these high matters! But of the 45 per cent who did not use their voting privilege, many have no desire, certainly no enthusiasm, for the proposed change; and only the serious-minded will be considered in this attempted analysis.

In the first place, there are the irreconcilable traditionalists. They repudiate the suggestion that they believe in the divine right of Presbytery and they claim to be the spiritual descendants of the Scottish reformers who fought against all ecclesiastical—and for that matter political—tyranny based on *jus divinum*. But their appeal to the system of Presbytery as historically ideal shows that they are practically in bondage to ancestral ecclesiastical forms, while their eulogies of the logically consistent and comprehensive system of Westminster doctrine convey the impression that for them the Confession of Faith possesses finality. This uncompromising element, however, is not taken as seriously by others as by itself. It is frequently said by those instinctively out of sympathy with the proposed union that if any-

thing could make them vote in its favor it would be the bad arguments of these opponents.

In the second place, there are those—found chiefly among the ministers—who constitute what may be called for want of a better term the “liberal” element in the opposition. They feel that the doctrinal burden of the proposed Basis will be heavier than that of the Westminster Confession. They are quite content to give assent to the ancient creeds or the reformed confessions as symbols of the Catholic faith, as the banner about which the champions of truth and freedom rallied, so long as they are allowed liberty to interpret them in their historic setting; but they cannot work up any enthusiasm for a modern statement of Christian belief which is so largely an apparent compromise between systems that have had their day and ceased to be. Why suggest the old theological controversies in a working theory of life for today? Why not let Calvin and Arminius—to say nothing of our First Parents—rest in peace? Or why be compromising on questions of scientific and historic study? Should a pre-Christian Semitic poem of the origin of evil be set down in cold prose as binding on the Christian intellect in the twentieth century? Should a doctrine of the Fall of Man be put forth in a form that conflicts with the scientific theory of evolution? Is a child born with a sinful nature? If so, is it because of the sin of Adam and Eve? Are the Miraculous Conception and the Virgin Birth of the essence of the Christian faith? If they are lacking in our highest Christology, that of the Fourth Gospel, are they necessary to a modern statement? Should not the Church unequivocally allow reverent investigation of these high themes? Did Christ make satisfaction in the forensic sense for the sins of the world? Why not give a doctrine of Atonement which preserves the scriptural and universally human principle of vicarious suffering and

which will be intelligible to those brought up in the atmosphere of evolutionary thought? A Canadian Professor of theology was recently dismissed from his chair ostensibly on the ground that he was not loyal in his teaching to the letter of his Church's creed. If there is a disposition to curtail liberty of interpreting ancient and reformed documents, shall we not be expected to give a rigid allegiance to the *ipsissima verba* of a modern statement? Such a statement, then, should be brief and fundamental, religious rather than theological, and devoid of reference to matters of controversy. The proposed doctrinal Basis appeals neither to the head nor to the heart of a large number of ministers and thoughtful laymen in the Presbyterian Church.

But these are not the only elements in the opposition. There are, in the third place, a great many silent folk who are governed by sentiment rather than by reason. Church loyalty, like patriotism, is not always rational. Many private members have an instinctive reluctance to merging their Church in this big union, although their feeling is hardly articulate. They are almost bewildered by the enthusiasm of their leaders in planning the sacrifice of their Church's identity. This, they feel, ought at best to be a last resort. They would rather have its individuality preserved in a more comprehensive scheme of co-operation. They doubt if a larger federation, including the Anglicans and the Baptists, would be brought any nearer by the proposed organic union. They are not very enthusiastic over some of the militant leaders of the Methodist Church. The recent attacks on Dr. George Jackson and Dr. George Coulson Workman—the latter a distinguished Old Testament scholar—left an impression of dogmatic intolerance of scientific investigation, scribal literalism, a lack of human kindness, and a certain almost cynical indifference to causing public scandal. The expediency of the union move-

ment has not been made quite clear to them. The problem of overlapping could surely be tackled first by a generous and statesmanlike policy of co-operation. Several missionary superintendents deprecate the charge of waste owing to sectarian rivalry in the western fields. In any case, if we cannot work side by side in a friendly spirit, are we capable of having any useful part in an organic union? Besides, is not the urgent need of all our churches that of intensive development? In missionary, educational, and social effort, are our present organizations really effective? If not, shall we secure an efficient by adding three inefficient? Perhaps our first duty is to concentrate on deepening spiritual life and perfecting methods in our own Communion, that we may become capable of making a distinctive and worthy contribution to such a union as is proposed. The policy of union is sometimes advocated as one almost of pessimism regarding the present situation. But we cannot create a new spirit by changing external forms. The Christian spirit in the lives of its members will make any Church, however defective its system, a really efficient instrument of service. Denominational effort born of devotion to specific tasks, missionary zeal, forgetfulness of self in the cause of humanity, will assuredly cultivate the spirit of unity with all others engaged in the same high and generous aims, and the spirit of unity will inevitably result in corporate union of some sort. But many who cherish the sense of unity feel that in view of present conditions in Canada the best contribution they can make to whatever permanent and effective union the future has in store for them is to devote themselves amid the congenial environment of their own Church to the actual work which that Church has at hand to do. Now this may be the result of native timidity or a conservative temperament, but it is not necessarily sectarianism.

WHAT AILS THE CHURCH?

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I remember a certain country church in a Western State as it was about forty years ago. It was a plain, wooden structure with uncushioned seats, uncarpeted floors, and with plain glass windows through which the farmers could keep an eye on their horses, hitched to the racks outside. The men and boys sat on one side of the central aisle, while the women and girls sat on the other, and there were about as many on one side as on the other. The congregation was made up mostly of farmers and their families, who came to church in farm wagons, drawn by work horses. The father and mother in each case usually sat on the spring seat, while the children and the hired men sat on seat-boards, sometimes indulging in the luxury of a cushion made by folding a quilt. Within the church the elderly men sat in the "Amen corner," and the elderly women sat in the opposite corner. The small boys, for some reason which I did not then understand, sat with their fathers instead of with other boys of their own age.

The services were rather plain and unpretending, with little adornment or embellishment. There was no choir, though a small reed organ had recently been purchased. The singing, which was by the whole congregation, had considerable volume to it. I am told by my elders that it used to make me cry; but that is further back than I can remember. You will probably infer that there was a good deal of it, such as it was. It seemed to come up out of the very viscera of the congregation. I do not remember very much about the

preaching, as there were some other and very important things to occupy the mind of a small boy at that period. I remember, however, that the preacher used his arms and his voice pretty violently, and I can distinctly remember seeing the roof of his mouth a good portion of the time. I remember also that he said a good deal about death and the Judgment, but more about the joys of religion, which used to puzzle me a good deal.

Probably none of us would be satisfied with a church or a religious service of that kind today. Nevertheless, one thing stands out in my memory of that church, not only at the time of which I am now writing, but for a number of years later. It did not give one the impression of being run solely for the purpose of apologizing for its own existence. I can faintly remember the day the church building was dedicated. It was the one theme of conversation in the neighborhood for an indefinite period—an aeon it seemed to me—before and after the event. The impression which formed itself in my mind was that "The Dedication" was an event in the same class with the Creation and the Day of Judgment.

I have attended a number of country churches in different parts of the country during the last decade, and the one I am about to describe is typical of many if not all of them. There are some outward evidences of financial prosperity, such as cushioned seats, carpeted floors, and stained windows. Carriages and automobiles have taken the place of the old farm wagons, though they are fewer in number. The singing is done mainly by a choir, though a few straggling singers from the congregation join in a faltering sort of way. The hymns are seldom chosen from among the great classics, but frequently from cheap song-books published by commercial publishers of religious literature. One in particular remains in my memory as a kind of nightmare—some mawkish verses sung to the tune of "Old Black Joe."

The sermon was less vociferous and probably in better taste than those of forty years ago. By some peculiar irony, one sermon which I recently heard in such a church as I am now describing was an attempt to show that since the Church was God's own institution it could not possibly die. This was delivered in the face of the fact that the preacher's own church was obviously dying before his very eyes.

I do not wish to imply that all the country churches of forty years ago were so vigorous, nor that all those of today are so feeble, as those which I have described. Nevertheless, it is my impression that there were then more country churches of the kind first described than there are now, and that there are now more than there were then of the kind last described. This impression is strengthened by the testimony of many men older than myself and with wider observation than mine. I think that there are few persons of wide observation who will deny that there has been a general decline in vigor, though exceptional neighborhoods and churches may be found which show the opposite tendency. The investigations of Mr. C. O. Gill prove conclusively that, in certain areas, this decadence has taken place.

What has happened? What has caused this change? It is easy to say that the change has come about because men do not believe what they once did. This is undoubtedly true. Whether we like it or not, we cannot honestly close our eyes to the fact that people do not believe as they did even forty years ago. Yet if this were all, we should find the liberal churches either progressing, or at least decaying less rapidly than the more narrowly orthodox churches. Since the opposite is the case, something more than a change of belief must be found to account for the decline.

Growing out of the change of belief perhaps, but more important than that, is the loss of a definite, soul-com-

elling purpose or program. Formerly the Church knew exactly what it was for; now it does not seem quite certain. Then there was no wavering; now those churches which are not merely drifting are running around in a circle looking for some "cause" to espouse, or something vaguely called "social service" to perform. Then the Church preached a clear and definite gospel of salvation, with damnation as the unattractive, though varyingly emphasized alternative; now it is not considered quite polite in the best religious circles to mention damnation, and, since there is nothing very definite to be saved from, salvation has lost its meaning. This is a change which has affected the liberal churches quite as much as the orthodox churches. Then their chief purpose was to combat the narrow and unattractive doctrines, particularly the doctrine of damnation, of the orthodox churches. Now, since the orthodox churches have practically, if not tacitly, abandoned those doctrines, the liberal churches, since they have nothing to combat, find themselves with as little to do as the orthodox churches themselves.

When men believed with all their hearts that the unredeemed soul was doomed to everlasting torment, while the redeemed were rewarded with eternal joy, the Church had one clear and definite purpose to fulfill. Moreover, this purpose was so big that all others shrank into pitiful smallness when placed beside it. The salvation of men was the biggest work there was in the world. What were the temporal affairs of this world in comparison with the eternal interests of immortal souls? What were industry and government, whose purpose was to promote temporal interests, when placed alongside the Church, whose purpose was to safeguard eternal interests? Talk about social service! What service deserved to be mentioned in the same breath with that of saving men, when the Church believed the doctrines of that

day? Any individual who professes to believe those doctrines and is not stirred with a mighty impulse to preach the gospel of salvation, who does not feel "Woe is unto me if I preach not," is either extremely hypocritical or cruelly selfish.

But why mince matters? The simple fact is that the Church does not really and in its heart believe in the old doctrines of salvation and damnation. There is an acid test which may be applied to determine this. Speak of the devil or hell, not in too coarse a manner, but as a bit of gentlemanly persiflage, before a body of preachers of any large or influential church. If your allusions provoke a smile, you may be sure that they do not take these names seriously. Or again, let any enlightened minister try to preach on these themes before any enlightened congregation. If he can bring himself to a genuine religious fervor, or, better still, if he can succeed in stirring his congregation to a genuine desire to "flee from the wrath to come," that will be an evidence that they really believe; if not, it will prove that neither he nor they believe. If, in the face of this evidence, they subscribe to a formal statement of belief in these things, you have evidence that they are self-deceived.

Whatever one may think as to the validity of this test, he will doubtless agree to the general principle that the Church, like any other organization, must have a program, a definite work to do, and that this work must be such as to appeal to the imagination of its members as being of vast importance. This, as it seems to me, is precisely what the Church today lacks. I realize, however, that two objections will be raised to this point of view. In the first place, it will be insisted that the Church has been urging its people to work, that we have been singing, "Work, for the night is coming," etc., for many years. In the second place, it will

be pointed out that all the churches have practically adopted the program of "social service," and that they are earnestly engaged today in carrying out such a program.

To the first of these objections I reply that it is not enough to preach a gospel of work unless you mention the job at which you expect people to work. Instead of merely singing, "Work, for the night is coming," it is necessary to be somewhat specific and say (if the metre can be fixed up), "Improve this road, for the night is coming. Build this bridge, for the night is coming. Drain this swamp, improve this crop, for the night is coming." Under the old doctrine of salvation, Christian work had a definite meaning. It meant saving souls, persuading men to cease from doing evil and to begin doing good, bringing them into the kingdom. In the absence of some kind of a doctrine of salvation, it means little more than persuading them to join the Church. Under these conditions, the Church becomes very much like an initiation society, such as you would find in many colleges. Until the Church has a program which extends beyond the mere increase of its own membership, its program of work will consist merely in working for new members; these new members, in turn, will have no work except the work for more new members, in endless and unprofitable repetition.

Under these conditions, a religious revival is merely a round-up, and baptism merely a branding operation, each church aiming to get its brand on as many individuals as possible without assuming any great amount of responsibility for the work of breaking them in to useful labor. The missionary work of the church, together with a very limited amount of charity work, furnish at the present time the chief exceptions to this rule. But in so far as the missionary work merely consists of efforts to convert the heathen, it fails to be constructive. It is

only when it seeks not only to convert them, but to *convert them to more productive and useful lives*, to put a new economic and social vigor into *their every-day work*, that it can be regarded as positively useful. As to the charitable work of the Church, it is generally agreed that much of it is misdirected. The only really charitable work, the only work which really does a man any good, is that which makes him more useful, which succeeds in getting him to do what he ought to do.

This perpetual program for membership brings the Church under that class of organisms whose energy is all expended in keeping alive, in trying to save their own life. Such an organism ought to die, and in a rational universe it must eventually die. But an institution which forgets that it has a life to save, whose energy is expended not in trying to keep alive, or to save its life, but in trying to serve, which loses its life or its energy in service, ought to live, and in a rational universe cannot die. "For whosoever will save his life shall lose it; but whosoever will lose his life for my sake, the same shall save it."

This points undoubtedly to the principle of social service, and brings us to the second objection mentioned above. The trouble with the program of social service as ordinarily preached is that we have a very limited idea as to what social service really is. I think that it is safe to say that the idea of social service which is most generally accepted is that it consists in stopping our regular work and proceeding to do something else. This idea, carried to its logical extreme, would require that every individual should neglect his own work in order to do some one else's. Things would then be in a pretty mess. Surely we ought to be able to see that any useful work is social service. So long as potatoes are needed, it is social service to grow good potatoes, as truly as to live in a settlement-house or espouse a political reform.

Another popular idea of social service is summed up in the formula attributed to the late Professor Sumner—"A conferring with B as to what C ought to do for D." Very few discussions of social reform ever get beyond that formula. That is particularly true of the efforts of religious bodies, social service institutes, and similar organizations.

What a spectacle it is to see so many religious organizations running from one thing to another, in a fever of anxiety to stand in with "labor," to array themselves on the side of God and sociology, to find some "advanced" position or "progressive" principle to defend! What is the use of talking about advancement or progress until you have a clear and comprehensive idea as to what progress really is? We are always prone to imagine that the direction in which we are already headed is the path of progress and human advancement, even though we are headed straight toward perdition. When we realize that nations have declined about as often as they have advanced, and that they have always thought that they were advancing, we shall become somewhat less cock-sure in our use of the word "progressive."

With political and social changes it is very much as it is with fashions. When we have become tired of one style of dress, one school of art, or one type of social institution, and are desirous of a new sensation, we invariably, unless we are old fogies like Cato and some others, regard the change which is actually occurring as progress. When one thing begins to bore us, and another thing attracts us by its newness, we think we are progressing. We get more pleasure from a new toy than from an old one; and from the point of view of the "pig-trough philosophy" of life, that is all we need to consider. From the very nature of the case, voluntary political and social changes must consist in the substitution of that which we like for that which we dislike. We may per-

suade ourselves that what the majority likes must necessarily be better than what it dislikes; but the majority never votes, for the excellent reason that it is not born yet. One of the most fundamental works of reform, more fundamental than any kind of legislation, is the persuading of men to like the right things.

A really constructive program must, of course, consist of something more substantial than talk, and more fundamental than dropping pieces of paper into a box. Speaking broadly, and allowing for a few exceptions, it is almost a rule that those countries, States, and cities in which most attention is paid to balloting and politics, are the least progressive or the most degenerate. There is no mystery about this. The larger the fund of human energy expended in running the machinery of government, the less there is available for running the industries, which are the real sources of human welfare and the objects for which governments exist. Sometimes, however, our ideas become so perverted that we begin to think that industries exist for the support of government. This is what leads to that worst form of modern idolatry, the worship of the Almighty Ballot, which is doing vastly more harm than the worship of the almighty dollar. Show me a community where the only themes of conversation are politics and doctrinal religion, and I will show you a community that is backward, unprosperous, and unprogressive. On the other hand, show me a community where the common themes of eager conversation are different forms of productive work and enterprise, and I will show you a progressive and prosperous community.

This suggests a constructive program of social service. Suppose that every time a doctor got religion he began to give himself to the study of medical science with a new zeal, and to the practice of the healing art with a new devotion. The more doctors there were who got

this kind of religion, the more rapidly medical science would advance, the better medical practice we should have, and the lower the death rate would be. Spreading this kind of religion would be a very good way of reducing the death rate. The man who would not try to spread such a religion would have something wrong with his mental and moral make-up, and would be a candidate for the madhouse or the jail.

Suppose that every time a farmer got religion he began to give himself to the study of agricultural science with a new zeal, and to the practice of his productive art with a new enthusiasm. The more farmers there were who got this kind of religion, the better agriculture we should have. The effective preaching of such a religion as this would be one of the very best ways of reducing the cost of living.

Suppose that every time a business man got religion he began to give himself with a new enthusiasm to the study of the science of business management, and with a new devotion to the art of business administration. The more business men there were who got such a religion as this, the better business conditions we should have, the more productive enterprises would be started, and the larger the demand for labor would be. Spreading such a religion as this would do more than anything now being done by any organization for the improving of industrial conditions and the elimination of poverty.

And suppose that every time a mechanic got religion he began to give himself with a new devotion to the study of the sciences underlying his trade, and with a new zeal to the application of his skill. The more mechanics there were who got this kind of religion the more rapid would be the advancement in the mechanic arts. Spreading such a religion as this would be one of the most effective means of promoting general mechanical improvement.

And so on through all the other occupations, trades, and professions, including that of the statesman; suppose that the spread of this type of religion made every one who came under its spell a better worker in his own field of useful endeavor, not only stimulating him to greater expenditures of energy, but leading him to conserve and utilize his energy in the most useful and productive ways, avoiding waste and dissipation, lavish consumption and ostentatious display, and all the other uneconomic vices. One would then be able to detect the spread of this religion in the vital statistics of the country, in the statistics of production, of the increase of capital and the rise in the rate of wages. In short, the more people we can save from going to waste, or the more we can put to work up to their highest capacity, the better community we shall have.

There is probably no one who would withhold his general approval of such a religion as this and the church which promulgated it. The only difficulty would be to get him to apply it to his own individual case. He would be compelled to admit, if he were at all reasonable, that it would be an excellent thing for the community if every one would accept the standards of such a religion, and each one, in his own way, render the utmost service in the way of useful work. He might even agree to act upon such a principle, provided, or whenever, all the rest of the community would begin. But the test would come when he was asked to act at once on the principle of larger service without waiting for others to begin. Then he might object and say, What is there in it for me? Why should I begin working harder at my trade, and giving better service, when others are not? What good will that do me? Where do I come in? etc., etc. Now a sound religion not only demands of each individual that he shall act upon that principle which would work best for the

whole community, provided every one acted upon it (that is what a moral principle is); it demands of him that he shall act upon it at once and continuously, and without waiting for anybody else.

This type of religion could base itself upon a very definite doctrine of salvation, which always implies a doctrine of damnation as its counterpart. This doctrine of salvation would be quite as clear-cut as the old doctrine but would differ from it in some particulars. Having a clear-cut doctrine of individual salvation instead of a vague doctrine of social service, the Church could preach to individuals with all of the old fervor, and would need no longer to make a spectacle of itself by running around in a circle trying to find something in the way of social service or political reform to espouse in order to justify its own existence.

A thing may be said to be saved when it is prevented from going to waste. If a man's life is going to waste, it is lost. If he can be prevented from going to waste and put to some use, he is saved. The only rational definition of immorality is the waste of human energy. That, and that only, is sin which results in the waste or dissipation of human energy. When a man's energy is being wasted, the man is to that extent going to waste, his life is to that extent lost, and he stands in need of salvation. Perhaps it would be better to say that the community needs his salvation. The most precious resource of any community is its fund of human energy. If that resource is wasted, the community will be impoverished. If it is saved, the community will be enriched. Here is a doctrine of salvation in which the whole community is vitally interested. This kind of a program of salvation is the greatest conservation program ever conceived.

Possibly we may conclude that we have been talking prose all our lives without knowing it. As a by-product

of the old gospel of salvation, men were taught such economic virtues as industry, sobriety, thrift, forethought, and mutual helpfulness. These are virtues because they are ways of economizing human energy. That is what a virtue is. Men have been taught to avoid such uneconomic vices as sloth, drunkenness, riotous living, frivolity, and quarrelsomeness. These are vices because they are ways of wasting human energy. That is what a vice is. In so far as the churches have been means of promoting those virtues and discouraging these vices, of conserving human energy and turning it into useful channels, it has been performing the greatest possible social service. Compared with this kind of conservation, all other programs of social service are trivial.

This by-product of the old gospel of salvation, which some of our more ardent religionists have affected to despise, must become the chief end and aim of all preaching. "The stone which the builders rejected, the same is become the head of the corner." The wild, untamed energy of human nature, which tends too much to run riot, to waste itself in the pursuit of whims, to dissipate itself in vice or luxury, to consume itself in fruitless conflict, needs to be tamed, harnessed, and put to work. This is a task of even greater importance than that of taming and harnessing the winds, the tides, and the waterfalls.

Aside from those forms of waste forbidden in the decalogue, the leading types of wasted human energy may be grouped under five heads—idleness, vice, luxury, conflict, and distraction.

Idleness is universally condemned in those who need to work in order to earn a living. But the more capable the man is, either by heredity or training or both, the greater loss it is to society if he is idle. When the man of little capacity works, he adds but little to the product

of the community. Consequently, when he is idle he does only a little less well than he can. But when the man of large capacity works, he adds largely to the product of the community; consequently he does a great deal less well than he can when he remains idle. One is, of course, not idle merely because he does not work for a living. He may be doing very useful work and doing it voluntarily without expecting any material gain for himself. It is only when he fritters away his time in self-amusement, in trying to acquire a "gentlemanly appreciation" of literature, art, golf, and whiskey, or when he is perpetually trying to acquire "culture," with no idea of ever employing his acquired talents usefully, that he can be said to belong to the idle class.

The idle class shades off gradually into the leisure class. They who go to their offices at ten o'clock and remain until two, who require the rest of their time to enjoy their income, or to make use of the opportunities which their wealth and social position provide, are doing only about half as well as they might. They are half lost, and that half needs salvation. Again, when a man who is capable of highly productive work busies himself with the common type of social reform, and succeeds in persuading himself that he is tremendously busy, telling B what C should do for D, when he himself ought to be draining swamps, clearing fields, building factories, or doing something else to give D employment or to produce the means for satisfying his needs, he is doing very much less well than he might and needs to be saved from going to waste.

Vice must include not only those personal habits which dissipate the energy of the human body and weaken the will, but also anything which occupies the mind to the exclusion of useful work. Even a game or amusement which is otherwise harmless becomes a vice when indulged in beyond the point where it functions as

recreation or preparation for work. He who spends enough time in games and amusements to keep his working capacity at its maximum is doing as well as he can. He who spends more is doing less well than he can. The game which fascinates the mind and holds it under such a spell as to prevent the profitable utilization of one's time becomes, by that very fact, a vice. The man who succumbs to this temptation is going to waste and needs to be saved. The business of the Church is to save him.

One of the most persistent fallacies in the world is the idea that luxurious expenditure on the part of the rich is good for the poor. There is surely no peculiar merit in spending for luxuries rather than for useful things. If I should spend a dollar for an article of luxury, I do, to be sure, set labor to work making luxuries—to the extent of a dollar. But if I spend it for a tool, I also set labor to work—to the extent of a dollar—making tools. It is certainly at least as good for labor if I spend my money for tools as it is if I spend it for luxuries.

As a matter of fact it is a great deal better to buy tools. After the tools are made and I have them, the tools are serving the rest of the world. The world is thereafter better provided with tools, and its productive power is increased. Moreover, I have not only given employment to labor by spending my money for tools; I must thereafter employ labor to use them. A community which does not practise thrift and invest in tools is universally a community where labor is badly off, and from which it tends to emigrate. A community which practises thrift and invests in tools instead of buying luxuries is a community to which labor is glad to come. In other words, if I buy luxuries, I do less well than I can with my money, therefore I do ill. I am to that extent going to waste and need to be saved. The church which does not try to save me is not doing its work.

By conflict is meant not only brawling and litigation, but competitive consumption. When the farmers compete in growing crops, no harm and much good results. That is rivalry in well doing. It helps to feed the world. But when they and their families try to outdo one another in ostentation and display, or even to keep up with the pace set by other people in matters of consumption, nothing but evil results. Of all forms of competition, the only really bad form is competition in the consumption of wealth. More evils have their root in this soil than in any other. It is the source of more heart burnings, jealousies, and covetousness than any other single habit. It is competitive consumption which causes us to worry over our economic and social positions. It is not so much fear of coming to want as fear of not being able to live as well as our neighbors, or the fear that the world will not take sufficient notice of us, that drives men and women to strain every nerve for more income with which to make a show, or to do or say smart things in order to attract attention. This is what drives business men to unscrupulous methods of competition, and writers, actors, speakers, and sometimes preachers, to exaggeration, innuendo, and other methods of falsification in order to win notoriety. It is closely associated with both greed and vanity.

As between the two, the latter is probably the worse, though either is bad enough. A great popular preacher said recently that no man could succeed in business without being dishonest. He would have been no farther from the truth if he had said that no one could be a great popular preacher without being a liar. One who expects to prosper in business must, of course, get business. If he cannot get it honestly by reason of the excellence of his goods or service, he must get it, if at all, by fraud, false advertising, adulteration, shoddy, or some similarly dishonest method. Men do not usually

prefer dishonesty to honesty. They would probably prefer a small income honestly won to a large one dishonestly won, were they not driven as with whips by the fear of falling behind the social procession, the fear that they, and more especially their families, may be outshone by some one else.

The evils of this form of conflict have long been recognized. Well-meaning but misguided people have assumed that these evils are inherent in competition itself. Such people ought never to play a game of croquet, for there is competition there. Even an innocent amusement of that kind, however, becomes vicious when played solely for a prize, *and* when the prize is regarded as the one thing in the world worth possessing. He who comes between me and the one desire of my heart is my enemy, and I shall kill him if he doesn't watch. If the one desire of my heart is to win an athletic prize, my opponents are my enemies and they must beware. If we are all animated by that kind of a spirit, even a game of croquet is wickedly played. Similarly, when the one desire of my heart is social distinction, or even to keep up with my neighbors, and when my social position depends upon my income, the man who stands between me and my income, that is, my competitor in business, is my enemy. Where we are all in the same state of mind, business competition becomes a wicked game. Inherently there is no more harm in business competition than in an athletic contest. Both become equally bad when played with a bad spirit. Discriminating reformers, therefore, will not inveigh against either form of contest as such. They will try rather to get at the root of the difficulty by eliminating the source of the evil. Football, for example, degenerates into a brutal game when the students of each college come to prize victory above everything else, including honor. But when honor, courtesy, fair play, and genuine sport are prized more

than victory, even football becomes a game fit for gentlemen and Christians. The same spiritual change will clean up business competition. The church which preaches the right kind of religion, which creates a state of mind under which social position depends upon character rather than upon scale of consumption, or where men no longer compete in the consumption of wealth, will be doing more for the improvement of business and social conditions than all the tinkering socialistic reformers put together.

This form of conflict is very closely related to those forms of wasted energy which are grouped under the head of distraction. Few of us realize what a source of waste this is. Did you ever try to work out a difficult problem or do any severe mental work, in a room full of noise, conversation, and confusion? If so, unless you possessed remarkable powers of concentration, you must have found it hard to get anything done. The reason was not a lack of mental power, but the waste of that power by reason of its being scattered and spent upon other subjects besides the right one. When you went out into a quiet room, you accomplished your work without great effort. Your mind was no better in the quiet room than it was in the noisy one, and you did not expend any more energy, probably not so much. The reason was simply that you economized and utilized your mental energy, whereas, under the distractions of the crowded room, it was scattered, dissipated, or wasted.

The individual who has not the anchorage which religion ought to give, who does not see things in their larger relations, as a religious person ought to see them, who does not have a sense of the larger values, which a religious person ought to have, is like the person in a crowded room full of distractions. He does not realize what things are really worth while, therefore he allows trivial things to occupy his attention; he does not see the larger

aspects of life, therefore the petty things worry him; he does not feel his feet planted upon the larger truths, therefore he is blown about by conflicting winds of economic, social, and religious doctrine. A sound religion gives him a sense of quiet, of poise and balance; it enables him to enter the quiet room where problems become simple, and lessons easy. "The peace of God which passeth all understanding" is the first condition of the highest economy of human energy and the most productive life. To the individual who has thus freed himself from distraction, the yoke of service is easy and the burden of the productive life is light.

All this becomes perfectly clear to one who has grasped the full meaning of the two fundamental and antagonistic philosophies of life—the "work-bench" philosophy and the "pig-trough" philosophy. By the work-bench philosophy is meant that philosophy of life which regards the world as an opportunity for work, for the active joy of productive achievement. By the pig-trough philosophy is meant that philosophy of life which regards the world as an opportunity for consumption, for the passive pleasures of absorbing the good things which the world supplies. Under the former we consume in order that we may produce; under the latter we produce in order that we may consume. Under the former wealth is regarded as tools to be used in further production or usefulness; under the latter it is regarded as means of self-gratification. Under the former as wealth accumulates it is invested and put to work; under the latter it is gathered into barns in order that its possessor may say, "Soul, thou hast much goods laid up for many years; take thine ease, eat, drink, and be merry."

He who has adopted the work-bench philosophy of life will obviously avoid idleness, vice, and luxury. Since he is intent upon production rather than consumption, on seeing how much he can put into the world rather than

how much he can take out, he will as naturally avoid destructive conflict as he will idleness, vice, or luxury. But precisely the opposite happens to him who has adopted the pig-trough philosophy of life. He continually tries to avoid work, and seeks idleness as soon as he is able to live without work. If one's purpose in life is to get as much out of it as possible rather than to put as much in it as possible, the manners and the morals of the pig-trough prevail as a natural consequence. And finally, the distractions of life have a peculiar hold upon people who are not anchored to a purpose outside themselves.

Though the work-bench philosophy of life differs from that which is vaguely called altruism, it produces very much the same results in conduct as altruism does when it is rightly understood. Suppose that you were a pure altruist, with no desire whatever except to be of the maximum service to the rest of the world. You would naturally look about to see where the greatest needs were. You would soon discover that there were two classes of needs; first, those of which the people are conscious, and second, those of which they are unconscious. When people are conscious of their needs, they are willing to pay for the service which satisfies them. When they are unconscious of them, they are naturally unwilling to pay for the service which supplies those needs. If you supply needs of the latter class, you must do it on a philanthropic basis. But if you would satisfy the former class of needs, those of which the people are conscious, you will find that your services will command a market price. If you decide upon that kind of service which supplies needs of which people are conscious, you will become rich and a capitalist, and you cannot help yourself. But while you are rich in goods you may remain poor in spirit, regarding your wealth as tools to be used in further production or service. But this will make you still richer. There is not a single step

in this process which you can avoid if you are a genuine altruist and have chosen to serve those needs of which people are conscious. You dare not remain idle, you must work even though you are rich. You dare not do a less useful if you are able to do a more useful work, though this will make you still richer because people will be willing to pay more for it. You dare not consume more of your income than is necessary to sustain your working capacity at its maximum, even though you accumulate wealth by your frugality. You dare not allow your accumulated wealth to lie idle so long as tools are needed in any industry which supplies needs, though you become a capitalist when you buy tools. You dare not invest in tools for which there is a small need if there is a greater need for tools of another kind, though men will pay more for the service of the latter. You dare not give either your own service free or that of your tools, if you see ways of utilizing the income which you might receive by adding to the world's stock of useful tools. And so on, up to your limit, you are under compulsion. Incidentally, you would be obeying in the fullest detail every teaching of the New Testament with respect to wealth.

A community in which every scrap of human energy was saved and applied to useful work would be the kingdom of God. It would in time prevail over all other communities by reason of its greater usefulness and its vastly superior strength. It would have within itself the power to become the chosen community, and would need no supernatural aid. A gospel of salvation which saves men from going to waste must be a vital factor in the creation of such a community. The church which preaches such a gospel effectively must necessarily become the true Church. It will need neither historical claims, miracles, nor any other advertising devices to establish its title.

BOOK REVIEWS

NIETZSCHE AND OTHER EXPONENTS OF INDIVIDUALISM. PAUL CARUS. The Open Court Publishing Co. 1914. Pp. 144.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE. H. L. MENCKEN. Luce & Co. 1913. 3d ed. Pp. xiv, 304. \$1.50.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF NIETZSCHE: AN EXPOSITION AND AN APPRECIATION. GEORGES CHATTERTON-HILL, Ph.D. D. Appleton & Co. Pp. 291.

NIETZSCHE, SEIN LEBEN UND SEINE WERKE. RICHARD M. MEYER. C. H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung. München. Pp. 690.

America has not been altogether fortunate in the introductions it has had to Nietzsche from home talent. Aside from Dr. Grace N. Dolson's early philosophical study, now out of print, and Miss Emily S. Hamblen's *Friedrich Nietzsche and his New Gospel*, which shows rare sympathetic insight, little of value has been written.¹ Lack of knowledge is the main reason; critical talent and literary skill, as in the case of Mr. Paul Elmer More, do not make up for this. Nietzsche has to be studied (contrary to the general impression), and almost no one has thought it worth while to do this.

One might expect better things of the professional philosopher, but Dr. Carus has disappointed us. He has no lack of good will, but his book is the result of hasty and superficial reading; necessary distinctions are not made; the treatment is "plump." Nietzsche is "pure-hearted and noble by nature," but "goody-goody"; his "life might have earned him the name of sissy." *Zarathustra* is spoken of as "the last work of his pen" (!), and is recommended to those who would know him at his best; though it is safe to say that without a previous reading of earlier works it is almost unintelligible. In general, Nietzsche is "a poet, not a philosopher, not even a thinker"; he "must not be taken too seriously . . . he criticised and attacked like the Irishman who hits a head wherever he sees it." Indeed, his philosophy is "a harmless display of words," and wherever he is mentioned by professional philosophers, "it is in

¹ I do not forget occasional single articles in out-of-the-way technical journals by scholars like Professor Bakewell and Professor Thilly, and Dr. C. C. Everett's early discussion in *The New World*. The latter (with all respect be it said) would have been greatly improved had Dr. Everett lived to revise it in the light of Nietzsche's complete *Werke*.

criticism" (strange that philosophers should concern themselves with mere "displays of words"). His best-known German expounders are said to be Rudolph Steiner and Alexander Tille. Dr. Carus appears to be ignorant of the more significant and authoritative works of Professors Riehl, Simmel, Ziegler, Vaihinger, Richter, Dorner, Drews, Joël, and of W. Weigand, J. Zeitler, and E. Eckertz. Of Frenchmen he mentions Professor Lichtenberger (credited to Nancy, though now long in Paris); not Émile Faguet, E. Seillière, C. Andler, nor the Belgian Professor R. Berthelot. We are told that Nietzsche was "too proud to submit to anything, even to truth," too proud "to recognize the duty of inquiry"; he "expressed the most sovereign contempt for science, exhibited a remorseless contempt for everything that comes to us as a product of history." Indeed he scorned "not only law and order, church and state, but also reason, argument, and rule." He did away with "moral maxims," and it is this that "has made him popular." Nietzsche knows nothing of "self-control"; he "made himself the advocate of vice and gloried in it"; among the thoughts of George Moore which Nietzsche might have written is, "I boasted of dissipation." If his doctrines prevailed, "the selfishness of mankind would manifest itself in all its rude bestiality." Sympathy is to him a relic of the ethics of a negation of life; "good and evil" are "distinctions invented for the enslavement of the masses." His "ideal is brutal strength, his overman the tyrant who tramples under foot his fellowmen"; "a ruthless demagogue, a self-made political boss," such is "the overman."

Any one familiar with Nietzsche's writings knows the occasion for all these judgments, and equally that they amount to a caricature of him. Max Stirner is called his "predecessor." He "adopted Stirner's extreme individualism," "stole his thunder," and, if he does not give him credit, "why should he?" since he acknowledges no "rule which he feels obliged to serve." "The fundamental error of them all [Nietzsche, Stirner, and 'other kindred spirits'—I quote here the publishers' announcement, presumably Dr. Carus's own] is an extreme individualism, which regards every single person as an absolutely autonomous sovereign being." But this is just what Nietzsche does not assert and rather denies. His philosophy is directed, he tells us in so many words, not toward an individualistic morality, but toward a *Rangordnung*. A sweeping individualism, as Dr. Carus justly says, tends to anarchy; but anarchy (save in a highly spiritualized sense and with exclusive application to the most spiritual class of men) is what Nietzsche abhors. Indeed it

must be said with great regret that Dr. Carus, instead of correcting and clarifying ordinary public opinion about Nietzsche—and what is the philosopher for but to correct and clarify ordinary opinion?—does little more than reiterate and confirm it. This does not mean that he does not say many wise things here, as in his other books.

The announcement of a new “fully revised” edition, “with much new material,” of Mr. Mencken’s much-read book (originally published in 1908) is a matter of interest. Mr. Mencken is a Baltimore journalist and musical critic of reputation. He wisely recommends reading other books of Nietzsche’s before taking up his *Zarathustra* (mentioning, oddly enough however, but one earlier and several later ones); discreetly says, “Nietzsche’s poetry had better be avoided by all who cannot read it in the original German”; and, apropos of the English edition of the *Works*, remarks that one feels his charm, “*even* when one reads him through the English *veil*” (the italics are mine). He is not, however, quite accurate in speaking of the English edition as “complete,” the “whole canon” of Nietzsche’s writings. Several volumes of posthumous work are not included, and they are of considerable importance. He treats successively of “Nietzsche the Man,” “Nietzsche the Philosopher,” and “Nietzsche the Prophet”—an admirable arrangement, save that under the last heading little or nothing is said of Nietzsche as prophet, the two chapters being devoted to his “Origins” and his “Critics.” These chapters belong to the revised part of the book. Just what improvements have come with the revision in general I am unable to state, as I have not the original edition with me, but some crudities and partial apprehensions appear to remain. For example, Nietzsche is still represented as asking, “Why should any man bother about moral rules and regulations?” “He should judge a given action solely by its effect upon his own welfare; his own desire or will to live and that of his children after him.” “To put it more simply, Nietzsche offers the gospel of prudent and intelligent selfishness, of absolute and utter individualism.” But for and from the great mass of men Nietzsche desiderates, as a matter of fact, a regard for social morality as something absolutely sacred (an “*unbedingt Heilighaltung der Herdenmoral*”). Mr. Mencken explains in a footnote (one of the additions, I imagine) that Nietzsche’s “selfishness” is only for the exceptional, superior man (he keeps the “any man” already quoted), and that this is the only kind of human being Nietzsche takes into account, the rest being “unworthy of consideration.” This last is emphatically not true. But even with such a limitation, the view fails to reckon with the fact that the higher man,

as Nietzsche conceives him, may risk or even sacrifice his life on occasion, instead of cleaving to it, and that in such giving and spending of himself his elevation and greatness in part consist.

Mr. Mencken thinks that, according to Nietzsche, the strong sacrifice the weak, putting them, for instance, "in time of war into the fore-front of the fray"; the result being that "the weakest are being constantly weeded out and the strongest are always becoming stronger and stronger"—a fantastical construction both of history and of Nietzsche's thought. "The strong cannot give of their strength to the weak without decreasing their store," it is said; but it is, according to Nietzsche, just because of their strength that they *can* give; it is the weak for whom the law of prudence is so imperative. So Mr. Mencken does not give quite accurately, because he does not himself perceive clearly, Nietzsche's distinction between "good and evil" and "good and bad." He is also more or less confused about the contrast of Apollonian with Dionysian; even speaking of the "apollonian morality of the ancient Jews," and of Roosevelt's "centralization" as "a truly dionysian idea"! He misstates the motives and processes of thought by which Nietzsche was led to believe in "eternal recurrence"; and he gives a very one-sided idea of Nietzsche's attitude to what he calls "the drudge class," "the proletariat." He has little sense of the part which self-control plays in Nietzsche's general ethical philosophy, imagining that it stands to Nietzsche for lack of courage (!), and also of the part which discipline plays in his view of education. Mr. Mencken too has good-will and might almost be called a Nietzschean, but he has not studied his subject thoroughly and patiently enough, and is evidently too much under the influence of his old-time anarchistic and materialistic perspectives, and yields too much to the journalistic instinct for smart writing and piquant statement. And yet he makes certain distinctions admirably and knows his subject much better than Dr. Carus. He points out, for instance, that while Stirner's "plea is for absolute liberty for all men, great and small," Nietzsche is for liberty only in the higher castes. He sees and says that Nietzsche was not a revolutionist or advocate of sudden change. His teaching, he recognizes, is addressed, not to men in the mass, but to the small minority of exceptional men; while at the same time it is not a caste-system (in the ordinary sense) in which he believes, since there is to be in it free movement up and down. He recognizes too that Nietzsche did not wish to abolish Christian morality completely nor propose a "unanimous desertion of the idea of sympathy for the idea of intelligent self-seeking." Further, he

discriminates as to Nietzsche's "romanticism." Altogether we have good hopes for a fourth edition of Mr. Mencken's book.

Dr. Chatterton-Hill's *The Philosophy of Nietzsche* is probably the best large book of all those originally written in English on Nietzsche—leaving then to one side the smaller works of Dr. Dolson and Miss Hamblen and the well-nigh perfect short manual of Mr. Anthony M. Ludovici in the *Philosophies, Ancient and Modern* series, as also a translation of Professor Lichtenberger's fine treatment of the subject. Dr. Chatterton-Hill is a *Privatdocent* in the University of Geneva (Switzerland), and writes as one who has known Nietzsche's spell though he is under it no longer. He at once goes to the bottom of things by characterizing Nietzsche as "always an essentially religious nature." He notes that Nietzsche even regarded Christianity and the moral law as "indispensable in their proper place," and that *Zarathustra* borrowed from the Gospels much of his method. What Nietzsche opposed, he says, is "the monopoly of Christianity"; for however useful it is to the mass of men, it acts like poison on those who are by their nature above the mass—the great, exceptional men who are humanity's final justification. He sees, indeed, that Nietzsche found a place and function for the slave and mediocrity, and quotes, as if to correct Mr. Mencken, Nietzsche's remark that contempt for the toilers is unworthy of the philosopher. And yet above the "gregarious animal, living with and by the herd," is, he knows, "the solitary individual, strong in his solitude," who was the supreme object of Nietzsche's concern. Christianity would practically outlaw him; Nietzsche would again give him room and scope. He also happily corrects Mr. Mencken (I do not mean that the latter is referred to), when he says, in giving Nietzsche's view, "He who is strong and powerful and a lover of life consumes his energy without further thought. He spends out of the overflowing richness of his vitality. He cares not for a long life. . . . Only in the measure that we can afford to live fully, to be extravagant and thriftless with our vital power—only in that measure are we strong and powerful." There are also happy reproductions of Nietzsche's views as to the differing *intellectual* character of the stronger and weaker races, and as to the essentially nihilistic tendency and direction of Schopenhauer's ethics based on *Mitleid* ("pity" is the more correct translation here, not "sympathy," the word which the author mostly uses).

Of criticism Dr. Chatterton-Hill gives us little; perhaps the best is that of Nietzsche's varying conceptions of truth (cf. pp. 175–183). Nietzsche is spoken of as at once a genius and a lover of paradox;

his general influence is, indeed, explained by his style and the force of his expression, but his influence on the world of thinkers is credited to other reasons. Some of the representations of Nietzsche's views are not quite satisfactory; *e.g.*, as to the Apollonian and Dionysian states of mind, though the author comes nearer the mark than Mencken. Again, he says that Nietzsche regarded "the cosmological process in its entirety as an æsthetical manifestation of the universal Will." But this holds only for Nietzsche's first period, and for a portion of that. The maturer Nietzsche knows no "universal Will"; he is pluralistic *au fond*. So his "worship of art as the *raison d'être* and object of life," which the author makes general, holds only of the first period. To mould life *itself* after the ideal, his ideal, becomes the aim of his later, and particularly latest, years. Dr. Chatterton-Hill even says that Nietzsche's message is sufficiently "Neronian to enable us to conclude that Nietzsche must have been an admirer of Nero." But he should read what Nietzsche says of Nero in *Will to Power* (§ 874). He quite misconceives Nietzsche's meaning in speaking of eternal life as wished for, because only in eternity can the plenitude of life's expansion be realized. For good or ill, eternal life is to Nietzsche only a recurrence of the heights and shallows of this life. So he misses the meaning of Nietzsche's glorification of "free death," and he sometimes overstates, *i.e.* states one-sidedly, Nietzsche's hostile attitude to morality—a subject that requires much refinement in handling. When he says, "Morality is necessary to the construction and continued maintenance of the social structure," he in effect only repeats Nietzsche; but for Nietzsche the social mechanism is not an end in itself, and its law is not the only law; and when this is set up as the only law, it becomes tyrannical and has to be fought. Here, as Dr. Chatterton-Hill lets us see, is the ground of Nietzsche's hostility to morality (*i.e.*, taken as something final and absolute)—and to Christianity. Unsocial or even, within limits, anti-social qualities may mark the great man, in Nietzsche's view of the matter; at least, he (the great man) wants to be himself, not one of a crowd, whatever *Bosheit* and hardness that may involve.

Professor Meyer's book has pathetic interest for students of Nietzsche in that it is the last work of his laborious life (he died in October, 1914). The distinguished author of the standard *Geschichte der deutschen Literatur des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts* was for many years Professor Extraordinarius in the University of Berlin (only not made Ordinarius, it is said, because of his Jewish ancestry; even as Professor Simmel, to become an Ordinarius, had

to leave Berlin for Strassburg—and Berlin is *not* in Russia). His present book is perhaps the best all-round book on Nietzsche in any language. Philosophical students will still go to Riehl and Vaihinger, and above all Simmel and Richter, and those with biographical interests mainly will go to the *Leben* by Nietzsche's sister and the *Vie* of M. Halévy; but for a view of the total human phenomenon—thought and personality—and especially of its historical and literary setting, nothing thus far compares with Meyer. It is a work to make us sensible of the disparity of our American and English culture. Meyer is a man of letters, but a philologist as well. He has philosophical training also, and deals, however lightly, almost always surely with Nietzsche's various philosophical problems; and he has wide historical knowledge and enormous literary erudition. Perhaps the book is a little over-supplied with the latter.

After several introductory chapters and three which may be called biographical (devoted in turn to Nietzsche's life, his studies and the method of them, and his distinctive personality), Meyer takes up the works chronologically and his book might be described as an illuminating commentary upon them. Of special interest is a preliminary chapter on the *Vorarbeiten*—the philological, philologico-philosophical, philosophico-pedagogical, and pedagogical studies, and also the University lectures, which antedated (or at least were independent of) the first-published book, *The Birth of Tragedy*. In general Meyer is at once sympathetic, penetrating (with the insight that sympathy alone gives) and critical. His relations with Nietzsche's sister, to whom we owe so much (he too), we perceive have not been altogether cordial. He finds her *Leben* no "*unbefangene historische Quelle*," and he deplores her treatment of Wilamowitz-Moellendorf (who attacked the *Birth of Tragedy*). He makes no concealment of the "all-too-human" side of Nietzsche himself; remarks on an uncivil and unlovely letter to Deussen (when the latter did not take solemnly enough his appointment to Basel), on an insulting communication to Paul Rée's brother about Rée, and cannot justify Nietzsche's injurious words to his old friend Rohde, which produced the final rupture between them. Constantly we come on signs of independent judgment. He corrects Nietzsche's interpretation of "science," disagrees with his view of E. von Hartmann, criticises his depreciation of "practical" men, finds him one-sided in his attitude to Christianity and sinking to the level of "ordinary theological polemics" in *The Antichristian* (he justified this as the proper translation of

Der Antichrist in a private letter to the present writer—it is also Professor Lichtenberger's); finds a mythological element in the doctrine of "eternal recurrence"; notes his occasional slips and negligences of style, in particular, the too frequent use of italics and the tastelessness of some of the word-combinations in *Zarathustra*. At the same time Meyer thinks that there is more continuity, consistency, and "system" in Nietzsche's views and their development than is commonly recognized. He regards him as a thinker *par excellence*. He has high words of praise too for his poetry—at least some of it. The conditions of a great letter-writer, however, he finds unfulfilled in him. For one thing, he was too exclusively concerned with his central problems (an excellent selection, I may add, from the five published volumes of Nietzsche's *Briefe* has been made by Dr. R. Oehler, Leipzig, 1911).

It is with diffidence that one ventures to differ from so great an authority on points of interpretation, but I question whether "no transition [for humanity] into a higher order," as asserted in *The Dawn of Day*, refers to a possible order of superman or supermen. It is rather the ordinary thought of immortality that is there in mind. So Meyer appears to me to omit something in his account of the psychological origin of the doctrine of "eternal recurrence"—namely, the element of intellectual necessity; I mean the general philosophical or scientific reasons. He overstates the mythical and mystical features of the idea. If "mysticism" simply means a state of transport and exaltation, Nietzsche certainly participated in it at times; but if it means that exaltation *takes the place* of thought and confuses intellectual perception, I question whether Nietzsche had much part in it. He once happily says, "*Wenn Skepsis und Sehnsucht begatten, entsteht die Mystik.*" It perhaps applied to Newman and certainly does to many refined and tender minds of the present day, but hardly to Nietzsche. Equally is Meyer's view questionable, that Nietzsche would rather have an endless movement in a circle than a fixed state on however high a level, *hence* "eternal recurrence." If I read his mind and soul aright, he would rather have progress *ad infinitum*; but he takes the world's forces and the sum of them, after current "scientific" fashion, as measurable, finite. Hence when a certain point in their development and elaboration is reached, there *can* be no further progress, and, in a world of movement and change, disintegration and recession become inevitable, with, in the course of infinite time, a repetition of the original developmental process. It was not wishes, but the logic of reality (as he saw it) that compelled to "eternal recurrence." But I must not

close without expressing deep respect for this monumental work of Professor Meyer, and for the spirit which animates it.

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THE JEWS OF TODAY. ARTHUR RUPPIN. With an Introduction by JOSEPH JACOBS. Henry Holt & Co. 1913. Pp. xxiv, 310.

This is a translation of a book which first appeared in 1904, and in a second form in 1911. The author exhibits the dangers which threaten Judaism from the facility with which the Jews have always been assimilated to the environing population and absorbed in it, a process which is going on in our own time with increasing rapidity; he discusses the causes and phases of this assimilation, and the remedy, which, in his opinion, is to be found only in a re-created Jewish nationality, having a Hebrew-speaking Jewish state in Palestine as its centre. Whatever may be thought of this theory, the description of the actual conditions of the Jews in the several European countries and in America and the large body of statistics which Dr. Ruppín has compiled, make the volume instructive reading and useful for reference.

G. F. MOORE.

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THE PROBLEM OF INDIVIDUALITY. HANS DRIESCH, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Heidelberg. The Macmillan Company. \$1.00.

Is life a mechanism and nothing more? Is it possible to interpret what happens in the living body wholly in terms of physics and chemistry? Can a complete interpretation of Nature be made in terms of bodies moving in space? These are some of the many formulations of the problem of "Vitalism *vs.* Mechanism," and some of those discussed by Professor Driesch in his latest book, *The Problem of Individuality*. As those who are familiar with the earlier works of the same author would expect, the present volume is an attempt to defend the vitalistic thesis. To Driesch, as to philosophically-minded biologists generally, nature and life may be only partially interpreted in terms of mechanism. To demonstrate the truth of vitalism and the inadequacy of the mechanistic hypothesis Driesch in the present volume uses both inductive and deductive methods of reasoning.

The author finds the fundamental problem of vitalism presented by the phenomena of embryology, regeneration, and adaptation—

all of which tend towards *wholeness* in the individual. "Is organic individual wholeness produced on the basis of a machine, *i.e.*, by processes which, though arranged in a special given manner are in themselves inorganic processes, as known from physics and chemistry; or are there in the organism whole-making processes *sui generis*, *i.e.*, processes not reducible to the forms of inorganic becoming?" Driesch accepts the second alternative, and advances three inductive proofs to support the conclusion that a non-physical, non-spacial directive agency which tends towards wholeness operates within the living organism. In his first argument he lays special stress upon the remarkable results of experiments upon the eggs of lower animals and upon the Ascidian *Clavellina*. If the blastula stage of such an animal as the sea-urchin be cut in any direction, it will grow—provided the fragment be not less than one-quarter the size of the whole blastula—into a complete organism, just as if it had not been cut at all. Similarly, if the branchial apparatus of *Clavellina* be cut into two pieces in any direction whatever, each piece will grow into a complete *Clavellina*.

Driesch argues that were an organism constructed on the principle of a machine, such growth—or restitution—making for wholeness would be impossible. Fragments of a *machine* could not of themselves restore the missing parts of the machine nor do what the entire machine could do. The experiments on the blastulæ appear to Driesch to indicate that at this stage of development the organism is not differentiated in the three dimensions of space. But the adult organism which develops from the blastula—or from fragments of the blastula—is so differentiated. Since it seems to Driesch that the determination of this result could not have been internal or mechanistic, he concludes that in the processes of development and of regeneration of lost parts—processes which make for the integrity of the individual—some agency is at work which is not of the type of chemico-physical agents.

This first proof of vitalism sounds very plausible if it be assumed that there is nothing mechanistic or machine-like within the fragments of the blastula or the branchial apparatus. The difficulty with Driesch's first proof of vitalism is that his premise is notoriously weak. In maintaining it as a valid argument in the year 1914, he wholly ignores the evidence of definite organ-forming substances in the cells of blastulæ as well as the evidence that the cells of organisms possess in their nucleus a structure which may, and probably does, mechanically determine their development. It has been experimentally shown that a particular alteration in the substance

of the nucleus of an egg effects a definite alteration in the organism which develops from the egg. The more recent experiments in embryology and regeneration strongly support the mechanistic hypothesis.

Driesch's second independent proof of vitalism is based on the fact that the egg from which the organism develops is formed within the ovary as a result of thousands of repeated cell-divisions. He regards this fact as evidence that the organism cannot be pre-formed machine-like within the egg. "How could a machine be divided and divided—and *always remain the same?*" He concludes that the ovarian eggs are essentially undifferentiated. How then can an organism, obviously differentiated in the three dimensions of space, arise from such an egg? Since he finds no evidence of structural or mechanistic determination of such a remarkable result, Driesch concludes that it is necessary to postulate some non-mechanical, directive agency to which he gives the Aristotelian name *entelechy*. The objections to the second proof are the same as those already stated against the first and it is not necessary to repeat them. The one who raises such objections, however, if he be open-minded, cannot help admitting that the precise way in which the nucleus mechanistically determines the development of the egg is wholly obscure. But it is well known that ferments or hormones may effect amazing results in a *living* body.

The third proof of vitalism is found by Driesch in the phenomena of instinctive action and of intelligent behavior. The main feature of instinctive action is the fact that it is not based on experience but is "perfect in its manifoldness *the very first time it occurs*, just like regenerations." It is not a little surprising that while most biologists regard the definiteness and limitation of instinctive action as a reason for regarding the organism as a mechanism, Driesch draws precisely the opposite conclusion, viz., that instincts prove that the organism is not merely a machine. In intelligent action the organism does not merely repeat mechanically past experience like a phonograph. The significant fact is that it uses and utilizes its past experiences and therefore shows itself more than a machine. Man is "master of his personal history." In his behavior "nothing is fixed in the sense of what fixation means in anything like a machine." To the reviewer this assertion sounds rather optimistic, but it may readily be granted that an interpretation of human action in terms of mechanism alone is inadequate.

Driesch's *entelechy* is neither a property of matter nor a form of energy. Neither is it intellect nor soul. *Entelechy* is assumed to

operate, sometimes by suspending and making potential transfers of energy in the living system, sometimes by relaxing its suspensory action so as to allow chemical or physical events to occur. Since by such operation the total amount of energy in a given system would be neither increased nor diminished, entelechy would not violate the principle of the conservation of energy.

Since, however, through the operation of entelechy upon physical and chemical processes in the organism it would not be possible to predict from a knowledge of the physical conditions *alone* just what would follow any particular change of conditions, the practical result of the action of entelechy would be experimental indeterminism. Therefore Driesch postulates experimental indeterminism but still holds to absolute determinism. How entelechy might act under definite conditions could be foretold on the basis of previous experience, but predictions would not have the same certainty as in the case of events in the non-living world.

Driesch regards the logic of vitalism as a branch of the logic of *wholeness*. He assumes as an axiomatic principle that "the degree of manifoldness of a natural system cannot increase from itself," since the conclusions must be implicit in the premises. But a living system may pass from one state to another which is more complex. In such a process an arrangement which is a mere sum is transformed into an arrangement of the character of unity or totality of some kind. There is no logical necessity for assuming a machine-like preformation as a prerequisite for such an increase in complexity in the system, which is effected by a rearrangement of the component elements through the agency of entelechy, which thus acts as "unifying causality."

The author attempts to bring his vitalistic doctrine into conformity with the Kantian system by asserting that wholeness or individuality is a category as valid as those recognized by Kant and his followers.

Wholeness is manifested not only by the biological individual but also by the race, and therefore Driesch is led to postulate a supra-personal kind of entelechy that realizes itself in space in the phylogenetic or historic process, just as personal entelechy realizes itself in ontogeny. The existence of a supra-personal unity, however, is attested by the existence of moral consciousness in man more than by anything else.

May nature be regarded as *one ordered whole*? Driesch finds in the existence of "laws of nature" evidence of wholeness in nature. But he is unable to accept the Spinozian dogma of the union of a

universal teleology and mechanism. Not every character of the Absolute has a spacial symbol. However, from our piecemeal experience we can never say whether there be not a monism of order in the Absolute. We simply "know in part," as St. Paul says.

While a monism of order is not altogether impossible, Driesch is compelled to accept the dualistic doctrine in spite of all logical postulates. "The Absolute is in any case such as to possess properties which at least in part are not symbolized to the human mind in spacial symbols." "What is not a mere belief and not a matter of feeling is the existence of factual wholeness in nature, the existence of something that is certainly more than a mere sum. And to have proved this, and thus to have given a sound foundation to all further speculations about natural and metaphysical *wholeness*, is the merit of vitalism."

Since *The Problem of Individuality* is itself a summary of the views of Professor Driesch concerning the science, logic, and philosophy of vitalism, it is impossible to do justice to the argument advanced by Driesch in a brief review. The book will interest the philosophical thinker as well as the biologist as the expression of a highly original and independent investigator in the field of vitalism. Whatever may be the merits of the inductive or the deductive argument of Driesch, most will agree with him that life includes more than is dreamed of in the materialistic philosophy. To have emphasized this in departments of thought and investigation where materialistic assumptions prevail is one of the great services of such men as Driesch and Bergson.

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CRIME AND ITS REPRESSION. GUSTAV ASCHAFFENBURG. Translated by ADELBERT ALBRECHT. Little, Brown, & Co. 1913. Pp. xxvi, 331.

Gustav Aschaffenburg is known to American psychologists as the former assistant to Kraepelin in the psychiatric laboratory at Heidelberg, and to American criminologists as the editor of the *Monatsschrift für Kriminalpsychologie und Strafrechtsreform*. He is known popularly through the experiment which he performed at Cologne upon type-setters, testing the amount of work accomplished with and without "moderate" dosage of alcohol. This experiment is frequently quoted by the Scientific Temperance Federation and the Poster Committee of the Boston Associated Charities.

This volume, *Crime and its Repression*, was first published in 1903 under the title *Das Verbrechen und seine Bekämpfung*. It

has been selected by the committee on Translations of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology as a work which may "best represent" one of the "various schools of thought in criminal science." The committee has made no mistake in translating this work by Aschaffenburg. His training in psychiatry added to an understanding of statistical method, and a deep well-tempered interest in and appreciation of social problems, has made possible the preparation of a book which is original and valuable in a high degree.

The volume opens with a Preface by Maurice Parmelee and an Introduction to the English Version by Arthur C. Train. Together these two statements offer a useful summary and criticism of the book that follows. Aschaffenburg begins his treatise with a discussion of problems and methods, and proceeds to a treatment in Part I of the social causes of crime, in Part II of the individual causes of crime, and in Part III of the struggle against crime.

Part I shows the relation of crimes to season, noting the usual correlation of a high rate of sexual crime and suicide with the early summer months, and a high larceny rate with the winter months, analyzing shrewdly the ultimate psychological causes of these phenomena. Similarly, in the next section, which deals with races and their relation to crime, he notes the low criminality rate among Jews, the higher rate among Protestants, and the still higher criminal rate among Catholics, and traces the causes of these variations to economic conditions and to the *mores* of each group. The next sections deal with the variation in crime in city and country, the influence of alcohol and other drugs on crime, accord special treatment to prostitution and gambling, and correlate crimes with general economic and social conditions.

Part II deals with the parentage of criminals, their education, age, sex-distribution, and domestic status. It examines the physical and mental characteristics of the criminal and the mental diseases among criminals. The overstatements of Lombroso are laid bare, but the important part played by Lombroso in initiating psychological study of the criminal is conceded.

Part III is penological, dealing primarily with the methods of punishing and preventing crime. Especial emphasis in Part III is laid upon modern penological methods—suspended sentence, probational release, indeterminate sentence, and the special treatment of juveniles. The necessity of individually adapted treatment for each case and of permanent detention of dangerous defectives is emphasized. Altogether it is an excellent concise summary of improved modern methods of treating criminals.

There are few weaknesses in Aschaffenburg's treatise, for the tone is in general dispassionate, the method of treatment analytical, searching, and psychological. Illustrations are largely drawn from and references frequently made to sexual crime and alcoholism, in which the author has made frequent and important studies. The treatment of these two subjects, however, is not altogether above reproach. In introducing the subject of alcohol on page 69, he states that "the descendants of inebriates are seldom of normal health and intelligence," and quotes Demme's study of the children in two groups of ten families each, and Legrain's study of 761 children of drunkards. Aschaffenburg appears to deduce from these studies that alcoholism has been the cause of the degeneracy of the offspring—a conclusion which is not clearly warranted by the facts of the cases in question. There is reason to believe that mental deficiency or some form of nervous instability was a factor prior to the alcoholism of the parents in these families, that the drinking of the parents was but a symptom of this feeble-mindedness or nervous instability. It is probable that the children were feeble-minded or otherwise degenerate through inheritance, perhaps according to the Mendelian formula—because their parents were deficient or carriers of deficiency. Degeneracy of parents, not alcoholism of parents, is the presumptive cause of the degeneracy of the children of inebriates until the contrary is clearly proved. (See H. H. Goddard's recent study *Feeble-mindedness, Its Causes and Consequences*.) The use of a diagram like that on page 71, which deals with the offspring of a single drunkard, concerning the mentality and heredity of whom nothing is told us, is unscientific and altogether unworthy of a writer of Aschaffenburg's general ability. The dispassionateness which characterizes the rest of the book appears to be lacking in this section which deals with alcohol, and to lead to loose statements like the following: "We cannot over-estimate (*sic*) the significance of these facts for the prophylaxis of crime." Loose phrasing of this sort may have some value in an emotional appeal to action, in the pulpit or on the public platform, but it is quite out of place in a work of science.

The author's treatment of prostitution is not satisfactory. He does not sufficiently consider the basic causes and their removal. He furthermore urges segregation of prostitutes and medical oversight, and is thus at variance with the conclusions of American vice commissions. He may have reached his conclusions concerning social control of this evil by a careful and scientific process, but he fails to reveal that process adequately and does not consider the

counter-arguments. His most important constructive suggestion in this section is for the rigorous prosecution of persons who make profit from commercialized immorality.

It should be said of this work, despite the faults suggested above, that it is a notable addition to criminological literature. Its major contribution within this field is the analysis of the factors which produce crime, but the book has the further merit of being concise, sane, comprehensive, and readable. This volume of the Criminal Science Series will be of marked value both to the specialist and to the general reader.

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HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

A HISTORY OF FREEDOM OF THOUGHT. J. A. BURY, F.B.A., Regius Professor of Modern History, Cambridge University (Home University Library). Henry Holt & Co. 1913. Pp. 256. 50 cents.

It is strange that a writer of Professor Bury's great ability and immense learning should have cared to write a bitter anti-religious pamphlet of this kind. Considered in that light, it is very well done. All the absurdities which have been taught in the name of Christianity are duly paraded, and all the intolerance and cruelties which have been shown in defending them are duly paraded. And no doubt it is not amiss that we should from time to time be reminded with some plainness of speech how extraordinarily weak has been the evidence upon which learned men were at one time prepared to defend stories and beliefs now abandoned as incredible, and be led to face the question whether much which is still gravely defended by educated men rests upon any better grounds. In fact, I should regard this book as very wholesome reading for orthodox persons, but as very bad for those whose prejudices it will confirm and whose passions it will stimulate. It will be bad for them, because the book wholly fails to suggest that there has been any higher side to the religion of the past, or that there is in the present any form of the Christian religion which is independent of the impossible historical and scientific views with which that religion was once associated, and which may still commend itself to persons as learned and as enlightened as Professor Bury himself. In fact, this little book is a piece of apologetic of the worst order. Arrogant contempt for opponents is as little to be commended in the apologist of "Free-thought" as in the apologist of Christianity. It is just as bad for "free-thinkers" to suppose that all Christians are fools as it is for Christians to imagine that all "free-thinkers" are knaves.

As a rule, of course, the actual facts are correctly given; but, looking at the matter merely from the point of view of objective history, Professor Bury's generalizations seem to me often one-sided and unwarranted. He systematically minimizes the severity and extent of the pagan persecutions, and he essays, in a truly Gibbonian spirit, to reduce the catalogue of the martyrdoms. All recent research has, if I am not mistaken, tended in quite an opposite direction. When Professor Bury declares that during the later persecutions "no effort was made to suppress Christian literature," he states what every one who possesses an elementary acquaintance with that literature at first hand, knows to be false. It is strange that the editor of Gibbon should have made such a mistake. Gibbon (chap. 16) quite correctly records the efforts made during the persecution of Diocletian to secure the surrender of the Scriptures and other sacred books of the Christians; nor does Dr. Bury in his notes hint at any dissent. This champion of liberty appears disposed almost to justify the persecutions on the ground that, if the Christians were not suppressed, they would become persecutors of paganism. It is grossly unjust to say that "according to the humane doctrine of the Christians, pagan, that is, merely human, virtues were vices," without a word to remind the uninstructed reader of the enormous accumulation of patristic testimony which would be produced against this hideous doctrine of St. Augustine. Professor Bury makes no distinction between one Christian age and another. The doctrine never became the accepted doctrine of the Church even in the Middle Ages. I need only remind the reader of Dante's attitude towards Aristotle and Virgil. Here is another amazing *suggestio falsi*: "The Greek physician Hippocrates had based the study of medicine and disease on experience and methodical research. In the Middle Ages men relapsed to the primitive notions of a barbarous age" (p. 64). The uninformed reader would hardly gather from these words that the study of medicine in every mediæval university was based upon the study of Hippocrates and other Greek physicians. The statement that "anatomy was forbidden, partly perhaps on account of the doctrine of the resurrection of the body" (p. 65) is directly opposed to fact. Dissections were practised in every mediæval university, and the study of anatomy was required for medical degrees. Professor Bury's view of the Middle Ages is essentially the ignorant view—quite as unhistorical a view as the partisan pictures of the "ages of faith" indulged in by such writers as Cardinal Gasquet. The whole book is in the same tone. As a popular handbook of anti-Christian

polemics, it will no doubt serve its purpose; as a contribution to history its value is small.

HASTINGS RASHDALL.

NEW COLLEGE, OXFORD.

THE PRACTICE OF CHRISTIANITY. By the author of *Pro Christo et Ecclesia*. Macmillan & Co. 1913. Pp. 291. \$1.25.

This small volume is a timely and needed study in distinctively Christian ethics. The whole world of social relations is conceived as it would be, reconstructed on the moral principles of Jesus. The regeneration begins personally but embodies itself in all the aspects of the collective life. "The State, the family, thrift, competition, the penal system, warfare," are items showing the detail into which the exposition is carried. The result and the process portrayed can hardly be looked upon as wholly valid or probable, but they serve to bring out impressively the "regulative principle"—"kindness with trustfulness as the foundation of all goodness"—which Christ introduced, its final authority, and radical and beneficent working. The spirit of the book is one of devout loyalty and faith towards "Our Lord," of informed social feeling, and optimistic expectation for humanity.

The style of the writer is over-homiletic for persuasion or the sustained enjoyment of the reader. It suggests a background of long accumulation of sermonic material and reflections, which, however in their abundance and variety may richly furnish forth other sermon-writers in turn, and supply many shrewd observations; as this, for instance, on one of the apologies for militarism—"that it is only defensive, not for any offensive purpose": "It is always easy to discover rights that are imperilled or weakness needing to be defended. In Aesop's fable, the wolf was probably perfectly sincere, because he was so much occupied with desire to tear the lamb that he could easily persuade himself that his water was being sullied."

CHARLES L. NOYES.

WINTER HILL, MASS.

THE NEW TESTAMENT IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: A Survey of Recent Christological and Historical Criticism of the New Testament. MAURICE JONES, B.D. Macmillan & Co. Pp. xxiv, 467.

The early years of the twentieth century have been prolific in books about the New Testament. The nineteenth-century study of the "life of Christ" demonstrated that for a biography of Jesus

Christ the materials are insufficient, and in that field new phases of the study have set in; some writers attempting brief characterizations like that of Bousset, while others have studied the earliest stages and final outcome of the church's faith in Jesus as Christ and Lord. Still other investigations have treated the question, now a burning one, of what place in the picture of Jesus' thought and person the eschatological ideas of the Gospels shall be allowed to have. The problem of the relative part of Jesus and of Paul in bringing about Christianity as we know it has produced a whole group of books. And the fundamental inquiry as to whether we can have critically tested historical knowledge of the life and ideas of Jesus Christ, sufficient to be the basis of any opinions about him at all, has been raised with louder insistence than ever before; so that the sceptical view has been carried to the extreme of contending that no historical person who can be identified with the Jesus of the Gospels ever existed.

In the study of Paul fresh light has been offered from new discoveries and the study of the Greek language of Paul's contemporaries which has been stimulated thereby, and from wider knowledge and better understanding of the various religions by which civilized men of that age were already seeking for salvation.

A competent survey of all this literature—books and articles—would be instructive in a high degree. But it would need to be made by a master, possessing rare qualities of knowledge, thought, and style, and powers of insight, selection, and generalization which might better be devoted to more original work. Mr. Jones, in spite of his wide reading, has not produced such a survey. The list of topics which the literature treats and the bibliographies are the most interesting things in his book; his accounts of the controversies and his criticism of the various positions taken in the discussion will not give the reader an adequate acquaintance with the matter. Even the bibliographies are unsatisfactory, because they are not complete, and because foreign books are usually regarded as if they were written at the date when they were translated into English; while the writer has often failed to detect the relative unimportance of articles which he treats at length.

The latter half of the book takes up recent monographs, articles, and commentaries on the several books of the New Testament, beginning with the Synoptic problem and ending with Revelation. The chapters vary in merit. Those which are most nearly confined to the modest aim of reporting the opinions of others are the best. But this book cannot be recommended as a substitute for a proper

New Testament Introduction, and it does not really add anything of value to current literature about the New Testament.

JAMES HARDY ROPES.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

THE HISTORICAL CHRIST; or An Investigation of the Views of Mr. J. M. Robertson, Dr. A. Drews, and Prof. W. B. Smith. FRED C. CONYBEARE, M.A., F.B.A., D.D., LL.D. Watts & Co., London. 1914.

A refutation of the extravagant theory of the Idealistic Monists, who deny the historicity of Jesus and the authenticity of all the New Testament writings, and of nearly all those outside the New Testament which bear on the early history of Christianity, has value when it emanates from "The Rationalist Press Association." It has greater value when written by so thoroughly scientific an authority as Dr. Conybeare. Dr. Conybeare is not limited to his unrivalled studies in the ancient literature of the Armenian Church, but understands historical criticism. A radical himself, he is well qualified to expose the shallowness of the hyper-critics of the Drews school, who count in their number every class of writer *except* a historical critic, and he fulfils the task *con amore*.

B. W. BACON.

YALE SCHOOL OF RELIGION.

THE GOSPELS IN THE LIGHT OF HISTORICAL CRITICISM. FREDERICK HENRY CHASE, Bishop of Ely. New York. Macmillan & Co. 1914. \$1.50.

This small book contains a reprint of an essay published in 1905 in the volume entitled *Cambridge Theological Essays*, an essay which received favorable notice at the time on account of its lucidity, its compactness, and the tone of devoutness and candor which characterized it.

To the present reviewer the value of the book seems to consist in its brief, clear statement of certain points, like the description of New Testament sources (pp. 9 ff.), influences which have moulded the tradition of sayings (pp. 21 ff.), comparison of the witness concerning the resurrection as found in Paul and in the Gospels (pp. 32 ff.), in the author's warm recognition of the duty of applying historical criticism to the New Testament, and in his expression of the spirit of caution and sense of religious values in which that criticism should be applied.

But the present significance of the book is doubtless to be found in the opening essay, which is new. Here the author speaks not

as an individual investigator but as a Bishop of the Church of England, concerning the limits of freedom of inquiry for the clergy, or rather "the limitations of the area within which a clergyman's conclusions in these questions may range" (p. xiv). In saying that the scientific worker in his consideration of evidence is "bound to take account of the Creed of the Church" (p. ix), he speaks with all gentleness and with respect for a spirit of complete candor and honesty, but the warning is unmistakable. If one, on the basis of the evidence, is forced to conclude that "Jesus Christ in his entrance into and departure from the world was like other men" (p. xiii), he has reached a conclusion contradictory to that of the Creed, and if the Bishop withdraws from such a student the authority to teach in the Church's name, "such action would without question be grave; it is only a facile rhetoric which could stigmatize it as intolerant" (p. xiv).

The timeliness of the republication of this essay becomes therefore apparent. It contains help towards reaching conclusions on certain important questions which shall be in harmony with those of the creeds. The question of the bodily resurrection of our Lord is discussed anew in the preface because in the meantime new treatments of the theme have appeared. Such a work as Lake's *The Resurrection of Jesus Christ* (1907) is probably in the author's mind, although he does not mention it by name. A careful reading of the argument, however, fails to reveal that he has added anything to the discussion in the original essay in the way of sifting of evidence. The new material consists rather of the addition of thoughts upon the nature of Christ's resurrection-body and upon the importance of the doctrine to the life of Christianity. Upon the question of the evidences for the Virgin Birth there is no new light. In the original essay the discussion of this point is left with the admission that the evidence is slight, but attention is called to the consideration that there are serious difficulties encountered in explaining the genesis of the story on any other basis than that of its historic truth. It is difficult not to think that to the clerical investigator the slightness of evidence in this case weighs less than in other cases it would in honesty be bound to weigh. At least it is noticeable that he leaves more room for difference of opinion in reaching results upon the question of the belief in miracles in the traditional sense, and we cannot help remembering that freedom here is not limited by the existence of any definite statements on this subject in the historic creeds.

On the whole, the responsibility of the religious teacher in an established church is stated with courage and conviction; but dis-

cussion is sure to be provoked as to the relation between the view here pronounced and real freedom of investigation, and further as to the place of authoritative creeds in a living church.

ELIZA H. KENDRICK.

WELLESLEY COLLEGE.

THE DIVINE NAMES IN GENESIS. JOHN SKINNER, M.A., D.D. Hodder & Stoughton. 1914. Pp. viii, 303.

ELOHIM AUSSERHALB DES PENTATEUCH; GRUNDLEGUNG ZU EINER UNTERSUCHUNG ÜBER DIE GOTTESNAMEN IM PENTATEUCH. Beiträge zur Wissenschaft vom Alten Testament, herausgegeben von Rudolph Kittel. Heft 19. FRIEDRICH BAUMGÄRTEL, Lic. Theol. J. C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung. 1914. Pp. viii, 90.

Professor Skinner's book, in the main a reprint of articles which appeared in the *Expositor* during 1913, is a defence of the current "documentary theory" of the Pentateuch against the attacks of Dahse, the most pretentious of its recent assailants. In a number of publications, beginning in 1903 and extending to 1914, the most elaborate of which is his *Textkritische Materialien zur Hexateuchfrage* (Giessen, 1912), Dahse has vigorously championed the contention first put forward by Klostermann some twenty years ago, that the documentary theory is untenable, because it is based on the occurrences of the names Yahwe and Elohim in the Masoretic text, which latter, it is alleged, the Septuagint shows to be utterly corrupt and unreliable precisely in respect to those names.

In spite of some provocation to the contrary from Dahse's pugnacious ally, H. L. Wiener, Skinner maintains an attitude of courtesy and good nature, endeavoring to state his opponents' positions with lucidity and fairness, and avoiding objectionable personalities, though he writes with a vivacity that we do not ordinarily associate with English theologians. The book is good reading, and will give to any student of the Old Testament who happens to be ignorant of the subject matter and merits of this controversy, a very fair idea of both. For the rest, it is gratifying to find an English writer on the Old Testament taking for granted that persons interested in a discussion of this character will understand German, although, oddly enough, the book contains more than the usual amount of elementary information.

The author has no difficulty in showing (1) that, as matters stand today, whatever might have been the case 150 years ago, the only effect of the complete demonstration of Dahse's contentions regard-

ing the Masoretic tradition would be to make a trifle more uncertain the admittedly uncertain (and relatively unimportant) analysis of the so-called JE sections into their supposed constituent elements J and E; (2) that, in point of fact, Dahse's contentions are very far from being demonstrated, the aggregate effect of his efforts being rather to justify the customary neglect of the Septuagintal testimony as to the divine names; and (3) that his attempt to substitute for the documentary theory a constructive hypothesis of his own, to account for the phenomena exhibited by both the Greek and Hebrew texts of the Pentateuch, is fantastic in the extreme and hardly worth the serious consideration of scholars.

There are, of course, numerous points of detail on which individual students of the Old Testament will differ from the author, and some on which he is clearly mistaken. That the completed Pentateuch dates from 444 B.C., is an opinion which is being increasingly abandoned; the Pentateuch, like its counterpart the Synagogue, was the product, not the cause of the Restoration. Παντοκράτωρ is not "the usual rendering in the LXX of *Sebaoth*" (p. 108, footnote); it is the usual rendering only in the Minor Prophets. The Chronicler was anything but "reckless of the distinction between Yahwe and Elohim" (p. 151), as Baumgärtel has clearly shown; nor is it true that "when writing independently, he evinces a preference for Elohim" (p. 150); on the contrary, he very much prefers Adonai, which he spells YHWH. It is not at all certain that "neither sense nor grammar is ever affected by the substitution of one [divine] name for another" (p. 168). Skinner is right in retaining Yahwe in Gen. 16 11 against Dahse and Wiener; the appellative correlate of Yahwe was *el*, "a god" (cf. Nu. 23 f.), and Elohim is neither here nor there in this passage. And the case of Gen. 28 20, where Skinner (p. 42) actually concedes to Dahse that Yahwe should be substituted for Elohim, is by no means clear; since even an Elohist narrative could not avoid Yahwe in verse 21. But in Gen. 12 7b, and again in 16 13, the grammar imperatively demands that Yahwe be replaced by *ha-el*, "the god." Ex. 3 14 f. (unlike Ex. 6 2 f.) does not record the "revelation" of the name Yahwe (p. 28); the whole point of the disclosure of the name to Moses is that it is the name by which the patriarchs had worshipped that deity in times past, and which would perhaps be remembered among their descendants in Egypt. It was to avoid that natural assumption that P supplied the patriarchs with the proper name El Shaddai.

On page 155 Skinner has amusingly furnished better evidence than he knew of the ease with which *κύριος* and *θεός* were confused

by the copyists. He has himself read κύριος for ὁ θεός in a statement of Dahse, with the consequence that he is forced to confess that "the meaning of this paragraph eludes his comprehension," and devotes a paragraph of his own to a bewildered assault upon an imaginary position. One is reminded of the French Deputy haranguing his constituents on the subject of corruption in public life: "So extensive and pervasive, my fellow citizens, is this evil of which I speak, that even I who stand here to address you upon the subject have not wholly escaped it!"

Dahse is admittedly an expert and indefatigable Septuagintal statistician. But statistics are of less than no value—they cumber the ground and clog the mind—except as they serve to verify or to invalidate an hypothesis precipitated by the sound historical sense of a competent investigator. In criticism as in natural science, the thing to be proved is of more importance than the proof, and is, moreover, not to be arrived at without the gift of the spirit. An ounce of Wellhausen's hypothesis, however much modification it may ultimately require, is worth more to Biblical science than tons of Dahse's "facts," the bearing of which remains to be shown. To be sure, the latter has his own hypotheses; but thus far their only service, to those hardy enough to toil in their train, has been to make the plain places rough. "Textual" criticism, like any other, must tend to simplify, or else it is not true.

Nevertheless, this controversy has not been without its value. It has unintentionally brought into notice the fact that the criticism of the last fifty years has left the question of the divine names in Genesis, and throughout the Old Testament, somewhat in the air. Unless one is dealing with inscriptions or original autographs, not even textual problems can be decided without a knowledge of the exact purport of the words under consideration. And if Yahwe and Elohim are indeed characteristic of two distinct yet fairly contemporaneous sources—the practice of P is artificial and perfectly transparent—one cannot help asking, How comes each source to employ its peculiar designation of one and the same deity? Or again, if Yahwe and Elohim have not the same semasiological value, why may not one writer, or any number of writers, employ now one vocable and now the other, according to the needs of the context or the mood of the moment? The circumstance that "*Majestät*," "*Der Kaiser*," and "*Wilhelm der Zweite*" are all used in Germany to allude to one and the same person, is not the slightest justification for assuming that their semasiological values are equal and identical or that the expressions are interchangeable. Except in

certain contexts, "*Wilhelm der Zweite*" in the mouth of a court chamberlain at the Schloss in Berlin would occasion surprise; while "*Majestät*" in the mouth of a street-vendor would be ludicrous.

It is high time this whole subject was tackled seriously and systematically. Both "textual" and "higher" critics have been operating with symbols of uncertain and to some extent mistaken value. Skinner habitually speaks of Elohim as if it were the equivalent of Yahwe, and indicates that El differed from both only in being "an archaic name for the Deity which had ceased to form part of the ordinary spoken language before these narratives were reduced to writing" (p. 106). If he had said that El was essentially an indeterminate appellative and originally associated with a polytheistic conception of Yahwe which our Old Testament has done its best to obscure, he would have been nearer the fact. Driver's treatment of the subject (*Genesis*, p. 403) is more befogging than enlightening, if only because he spells "god" with a capital. As to Elohim, Wiener is quite right in criticising Skinner for treating it as a proper name; but he is wrong in assuming that it was a plain appellative. When used of a single deity, it was a circumlocutory title, which in pre-exilic times was more or less consciously employed as such. The classical Hebrew appellative for "a god" was *el*, and for the determinate "the god" it was *ha-el*. *Elohim* is the indeterminate plural, "gods," which necessarily did duty when the generic idea of "divinity" was to be expressed, whether substantively or (in the genitive) adjectively. And the generic "Divinity" as the designation of a single deity is of course not a plain appellative. It may well be that the customary use of "Divinity" instead of Yahwe implied—like German "*Majestät*"—a certain degree of sophistication, which naturally went hand in hand with other marks of sophistication, and so may serve to characterize and identify an individual source or writer.

Enough has been said to indicate the nature of the studies demanded for the scientific and definitive settlement of the question of "the divine names in Genesis." It is not likely that the findings will have any serious effect upon the documentary theory, in so far as this distinguishes between Nationalist, Deuteronomic, and Levitical sources; though they may modify existing tenets as to the first of these elements. Whatever the outcome, a solid foundation must be laid; and a good beginning in that direction is furnished by Baumgärtel in the methodical little volume whose title appears at the head of this review.

WILLIAM R. ARNOLD.

ANDOVER THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

DIE BRIEFE PETRI UND JUDÄ. Völlig neu bearbeitet von D. RUD. KNOPF.
Vandenhoeck u. Ruprecht, Göttingen. 1912. Pp. 329. 6.40m.

The sixth edition of this volume of the Meyer Series, edited by Kühl, was published in 1897. Its criticism of the three Epistles harmonized with that of the earlier editions of the Meyer Series. The positions taken there were essentially those of Bernard Weiss in his *Der Petrinische Lehrbegriff* and *Theologie des N. T.* First Peter and Jude were maintained to be genuine. The Second Chapter of Second Peter is interpolated into a letter written by the Apostle. First Peter was written to Jewish Christians in Asia Minor, of whose existence this letter is the sole evidence.

The present edition reaches critical conclusions so directly opposite to these as to make the reader ask what the name "Meyer" prefixed to the series stands for. All three letters are pseudepigraphs—First Peter written by a Pauline Christian of the second generation between 90 and 100 A.D., Jude by some unknown believer, perhaps of Syria, between 80 and 100, Second Peter between 150 and 180.

As regards First Peter, the reasons for thinking that the Apostle could not have written it are, (1) the fact that it bears no trace of personal acquaintance with Jesus or of knowledge of his teaching; (2) the mastery of Greek, in respect to which it takes a high place among New Testament writings; (3) the evident influence of the letters of Paul upon its author, apparent not only in his leading thoughts but also in the form of several passages. The last-named fact makes against the theory that the letter is composite; Peter supplying the thoughts and Silvanus or Mark giving them expression. The assumption apparently made in the letter that persecution was beginning in the provinces in which its readers lived, suggests the opening of Domitian's reign as its date. Knopf thinks that the letter was probably written in Asia Minor, and that the greeting in 5:13 from "the fellow-elect in Babylon" (*i.e.*, Rome) was added to strengthen the impression of Petrine authorship.

The date of Jude, Knopf thinks, cannot be precisely determined. The standing it had gained at the beginning of the third century obliges us to place it as early as 150. It contains nothing forbidding our assigning it a much earlier date, even putting it into the first century. As the heresy at which it is aimed seems to have gained a firm foothold in some localities, and to have much in common with the ideas and practices of the Nicolaitans denounced in the Apocalypse, we may believe it to have been written at some time during the last two decades of the century.

Second Peter, which bears plain traces of the influence of Jude, is a Catholic letter written to strengthen the weakening belief of the church in the Parousia. An indication of its date is found in its giving Paul's Epistles a place among the Sacred Scriptures (3 16). "Here the New Testament canon is in plain sight." Our author says that it is much easier to think of such an assertion being made after than before 150. A probable date for the Epistle is 180.

The commentary is written in a free style, with ample use of explanatory historical material, showing in these respects a marked contrast to Kühl's presentation of the letters in the seventh edition. Instead of detached expository comment we find a connected discourse, into which exposition, illustration, and discussion of interpretations differing from the author's are interwoven in a readable context. Those acquainted with Dr. Knopf's *Nachapostolische Zeitalter*, published in 1905, will be reminded of the ample learning and historical tact displayed in that excellent book. A marked feature of the exposition is the use made of the mystery religions in explaining the religious ideas of the readers of First Peter. Knopf differs from Kühl and most other recent commentators in regarding the "spirits in prison," to whom Christ preached after his death (1 Pet. 3 20), not as disembodied human spirits but as the sons of God of Gen. 6 2; thus finding in the passage a modification of the myth told in Enoch 6-11. In 46 the "dead" to whom a preaching was done are men, "the innumerable shades in the wide dark caverns of Hades." "Here appears the proud consciousness which ancient Christianity had of the universal content and value of the Gospel."

To those New Testament students who accept Dr. Knopf's critical conclusions, First Peter, Second Peter, and Jude will take on new interest and value from the help they give in connecting the Christianity of the second century with that of the Apostolic Age. In putting them to this use the author's comments on the text and especially the illustrative material he has collected will be found enlightening.

EDWARD Y. HINCKS.

ANDOVER THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

JEWISH AND CHRISTIAN APOCALYPSES. The Schweich Lectures for 1913. F. C. BURKITT. Oxford University Press. 1914. Pp. viii, 80. 3s.

RELIGIOUS DEVELOPMENT BETWEEN THE OLD AND THE NEW TESTAMENTS. (The Home University Library of Modern Knowledge.) R. H. CHARLES. Henry Holt & Co. Pp. 256. 50 cents.

Few subjects have so greatly increased in importance for the pursuit of historical theology as the study of that period which in-

tervenes between the Old and the New Testaments. There is therefore likely to be considerable interest raised by Professor Burkitt's and Dr. Charles's recently published books.

Professor Burkitt's book is one of those rare publications which appeals both to the educated but unprofessional public and also to a small group of special students. The former will find that the body of the lectures is one of the most interesting and clearest accounts yet published of the general nature and real importance of Apocalyptic literature. The smaller group of specialists will find much interesting and some controversial matter in the appendices.

In the first of his lectures Professor Burkitt expounds the general meaning and importance of the Apocalyptic Idea, and he does so by the interesting method of contrasting the Rabbinical Judaism of Johanan ben Zakkai, which rejected the Apocalyptic Idea, with Christianity, which accepted it and for a time perpetuated its teaching. In his description of the former he does a justice which has often been denied by Christian scholars to the teaching of Johanan ben Zakkai. "This great Rabbi rejected the notion," says Professor Burkitt, "that the Kingdom of God was an external state of things which was just upon the point of being manifested, and (as a corollary) that the person of insight could know something about it beforehand. . . . He kept a sober mind, like Jeremiah before him. He saw the inevitable destruction of Jerusalem; and so, when the crash came, and the sacrifices came to an end, he was prepared to guide Jewish thought and religion into new channels, not less profound, if necessarily more narrow, than those along which they ran of old. He was content to let the future age wait for God's good time, when it should please him to reveal it; and perhaps it was as well that he could not foresee the future, or he might not have had the courage to begin his epoch-making work in the Vineyard at Jamnia."

This raises exceedingly interesting considerations, and I know of no Christian book which brings out so fully as these lectures the fact that Rabbinical Judaism must be credited with a good deed in having kept alive the national existence of the Jews through eighteen centuries, in which they have had neither land nor temple as a rallying point, but have perpetuated their national existence solely by their loyalty to a code of conduct.

The second lecture deals with the Book of Enoch. Here again Professor Burkitt illustrates his point by a comparison between two opposite points of thought, each of value for the history of Christianity. Just as in the first lecture he contrasted the treat-

ment of the Apocalyptic Idea among Christians with that which it received from the Jews, so he now contrasts the general view of the universe given in Enoch with that made popular in the Greco-Roman world by Posidonius. The comparison is entirely justifiable; Enoch cannot be understood until it be realized that it is really an attempt to give a "philosophy of history." "It is," to quote Professor Burkitt, "an attempt to see the world steadily and see it whole, to unify the physical world, the moral world, and the political world, the world, that is, of the national destiny of God's chosen People. It contains a serious attempt to account for the presence of evil in human history, and this attempt claims our attention because it is in essentials the view presupposed in the Gospels, especially the Synoptic Gospels. It is when you study Matthew, Mark, and Luke against the background of the Book of Enoch, that you see them in their true perspective."

That is admirably stated; but I am not sure that Professor Burkitt deals out equal justice to Enoch and Posidonius. For instance, when he says that "it is fair to say that Posidonius was as truly a formative influence on Pagan culture as Enoch was on Christianity," he seems to imply a contrast between the influence of Posidonius on Pagan culture and that which he exercised on Christianity, which is, I think, unjustified. If we treat Posidonius as a symbol for the general stream of thought (and it is in this way that his name seems generally¹ to be used), his influence on Christianity was in the end probably greater than that of Enoch. Again, he is certainly right in saying that Posidonius fails to explain the existence of evil in the world. But does he quite sufficiently recognize the harm done by Enoch to Christianity in explaining evil by an altogether imaginary and erroneous reconstruction of history? Finally, to continue these carping criticisms, I cannot think that Professor Burkitt is right in denying the creative function of thought. He says, "I am not a philosopher and I do not believe that philosophy, or indeed reflection in general, is really creative. Instinct and conviction, often inarticulate, are creative, and man uses his powers of thought and reflection to justify the actions to which his instincts and convictions have led him." There is, no doubt, an element of truth in these remarks, but on the whole I think that there is more untruth. No doubt, instinct is creative, and inarticulate conviction is possibly sometimes creative; but it is surely an exaggeration to

¹In much the same way, and with not much more justification, as we use Q to represent a stream of literary activity. People speak more and more of Posidonius and Q as if they were intimately acquainted with their contents, though in actual fact neither is extant at first hand.

deny that thought has created better things than either of these, and cannot be degraded to the rank of being merely their interpreter.

The third lecture deals with the minor Jewish Apocalypses. The limitations of a review forbid any detailed discussion of the many points of interest raised, but I am glad to notice that Professor Burkitt repeats his objections to Dr. Charles's theories as to the text of the *Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs*.

The last lecture deals with early Christian Apocalyptic writing, but in point of fact does not treat very fully this branch of the subject, largely no doubt owing to the limitations of lecturing. Professor Burkitt suggests that a difference may be drawn between the purely Jewish Apocalyptic found in Mark 13 and in cognate literature, the almost purely Pagan Apocalyptic of the Apocalypse of Peter and related documents, and a third type which endeavors to combine the method of Jewish Apocalypse with the desire to set forth the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation. I notice that he does not discuss the *Shepherd of Hermas*. This is undoubtedly an Apocalypse, and it seems to represent a further development of his third class in that it deals with the problems of existing church life as well as with the doctrine of the Incarnation. The most important part of this lecture is the contention that the *Ascension of Isaiah* is a Christian Apocalypse of the third type. Those acquainted with the subject will realize that in thus treating the *Ascension of Isaiah* as an essentially Christian document, Professor Burkitt is differing from many of those who have studied the subject, and his discussion ought certainly be read by all who are interested in early Christian literature. Personally, I think that he makes out a satisfactory case, and that the attempts to dissect the text into a primitive Jewish document with a series of later Christian interpolations are unsatisfactory; but the subject is difficult and will no doubt meet with extended treatment from specialists.

The appendices cannot be reviewed at length. The most important deals with the Greek text of Enoch, and is an elaborate attempt to show that the text of the Gizeh manuscript is preferable to that of the Ethiopic Version and the quotations of Syncellus. This is a point which can scarcely be appreciated properly except by the somewhat limited class of those who are equally at home in Greek, Aramaic, and Ethiopic, and it would be foolish for others to express positive opinions until the controversy is finished. After reading Professor Burkitt, I am inclined to think that he makes out an exceptionally good case, but I imagine that Dr. Charles will have some reply to make.

Dr. Charles's book on the religious development between the Old and the New Testaments, is, like everything he writes, marked by a deep knowledge of the later Jewish literature; but it is impossible to feel that it is a very satisfactory production. In reading his pages I have been unable to escape the feeling that I can understand what he means only because I have already some knowledge of the facts to which he refers, and am constantly irritated by the apparent assumption of pontifical authority in matters which, after all, are not yet settled. The most useful part of the book is the last two chapters, which give a satisfactory account of the literature of the Old Testament Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha, an admirably clear statement of Dr. Charles's views on all these books, and in many cases a summary of the opinions of other scholars.

The weakest part of the book, which the general editors of the Home University Library ought surely to have dealt with, is the digression into ecclesiastical politics on pages 169 to 184. There is hardly a word in these paragraphs which has anything at all to do with the subject of the book. They are controversial to a high degree, and the views advocated seem to many entirely mischievous. What, for instance, is to be said of such a paragraph as this: "To the thoughtful students of the past and of the present it is not disestablishment, but re-establishment of national Churches that is now necessary, if the Church and State of the various Christian nations would each achieve their highest"? Similarly, the attack on the Roman Catholic Church on page 177 would justify any purchaser of the book in complaining that he bought it to obtain the views of a scholar on ancient religious history, not of an Orangeman on Roman Catholicism. The sad fact is that as soon as Dr. Charles deserts his own subject, the positiveness of his utterance seems to increase in inverse ratio to the controversial character of his statements. For instance, on page 130 Dr. Charles says, "The doctrine of eternal damnation is a Judaistic survival of a still more grossly immoral character. This doctrine is antagonistic in the highest degree to the Sermon on the Mount, where a man is taught to love his enemies even as God does." One can only feel that although Dr. Charles is a very learned scholar on Jewish Apocalyptic writing, he has yet to learn how to treat the New Testament from a scientific standpoint. It is almost incredible that any one should be able to write such a passage and completely ignore the fact that in the Sermon on the Mount we are told, "Whosoever shall say 'Thou fool,' shall be in danger of the fire of Gehenna" (Mt. 5 22); and,

"If thy right hand cause thee to stumble, cut it off and cast it from thee; for it is profitable for thee that one of thy members should perish and not that thy whole body go into Gehenna" (Mt. 5 30). I do not believe in eternal punishment in a physical Hell any more than Dr. Charles does, but surely our opinion on this point cannot blot out the fact that we have the Synoptic Gospels against us.

KIRSOPP LAKE.

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LIVES OF THE ENGLISH MARTYRS DECLARED BLESSED BY POPE LEO XIII IN 1886 AND 1895. Written by Fathers of the Oratory, of the Secular Clergy, and of the Society of Jesus. Completed and edited by DOM BEDE CAMM, O.S.B. Longmans, Green, & Co. 1914. Vol. I, pp. lxvi, 545; Vol. II, xlii, 691. \$5.00, 2 vols.

When Gregory XIII was Pope, the English College at Rome was adorned with a series of frescoes representing English saints and martyrs before the Reformation, and to these were added pictures of modern martyrs who suffered in the reigns of Henry VIII and Elizabeth. The papal permission to include these moderns with the ancients was afterwards adjudged to be an informal but sufficient beginning of the long process of their possible canonization. In this process the holy person is first pronounced Venerable, then Blessed, and at last, after much examination of the matter, Saint. By decree of Pope Leo XIII, all of the martyrs whom the artist had depicted in the fresco with the saints were numbered among the Blessed. They were accorded what is technically called Equipollent Beatification. The faithful in England were permitted to honor them with public veneration. Brief biographies of these sixty-three persons appear in these volumes.

Of course, this kind of writing is hagiography rather than history, but within the limits thus prescribed it is admirably done. Records and documents have been carefully searched, and the results are recorded as quietly and dispassionately as the circumstances permit.

The Blessed show more human nature than appears in most of the conventional saints. "'Sirrah,' says the Lord High Treasurer to Thomas Woodhouse, 'was it you that wrote me a letter the other day?' 'Yes, sir,' saith Mr. Woodhouse, approaching as near his nose as he could, and casting up his head to look him in the face, 'that it was, even I, if your name be Cecil'; whereat the Treasurer, staying awhile, said more coldly than before, 'Why, sir, will ye acknowledge me none other name nor title than Mr.

Cecil?' 'No, sir,' saith Mr. Woodhouse. 'And why so?' saith the Treasurer. 'Because,' saith Woodhouse, 'she that gave you those names and titles had no authority so to do.' 'And why so?' saith the Treasurer. 'Because,' saith Woodhouse, 'our Holy Father the Pope hath deposed her.'"

This is the sort of thing which the Quaker martyrs were forever saying to the Puritan magistrates. In most persecutions there are martyrs who suffer more for their impudence than for their convictions. They are martyred for their bad manners rather than for their good conscience. Their decisive offence consists not in treason or heresy but in approaching as near as they can to the nose of the judge and casting up their head to look him in the face. Under these conditions the most impartial judge finds justice difficult.

But for the most part, the sympathy of the reader is with the martyr. The torturing and killing of honest and devout men who resolutely refuse to do or say what they believe to be wrong, arouses the indignation of fair-minded persons. They hate the substitution of violence for reason. No language is too strong to express the thoughts of their hearts as they read the tragic stories of Thomas More and Bishop Fisher and the last Abbot of Glastonbury.

These emotions are equally aroused, however, by Foxe's *Book of Martyrs*, which ought to be re-read along with these biographies. The war of religion which was fought in England in the sixteenth century is described by Foxe from the point of view of the Protestant army; Dom Camm and his associates describe it from the other side. Foxe glorifies the men whom the Roman leaders killed when they got the chance; Camm praises the virtues of those who fell when the Protestants were victorious. Every war is followed by similarly contrasting biographies. It is perhaps too much to expect that either side, in the heat of such partisan writing, should recognize the provocation or the justice or even the valor of the other. Foxe, at least, is pardonable, writing as he did only five years after the end of the "unlucky and rueful reign of Queen Mary."

It may be set down as a general principle that all the martyrs are right. Every man who for conscience' sake resists even to death the endeavor to compel him to deny the truth, is worthy of our praise. We will give him whatever honorary degree the canon law allows. We will call him Venerable or Blessed or even Saint. But this we will do without any very careful scrutiny of his opinions, and without caring much about the side on which he stood. We will not insist that his idea of the truth must square with ours.

The fact that in a world much dependent upon comfort and prosperity this man put these under his feet and gave his life for a principle, entitles him to a place among the heroes, whether he was a German or a Belgian, whether he called himself a Catholic or a Protestant.

A difference between the Catholic and the Protestant martyrs is that the Catholics suffered mostly in courts secular, the Protestants in courts ecclesiastical. The Catholics were put to death for treason, the Protestants for heresy. The Catholics made themselves obnoxious by their allegiance to the Pope, the Protestants by their interpretation of Scripture. It is to the disadvantage of the fame of the Catholic martyrs that they lost their lives in a losing cause. The Pope, whose rights they maintained so nobly, was put out in spite of them, and religion in England was rather helped than hindered thereby. The Protestant martyrs, on the other hand, died to secure a freedom of thought and speech in which we gratefully rejoice today.

The chief interest and value of these books is in the careful accounts which they give of the devotion of obscure men. Nobody will ever tell the story of Thomas More so well as William Roper did; but Thomas Woodhouse, and John Nelson, and Ralph Sherwin, and Robert Johnson, and William Lacy, and a score of others are new accessions to the friendship of the general reader.

GEORGE HODGES.

EPISCOPAL THEOLOGICAL SCHOOL, CAMBRIDGE.

THE WESTERN REBELLION OF 1549. (An account of the Insurrections in Devonshire and Cornwall against Religious Innovations in the Reign of Edward VI). FRANCES ROSE-TROUP. Smith, Elder, & Co. 1913. Pp. xvi, 520. \$5.00.

Mrs. Rose-Troup's book has definitely to do with the uprising in the southwestern part of England caused by the publication of the Prayer Book of 1549 and the enforcing of radical religious changes. It brings into especial prominence the religious condition of the people of Devon and Cornwall, their contentment with the older forms of the faith, their resistance to innovations of any kind, even to the point of the attack on Exeter and of the defence of the adjoining country against the king's soldiers, their willing self-sacrifice for institutions that gratified real spiritual need, and their consequent annihilation in large numbers. In writing the book Mrs. Rose-Troup's particular service has been to show that this south-

western rebellion was worthy of more attention than it has as yet received from any of the English historians; that it was primarily religious rather than agrarian, and that it represented a large number of people militantly opposed to the policy of Edward VI and actively loyal to the old Roman forms. The study will be of value not only to students of English political history, but to those looking for further information in regard to the attitude of the English towards the Prayer Book.

HENRY B. WASHBURN.

EPISCOPAL THEOLOGICAL SCHOOL, CAMBRIDGE.

IN THE SERVICE OF THE KING. A PARSON'S STORY. JOSEPH B. DUNN.
G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1915. Pp. x, 158. \$1.25.

Autobiography is always interesting. This book is pre-eminently so, because the emphasis is laid not upon the events of the author's life but upon their bearing on the experience of ministers. It is full of cheerfulness, courage, humor, and deep piety; full of stimulus for those who fish for men.

THE PAPERS OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF CHURCH HISTORY, Second Series, Volume IV, edited by Professor William W. Rockwell, and published by G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1914 (pp. xxii, 215; \$3.00), contains, in addition to Reports of three Meetings, Addresses and Papers of permanent value. Among these are "Servatus Lupus, a Humanist of the Ninth Century," by the late president, Dr. Samuel M. Jackson; "The Mediæval National Church," by the president, Professor J. C. Ayer, Jr.; "The Stigmata of St. Francis," by C. H. Lyttle; "John Huss," by D. S. Schaff; "The Relation of Wessel Gansvoort to the Reformation," by E. W. Miller; "Luther and Toleration," by J. A. Faulkner; "The College of Cardinals and the Veto," by H. B. Washburn; "Religious History of the Negroes in the South," by R. C. Reed.

FREDERIC PALMER.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

THE DREAD OF RESPONSIBILITY. ÉMILE FAGUET, Member of the French Academy. Translated, with introduction, by EMILY JAMES PUTNAM.
G. P. Putnam's Sons. Pp. 221.

This brilliant monograph may properly claim the attention both of the psychologist and of the student of society. Its thesis is that the French people, mentally keen and able as they are, are unwilling

to accept, or temperamentally inhibited from accepting, the responsibilities which their various professions and occupations would naturally impose on them, and that the results of this tendency make themselves felt in the administration of justice, in the life of the family, in the history of the professions, and in the political life of the nation as a whole. "The French character," M. Faguet says, "is not on as high a level as the French mind, and that is the cause of all the trouble." The French mind is of the very first order. But the benefits which this intellectual power should render do not come to the fore, because as a people the French are, the writer thinks, light, wanting in character and will.

"We are prompt to give in. We are children, we are greybeards, we are never—I speak of the majority—in the prime of life. Without being lazy—far from it—we like to lie back on those who make us work. It is the paradox of our nature. We like to surrender ourselves to the State while allowing it to impose even heavy tasks upon us. The basis of this paradoxical inclination is the lack of personal will, and this lack of personal will itself comes from the horror of responsibility."

This thesis is supported by arguments based on a large array of facts. The first group of these is drawn from the state of legal procedure in France. The author says that the whole system of law (in France) and the whole legal usage of the régime which followed 1789 are dominated by the idea that he who judges is irresponsible, and that no blame is to be cast upon him. "In fact, the judge does not judge in equity, but in accordance with the law. In other words, he is not a judge, he is a clerk."

In this respect the French judges are compared unfavorably with English judges, and one is reminded here of the comparison which Francis Parkman drew between the French and English régimes in their American colonies during the long period which ended with the English occupation of Canada and the West. The French leaders were expected, Parkman says, to refer back continually to headquarters in Paris for instructions as to the conduct of their affairs. The Englishmen stood and marched forward, each man for himself, but with the sense that they were all working for the whole.

"The great vice of the bench in France," M. Faguet writes, "is that it is a career, like the department of registration, which one enters very young, at a very small salary, and in which, as everywhere, one advances very slowly if he confines himself to the correct performance of his duties; and where, as everywhere, one advances rapidly if he renders services to the government. Well, a man seeks advancement, he is dominated by the care for advancement, and he often does what is necessary to obtain it.

In England the bench is not a career; it is the crown of a career. There they make judges of old barristers, men who have achieved their career, and a brilliant one, at

the bar, and who have there formed habits of independence which they do not lose; moreover they have no reason to desire advancement because there is hardly anything left to advance to."

Among other examples illustrating the unfortunate side of this situation M. Faguet examines at some length the legal management of the questions involved in the decision of the Court of Cassation with regard to the final disposition of the case of Captain Dreyfus. This decision was evidently inspired, he says, not by a desire to do legal justice to the situation but to satisfy the government. The civil court felt itself irresponsible and wanted to be so. It said virtually, "Every one will understand that in bending the law to put an end to the Dreyfus case I obey the desire of the government. Carry your grievance to the government." Then the writer goes on to say:

"But what sort of a bench is that? It is a very wise bench, very prudent, very learned, even very honest, from which every thought of responsibility has vanished; that is the whole trouble. One of its ancestors, under the Restoration, said to the government of the time, 'The court gives decisions, not services.'"

Passing next to the professions, the author says the Frenchman's

"passionate desire, whether for himself or for his sons or for his daughters, is a profession of complete repose. . . . The fear of risk among us is appalling. The greatest insult you can offer the French bourgeois is to say to him, 'You ought to have your daughter learn a trade.' 'A trade? dressmaking? for what do you take me?' 'A less lucrative trade, school-teacher, professor.' 'A student? for what do you take me?'"

This same habit of mind, he believes, regulates the family life, and—to speak of only one point—determines the low birth-rate so characteristic of French society.

The most important portion, perhaps, of the whole argument relates to the political constitution and the political customs of the French people. The writer contrasts here the "real (though often slighted) responsibility" of the king with the relative irresponsibility of each of the constituent parts of the present government. "In our day," he says, "we have so constitutionally limited the responsibility of power as to make it practically nil." Really the president of the French Republic is a cipher, and yet is the nominal head. The author considers that France is the best example of a "pure democracy," the only other equally good example being the Athenian Republic during a short period. The Spartan, the Roman, and the Venetian Republics were, he thinks, not democ-

racies, but aristocracies; and "as for the American Republic, it is a constitutional monarchy, and nothing else."

This would not be the place to go far in the study of these conclusions and the consideration in detail of the arguments that are declared to lead to them. It will be enough to say that M. Faguet believes the best government to be an aristocracy, but an aristocracy not social but real—that is, based on merit and the power of co-operation.

"The aristocratic element in a nation is all that part which has enough of vitality and of cohesive force and of sense of responsibility to form a group, an association, an assemblage of parts, an organism, to become a living thing, that is to say, a collective person."

The writer admits, however, that the present system might be made to work fairly well if all persons concerned would consent to recognize the responsibility that rests on them to assume to their full extent the powers and obligations which are theirs by law. This brings us back to the main thesis of the book—namely, that while the French mind is of the very best sort, the French character and will do not match up to it.

Referring, in the last paragraph, to Nietzsche's much-talked-about "will to power," M. Faguet says,

"There is a great deal to be said about that; but there is a will of power that cannot be too highly recommended to and wished for those one loves, beginning with oneself; it is the will of power over oneself."

The reviewer does not feel competent to say whether the author of this book has marshalled his facts justly; and indeed, one criticism is made by the translator, Miss Emily James Putnam, in her interesting introduction. However this may be, it is an eminently useful task to call attention to the significance of a great psychological tendency such as that which the author defines under the name of the dread of responsibility. To discuss the thesis here involved from the psychological standpoint would again carry us too far. The reviewer would only say that in his opinion it is eminently desirable to get away from psychological characterizations which imply a lack and failure, and to substitute for them characterizations that call attention to active forces which are at work. Everything in the world is active. Failure is the result of a conflict in which tendencies of an inferior sort but still active gain the ascendency. Looked at in this way, it would certainly be found that behind the dread of responsibility there lay a craving which

could be referred to a tendency having its main root in childhood which had outlived its usefulness and had become harmful. That such results can happen is due to men's ability to repress their childhood longings and yet to keep them virtually alive.

The translation is excellent to a rare degree, done in first-rate English yet without sacrifice of the flavor of the original.

JAMES J. PUTNAM.

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THE POSITION AND PROSPECTS OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH

ALFRED FAWKES

ASHBY ST. LEDGERS, ENGLAND

In the *Cambridge Modern History*¹ and in a later work, *Studies in Modernism*,² the present writer has given an account of the last three pontificates, those of Pius IX, Leo XIII, and Pius X. Each of the three was in its own way a momentous pontificate, and has left a lasting mark on the Church. With the present Pope a new period opens. It will be one of harvest. The passions unloosed by his immediate predecessors have burned themselves out; but their works follow them. Benedict XV will reap what they have sown. Also—and this is the real key to the position—he will have to meet the situation created by the European war. His is a pathetic, almost a tragic, figure; for it combines the appearance of power with the fact of powerlessness. Never was man less master of his fate than he. His infallibility binds him hand and foot; he inherits the legacy of evil left by his predecessors; he is crushed under the crimes of kings.

To the student of mankind few subjects offer greater interest than the position and prospects of the Roman

¹ Vol. XI, Chap. XXV.

² Smith, Elder, & Co., 1913.

Catholic Church. The issues raised are complex and, it may appear, uncertain. It is difficult to reconcile theory and fact; for while the Church professes to be unchanging, the outlook of Catholics changes, though slowly. And a "dry light" is not easy of attainment. The tone of Papal Encyclicals, e.g., is uniformly pessimistic; that of the clerical press as uniformly optimistic; visionaries, such as Mr. H. G. Wells and the late Mgr. Benson, prophesy good; scientific and statistical writers evil. Which are we to believe?

In any case it is well to note certain notorious facts bearing upon the question.

(1) While Pre-Reformation Catholicism, at least in the West, was the Church, Post-Reformation Catholicism is one of the Churches—of the fragments into which mediæval Christendom broke up at the Reformation; and this distinction is one whose importance it is impossible to over-rate. Mediaeval Catholicism represented its period—the Middle Ages; Modern Catholicism does not represent, indeed it is a standing protest against, the modern age.

(2) There is now no such thing as a Catholic country—a nation whose life, laws, and civilization are formed on Catholic lines. Nor can we conceive such a society as possible. Catholicism has become an individual attitude, and ceased to be a corporate fact.

(3) Catholicism is no longer world-wide, or even European, but Latin. The dividing line drawn in the sixteenth century left the non-Romance nations on the Protestant, the Romance or Latin—with the Irish Celts—on the Catholic side.

(4) Even in these nations Catholicism declines as civilization advances. The backward section of the community remains Catholic; the forward section sits loose to or falls away from the Church. "Of the Vatican's 190,000,000 followers more than 120,000,000 are illit-

erate. This means that the majority of the Roman Catholics of the world to-day consists of American Indians, half-castes, negroes, and mulattoes; Italian, Spanish, Russian, and Slavonic peasants of the most backward character; and Indian, Indo-Chinese, and African natives. These make up much more than half of the whole. Further, the great bulk of the remainder are the peasants and poor workers of Germany, Austria, France, Belgium, and Ireland. This aspect of Catholicism is perhaps the most important of all.”³

On the other hand,

(5) Catholicism bulks larger before the world than it did a century ago; and

(6) the Catholic population is larger. While

(7) there is a perceptible movement, known in France as the *esprit nouveau*, which appears to be making in the direction of the Catholic Church.

To which it may be answered that the part is not to be taken for the whole; that population as such has risen by leaps and bounds during the nineteenth century; and that this, taken with the fact of migration, accounts both for the increased number of Catholics and for their political influence—which is most noticeable in mixed countries where a small group of voters can often turn an election. While the so-called *esprit nouveau* is temperamental rather than either intellectual or religious in character, its ecclesiastical form is accidental; the substance is a certain timidity and refusal of adventure. “Vos protestations d’activité masquent un affaiblissement de la pensée française qui a besoin de repos.”⁴

In Pius IX (1846–78) the recoil from the French Revolution reached its height. After an episode of sentimental democracy (1846–48), he fell back upon

³ The Decay of the Church of Rome. Joseph McCabe. P. 305.

⁴ Jean Barois. Roger Martin du Gard. P. 444.

absolutism in politics and a centralized theocracy in religion. The achievement of his pontificate was the suppression of the remains of eighteenth century Liberalism which, in the shape of Gallicanism, Febronianism, and Pistoianism, still lingered in the Church. For details the reader will do well to consult Friedrich's *Geschichte des Vatikanischen Konzils* (Bonn, 1877). Never has Catholicism sunk so low as in his reign. The Pope was a visionary, and the epileptic tendency from which he suffered was the key to his personality. He was led by omens and prophecies; the atmosphere in which he lived was one of marvel; it was the age of La Salette, Lourdes, and Paray-le-monial. Antonelli threw a miracle or a dogma from time to time to the pietists, as one throws a bone to a dog, to quiet them, while he intrigued with the worst men in Europe for the Temporal Powers and the petty Italian tyrannies. He failed, leaving a legacy of hatred, unexhausted to this day, behind him, and the breakdown of his policy led inevitably to a new departure under the new pontiff. "Ecce, convertimur ad Gentes!" was the watchword of Leo XIII.

Leo was no less impregnated with the lust of domination than his predecessor, and, diplomatist as he was, he was even more imperious; but he was what Pius had not been—a wise, a wary, and a strong man. From the first this was felt. Caricaturists had represented Pius IX as a querulous scolding old woman. No one—and the fact is significant—ever represented Leo XIII in this way. He might be disapproved of, disliked, or distrusted; he could not be despised. For a man of his years and calling he possessed in a singular degree the instinct for fact. His most memorable act was his breach with Legitimism. The party, he saw, was effete and its alliance compromising. "There," he said, pointing to the crucifix, "there is the only corpse to

which the Church is tied." He was of the old order, and democracy was temperamentally uncongenial to him; but in his Encyclicals on the Labor question, as in the encouragement given to the *Sillon* in France and the *Democrazia cristiana* in Italy, he recognized it as a fact of the situation. The critical movement lay beyond his personal horizon, but he would not condemn Modernism. He can scarcely have loved the French Republic; but only a few days before his death he assured the French Ambassador that "nothing" (he repeated it emphatically), "nothing should make him break with France." He believed that he could catholicize democracy and science. He could not; the one and the other alike escaped and outstripped him. This was the tragedy of his reign.

But if he could not do all, he did much. He could not change the course of events or direct their development on other than their own lines. But he made the best where others before and after him made the worst of the situation; he arrested the forces that made for dissolution; he encouraged the higher and repressed the lower elements in the vast and complex society with which he had to deal. He left the Church respected. Under his predecessor it had been, under his successor it was to become, contemptible. While Leo lived, it was a power to be reckoned with; not only politically—this it must be for long, under whatever rulers—but in thought and life. It attracted some of the weightiest static elements of the body politic, men—of whom M. Brunetière was a type—who put unity and action before speculation, and saw in the Church the great centripetal force in society, the centre of gravity with whose removal or weakening the various elements would inevitably lose cohesion and disperse. The instability of French politics has made this point of view more familiar to French than to English thinkers. It may, or

may not, imply religious belief; there is a party known as *les catholiques athées*. But it certainly implies the support of religious institutions; and, as in France these are Catholic, a wise Pope will court the alliance of those who hold this position. Leo XIII did so. But—*do ut des*. There are conditions, if tacit conditions, to their cooperation. Can any stretch of the imagination picture the late editor of the *Revue des Deux Mondes* presenting himself at the Vatican under Pius X?

But it was not political thinkers only who ceased to despair of Catholicism. It was thought possible to graft the methods and conclusions of science upon its venerable traditions, and so to make the centuries one. These aspirations took shape in Modernism—an attempt to naturalize history, criticism, and the philosophy of spirit, in the Church. It was a dream. But it was a dream dreamed by the wisest and best men in Latin Christendom—a dream which it was, and is, well to have dreamed. “Il est beau non de rêver toujours, mais d’avoir rêvé dans son enfance. Il en reste un parfum et comme une tradition de poésie qui defraie l’âge ou l’on n’imagine plus.” Its Achilles’ heel was that it overlooked what is the distinctive feature of Latin, or Roman, Catholicism—the peculiar development of the notion of authority embodied in the Papacy, and the consequent relation of the Church to the modern mind-movement, which is that of a residuum left behind when the freer and saner elements of life have broken away. Were Catholicism to lose this character, it would cease to attract the social and cultural levels to which it is now so uniquely adapted. Those who occupy them do not think, and do not want to think. “Abide ye here with the ass, while I and the lad go yonder and worship”; they are children of the bondwoman, not of the free. Leo XIII saw this as clearly as his successor; but he saw also what his successor did not see—that a

Church incapable of movement will be left behind by a moving world, and that Modernism was a development of the human spirit which, if the Papacy could not admit, it could still less suppress. Seeing the inevitableness of the rising tide, he refused the unequal conflict; he temporized, and would neither sanction nor condemn. He trusted to events—to the weight of custom, and to the preponderance of the fixed over the volatile elements in ecclesiastical Christianity—to retain the equilibrium of the conflicting forces; which was probably the wisest thing that a Pope could do.

His policy, he hoped, would survive him; he did all that a Pope can do to secure the reversion of the Papacy to the one man of eminence in the Sacred College, Cardinal Rampolla. The Austrian Veto shattered the scheme; and the cardinals, who under his autocratic rule were rather subordinates than counsellors, scattered like frightened sheep. The *piccolo mondo cinquecentesco* which he had kept at arm's length saw its opportunity. A cave of Adullam, in which "everyone that was in distress, and everyone that was in debt, and everyone that was discontented" gathered, was formed. They were ignorant and hated knowledge; they were intolerant and hated compromise; they were stupid and the signs of the times were hidden from them. The outcome—he was rather their instrument and dupe than their conscious ally—was Pius X (1903–14). A peasant by birth, a country priest by training, he possessed at once the virtues and the defects of his class—its simplicity and its narrowness, its piety and its guile. Imposed by the Triple Alliance on the Conclave, he was the Pope of a reaction, which, like most reactions, carried those concerned in it very much further than they wished or intended. For the temper of Rome is the reverse of fanatical. It is that of the permanent staff of a great public department. The men who compose the Curia

are of the official type—cautious, painstaking, unimaginative. They distrusted Modernism, being opposed to ideas and to innovation as such, but they would have met it with other weapons than the Encyclical *Pascendi*; they resented the policy of the French Republic, but they would not have lost France. Their disapproval of the Pope and his Spanish advisers was undisguised. Conceive the late General Booth Archbishop of Canterbury! The cases are parallel. Can it be wondered that to the day of his death Pius X was a stranger in Rome? He was unhappy in his choice of agents, and of much that was done under, if not by, him the less said the better. Nowhere did the malaria which hangs about the base of the Rock of Peter work more poisonously than in the Concordat controversy. The unfortunate French bishops were compelled to carry out a policy—that with regard to the *Associations Cultuelles*—against which they had protested, and to keep silence when the fact of their protest was denied, while the Montagnini papers—the *Fiches Pontificales*—give an unpleasing picture of the Vatican interior. The *camarilla* which surrounded the Pope was frankly detestable; both he and his office were degraded by contact with these bad men.

The Pontifical Acts of 1907 struck at more than Modernism. Much was condemned that had a historical position in Catholicism—mysticism, experimental faith, immanence, symbolism—all that spiritualizes system and inspires formula with life. What was left was bare, dead letter. “The Church and the Faith which the Church holds were made ridiculous,” says an article remarkable in itself, and doubly remarkable because of the quarter in which it appears. “But for those who desired to remain in communion with the Church, the farce became tragic; the most odious, because the least bloody, methods of the Inquisition were revived.”

The leprosy of delation, never far from the surface where ecclesiastics congregate, broke out. It was the hour of the spy and the informer; the sun of Apostolic favor fell upon the assassins of the whisper and the pen. "No piety, no simplicity can cover up the conduct of the *Corrispondenza Romana*. It was base, and crudely base."⁵ What wonder that Father Tyrrell broke out with vehement words of indignation? "I have felt the moral badness of Rome and the Curia so deeply and acutely these last years that I cannot take service as a priest under such *canaille*. The Montagnini and Benigni revelations have extinguished every spark of respect for the present *personnel* of the Roman See. There must be a *debâcle*. After that, perhaps, a reconstruction. The root error was in 1870. Condense all power into the hands of one man, who may be a fool or a knave, and what can you expect? It would be a miracle if things were otherwise, and miracles don't happen."⁶

That a policy must be judged by its results is a view to which the moralist will not easily assent. The ethical element is in the long run decisive; men are moved, and will continue to be moved, by ideas. But let us take the force-standard for what it is worth here and now, pre-scinding from its ultimate value, and ask in what state have the eleven years of the late Pontificate left the Church?

(1) In 1903 Catholic scholarship ran close on the heels of Protestant. No Protestant had done better work in criticism than Loisy; as a thinker Tyrrell stood with Troeltsch and Eucken; no German or English historian ranked higher than Duchesne. Science, it was recognized, was undenominational; it knew neither Jew nor Greek. Now the Catholic Ghetto has been reconstructed. "*Acatholica damnantur; catholica non*

⁵ The Church Times. Aug. 21, 1914.

⁶ Autobiography and Life of George Tyrrell, II, 340.

leguntur." Catholic writers are un-read, non-Catholic banned.

(2) In 1903 a generous ardor inspired the youth of the Latin nations. Simplicity, sincerity, the realization of the better self of individuals and communities—such were the ideals of the coming generation; materialism, sensuality, self-seeking had crossed the Rhine. Now an arid sirocco has breathed over this spring; the blow struck at the *Sillon* chilled and crushed its bloom. So with the Italian *Opera dei Congressi* and the German *Christlicher Arbeiter Verein*. The former was lay, the latter unsectarian. They were openly suppressed or tacitly discouraged; the gates of the Ghetto shut with a clang. The Index, as far as in it lay, silenced Catholic and non-Catholic writers indiscriminately—the thought of Maeterlinck and the speculation of Bergson, the piety of Fogazzaro and the erudition of Duchesne. It was a dull stupid tyranny, and it was as blind as it was stupid. Excellence was a sufficient reason for proscription; to be distinguished was to be condemned.

(3) In 1903 France was the eldest daughter of the Church. There had been friction, but it was less real than apparent. No love was lost between the secular clergy and the regulars. The bishops protested against the suppression of the religious Orders, but their protests were half-hearted. The Government had done what they wished done but could not themselves do. Now—"La grande pitié des Églises de France"! The official Church is bleeding to death from the wound inflicted by the abolition of the Concordat, and its consequent moral and material separation from the national life.

What is there to put over against these things? An attempted revival of plain chant; certain changes in the service books; the modification of a few fasts, and the abolition of a few feasts, of obligation; the admission

of children of seven to communion; the general enforcement of the *Ne Temere* decree of the Council of Trent, invalidating "clandestine" marriages; certain technical changes in the procedure of the Roman Congregations. With this, all has been said.

Atque utinam his potius nugis tota illa dedisset
Tempora saevitiae, claras quibus abstulit Urbi
Illustresque animas impune et vindice nullo.

Otherwise did the great founders of the Papacy envisage the world and life. So do shades mutter; not so do the voices of the living sound.

Benedict XV represents the inevitable reaction against reaction. He is a Curialist first and foremost. In him the tradition which takes the Pope from the highly trained officials who form the staff of the great Roman Congregations resumes its sway. He will not be influenced, it is safe to say, by ideas; he will say little; he will have little sympathy either with the dull obscurantism of his predecessor or with Leo's launch into the deep. His policy will be one of reserve; he will be prudent. But should the times call for other than the prudential virtues—for initiative, adventure, spaciousness of outlook—he may fail.

"Sarà, dunque, un pontificato di raccoglimento. Più che un pontefice, un capo, Benedetto XV ha l'aria di essere un commissario. Ma a vita e senza superiori. E un terzo aspetto, e interessantissimo, della crisi dell'autocrazia nella chiesa: l'infallibilità taciturna."⁷

He starts with one great advantage; he succeeds Pius X. No change, it is generally felt—and nowhere more than at Rome—could be for the worse; any change must be for the better. There is a disposition to make allowance for the immense difficulties of the situation which he inherits, to interpret his actions in the most

⁷ Bilychnis. Oct. 1914.

favorable sense. And the war facilitates a new departure. Both the Modernist controversy and the breach with the French Republic are now ancient history; more actual interests absorb men's minds. Other lines of movement, ethical and moral rather than theological, are indicated. They have not, so far, been followed. The world is moving, surely and rapidly; the bark of Peter hugs the shore. It was a saint

“Che fece per viltate il gran rifiuto”;

but it may be made by an over-cautious politician as well as by a timid saint. The personal impression given by Benedict XV is favorable; no Pope since Pius VII has inspired so much esteem. “Le nouveau pape est personnellement très estimable,” says a well-informed writer; “prêtre digne et pieux, administrateur énergique, et cependant modéré de caractère. Il est politique, mais par tempérament, semble-t-il, autant et plus que par réflexion. Bien qu’il est intelligent, son esprit ne se pose pas sur les questions générales et de principe; ou bien, si une telle question se présente, il la décompose tout spontanément en un certain nombre de questions particulières, dirons pratiques, auxquelles il cherche une solution. Ce ne serait donc pas uniquement par prudence qu’il se serait abstenu de discuter la guerre présente du point de vue du droit, mais aussi bien qu’il n’y aurait pas pensé, ou qu’il n’aurait pas vu l’utilité d’une telle discussion. Il ne verrait que la situation donnée, l’état de guerre; et il s’efforcerait simplement d’en atténuer les horreurs selon ses moyens, qui, en effet, ne sont pas grands.” In other words, he is wanting in imagination, his horizons are narrow, he has little power of dealing with ideas. At certain times and under certain conditions men with these defects have done excellent work in the world. But in the European situation of today they are precisely the defects which

are fatal to leadership. The large view, the quick insight, the adventurous temper—these are the “notes” of the leaders of modern men.

The good qualities of the Pope set the dissatisfaction inspired by the policy of the Papacy at the present crisis in a stronger light. The Roman Bishop is, *ex hypothesi*, the infallible teacher in faith and morals. With regard to the former, he extends his jurisdiction. Question some subtle point of scholastic divinity; at once you find yourself excluded from the sacraments and cut off from the Church. Morality is another thing. In the face of the unprecedented horrors of the present war, Rome is silent. Treaties are broken, territories devastated, non-combatants massacred, women shamed. “But there was no voice, nor any that answered.” Not even the invasion of ecclesiastical privilege—the violation of churches, the killing of priests, the forcible detention of a cardinal—provokes a protest; the Infallible is dumb.

The answer—of which, to do them justice, those who make it seem somewhat ashamed—that the Pope, being the common Father, cannot take part against any of his children, is the merest trifling. The superior who keeps silence is answerable for the ill-doing of his subjects and becomes partaker of their sin. Not so did the great Mediaeval Pontiffs conceive their calling. Their dream of a theocracy, if impossible, was at least grandiose; when it was dissipated, an age of Epigoni set in. The Vicar of Christ became an Italian prince; and the possession of this petty principality was fatal to the larger conception of the Papacy; its memory haunts the modern Popes like an evil dream. It is here, not on the ground of technical theology, that the key to the situation of the Roman Church of today is found. For the politics of the Church explain her theology—not *vice versa*; a concrete wrong moves men more easily and profoundly

than an abstract error in belief. The Temporal Power did Catholicism more harm than the Vatican Definition of Papal Infallibility; the Laodicean attitude of Benedict XV in the face of the present unloosing of Satan discredits the Papacy more than did the anti-Modernist follies of Pius X. In France, which, even under the Republic, remains the centre of the Latin world, the signs of discontent are manifest. The reserve of the Pope with regard to the violation of Belgian neutrality, and the coldness (to use no stronger word) of his attitude towards Cardinal Mercier, have excited the surprise and indignation of the French press, which had expected to find in him a warmer champion of a Catholic country and a Christian cause. The Paris papers veil their censure, so as not to divide opinion by giving offence to the clericals; but the provincial journals are more outspoken. Special attention has been excited by an article entitled "Dieu n'est pas neutre,"⁸ and remarkable both in itself and as coming from a well-known priest. The writer characterizes the Pope's protestations against war as "un peu conventionnelles et comme 'de style.'" In a conflict of ideas and principles neutrality is impossible: "est-ce que Dieu est neutre?"

"Que votre Sainteté, face à face avec le Crucifié, daigne se demander ce qu'auraient fait, devant le monceau des crimes allemands, les grands Papes vos prédécesseurs—Léon, Grégoire, Boniface, Pie, etc.? Auraient-ils toléré, ces preux illustres et venerables de la théocratie, le massacre des femmes, des enfants, et des prêtres? l'incendie des villes ouvertes? la destruction des églises?"

"Guillaume II a violé toutes les lois divines et humaines. Il a écrasé un petit peuple, loyal et fier. Il est couvert de sang et d'opprobre. Vous n'avez rien dit. Il a fait tuer centaines de vos prêtres; il détient prisonniers

⁸ Le Petit Dauphinois. Grenoble. Jan. 11, 1915.

trois évêques; il vient d'outrager un cardinal de la Sainte Église Romaine. Vous n'avez encore rien dit. Pour moins que cela Pie VII a excommunié Napoléon. Pourquoi vous taisez-vous? Pourquoi demeurez-vous 'neutre' entre eux, abominables à jamais, et leurs victimes? Jésus-Christ ne serait pas neutre."

Such protests as these are untouched by Modernism; they spring from another soil. And their importance lies in implications of which those concerned are scarcely, if at all, conscious. What they show is that Catholicism is a spent force. Its weapons are blunted, and, such as they are, it dares not use them. The thunderbolts of the Church, which once terrified Kings, today excite no more than a modified fear in peasants. When the late Pope excommunicated a famous French scholar, his servant, influenced by his confessor, left him, but returned within the week. And the more conspicuous the culprit, the stronger the disinclination to proceed to extremities. The risk is too great. Even Pius IX did not venture to excommunicate Victor Emmanuel by name; it needed a Pius X to inflict this penalty on Loisy and Romolo Murri. And the world did not even laugh—it passed him and his sentence by. The present case, it is true, is not *in pari materia*; the crime of the Emperors shocks the conscience of mankind. But a Pope could not excommunicate the Catholic sovereigns of Germany and release the subjects of the Protestant from their allegiance without greatly daring; and the Catholicism of the twentieth century dares not greatly dare. It would be a break with the traditions of nearly four hundred years, a revival of claims long obsolete, and the adoption of a policy which, if a failure, would place the Papacy definitely on a shelf in a museum of antiquities; while, if successful, it would transform the Church into a living force whose action would defy calculation. Benedict XV is not the man to risk the venture. There is

no reason to suppose that he takes himself otherwise than seriously. But to believe that the world, even the Catholic world, rates the Papacy at its theological valuation, or that the venerable system for which it stands can endure the strain of a new birth or sustain the shock of a new departure—this presupposes mental and moral qualities of a very exceptional order. "I have not found such faith, no not in Israel." It is not within but without the Churches that it is found. The Churches are stationary, not expeditionary, forces, and their piety is of the static type.

The two main features of the late Pontificate were, as has been said, the crusade against Modernism and the abolition of the French Concordat of 1801. With regard to both a certain reaction has taken place. The Pontifical Acts of 1907 have still further alienated the lay mind from the clerical; they have driven from the Church not a few persons whose natural place is in her communion, and repelled men of good will who were gravitating towards faith. The value of these results it is for those concerned to estimate. What we shall note here is the fact of a reaction, even under Pius X, against the "fool-fury" of the "insolent and aggressive faction" which had the ear of the Pope. Today bishops denounce Integralism; the *Tribuna*⁹ notes the changed attitude of Jesuits: "Se veramente la Compagnia di Gesù ha deliberato di fare del liberalismo . . . gesuitico, non v'è integralismo che tenga. Pio X passa; la Compagnia resta." Benedict XV has little sympathy with or understanding of Modernism as such. But it is probable that he will trespass as little as possible on the ground of speculative or scientific theology. It is impossible to isolate so large a body as the Roman Catholic Church, or to prevent the Liberalism which is tolerated from passing over into the Modernism which has been condemned. There will always be a van- and rear-guard.

⁹ Sept. 25, 1913.

The work of Rome in the near future may be less to take part with either than to keep the peace between the two. A certain element of make-belief is inseparable from the process; it is also inseparable from human affairs.

It is difficult for a foreigner to understand the shape taken by the religious problem in France. The country is not irreligious or even uncatholic, but it is anti-clerical; and since Catholicism is essentially clerical and French religion essentially Catholic, friction arises. The policy of Pius X undoubtedly embarrassed the government. The Republic will not go to Canossa, but it did not intend, and does not contemplate with satisfaction, the dilapidation of the churches and the starving out of the clergy; it was the obstinacy of Rome, not the will of the French people, which brought about these things. A few months ago it might have been thought that the "union sacrée" inaugurated by the war indicated a probable solution of the difficulty. The conduct of the clergy, secular and regular, and of the religious orders of women, has been heroic; the tie of country has proved higher and more binding than that of sect. Might not this patriotic collaboration be extended to home politics? By an inconsiderable sacrifice of *amour propre* on the part of the Church and the government, might not at least a *modus vivendi* be attained?

It is probable that such an agreement could, and would, have been reached, had it not been for the "neutrality" of the Vatican with regard to the German invasion of Belgium and French Flanders, and the horrors by which this invasion has been accompanied. The feeling aroused by the "neutrality" of Rome has created an entirely new situation. It may be open to discussion whether the Pope is or is not infallible, or whether transubstantiation does or does not take place in the Eucharist; but it is not open to discussion whether murder and rape

and robbery are evil, or whether a religious teacher is bound by the obligation of his office to denounce them. "Thus saith the Lord God, Behold, I am against the shepherds; and I will require my flock at their hands." The present age is not one in which it is wise to put a strain upon faith. Even by those who retain them, the traditional beliefs are acquiesced in rather than held with conviction or fervor, and their external framework—churches, creeds, religious observance—is increasingly regarded as a matter of circumstances and expediency, conditioned by place and time. The conception of morality, on the other hand, has extended and developed; its content is greater, its foundations are stronger, its horizons are larger than in any previous age. Were the Pope to speak out boldly, "Thou shalt not," the conscience of the world would be with him as it has never been even with his greatest predecessors. He will not; and in consequence the conscience of the world is falling from him and from the conception of religion for which he stands. The root fallacy of this conception is that it substitutes the outward for the inward, identifies the idea with its clothing, and forgets that the Word of God is neither system nor enactment but spiritual life. Whether or no the famous letter which appeared in the *Petite Gironde* (of Dec. 24, 1914) is rightly or wrongly attributed to a Belgian prelate, it is certain that it has been largely circulated in France and Belgium, and that it expresses the all but universal feeling of Catholics in those unhappy countries:

"Most Holy Father,

We have heard the declaration by which you have announced that you will observe a strict neutrality between the two camps in this frightful war which devastates the world. Respectfully submissive to the supreme Pastor and Doctor, we shall henceforth exhibit a like attitude both to oppressors and oppressed. If we have not done so hitherto, it is because we have believed that we found mo-

tives in the Scriptures for treating differently the victim and his executioner.

When the first murder was committed, God said to Cain, 'The voice of thy brother's blood crieth unto me; thou shalt be cursed.' When God announced the destruction of Sodom, Abraham remonstrated: 'Wilt thou consume the righteous with the wicked? That be far from thee to do in this manner. Shall not the Judge of all the Earth do right?' St. Paul has said, 'Abhor that which is evil'; and in the Gospel we read, 'Ye cannot serve God and Mammon.'

For these reasons, Most Holy Father, we have pronounced anathema upon the barbarians. And for yet another—that our poor decimated flock should not apply to their shepherds the reproach of Malachi to the unworthy Levites: 'Therefore have I also made you base and contemptible before all the people, according as ye have not kept my ways, but have respect of persons in the law.'

But henceforth, faithful to the lessons let fall from the Chair of St. Peter, we shall observe the strictest neutrality between the martyrs and the torturers."

Bitter, but deserved, is the irony of such words. It is no matter for congratulation, for it is by no means clear by what, if any, religious influence its place can be taken; but it is matter of certainty that one of the results of the war now devastating the world will be a notable weakening of and falling away from the Roman Catholic Church.

Since the above was written, attention has been drawn by two exceptionally well informed English writers, Mr. Richard Bagot and Dr. E. J. Dillon, to the thinly veiled hostility of the Vatican to the Allies and to the ideas which the Alliance represents. Their papers, which appear respectively in the *Fortnightly Review*, May, 1915, "The Vatican and the War," and in the *Contemporary Review*, May, 1915, "The Pope and the Belligerents," deserve careful study. The former quotes the answer of a great Roman official, given with a shrug of the shoulders, when the massacre of priests and the rape of nuns which follow the track of the German army in

Belgium were brought to his notice by an agent of the Belgian Government: "Que voulez-vous, Monsignore? Ce sont les épisodes de la guerre."

The *Tablet*, alive to the fact that, under the circumstances, infallibility needs a defender, steps into the breach (May 1, 1915) with an apologetic article, "Infallibility and the German Atrocities"; the importance of which lies not in the defence put forward, which is thin and sophistical enough, but in the admission that a defence is required.

THE CONFLICT OF MORAL OBLIGATION IN THE TRILOGY OF AESCHYLUS

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It will be generally admitted, I think, that Aeschylus is one of the great religious and philosophic poets of all time. And it will be perhaps hardly less generally conceded that no philosophic problem was for him more interesting or more momentous than that of establishing and defending the concept of a moral government of the world. Even those who accuse him of having subjected all things to the iron rule of Fate cannot reproach him with a blind fatalism. If he saw inexorable Necessity at the heart of the world, he also saw Justice writ large upon its face; and if he believed God and man alike to be pawns in the hands of Destiny, the rule of the game was still to punish the wrong moves of the one by the sure interposition of the other.

The question of this reputed fatalism I do not intend to argue. I must content myself with recording my agreement with those who find in Aeschylus an exponent of the freedom of the will. But it will not be amiss to add at the same time the warning that to him, as to his contemporaries, the problem of freedom had not occurred in the form in which it confronts us. The possibility in any given choice of a metaphysical "indifference" of the will to all antecedent motives was a point which had not been raised. Freedom and responsibility dwelt in the realm of feeling pure and simple, and were regarded as non-existent or existent according as a choice did or did not seem to the agent to be made under outer compulsion.

But if Aeschylus is not a fatalist, he is something far more terrible. He may leave his characters their freedom, but he leads them into situations where its exercise is intolerable. He confronts them again and again with dilemmas where there is a conflict of duties such that while a choice is morally imperative, none is morally possible. Fidelity to one obligation involves disloyalty to another equally solemn. The divine law bids and forbids in the same breath. If honour is to stand, it must be rooted in dishonour. Under such circumstances freedom is far more dreadful than Fate.

It is largely by the use of this device, I think, that Aeschylus arrives at his effect of extraordinary grandeur. Each of the three great tragedians had his way of transmuting the baser elements of the ancient legends into the pure gold (perhaps in the case of Euripides it is silver) of high and noble tragedy. In the very act of discrediting a story or of protesting against a conception of the good which appeared to him unworthy, Euripides would transfuse into them the life-blood of human experience, with all its pulse and glow of passion and emotion and motive. Sophocles accepted all, and transfigured all in a vision "under the aspect of eternity," where things were no longer what they seemed, but one and all asserted eternal Providence. Aeschylus, on the contrary, viewing history, as he did, as the display of a divine Justice to whose law all other laws, physical and moral, were subservient, discredited nothing and transfigured nothing. He found rather in the past, however primitive and barbarous its legends, a cumulative justification of the ways of God to men. But what was dark and low in the ancient myths he raised and illumined for all time, not only by making their tale of suffering an account of the due wages of sin, but also by showing behind sin itself the struggle and agony of conflicting yet divinely imposed obligations, and by displaying

his characters neither as playthings of blind Fate nor as sacrifices to the incomprehensible purposes of the gods, but as victims of their own freedom. Guilt for him is not a sudden and wanton thing. It is the slow inclination of the balance after long wavering. Duty is weighed against duty in the scales, not pure good against unmitigated evil. The deed can justify itself in part, for the moral situation involved in it presents a dilemma, where the victim can only do what is right and morally enjoined from one point of view by doing what is wrong and forbidden from another. Hence the crime about which the tragic situation centres is never wholly villainous. Of the impulses of which it is the result some at least are noble. And the decision which ensues, criminal though it may be, is felt and justified by the agent as having been compelled by a moral obligation. The tragic character of the fault then lies in the perversion of the will, not by a wholly evil motive but by a false estimation of the true weight and worth of the conflicting aspects under which the right presents itself.

It is my object to trace briefly in the *Agamemnon* and *Choephoroi* of Aeschylus the evolution of a series of these conflicts of duty in what I believe to be an ascending scale from a lesser to a greater degree of balance, culminating in a complete equilibrium of obligations. I shall then discuss the solution offered by the poet in the *Eumenides* to the moral problem which such a situation presents.

It will be well, by way of preface, first to remind ourselves of a factor in the Trilogy second only in dramatic importance to the balancing of obligations. This is Aeschylus' treatment of the ancient motive of a family Curse, arising in some primal sin and haunting the doomed race from generation to generation, ever turning new crime to the punishment of old, and again ever making its instruments in their turn the objects of its vengeance.

This Curse is conceived not as an internal taint, but as an external and semi-personal agent. It is a *δαίμων γέννας*, a *συλλήπτωρ πάτροθεν*, an *ἀλάστωρ*, a family ghost, descending from father to son, a spirit of vengeance patiently biding its time to repay itself out of the fortunes of the living for the misdeeds of the dead. Its victims, however, are never innocent. The children are not punished for the sins of the fathers. Whatever the idea may have been in earlier and cruder times, as it appears in Aeschylus' mind it is purged, deliberately perhaps, of any implication of beliefs like the Hebrew teaching of the visitation of the sins of the fathers upon the innocent children, or the Christian doctrine of original sin. For Aeschylus, the children contract the ancestral doom not through heredity but of their own free and sinful will. Those among them that are pure in heart escape. But if they incline to evil ways, the Curse enters in through their propensity to sin and infects them. Their wickedness, for which they and they alone are responsible, it then turns to the service of the divine justice. Through their deeds it exacts repayment—an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth—of the debt of ancient wrong; but the very acts by which justice is done heap up a new debt and become in their turn, because conceived in sin, the occasion of fresh retaliation. Thus perpetuated, the Curse descends from generation to generation.

It is under the menace of such a haunting family Curse that we find the house of Atreus at the beginning of the Trilogy. In olden times Atreus and Thyestes had fled from their father Pelops to Argos, where Atreus married Aerope the daughter of King Eurystheus, and later ruled in his stead. But Thyestes committed adultery with his brother's wife, and was banished from Argos. He returned, however, and sought sanctuary at the altar. Atreus, fearing to put him to death, for vengeance

murdered certain of his children and served them to him at a feast. But when Thyestes discovered the deed, he laid a curse upon Atreus and his children, that they too should perish miserably.

We come now to that portion of the story upon which the Trilogy is based. Agamemnon and Menelaus, the sons of Atreus, married the daughters of Leda, Clytemnestra and Helen. Helen was carried off by Paris, son of Priam, and for her sake the two kings led the hosts of the Achaeans against Troy. But the expedition was held becalmed at Aulis through the will of the goddess Artemis, who was angered against Agamemnon because he had slain a doe sacred to her, and she demanded for her appeasement the sacrifice of his daughter Iphigeneia. And Agamemnon in the end consented to the sacrifice. So Troy was at last besieged, and after ten years' time taken.

Meantime Clytemnestra, left behind in Argos, took Aegisthus the youngest son of Thyestes as her paramour. Because of her passion for him and her wrath at the death of Iphigeneia, she plotted to kill Agamemnon on his return. Meanwhile she sent away their son Orestes to King Strophius of Phocis to be brought up far away. And when Agamemnon returned from Troy, she and Aegisthus murdered him and reigned in Argos.

But Orestes, when he was grown, heard of his father's shameful death, and went to Delphi to inquire of the oracle what he should do. And Apollo bade him avenge his father's death upon his mother. So he went secretly to Argos and slew both Clytemnestra and Aegisthus. Then the Furies of his mother seized upon him, and maddened him and drove him forth over the whole earth in search of purification from the stain of his deed. At last he came again to Delphi, and was promised there that he should find release from his suffering at Athens. So he went to Athens still hounded by

the Furies of Clytemnestra. Then Apollo and the Furies disputed his guilt before certain citizens of Athens and the goddess Athena as jury. The Athenians were equally divided, but Athena gave her vote for acquittal. Therefore Orestes was released.

But the Furies were angry with the goddess and with Athens, and threatened to wreak their vengeance upon the Athenians and depart from the land. Athena, however, placated them with promises of great honor in the city, and a shrine near her own temple. So they put aside their wrath and were henceforth known and worshipped, not as Erinyes or Furies, but as Eumenides or Gracious Ones. As for Orestes, he went back to Argos, and the Curse on the house of Atreus ceased.

With this story in mind let us now turn back to the first play in the Trilogy, the *Agamemnon*. The shadow of the Curse—a shadow both of past and coming events—falls darkly across its opening pages. In the first chorus the prophecy of the soothsayer Calchas is fraught with sinister meaning. The omens—two eagles rending a hare big with young—predict indeed the final success of the expedition against Troy. But they also recall the accursed feast which Atreus set before Thyestes, and Agamemnon's own slaying of the sacred doe, and the wrath of Artemis. Again, they dimly forewarn against the sacrifice of Iphigeneia, and the murder of Agamemnon at the hands of Clytemnestra and her paramour.

Go forth, he cried, and Priam's town shall fall.
Yet long the time shall be; and flock and herd,
The people's wealth, that roam before the wall,
Shall force hew down, when Fate shall give the word.

But O beware! lest wrath in Heaven abide,
To dim the glowing battle-forged once more,
And mar the mighty curb of Trojan pride,
The steel of vengeance, welded as for war!

For virgin Artemis bears jealous hate
 Against the royal house, the eagle-pair,
 Who rend the unborn brood, insatiate—
 Yea, loathes their banquet on the quivering hare.

(Ah woe and well-a-day! but be the issue fair!)

For well she loves—the goddess kind and mild—
 The tender new-born cubs of lions bold,
 Too weak to range—and well the sucking child
 Of every beast that roams by wood and wold.

So to the Lord of Heaven she prayeth still,
 “Nay, if it must be, be the omen true!
 Yet do the visioned eagles presage ill;
 The end be well, but crossed with evil too!”

Healer Apollo! be her wrath controll'd,
 Nor weave the long delay of thwarting gales,
 To war against the Danaans and withhold
 From the free ocean-waves their eager sails!

She craves, alas! to see a second life
 Shed forth, a curst unhallowed sacrifice,
 'Twixt wedded souls artificer of strife,
 And hate that knows not fear, and fell device.

At home there tarries like a lurking snake,
 Biding its time, a wrath unreconciled,
 A wily watcher, passionate to slake
 In blood resentment for a murdered child.

Such was the mighty warning, pealed of yore
 Amid good tidings, such the word of fear,
 What time the fateful eagles hovered o'er
 The kings, and Calchas read the omen clear.¹

In this initial situation we find also the first and least evenly balanced of the series of conflicts of obligation. On the one hand, Agamemnon is assured that the gods approve the expedition against Troy and will eventually

¹ Agamemnon, 124 et seq. The quotations are from Morshead's translation.

crown it with success; on the other, he is reminded of the hereditary Curse hovering vampire-like about his house, and waiting but the invitation of some evil deed to enter in and exact its toll of blood. He acts then both at the behest and in defiance of the prophecy. His decision is right, but it behooves him to see that it be not rash.

All too soon, however, he gives the *δριμύς ἀλάστωρ* of his race the opening which it seeks. The fleet, launched against Troy, is held by adverse winds at Chalcis in Euboea. The soothsayer announces the wrath of Artemis which can only be appeased by the sacrifice of Iphigeneia. Agamemnon must decide between the failure of the whole Trojan enterprise and the life of his daughter. Like his decision, the conflict of duties preceding it assumes at this point a tragic dignity. On the one side are his fidelity to the cause of his brother Menelaus, his duty to the expedition, and his loyalty to his comrades-at-arms; on the other is his duty to his child. The one obligation can only be fulfilled at the expense of the other. A choice must be made. And Agamemnon chooses wrongly.

Of the sinfulness of that choice, Aeschylus leaves us no doubt. It is prompted by a dire necessity indeed, but it springs from a blinded vision and a hardened heart.

Thus on his neck he took
 Fate's hard compelling yoke;
 Then in the counter-gale of will abhorr'd, accursed,
 To recklessness his shifting spirit veered.
 Alas that Frenzy, first of ills and worst,
 With evil craft men's souls to sin hath stirred!
 And so he steeled his heart—ah, well-a-day!
 Aiding a war for one false woman's sake,
 His child to slay,
 And with her spilt blood make
 An offering, to speed the ships upon their way.²

² Agamemnon, 218 et seq.

From this moment Agamemnon's fate is sealed. He has willed the wrong, and the Curse seizes upon him, to make him both the instrument and the object of the law of retaliation. By his deed, the actual sacrifice of his own child, repayment is made for the long-ago murder of the children of Thyestes. But his act is none the less a new sin which will find him out at last. The divine Justice bides its time through all the long years that he moves in splendid security, king of men, captain of the great captains that make war on Troy. Ilium is taken, and the gods grant him a safe and swift return. And then in the hour of final triumph, vengeance comes, sudden and terrible. The acclamations which greet his homecoming die away behind him, as he enters the palace, into that sudden, dreadful moment of silence about which the *Agamemnon* pivots—a moment broken once, and then once again less sharply, by the cry of one wounded unto death.

The murder of Agamemnon by Clytemnestra is presented as the outcome of a more acute and at the same time more evenly balanced conflict of obligations than that which actuates the sacrifice of Iphigeneia. Agamemnon's cause is minimized. In any event it required no pleading. The Greek audience did not need instruction in the duties owed a husband by his wife. On the other hand, the case for Clytemnestra is urged with all the resources of the pleader's and the dramatist's art. Her adultery with Aegisthus, though it is at once poetic justice for the ancient sin of Thyestes and a sufficient and wholly ignoble motive for her crime, is kept almost entirely below the surface of the action, and allowed to contribute only a dark undercurrent to the sweep of events. Again, her righteous anger at the effrontery of Agamemnon in flaunting his own infidelity before her eyes and in commending his latest mistress to her care, is similarly made only a contributory and not a deter-

mining cause. In a word, Aeschylus rejects both the fear of a guilty and the anger of an outraged wife as motives, appropriate and sufficient as either might have been to the ensuing event. The dominant motive he bases fairly and squarely upon a moral relation and a moral obligation. It is the duty incumbent upon a mother to avenge the murder of her child, which inspires Clytemnestra's action. Indeed, for an instant he permits her to stand before us, austere, impersonal, redeemed from her baseness and vindictiveness. Her will and her personality are in abeyance. She is merged with the avenging angel of the Atreidan race, consecrated to the work of the eternal Justice of the world, of which she has been the divinely appointed instrument, and uplifted by the vision of that Justice finally accomplished by her deed and of the shadow of the Curse at last removed forever from the Atreidan house.

I will quote somewhat at length from the great scene between Clytemnestra and the chorus, in which she defends herself:

CHORUS

Grim is his wrath and heavy on our home,
That fiend of whom thy voice has cried,
Alas, an omened cry of woe unsatisfied,
An all-devouring doom!

Ah woe, ah Zeus! from Zeus all things befall—
Zeus the high cause and finisher of all!
Lord of our mortal state, by him are willed
All things, by him fulfilled!

Yet ah my king, my king no more!
What words to say, what tears to pour
Can tell my love for thee!
The spider-web of treachery
She wove and wound thy life around;
And lo! I see thee lie,
And thro' a coward, impious wound
Pant forth thy life and die!

A death of shame—ah woe on woe!
A treach'rous hand, a cleaving blow!

CLYTEMNESTRA

My guilt thou harpest, o'er and o'er!
I bid thee reckon me no more
As Agamemnon's spouse.
The old Avenger, stern of mood,
For Atreus and his feast of blood,
Hath struck the lord of Atreus' house,
And in semblance of his wife
The king hath slain.
Yea, for the murdered children's life
A chieftain's in requital ta'en.

CHORUS

Thou guiltless of this murder, thou!
Who dares such thought avow?
Yet it may be, wroth for the parent's deed,
The fiend hath holpen thee to slay the son.
Dark Ares, god of death, is pressing on
Thro' streams of blood by kindred shed,
Exacting the accout for children dead,
For clotted blood, for flesh on which their sire did feed.

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CLYTEMNESTRA

I deem not that the death he died
Had overmuch of shame;
For this was he who did provide
Foul wrong unto his house and name.
His daughter, blossom of my womb,
He gave unto a deadly doom,
Iphigeneia, child of tears.
And as he wrought, even so he fares.
Nor be his vaunt too loud in hell;
For by the sword his sin he wrought,
And by the sword himself is brought
Among the dead to dwell.

CHORUS

Ah, whither shall I fly?
 For all in ruin sinks the kingly hall;
 Nor swift device nor shift of thought have I
 To 'scape its fall.
 A little while the gentler rain-drops fail.
 I stand distraught—a ghastly interval—
 Till on the roof-tree rings the bursting hail
 Of blood and doom. Even now fate whets the steel
 On whetstones new and deadlier than of old—
 The steel that smites, in Justice' hold,
 Another death to deal.
 O Earth! that I had lain at rest
 And lapped for ever in thy breast,
 Ere I had seen my chieftain fall
 Within the laver's silver wall,
 Low-lying on dishonoured bier!
 And who shall give him sepulchre,
 And who the wail of sorrow pour?
 Woman, 'tis thine no more!
 A graceless gift unto his shade
 Such tribute, by his murd'ress paid!
 Strive not thus wrongly to atone
 The impious deed thy hand hath done.

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CLYTEMNESTRA

Peace! for such task is none of thine.
 By me he fell, by me he died,
 And now his burial rites be mine!
 Yet from these halls no mourners' train
 Shall celebrate his obsequies.
 Only by Acheron's rolling tide
 His child shall spring unto his side,
 And in a daughter's loving wise
 Shall clasp and kiss him once again!

CHORUS

Lo! sin by sin and sorrow dogg'd by sorrow,
 And who the end can know?
 The slayer of to-day shall die to-morrow;
 The wage of wrong is woe.

While Time shall be, while Zeus in heaven is lord,
 His law is fixed and stern;
 On him that wrought shall vengeance be outpoured,
 The tides of doom return.
 The children of the curse abide within
 These halls of high estate,
 And none can wrench from off the home of sin
 The clinging grasp of fate.

CLYTEMNESTRA

Now walks thy word aright, to tell
 This ancient truth of oracle;
 But I with vows of sooth will pray
 To him, the power that holdeth sway
 O'er all the race of Pleisthenes.
 Tho' dark the deed and deep the guilt,
 With this last blood my hands have spilt,
 I pray thee let thine anger cease!
 I pray thee pass from us away
 To some new race in other lands,
 There, if thou wilt, to wrong and slay
 The lives of men by kindred hands.

For me 'tis all-sufficient meed,
 Tho' little wealth or power were won,
 So I can say, 'Tis past and done.
 The bloody lust and murderous,
 The inborn frenzy of our house,
 Is ended, by my deed!³

The answer of the chorus is plain. The plea of Clytemnestra is rejected. She is not irresponsible but free, and her decision flows not from the pure springs of duty alone but is tainted by an admixture of baser motives. Her vision of the right has been clouded by fear and anger and lust. She has chosen wrongly. If then she has made of herself the instrument, she has at the same time made of herself a fit object of the Curse. Her deed,

³ Agamemnon, 1468 et seq.

no less than Agamemnon's, involves the law of retaliation and calls for punishment. And again Justice comes suddenly, at the end of so long and so well-established a security that it has almost seemed as if the gods forgot.

In the murder of Clytemnestra by Orestes we reach the climax of the counterpoising of obligations. The balance is now absolute, considered both morally and dramatically. Filial duty as strictly enjoins Orestes to avenge his father as it forbids him to kill his mother. Natural feeling renders both alternatives equally dreadful. He is in an *impasse* where movement forward or to either side is equally impossible. But to render the horror of the situation complete, his retreat is also cut off. The irony of things is such that indecision is equivalent to decision. Choose he must, for to choose not to choose is to leave Agamemnon unavenged.

With emotion, motive, judgment, and obligation all thus brought to an absolute equilibrium, an outside power is required to tip the scales and precipitate the crisis. But this power cannot be sought in any admixture of base motive. No madness of "Ἄτη blinds Orestes' vision. His judgment is not perverted. He faces the full terror of his situation with a clear eye and a pure will. His heart is not hardened by sin but steeled by a divine command. It is to a god whom he turns in his extremity, and it is a god who bids him slay his mother.

CLYTEMNESTRA

Stay, child, and fear to strike. O son, this breast
Pillowed thine head full oft, while, drowsed with sleep,
Thy toothless mouth drew mother's milk from me.

ORESTES (*to his companion Pylades*)

Can I my mother spare? Speak, Pylades.

PYLADES

Where then would fall the best Apollo gave
 At Delphi? where the solemn compact sworn?
 Choose thou the hate of all men, not of gods.

ORESTES

Thou dost prevail; I hold thy counsel good.⁴

This intervention of Apollo cannot but suggest the device of the *deus ex machina*. It is inspired, however, by a higher art than that which, justly or unjustly, is attributed to Euripides. It does not pretend to cut a knot which cannot be untangled, and thus to bring matters to a *dénouement*. It rather emphasizes the problem and prepares the way for further treatment of it.

If in turning at length to the *Eumenides* we have to note the substitution of a divine command for the passion and blindness of a sinful heart as a controlling spring of action, we may also find significant the changed method of the punishment of Orestes. The haunting Curse of the house of Atreus has disappeared, and its place has been taken by the avenging Erinyes of Clytemnestra. The continuity of the action, however, is not broken by the transition. In a sense, Orestes is still the victim of the Curse. Its operation accounts for the situation and the dilemma with which he finds himself confronted, and from which there is no escape. And it uses him as the instrument of its vengeance. But it does not perpetuate itself through his act, and mark him out as its victim. The Erinyes replace it as the agents of his punishment.

This substitution, I think, is deliberate, and is intended, along with the substitution of the command of Apollo for the blindness of sin, to raise the question of how far Orestes' deed is to be considered criminal. To have retained the Curse would have been to condemn Orestes

⁴ Choephoroi, 896 et seq.

unheard, and to presuppose that he has sinned, for, as we have seen, the Curse can only operate through an agent already criminally disposed. Moreover, the Curse is an expression of the impersonal Justice inherent in the order of the world, whereas the Erinyes are more personal, and more divorced from the concept of any abstract law of just reparation. They are the spirits of vengeance rather than of justice. They hearken simply to the cry of the wronged and slain for blind revenge, when the slayer has been his kin, and take no heed of the motives and circumstances of the act. They see no further than that to slay one's kin is in any case a wrong for which payment must be made, irrespective of the innocence of the agent. From their pursuit and from the wrath of the ghost of the murdered Clytemnestra, Orestes cannot be freed, whatever the merits of his case may be.

So it is that the Erinyes appear not as judges, but as prosecutors pure and simple, urging their cause *à parti pris*. All their weight is thrown on one arm of the scales. And over against them, as a counterpoise, is Apollo, the defendant, equally partisan. God is arrayed against god. The argument is, as it were, transferred to Heaven, and the conflict of duties involved is raised to a superhuman level and becomes a cosmic problem. At this new height, however, the equilibrium continues to be exactly maintained. There is a curious wrangle which leaves, for us at least, the crux of the question untouched. The Erinyes justify their partisanship and their neglect of the cry of Agamemnon for vengeance (a situation demanded by the dramatic necessities of the play) by arguing that a husband is no blood-relation to his wife. In return, Apollo grounds his championship of Orestes on the plea that a son is no blood-relation to his mother. Just how seriously Aeschylus means to urge these arguments it is impossible to determine. To the modern ear they seem specious. But however

that may be, their very speciousness is of considerable dramatic value. It keeps the situation in suspense. Even on the superhuman and cosmic level the deadlock is still complete.

Another aspect of the situation has provoked criticism. The arguments take place before a human tribunal constituted for the occasion—the Areopagus, presided over by the goddess Athena. It is said that to bring the gods as pleaders before a human law-court and to submit the question at issue to its decision, is weak, and that Aeschylus in his patriotic desire to exalt the Areopagus by attributing its foundation to so august an occasion has fallen into bathos. But after all, whether or not Aeschylus' manipulation of this development in the plot be due to patriotism, is it not also amply justified dramatically? The decision of a case so subtle and so momentous, if it is to be sympathetically accepted and regarded as valid, must not shock the moral sense of the audience. It must appear, not as an incomprehensible decree of the gods, accepted without being understood, but rather as a clarification of the spectator's own perplexity, and a revelation to him of his own real feeling and judgment in the matter. In referring the case to the Areopagus, Aeschylus is but referring it to his audience, and asking for their solution of the problem. And the tie in the Areopagus is a reflection of their inability to take sides and to break the deadlock.

It remains for Athena to cast the decisive vote, which she gives in favor of Orestes. But her reason for her action, like the arguments of Apollo and the Erinyes, seems at first sight irrelevant to the deeper moral aspects of the question. She favors Orestes rather than Clytemnestra because, born as she is, directly from the head of Zeus, she has had no mother. But here again we may ask whether her explanation of her course is as beside the point as it appears. The case has now

been carried to the court of final appeal, and has been tested by the divine wisdom and weighed in the flawless scales of absolute Justice. But the divine is no more able than the human tribunal to hand down a decision based upon moral grounds. The moral obligations exactly balance, and hence condemnation and acquittal are equally just. The reason then for the decision must be found in other than moral considerations.

We may also note the inversion of the original dilemma. The very situation which makes it morally obligatory on Orestes to choose between the alternatives presented makes it equally obligatory upon Athena to refrain from choosing. He by a refusal, she by a willingness, to take sides would be committed to the same morally indefensible partisanship. The one by suspending, the other by rendering judgment between the conflicting claims, would register a similar approval of unrighteousness and prove unfaithful to the Moral Law.

This *dénouement* has been attacked as weak. Aeschylus, it is said, gives up the problem in despair as insoluble, and the play ends in an anti-climax, or rather in suspense. But were this true, would not the final episode of the placation of the Erinyes and their transformation into the Eumenides be inexplicable? Would not its dramatic irrelevance to the play as a whole be beyond any possible justification by a patriotic and pious desire to celebrate the institution of the worship of the dread goddesses at Athens?

It is impossible, however, to believe that the transformation of the Erinyes into the Eumenides was not intended to be an integral part of the development of the plot. Aeschylus may be a patriot, but he is also a playwright. And the function of the episode, it seems to me, is clear enough. It serves precisely to indicate the solution of the problem which the poet has in mind. Doubtless he feels that the problem is in a sense insol-

able, but the very solution lies, to speak paradoxically, in recognizing its insolubility. For after all, how shall Justice, human or divine, deal with a case where the conflicting obligations are equally imperative and equally balanced? Justice must suspend judgment, for it can give no decision without violating itself. To decide either for or against Orestes is equally to nullify the most solemn obligations of filial duty. The gods must take both sides and no side if they are not to contravene the very law of which they are the guardians. Justice, then, in a case where the agent has been the victim of equally balanced moral obligations, lies precisely in not judging. The defendant escapes, not through any positive movement of the moral machinery of the universe in his favour, but through the immobility consequent upon its having reached a dead centre.

This is the thought, it seems to me, which underlies the final episode of the transformation of the Erinyes into the Eumenides and makes it a vital part of the evolution of the drama. When the Erinyes, balked as they think of their legitimate prey, threaten to visit Athens with their wrath, Athena points out that they have not really lost their case, regarded even in its crudest aspect of blind and primitive blood-vengeance. The decision has not gone against them, for no decision as to the merits of the case has been given. Their demand for the punishment of the slayer of Clytemnestra has not been outweighed but merely counterbalanced by the right of the murdered Agamemnon to be avenged. Therefore their anger is without justification.

This, however, is but half of the story. Athena's plea might give perhaps sufficient reason for inducing the Erinyes to depart without molesting the city, but it does not account for their decision to stay and become beneficent tutelary goddesses. The underlying idea of the further argument by which Athena prevails upon them

to remain seems to be that their very failure to exact the penalty demanded of Orestes by the primitive and purely automatic law of blood-vengeance is really their triumph as servants of a higher Justice which takes motives and circumstances into its reckoning. Her invitation to them to become the Eumenides, partners in her task and in her honours, is an appeal to them to become the conscious and comprehending ministers of that Moral Order which hitherto they have desecrated but dimly and served only in part. Retaliation, to be just, must be allied to wisdom, must be actuated not by what is lowest and most barbarous, but by all that is noblest and most civilized in man.

If the Erinyes will become the Eumenides, if they will accept and serve this higher and civilized Justice which marks the reign of the new gods and is expressed in the acquittal of Orestes, then all will be well. They will be worthy of worship, and will be revered and honoured along with the Reason with which they have allied themselves. If not, they must go. But Athena's threat is veiled. It is by persuasion that the Erinyes are finally won. Justice cannot be established upon violence. The Right can reign, can only be right, if it is based not upon a forced but upon a freely given recognition and homage.

Such I take to be the solution offered by Aeschylus to the problem presented by a balance of conflicting duties. But is there not also a suggestion that this solution is secondary to a harder and deeper task—that of reconciling to the civilization of the poet's day, with its humane and splendid vision of both the nature of the gods and the destiny of man, the old order of barbarism and violence out of which that civilization had so lately arisen? The social conditions and the moral ideals reflected in a concept such as that of the Erinyes had been left behind. If the cult was to endure, it had to be brought

into accordance with the juster views and the nobler sentiments of modern times. Piety and patriotism alike imposed upon Aeschylus the task of transfiguring and ennobling it. This he accomplished by the idea of an evolution of the Erinyes into the Eumenides, which should focus, as it were, the development of primitive and barbaric into the civilized and enlightened Justice of which the final release of Orestes is an example.

The last point gains at least plausibility from its accord with a well-accredited interpretation of the significance of the Trilogy or Tetralogy, of which the *Prometheus Bound* alone is preserved to us. The problem there is to square the old, imperfectly moralized Zeus of the Homeric and Hesiodic canon and of the *Prometheus Bound* with the all-just and all-holy Zeus of the great choruses in the *Agamemnon* and the *Suppliant Maidens*. The key to the difficulty, it has been suggested, lies in the idea of an evolution of the character of Zeus. Aeschylus reconciles the old canonical story to the demands of a maturer ethics by representing Zeus as growing, just as man has grown, out of the old reign of violence and brute force into that conformity with the moral ideal in which the divinity of the gods alone consists, and upon which their sway over the hearts of men depends.

There may be then a deeper affinity between the *Eumenides* and the *Prometheus* than is patent at first sight. Both plays perhaps really express the same idea, are occupied with the same problem, and propose the same answer. But one is not warranted in presenting such a suggestion, nor for that matter perhaps this Paper as a whole, in more than a tentative and interrogatory spirit.

FRA SALIMBENE AND THE FRANCISCAN IDEAL

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One of the most engaging personalities of that most engaging of Christian centuries, the thirteenth, is Brother Salimbene of Parma. His life, begun in 1221, five years before the death of Francis of Assisi and ended, probably, about 1288, thirteen years after the birth of Dante, connects the mystical, devotional, ascetic piety of the Middle Ages with the rational, individualistic, personal attitude of the modern mind. A devoted member of the Franciscan Order and acutely sensitive to its historic significance, he spends his life in its manifold activities, and toward the close sets himself to the congenial task of putting down in order the most vivid impressions remaining to him of the men and things he has had dealings with.

The result is the famous Chronicle, now for the first time presented to the learned world in an edition worthy of the best traditions of modern editorial thoroughness and exactness.¹ It was a fortunate chance that brought the work of this Italian, concerned almost entirely with the affairs of his own country and his own Order, within the scope of the *Monumenta Germaniae Historica* and thus into the trained hands of the late Professor Oswald Holder-Egger. As an Italian patriot, citizen of a Lombard commune, and devoted servant of the papal system, Salimbene regarded the emperor—or, as after 1245 he always called him, the *quondam* emperor—Frederic II as the embodiment of all evil. He loses no opportunity of describing, often in considerable detail, this plague of

¹ *Chronica fratris Salimbene de Adam ordinis Minorum*, ed. Oswald Holder-Egger in *Monumenta Germaniae Historica*, SS. XXXII. MDCCCCV-MDCCCXIII.

Italy, this implacable enemy and ultimate victim of the sacred Papacy. His work is, therefore, at many points a direct contribution to German imperial history and as such belongs properly in the majestic collection of the *Monumenta*.

The original of the Chronicle exists in but one manuscript, and that an imperfect one, in the Vatican Library. It has long been known and partially exploited by scholars, but heretofore has been edited but once, in 1857 at Parma in a fragmentary and altogether unsatisfactory fashion.² The present work leaves little to be desired for completeness, accuracy, and elegance of form. In several beautiful facsimiles of the manuscript we are able to admire the painstaking care of the author—who was unmistakably his own amanuensis—the uniformity of his characters, the regularity of his abbreviations, and his sense of decorative effect. A companion piece to this final edition of the original text is the German translation by Professor Doren of Leipzig, of which only the first volume, covering about half of the original, has appeared. Dr. Doren has fully appreciated the vast difficulties of putting into modern form the singularly varied and altogether individual mode of expression which makes the charm of Salimbene's narrative, but he has gone far toward realizing the ideal of a good translation. He has striven to represent the spirit of his text, and with considerable success. If at times he glides rather too easily over the rough places, he at least avoids the error of too bold conjecture. Until some competent hand shall take up the task of giving us a complete version in English, these handy volumes of Dr. Doren will be the readiest means of making acquaintance with the genial friar.³

² *Chronica Fr. Salimbene Parmensis ex codice Vaticanæ nunc primum edita Parmæ MDCCCLVII.*

³ *Die Chronik des Salimbene von Parma nach der Ausgabe der Monumenta Germaniæ, bearbeitet von Alfred Doren. Leipzig, 191.*

In saying this we are not forgetting the praiseworthy attempt of Mr. G. G. Coulton, who already in 1906, using presumably the first part of the present volume, which had appeared the year before, and also advance sheets of later parts, produced his attractive study called *From St. Francis to Dante*.⁴ He undertook to give, to use his own words, "a translation of all that is of primary interest in the Chronicle of the Franciscan Salimbene." Mr. Coulton's work is well done and will be satisfactory for all those readers who are willing to let some one else decide what is "of primary interest" and also what is suited for ears polite. After all, when we have finished, it is Mr. Coulton's book we have been reading with a somewhat flattened Salimbene as its illustration.

Salimbene is an instructive instance of the impossibility of drawing sharp lines between the great periods of human progress. Mediaeval in his faith, in his class spirit, in his childlike indifference to observed facts, in his utter incapacity to estimate the value of evidence, he is modern in his intense interest in himself and all that belongs to him. We call him a "chronicler" and his work a "chronicle," but he was as far as possible from being a systematic recorder of events in their regular sequence. He does, indeed, follow a general chronological order, but this is nothing more than a very meagre scaffolding on which he clammers up and down at will, with excursions on side lines whenever the temptation offers. If we can believe his own words, the motive to his literary activity was the desire of a niece, a nun, daughter of his elder Franciscan brother, to know more about her ancestry and incidentally about the world activities in which they had been engaged. The good uncle proceeds, therefore, to satisfy this laudable curiosity; but first he must go back and furnish a background of general historical information. His sources

⁴ *From St. Francis to Dante*, G. G. Coulton, M.A. London, 1906.

for this early narrative are fairly easy to trace, and the inquiry into these sources has been valuable in clearing up many hitherto obscure points of critical scholarship.

Perhaps the most vivid impression we receive from Salimbene's story is that of the real motive of the monastic or the fraternal life. The ideal of the true mediaeval monasticism was an ideal of separation from the life of the world, primarily for the good of the separated soul. Yet even in this earlier period nothing is clearer than that such separation affected chiefly such commonplace characters as would have been of little account in any social scheme. The man of capacity in any form was not allowed to rust in the stupid routine of the cloister. The "world" he had affected to despise and appeared to desert called him with myriad voices, and through precisely these earlier centuries there is no more familiar figure than the aggressive monk, active in all the ways open to any of his contemporaries, none the less a fighter in the world's battle because he did not—ordinarily—wield the weapons of the flesh. The history of monastic "reform" throughout the Middle Ages is nothing more or less than the ever renewed but ever fruitless protest against these worldly activities. Only in one respect was the principle of separation fully maintained, in the absolute rejection of the family as the basis of social activity and the substitution for it of a self-perpetuating, self-sustaining community. Certainly in our own day, when a similar menace to the family is becoming more and more acute, we ought to understand more sympathetically than ever the peculiar attraction of this peculiarly mediaeval institution.

The mediaeval monastic ideal had been separation from the world, but against this there had never been lacking the kind of protest which at last culminated in the great new departure of the Mendicants. The Franciscans and Dominicans, or, to use the terms by

which Salimbene invariably calls them, the Minorites and the Preachers, alike in their common rejection of the principle of bodily "inclusion" differed only in their specialization of functions. The Franciscan professed to supplement the work of his predecessors on the side of practical benevolence, the Dominican on the side of learned exhortation to moral duty. But both alike continued the rejection of the family as the ideal unit of social efficiency. In the story of Salimbene we have a graphic illustration of this persistent antagonism. His family was of ancient and honorable station. Father and mother were living. An older brother, married and a father, had already been swept into the current of spiritual enthusiasm that was carrying the youth of Italy away from the safe moorings of civic tradition into many varieties of ecstatic religious experience, and had joined the Franciscan Order. Young Ognibene—as he was then called—in his eighteenth year fell into the same net. He was the third and youngest son, the last hope of his father's house. He knew his parents would disapprove, and so he slipped away from home and found shelter in the local Franciscan house, to be sent afterward to several other and safer retreats. Let him tell the story in his own words:—

"So long as he lived, my father grieved over my entrance into the order of the Minorites and refused to be comforted, because he had no son to succeed him in his inheritance. He made a complaint to the emperor (Frederic II), who was at Parma at the time, that the Minorites had taken away his son. Thereupon the emperor ordered Brother Elias, Minister General of the Order, as he valued his favor, to send me back to my father. After that, my father went to Assisi, where Brother Elias was, and gave the emperor's letter into his hands. As soon as he had read it, Brother Elias gave him an order to the brethren of the house at Fano where I then was, charging them upon their obedience to hand me over to my father at once, if I desired it; but otherwise, if I was unwilling to go, they should hold me precious as the apple of their eyes.

"So a number of gentlemen [*milities*] came with my father to the house of the brethren at Fano to see the outcome of my affair, and I was made a spectacle for them, but they a means of salvation for me. When the brethren and lay members were gathered in the chapter-house a great deal of talk went on back and forth, and then my father brought out the letter of the Minister General and showed it to the brethren. Brother Jeremiah, the Custos, read it aloud to them all and replied to my father: 'Sir Guido, we are sorry for your grief, and we are ready to obey the orders of our Father; but here is your son; he is of age, let him speak for himself. Ask him if he wishes to go with you, and if so, let him go, in God's name! But if he will not, we cannot compel him to go.' So my father asked me whether I would go with him or not. And I answered, 'No! For the Lord says, *No man having put his hand to the plough, and looking back, is fit for the Kingdom of God.*' Then my father said, 'Have you no thought for your father and mother, who are in great trouble on your account?' And I said, 'No indeed, I have no thought for you! For the Lord says, *He that loveth father or mother more than me is not worthy of me.* And He says of you too, *He that loveth son or daughter more than me, etc.* It is you, father, who ought to be thinking of Him who for our sakes hung upon the cross, that He might give us eternal life.'

"Then the brethren rejoiced that I spoke thus to my father, but he said to them, 'You have bewitched my son and deceived him into refusing me. I will complain again to the emperor against you and your Minister too. But now let me talk with my son apart from you, and you will see that he will come with me fast enough.' So the brethren allowed me to speak with my father apart from them, because from what I had already said they had quite a little confidence in me; but they listened behind the wall, for they were trembling like a reed in the water lest my father with his blandishments might change my purpose, and they were afraid, not only for the safety of my soul, but lest my withdrawal might keep others from entering the Order. Then my father said, 'My dear son, don't trust these petticoated knaves! They have been fooling you. Come with me, and I will give you everything I have.' Then I answered and said to my father, 'Go, father, go! For the Wise Man says, Prov. iii. 27, *Prevent not him from well-doing who is able, and if thou canst, do well thyself.*' And he answered me with tears and said, 'What shall I say to your mother, who grieves for you without ceasing?' I said to him, 'Say to her from me, Thus says your son, Ps. 26, *When my father and my mother forsake me,*

then the Lord will take me up.' And when my father heard all these things, in despair of my return he threw himself on the ground before the brethren and the laymen who had come with him and said, 'A thousand devils take you, accursed son! and your brother here, who has befooled you! My curse be upon you both forever, and may it bring you to the infernal spirits!' And he went out in a violent passion; but we remained greatly comforted, giving thanks to our God and saying to each other, '*Let them curse, but bless thou*', Ps. 108. The laymen went away powerfully edified by my perseverance; but the brethren rejoiced mightily because God had done manfully through me his little child.

"The following night the blessed Virgin gave me my reward. For I seemed to be lying before an altar in prayer, as the brethren are wont to do when they rise for matins. And I heard the voice of the blessed Virgin calling to me, and lifting up my face I saw the blessed Virgin seated upon the altar where the Host stands and the Cup, and she had her child in her bosom and held him out to me and said, 'Fear not! but come and kiss my son, whom to-day you have confessed before men.' And when I was afraid, behold! the child opened his arms eagerly awaiting me; and so trusting in the eagerness and the innocence of the boy and the wide charity of his mother, I approached and embraced and kissed him. And the gentle mother left him to me for a long time; but when I could not have enough of him, the holy Virgin blessed me and said, 'Go, dear son, and rest, that the brethren who are rising to matins find thee not here with us.' So I complied and the vision left me; but in my heart there remained an indescribable sweetness, such as I have never felt in the world."

Once more Salimbene tells with the same gusto of a renewed attempt to bring him to some notion of respect for his family obligations. Five years after his entrance into the Order there came to him certain clowns (*ystriones*) who were called "knights of the court" (*milites de curia*), "but I cared no more for them than for the fifth wheel of a coach. One said to me, 'Your father sends his greetings, and your mother says, if she might but see you for one day, she would gladly die the next.' He thought he was giving me a powerful motive for a change of purpose; but I said to him in anger, 'Away with you, you wretch! I won't hear another word. My father is an Amorite

and my mother a Hittite!' (Ezek. 16 3). So he went away in confusion and never came back again."

This is the view of his monastic vocation which Brother Salimbene, writing some forty years later, desired to impress upon the world—perhaps upon himself. It is of interest as giving fairly both sides of the problem, the claim of the world as well as the summons to the "higher life." The detail is almost purely conventional—the heartbroken parents, their appeal to the highest secular authority, the trembling boldness of the brethren, saving their case by throwing the responsibility upon the novice himself, the glib priggishness of the boy with his pat quotations from Scripture, and finally the consoling vision of the Madonna—it must have been a dull student indeed of saintly literature who out of these elements could not weave an appealing story. The valuable part of it is its dramatic presentation of a world conflict. After all, the "world," including the supreme representative of earthly power, had to give way before the passive resistance of a handful of friars strong only in their loyalty to a false ideal of society.

A curious side-light is thrown upon the youth's actual feeling at the time in a later passage where Salimbene, speaking of the Emperor Frederic, says, "I have seen him and at one time liked him [*dilexi*]; for he wrote in my behalf [*pro me*] to Brother Elias, Minister General of the Minorite Brethren, directing him, as he valued his favor, to give me back to my father." Did the memory of the aging friar slip back to what was his honest state of mind during his novitiate, and is the earlier account just given only a bit of pious "literature"?

While Salimbene was still a very young man in the Franciscan house at Pisa he became greatly interested in the writings, genuine and spurious, of the Abbot Joachim of Floris, who in the generation preceding had caught the imagination of Young Italy by an interpre-

tation of Christianity as a phase in the development of that "Eternal Gospel" which had always been fulfilling itself in stages corresponding to the dispensations of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Joachim's mystical temper appealed powerfully to our young brother, and he became an avowed follower of the Calabrian prophet. Joachim himself appears to have preserved a certain caution in his prophetic function; for Salimbene says that he never set definite dates of fulfilment, leaving it to those who should be living at the time to see his exact meaning. Some of his interpreters, however, were less careful, and it was the failure of some of Joachim's alleged prophecies which finally broke the historian's faith in him.

The nature of the Joachite methods is well shown in a spirited scene at the Franciscan house at Hyères while Salimbene was a visitor there. He had come to Hyères chiefly to hear Brother Hugh of Digna discuss about Joachim, and the opportunity came in this way. Two Dominicans were waiting in the town for a favorable chance to take ship, and one day after dinner a brother of the house asked one of these, named Peter, what he thought of the doctrine of Abbot Joachim.

"Brother Peter answered, 'I care no more for Joachim than for the fifth wheel of a coach [a favorite simile of our author]. Why, even Gregory [I] believed that the end of the world was near in his day because the Lombards had come and were destroying everything before them.' So the brother ran to Brother Hugh's room where he was surrounded by jurists and notaries and scientists [*phisici*] and other scholars and said to him, 'There is a certain Dominican here who does not believe a word of that doctrine of yours.' Brother Hugh said, 'What is it to me if he doesn't? Let him take the consequences. However, invite him to a discussion and let us hear his reasons for doubting.' So the Dominican came, but unwillingly, partly because he had so low an opinion of Joachim, partly because he did not believe there was any one in that house who could compare with himself in learning or in knowledge of Scripture. When Brother Hugh saw him he said, 'Are you the man who doubts the teaching of Joachim?' 'Indeed I am,' an-

swered Brother Peter. 'Have you ever read Joachim?' said Brother Hugh. 'I have indeed and thoroughly too.' 'Yes, I've no doubt you have read him, as a woman reads her psalter, and when she gets to the end forgets what she read at the beginning. That's the way many people read and don't understand, either because they despise what they are reading or because their ignorant hearts are darkened. Now then, tell me what you would like to hear about Joachim.' 'I should like to hear you prove from the prophet Isaiah, as Joachim teaches, that the life of the emperor Frederic is to end after seventy years—for he is still alive—and also that he cannot be slain except by God, i.e. not by a violent death, but only by a natural one.' Brother Hugh answered, 'Gladly; but you must listen patiently and not with shouting and objections, for in this doctrine the inquirer must have faith.' Abbot Joachim was a holy man, and he says that his predictions were revealed to him by God for the benefit of men.

"As to the holy life of Joachim, besides what is found in his 'legend' we can prove it by an instance of his exceeding patience. Before he became abbot, while he was still under discipline, a serving brother who had a grudge against him filled his drinking-cup regularly for a whole year with water, and he bore it with patience, making no complaint. But when, toward the close of the year, he was sitting one day next the abbot at table, the abbot said to him, 'How is it that you are drinking white wine and haven't offered me any? Is that your idea of politeness?' To which the saintly Joachim replied, 'I was ashamed to offer it to you, my Father, because this is a secret of mine.' Then the abbot lifted Joachim's cup to try it, tasted of it, and found he had made a bad bargain. Then when he found that it was water not made wine he said, 'What is water but water? Who gave you permission to drink such a beverage as this?' Joachim answered, 'Father, water is a sober drink, it doesn't trip the tongue, nor cause drunkenness nor much speaking.' But when the abbot learned in the Chapter that this insulting revenge was due to the malice and ill temper of the serving brother, he was minded to turn him out of the Order; but Joachim threw himself at his feet and begged that he would not punish the lay brother with expulsion."

The poor fellow was let off with a severe reprimand and the penalty of drinking water for a year in his turn. The argument is obvious. A person of such distinguished humility must be worthy of all acceptance in the rôle of

prophet! There follows a long disputation, in which Brother Hugh defends the principle of prophecy even through the mouths of evil men or, still stranger, through heathen agents. Poor Brother Peter gets the worst of it, of course, overcome by the amazing learning and readiness of his opponent.

The discussion is broken off by the announcement that the expected ship is ready to sail, and the two Dominicans hurry away without so much as saying good-bye. After their departure Brother Hugh said to the rest who had heard the discussion, "Don't take it ill of me if I have said some things I ought not to have said, for debaters are apt to be led into extremes by their excitement;" and he added, "These good people are always bragging about their learning, and saying that in their Order is the fountain-head of wisdom. And they say they have been among fools when they have been in the houses of the Minorites, where they have been most kindly entertained. But, by the grace of God, they weren't able to say this time that they had been among fools, for I have done as the Wise Man says in Proverbs—'answered a fool according to his folly.'"

Salimbene can never resist the temptation to take a fling at the Dominicans, especially to ridicule their claim to superior learning. Yet he has a sincere respect for them as, after all, sharing with his own Franciscans the character of honest mendicancy. It gives him solid comfort to find in his precious Joachim, who died in 1202, the obvious prophecy of two great twin Orders, who are to realize the prototypes set forth in the interpretation of the prophet Jeremiah then attributed to his Calabrian successor. It is of no importance, so far as Salimbene's faith in his master is concerned, that this interpretation is now believed not to be the work of Joachim. Some of these prototypes are the crow and the dove—since the Dominicans are all black and the

Franciscans parti-colored; the two angels sent at evening to Sodom before its destruction; Esau and Jacob; Joseph and Benjamin; Moses and Aaron; the two spies sent by Joshua to Jericho; Peter and John going to the sepulchre, of whom it is said "the two ran together," etc. And again comes the sly dig at the Dominicans. The Abbot Joachim thought the Dominicans were prefigured by Peter because, when Peter and John were going up to the temple at the ninth hour, it was Peter who said, "Silver and gold have I none," although John was as poor as he and deserved just as much credit for his poverty. Now the Dominicans are always claiming every praiseworthy thing for themselves and therefore they must have been prefigured in the character of Peter. "Nor is that passage in John [xx]—'the two ran together'—without its mystery, for at the same time and under the same pope, Innocent III, both Orders began. In the tenth year of the pontificate of Innocent III, the year 1207, the blessed Francis began the Order of the Minorites." So far so good; but it is amusing to see how Salimbene's desire to chaff the Dominicans gets the better of his own chronology: "And where it is said, '*That other disciple outran Peter and came first to the sepulchre, but did not enter in,*' that means that the Order of the Minorites appeared in the world first in the above-named year; but the blessed Dominic began the Order of the Preachers in the year 1216 under Pope Honorius III."

So in the reference to Jacob and Esau: "The Order which was prefigured by Esau went to the daughters of Heth, i.e. to the secular sciences, as, for example, to Aristotle and other philosophers. This is the Order of Preachers, prefigured in the crow, not as to the blackness of their sins but as to their dress. But Jacob, a plain man, dwelt in tents. This was the Order of Minorites, who at the beginning of their appearance in the world gave themselves to prayer and contemplation."

But this very devotion of Salimbene to the two great Orders, no matter how severely he might criticise the shortcomings of individual members, made him fiercely intolerant of all imitators. It is obvious that the apparently easy lives of the begging friars would attract many of the unemployed, and there seemed no good reason why Orders should not be multiplied as far as the patience or the superstition of the well-to-do could be stretched. Salimbene gives us vivid sketches of several such attempts which came under his own observation. The leaders were usually disappointed candidates for one of the great Orders. One such applied to Brother Hugh at Hyères; but that clever person told him, if he felt the call to poverty, to "go into the woods and learn to eat roots, for the time of tribulation was at hand." The fellow, however, was not looking for that kind of poverty. He got together a band of loafers like himself, who clothed themselves in striped mantles and began to beg. "For," confesses Salimbene, "we and the Preaching Brethren have taught all the world to beg, and all kinds of people are putting on gowns and making mendicant rules for themselves."

These particular specimens were called in derision by the neighboring Franciscans "Men of the Woods," by others "Sack Brothers," from their peculiar dress. They seem to have enjoyed a certain vogue for about twenty-five years, but were abolished by a general order of Pope Gregory X in 1274. No wonder that a certain lady of Modena said, as she saw these beggars going from door to door, "We had bags and satchels enough before to empty our store-houses without these Brethren of the Sack!"

[A]nother similar movement had its origin at Parma while Salimbene was living there. He begins his account of it with a sufficiently clear description of its "charter-members." "That congregation of loose fel-

lows, swineherds, fools, and clowns 'who call themselves Apostles and are not so, but are the Synagogue of Satan'; for they are of no use in preaching or chanting the service or celebrating Mass or hearing confession or teaching in school or giving good counsel or even saying prayers for their benefactors, because they are running about town all day making eyes at the women. How they serve the Church of God or are useful to Christian folk I cannot see. They spend their whole time wandering idly about; they neither work nor pray."

The leader of this troop was one Gerardino Segalelli, a townsman of Salimbene, "of low origin, unlearned, a layman, a clown [*ydiota*], and a fool." He had tried to join the Franciscans, but being refused he "hung about the church of the Brethren planning the foolish scheme which he afterwards carried out." Like all the imitators, says Salimbene, he tried to copy the Franciscan dress, let his hair and beard grow long, sold his bit of a house and scattered the price of it, not among the poor but among the loose fellows of the place, who spent it forthwith in gambling, blaspheming the living God. But, not satisfied with emulating the virtues of Francis, he wanted to be like the Son of God, and so had himself circumcised and went about making extravagant claims to chastity, but deceiving unsuspecting women. He trotted about Parma alone—this was one of his sins—saluting no one, but crying out at intervals "Repenshe! Repenshe!"; for he did not know how to say "Repent ye," and his followers after a time spoke in the same way, because they were country folk and simpletons [*ydiote*]. Salimbene gives several detailed accounts of individuals who tried their fortunes with these "apostles" to the scandal of their several communities, goes on to state three reasons why the "apostles" are not in a state of salvation, and then enumerates twelve specific forms of foolishness which they display. In this enumeration we find a general

summary of the author's views as to the true position of Orders in the Church.

First, they neither fear God nor honor man; for when Pope Gregory declared their association, as well as that of the Sack Brethren, dissolved, the latter obeyed, taking on no more members, so that they gradually died out, but "these fools, beasts and simpletons took no notice of the papal order but kept on increasing their numbers, and," says Salimbene, "they will never cease from their folly until some other supreme pontiff shall wipe out their memory from the earth." Secondly, some of them do not practise chastity, to which all *religiosi* are bound and which our Lord taught by word and example. Thirdly, some of them do not keep the vow of poverty, but after selling their property keep the money for scandalous uses. "Now observe," says Salimbene, "that these three things are the basis of all 'religions,' without which there can be no salvation for a '*religiosus*'; in fact, if one lacks any one of these he can in no way be called a '*religiosus*.'"

The twelve kinds of foolishness of the "apostles" are their lack of a head, their wandering about alone, their idleness, want of discipline, failure to teach their novices the rule of life, "which is a great folly, for whereas beasts and birds have at once by nature what they require, the soul of man is created by God as a *tabula rasa* and therefore needs instruction." They live around from house to house, "which is a vile life." They give up the work for which they are fitted, namely, herding cows and pigs, cleaning out vaults and tilling the ground, thrusting themselves into work for which they have no fitness, namely, teaching and preaching.

Here Salimbene darts off at a tangent to describe his own studies from earliest childhood. He had never ceased studying, and now, at the age of sixty-three, "I may say in truth with Socrates, 'This only I know—

that I know nothing.' But those untaught fools and ribald fellows who call themselves 'apostles' want to preach without learning, having neither knowledge of Scripture nor good morals nor an upright life; but they go about the world making fools of themselves and sowing the seeds of heresy. It is as if a bird should try to fly without wings or a lame man to walk without feet." It particularly offends Salimbene that these precious knaves should try to outdo the original apostles in the matter of dress. It appears that they thought to acquire merit by obeying literally the apostolic injunction not to take two coats for their journey. This is overdoing it. They claim to know too much. Of course there are limits both ways. It was plainly an extravagance in the other direction for a certain Patriarch of Aquileia to begin Lent with forty courses at dinner, cutting off one every day till Easter, that the honor and glory of his Patriarchate might not be diminished. But that is no reason why these fools should suffer the "torments of vermin which they cannot shake out and of sweat and dust and foul smells, because they cannot shake or wash their one garment unless they go naked. One day a woman told two Minorites that she had a naked 'apostle' in her bed, and there he would have to stay until she had washed and dried his garment. Thereupon the brethren had a good laugh at the stupidity of the woman and of the fool apostle too."

Another offence was that these people begged but gave no alms, keeping all they got, whereas it was the duty of every clerical person to render service in return for the support which the community was bound to give him. The charge that they had taken upon themselves a name far too lofty and noble for their low quality gives Salimbene a chance for one of his excursions into ancient prophecy. These people were not prefigured by any of the numerous twelves and seventies mentioned

in the Scriptures old and new. "Apostle" means "one sent," but these people were not sent by any one. They came of themselves and even refused to obey the papal order to disperse. Putting together all these reflections, we are able to see clearly Salimbene's conception of the Franciscan ideal.

If our chronicler had a hero, it was John of Parma, a fellow Franciscan and during the years 1247 to 1257 Minister General of the Order. Salimbene was proud of him as a townsman, admired him for his many capacities, and revered him as a leader. He devotes to him a considerable section of his recollections and uses him in various ways as a type to express positively the ideal he has just been negatively defending. He gives his account of John largely in quaint anecdotes simply told and bearing the marks of essential accuracy. The monastic virtue of humility is, of course, chiefly emphasized. Salimbene had gone up to Tarascon in Provence to meet the General on his return from a long tour of inspection in England, France, and Spain. There one evening after compline at the Franciscan house the General went into the cloister to pray; but the visiting brothers were afraid to go to bed before their chief.

"So, seeing their trouble and hearing them muttering, since they wished to sleep and could not, for a light was shining where the beds were, I went to the General, because he was very close and intimate with me, being of the same city and related to relatives of mine. I found him in the cloister praying and said to him, 'Father, the visitors are worn out with the toil of the journey and would like to go to bed, but they are afraid to get into their beds until you shall first come to yours.' Then he said to me, 'Go, and tell them from me that they are to go to sleep with God's blessing.' And so I did, but I thought I ought to wait for the General, to show him to his bed. So when he came back from praying I said to him, 'Father, you are to sleep in this bed, which has been made ready for you.' And he said, 'That bed which you are showing me is fit for a pope to sleep in, but never shall Brother John of Parma lie in it.' And he lay down in the vacant bed which I was expecting

to have. I said to him, 'Father, may God forgive you for taking away the bed I was expecting to sleep in, because it was assigned to me.' And he said, 'My son, you are to sleep in that pontifical couch.' And when I, following his example, refused, he said, 'But it is my special wish and command that you lie there.' So I had to do as he ordered."

There follows a pretty little scene to illustrate the General's business capacity and fairness in making appointments to office. It so happened that an English friar, one Stephen, to whom John had promised a lectorship in Rome at his own request [*pro consolatione sua*], arrived in Tarascon just as messengers came from the brethren at Genoa asking the General to send them a good Lector. "Then the General, who knew how to dispatch business quickly, for he was a man of good counsel and always had ready a well-considered plan, said to Brother Stephen, 'Here is a letter in which the brethren of the Genoese house ask me to provide them with a good Lector, and if you would be willing to take the place I should be greatly pleased; and' when I come there I will send you on to Rome.' Brother Stephen answered, 'I shall be willing and glad [*consolatorie*] to obey you.' And the General said, 'You will be blessed, my son, for you have made a good answer. You will go with these brethren, you and your comrade, and I will write to the Minister and the brethren there to accept you as well recommended.' And so it was done."

But however great his admiration for the General, Salimbene must have his little joke. His comrade, also a John or Littlejohn (Johanninus), and also of Parma, said one day to the General, "'Won't you help Brother Salimbene and me to win our halos?' The General turned to my comrade with a smiling face and said, 'How can I help you to a halo?' 'By giving us a license to preach,' answered Brother Littlejohn. Then Brother John, the General, said, 'Verily, if you were both my

own brothers, you should not have it except by the sword of an examination!’ Then I answered and said to my comrade in the hearing of the General, ‘Get out! get out! with your halos! I had my preacher’s license a year ago from Pope Innocent IV at Lyons, and now do you suppose I would take it from Brother Littlejohn of St. Lazarus? It is enough for me to get it once from him who has the power to grant it.’ And truly Brother John was called ‘Master Littlejohn’ when he was a teacher of logic in the world [*in seculo*].”

This gives Salimbene a start for a detailed sketch of the General’s life, beginning when he was a poor boy brought up by an uncle in the monastery of St. Lazarus in Parma.

“He was of moderate stature, rather short than tall, with well-shaped limbs, well set up, sound, and with great endurance as well in walking as in study. His face was like that of an angel, friendly and always merry. He was generous, liberal, courteous, charitable, humble, gentle, kind, and patient, devoted to God, diligent in prayer, pious, benevolent, and compassionate. He celebrated Mass every day and with such devotion that all present felt a certain grace therefrom. He preached with such fervor, both to the clergy and to the brethren, that he moved many of his hearers to tears, as I have often seen myself. His speech was most eloquent, never hesitating. His learning was great, for he had been a teacher of grammar and of logic in the world, and as a Minorite he was a great theologian and disputant. When he passed through Rome the brethren had him preach or discuss before the Cardinals, and he was reputed by them as a great philosopher. He was a mirror and an example to all who looked upon him, for his whole life was full of honesty and holiness, and his conduct was perfect. He knew music well and sang well. Never have I seen such a rapid writer or so beautiful and accurate and readable a hand. His literary style was lofty and polished and extremely sententious when he so desired in his letters.

“He was the first General Minister who began to go about through the provinces of the Order. But when Brother Bonagratia [a successor of John] undertook to follow his example and visit the Order in this way, he could not endure the hard work and within four years fell sick and died. Brother John was also the first to issue

letters of reception to lay devotees, both men and women, into the benefits of the Order. And this is the form of the certificate which he gave them:

“‘To our beloved in Christ, friends and devotees of the Lesser Brethren, Sir J. and the lady M., his wife, and A. their beloved daughter, John, General Minister and servant of the Order of the Lesser Brethren, health and everlasting peace in the Lord! Accepting with sincere affection your devotion to our Order, which I have learned from the pious report of the brethren, and desiring to make a salutary return for your love to us, I admit you to all the benefits of our prayers in life and in death, granting you by these presents full participation in all the blessings which the grace of our Saviour shall deign to bestow through our brethren wherever they may dwell throughout the earth.’ And please to observe that he refused to give these certificates except upon the express request of persons known to be devoted to God and the Order and special benefactors of the same.”

It seems as if Salimbene must have had some experience of the scandals which were sure to result from this trading in the divine favor thus inaugurated by his friend, and desired to guard him against suspicion.

The weak point in John of Parma appears to have been that he was what Salimbene calls “a very great Joachite,” inclined, that is, to a vague mysticism and perfectionism which seemed dangerous to the organized church system. The result was that popes who had at first regarded him with the utmost favor began to suspect him as a fanatic. “Pope Nicholas III took him one day by the hand and led him familiarly about the palace saying to him, ‘Since you are a man of prudent counsel, would it not be better for you and for your Order if you should stay here in Rome with us as a cardinal, rather than to follow the words of fools who speak prophecies out of their own hearts?’ Brother John answered the pope and said, ‘For your honors I care not at all . . . but as to giving good counsel, I tell you I could indeed give wholesome counsel if there were any to hear me; but at the court of Rome in these days, little is talked of but wars and

scandals, and nothing is said about the saving of souls.' Thereupon the pope groaned and said, 'We are so used to all this that we imagine that everything we do and say must be worth while.'"

Here our chronicler makes a skip of several years and goes on to say, "When I was living at Ravenna Brother Bartholomew said to me, 'I tell you, Brother Salimbene, Brother John of Parma made a great deal of trouble for himself and for his Order; because he was of such learning and holiness and of such exemplary life that he could have rebuked the Roman Curia and they would have listened to him. But when he followed the prophecies of fanatics he brought reproach upon himself and greatly injured his friends.' 'Well,' I said, 'it seems to me so too, and I am greatly grieved, for I was very fond of him indeed.' 'But you too were a Joachite,' said Brother Bartholomew. And I replied, 'That is true; but after Frederic died (1250), who was once emperor, and the year 1260 had passed, I gave up that doctrine completely and am disposed to believe nothing but what I see.'"

This extreme disobligingness of the Emperor Frederic in dying so many years before the date set for his exit by the prophecies of Joachim was only one of the grudges which Salimbene had laid up against him. A considerable portion of his narrative is devoted to a recital of Frederic's Italian campaigns, especially of those in which his native Parma played the central part. At the close of this narration he sums up the life and character of his subject under the scheme of twelve misfortunes and seven "curiosities" or "superstitions." It is characteristic of his method that when he comes to his tenth "misfortune" he calls it the last, but then, evidently later, felt it important to add two more, in order, as he naïvely says, "to make up the number twelve." Frederic's misfortunes, the loss of empire, the rebellions of his son

and his most trusted servants, the entire failure of his Italian policy, are all traced by Salimbene to his hostility to the Church. "His second misfortune was that he desired to trample the Church under his feet, so that the pope and the cardinals and all the rest of the clergy should be paupers and go afoot; and this he purposed, not out of zeal for religion, but because he was not a good Catholic, and because he was greedy and avaricious and wanted the wealth of the Church for himself and his children and to crush the power of the clergy, lest they rise up against him. And this his purpose he confided to his intimate councillors, through whom it afterward became known. But God did not permit that such things should be done to His own.

"His third misfortune was that he tried to subdue the Lombards, but could not, for when he had them on one side he lost them on the other. For they are a mighty subtle and slippery folk, saying one thing and doing another; as when you try to hold an eel or a lamprey tight in the hand, the harder you squeeze the faster he slips away."

Salimbene writes with especial joy of what he calls Frederic's "superstitions, curiosities, maledictions, unbeliefs, perversities, and abuses," all of which he says he has described in another chronicle unfortunately lost. All these categories may safely be reduced to the one idea of "eccentricities." To this Franciscan mind the greatest of moral aberrations was what we should call "originality," or, to come nearer to Salimbene's vocabulary, "curiosity." Out of such a quality was sure to come a search for novelty, and this—to us the indispensable motive toward all valuable activity—was to the thirteenth century churchman the inevitable starting-point for every kind of disturbance in the divinely ordered scheme of things. It was certainly a shade more than queer if the emperor did really cut off the thumb of his notary

because he wrote his name "Fredericus" instead of "Fridericus"; but our faith in Salimbene's accuracy is not strengthened when he dishes up again for Frederic the old story told by Herodotus of an Egyptian king who tried the experiment of segregating young children to see whether they would speak "Hebrew or Greek or Latin or Arabic or at any rate the tongue of their parents." Salimbene adds the detail that the children all died "because children cannot live without the hand-clapping and gestures and smiling faces and petting of their maids and nurses; whence the name *fascenine* is given to the songs a woman sings as she rocks a child to sleep."

Still more curious is the accusation that "when Frederic saw the Land of Promise which God so often praised, calling it a land flowing with milk and honey and excellent among all lands, he did not care for it, and said the God of the Jews could not have seen his country, the Terra di Lavoro, Calabria, and Sicily, or He would not so often have praised the land which He promised and gave to the Jews; like that clerk who spoke unseemly things against God, and straightway lightning from Heaven smote him and he fell dead."

"A sixth curiosity and superstition of Frederic was that he once gave two men a good dinner and then sent one to sleep and the other out hunting. Then at evening he had them both cut open in his presence to see which had the better digested his meal; and the doctors said he who had slept had made the better digestion." Precisely why Frederic should have shut a man up in a wine-cask till he died in order to prove that the soul dies with the body, one does not quite see; but Salimbene says he did this, and uses the tale to show that Frederic was an "Epicurean," who believed in eating and drinking, for tomorrow he would die. He accuses Frederic of hunting up all possible passages of Scripture to defend this view of life, and then piles up a mass of counter-quotations,

"which," he says, "all tend to destroy the credulity of Frederic and his wise men, who believed there is no life but the present, so that they might the more freely live in the wretchedness of fleshly lust."

Putting together all these criticisms of this extraordinary man we see that Salimbene's indictment really means that Frederic II was a person of keen and eager intellect, anxious to learn and fearless in his investigation into the facts of Nature—in short a modern man and therefore detestable to the mediaeval spirit of conformity and dread of the unknown.

I hope to have shown by these random selections what a wealth of material is offered in this new volume for a better understanding of that mysterious transitional age when the dark shadow of priestly domination was passing slowly from the mind of Europe, giving place to the gradual illumination of a new doctrine of life, whose central idea was the goodness of earth and of humanity because they were alike the creation of a God who was good. In their blinded way the earliest followers of the Franciscan ideal were making their contribution to this development. The value of Salimbene's comments is in showing to what grotesque misapplications this ideal, in itself essentially false, was sure to be subjected. His own experiences fall within the first two generations of the Mendicant experiment, precisely the time when the great opposition of the "spirituals" and the "conventuals" was shaping itself within the Franciscan Order. In the generation following him this antagonism was to break out into a furious struggle in which the supremacy of the papal system itself was put in jeopardy. The stammering apology of Salimbene is a direct prophecy of the crushing indictment of Ockham and Wycliffe.

REFLECTIONS OF RITUAL IN PAUL

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Alongside the doctrine that our Gospels, in their general structure as well as their individual anecdotes, reflect the beliefs and practice of the primitive brotherhoods which gave them currency, should stand (if the theory be valid) some corresponding reflection in the still older Pauline Epistles. Especially should we expect Baptism and the Eucharist to affect the mode of teaching.

Direct references are of course not wanting. Orderly observance of the Lord's Supper is one of the objects in view in the writing of First Corinthians. We take our own ritual from 1 Cor. 11 23-26. Rom. 6 3 f. expounds the significance of Baptism, not without clear implication that the Romans, though no converts of Paul, must have been taught a similar doctrine. Gal. 5 21 and 1 Cor. 15 1-11 refer respectively to primitive ethical teaching and to the outline of the apostolic preaching of the Resurrection. Besides these we have more indirect references to primitive doctrinal confessions in Rom. 10 9 f., 1 Cor. 8 4-6 and 12 3. These more or less conscious and intentional allusions have a certain analogy with those Gospel narratives, such as the Feeding of the Multitude, the Last Supper, Vigil in Gethsemane, Passion, and Resurrection, which have a recognized adaptation to known observances of the early church. How illuminating both to narrative and ritual the perception of this relation may become needs hardly to be mentioned.

But it is something more and different when the treatment of other subjects is affected, be it in the Gospels

or in Paul, by familiarity with the ritual. On the small scale we notice it in the Gospels, when Mk. 10 38 f. gives the saying of Jesus to the sons of Zebedee in the form: "Ye shall indeed drink my cup, and with the baptism wherewith I am baptized shall ye be baptized"; whereas Mt. 20 23 has only: "My cup ye shall indeed drink." We notice it similarly in Paul when in 1 Cor. 10 2-4 Israel is said to have been "baptized unto Moses in the cloud and in the sea; and did all eat the same spiritual meat and drink the same spiritual drink." One may well ask whether the influence thus apparent has not gone deeper and affected the general structure of argument and story.

Baptism and the Lord's Supper seem in fact to constitute the two foci of gospel tradition. The Galilean Ministry is related as an account of how Jesus *when he was baptized* was endowed with all the powers of the Spirit of Adoption and how he thenceforth pursued his career full of "the word of wisdom and the word of power." One can hardly fail to see the parallel to the neophyte's experience in baptism and the accompanying endowment with "gifts of tongues" and "prophecy, miracles, helps, healings," and the rest. The Judaean Ministry simply prolongs backward the interpretation of the rite of *the Blood of the New Covenant*. It begins where Jesus, setting his face toward Jerusalem, reveals to the Twelve the doctrine of the Cross and Resurrection. Its few sporadic miracles are all symbolic. Its anecdotes all deal directly or indirectly with the single lesson: Die to live.

We may well imagine that the clustering of anecdotes and sayings from the story of Jesus' life about these two foci, so that each half of the gospel narrative has its appropriate beginning and ending, is partly owing to the fact that Baptism and the Lord's Supper would inevitably be the chief occasions for rehearsing the story.

Is there, then, any similar unconscious influence traceable in the general structure of the Pauline Epistles where these come nearest to the form of systematic expositions of Paul's "gospel"? Is there an analogous grouping in Romans and Ephesians, and perhaps Galatians as well, even if the Corinthian letters, and others whose specific occasion has determined the course of thought, show no such tendency? It will be well before attempting an answer to consider first what evidences appear even in First Corinthians, written in answer to a series of questions by Paul's correspondents, and apparently answering them *seriatim*, of incidental reflection of ritual. For besides the general features common to all the Epistles which adapt them to public reading in the churches—we mention only the closing Benediction (in 2 Cor. 13 13 Trinitarian in form) so closely analogous to the Benediction which it was the prerogative of the Levite (Num. 6 22-27) to pronounce in the synagogue at the close of the service—there are certain well known features of First Corinthians which almost certainly reflect the observances of Passover. The letter implies its composition at about this date (cf. 16 8), and as we know by abundant later testimony the celebration of the great Jewish Feast of Redemption did not cease in the Christian church. Its ritual continued with slight alteration, but with a spiritualization and enhancement of its meaning. Thus in 1 Cor. 5 7 f. we have allusion to the ceremony of Purging of Leaven, preparatory to Passover (or more strictly to Unleavened Bread, the seven-day feast of the new grain-harvest ushered in by Passover). The reflection of the ritual here is quite unmistakable. At mid-day of Nisan 13, a few hours before the slaughtering of the lambs, it was the duty of each Jewish householder, upon signal given by the priestly authorities, to inaugurate a formal search of the premises, removing every vestige of the leaven of the last year's use, that after

the seven days of unleavened bread (*mazzoth*) the new year might be begun with fresh leaven. We cannot, then, mistake the figure when Paul writes to the Corinthians: "Purge out the old leaven, that ye may be a new lump of dough (*φύραμα*), even as ye are unleavened (*ἀζύμοι*); for our Passover, too, hath been slaughtered, even Christ. So then let us keep festival not with old leaven, nor with leaven of malice and wickedness, but with unleavened cakes (*ἀζύμοις*) of sincerity and truth." The reference here cannot indeed be properly called "aetiological," for Paul is not attempting to account for or support the Jewish rite; but his language is influenced by it to an extent which clearly proves that the Corinthians, Gentiles though they were, if not actually engaged in a ceremonial corresponding to the Jewish, were at least quite familiar with the Jewish ritual. And this inference is important, for, while the fact is not generally recognized, there is ample evidence that the allusions to the ceremonial of this two-fold feast—Passover-Unleavened Bread—extend all through the Epistle and should be decisive on vital points of interpretation.

The central feature of the Passover rites for Christian symbolism was of course the slaughter of the lamb in the evening of Nisan 14. The central feature of Unleavened Bread was the lifting up before God in the temple of the "wave-sheaf" of "First-fruits" on Nisan 16. By his resurrection on the third day (*i.e.* Nisan 16, the third day after the slaughter of the lambs) "Christ became," says Paul, "the First-fruits of them that slept." Indeed the ideas and symbolism of this Festival of the New Corn underlie the whole of his great chapter on the Resurrection Body (1 Cor. 15). In particular, he compares the death *and burial* of Jesus to the kernel of grain dropped into the soil seemingly to perish, but really to receive from God a new body (corresponding to the old) through the mighty working of the resurrection life.

Christ likewise, says the Apostle, "died for our sins according to the Scriptures *and was buried*, and was raised again the third day according to the Scriptures." This common gospel, preached alike by Paul and all other evangelists (ver. 11), is the starting point for an exposition of his doctrine of the resurrection body. There is indeed great dispute among commentators and critics as to what "Scripture" can be referred to in Paul's allusion to "the third day," seeing Hos. 6 2 is never so employed by early writers. But if we continue with his argument throughout the chapter, observing that his thesis in verse 20 is a comparison of the risen Christ to the "wave-sheaf" of new corn lifted up before God in the ceremony of "First-fruits" on Nisan 16, we shall see at least a correspondence with "the Scriptures" which prescribe the ritual of Passover and Unleavened Bread (Lev. 23 4-14). The ritual direction is that "on the morrow after the sabbath (*i.e.* after the first day of Unleavened Bread, "the fifteenth day of the same month," ver. 6) the priest shall wave the wave-sheaf before the Lord." Thereafter seven weeks are to be numbered until Pentecost, thus making an unbroken festival, the Feast of Weeks, whose observance, as we know, passed over from Judaism into the Christian church. "First-fruits" fell in the year of the crucifixion (Jn. 19 31), if not in every year, on "the first day of the week," which would be, "according to the Scriptures," the "third day" after the slaughtering of the Passover lamb. When, therefore, in 1 Cor. 5 7 Paul makes an equivalence between Jesus' violent death and the slaughter of the lamb on Nisan 14, and in 15 20 between his resurrection and the lifting up to God of the wave-sheaf of First-fruits ("Now is Christ risen from the dead and become the First-fruits of them that slept") on Nisan 16, it is not unreasonable to hold that the "Scripture" on which he professedly bases his calculation of days is that which prescribes the

calendar of the Feast of Weeks, enacting in particular that the ceremony of First-fruits shall take place "on the morrow after the sabbath," "the third day" from the Passover sacrifice. We may even be disposed to think also (though this would be mere conjecture) that the series of "manifestations" related in 1 Cor. 15 1-11 is in a sense a primitive *catechesis* of the Christian Feast of Weeks, the same Pentecostal period which is emphasized in the opening chapters of the Book of Acts.

But suppose that we have not found in Lev. 23 4-14 the true explanation of Paul's reference to Scripture as designating "the third day" as that of the resurrection. Still it remains highly significant that in 1 Cor. 15 20, 36-38, 42 ff. he reverts to the imagery of the current festal season, which he had already applied to the death of Jesus in 5 7, to interpret now Christ's resurrection also. Were it not for the parallel thus drawn between Christ's resurrection body and the wave-sheaf of first-fruits, we should be at a loss to understand the special mention of the *burial* of Jesus in 15 3; for the story of the sepulchre found empty (which was either unknown to Paul or else has been purposely ignored by him) plays no part whatever in his argument. No; his mention of the burial serves to complete the parallel with the *wheat sown in the ground* (ver. 35-38), for which God provides a new body "even as it pleased Him, and to each seed a body of its own." Realization of the allusion to the ceremonial of "First-fruits" makes the meaning clearer, just as is the case with the allusion to Purging of the House from Leaven in the chapter urging the Corinthian church to purify itself from immorality.

We are not yet at an end with the use of Passover themes in First Corinthians. When Paul would correct the abuses at Corinth in his converts' celebration of the Lord's Supper, he reminds them that by proper observance they "proclaim" (καταγγέλλετε) the Lord's

death. The term is indeed a suitable one to describe the *ιερός λόγος* of the mysteries, the drama set forth in these mystical rites, but (what doubtless is much closer to the mind of Paul) it describes exactly that parallel feature of the ritual of Passover prescribed in Ex. 12 26 f., which makes the "proclaiming" of the story (the *haggada*) the most vital part of the whole.

Passover themes are again reflected in 1 Cor. 10 1-5; for the incidents of the flight from Egypt, passage through the Red Sea, feeding with manna, supplying with water from the rock, employed by Paul to set forth the Christian sacraments, are scenes from the Redemption story which Passover commemorates. Israel, when they passed from the bondage, the darkness and death of Egypt through the Red Sea, and were covered by the guiding cloud of the divine Presence as they journeyed under direction of Moses toward the Promised Land, "were baptized unto Moses in the sea and in the cloud." The manna which fed them and the water from the smitten rock prefigured the "spiritual meat and drink" of the Lord's Supper.

And Ephesians is almost equally rich in reflections of Passover themes. For Origen (to take but one example) is surely right in his exegesis of the difficult passage Eph. 6 15. This exhortation to "stand, having your loins girt, and your feet shod with the readiness (*ετοιμασία*) of the gospel of peace," is an allusion to the Vigil of Passover similar to that in 1 Thess. 5 4-10, in both cases mediated by the Passover imagery of Is. 59 16-20. For the law for the celebration of Passover (Ex. 12 11) prescribes that the feast shall be eaten "in haste," "with your loins girded, your shoes on your feet, and your staff in your hand," ready to fare forth at the word of the "glad tidings of peace" and redemption. This, says Paul, should be the Christian's attitude in his vigil until the dawn of the Redemption morning. For vigil too

belongs to the ritual of Passover. "It is a night of vigil unto the Lord for bringing them out from the land of Egypt, a night of vigil unto the Lord to be observed of all the children of Israel in their generations" (Ex. 12 42).

We might well take note also, while considering these reflections of Passover ritual, that Eph. 1 3-14 is constructed on the rhythmic plan of one of those "spiritual songs and hymns" of the Redemption which are referred to in Eph. 5 19, and that one such has actually been quoted in 5 14.

Thus far we have confined ourselves to reflections of Jewish ritual, or adaptations of them in the Christian assemblies, in the hope that their obvious usefulness for the interpreter will stimulate effort to apply a similar method to the greater and more systematic Epistles with reference to the two distinctively Christian rites of Baptism and the Eucharist.

Romans, unlike First Corinthians and (perhaps) Ephesians, was not written at the very season of Passover. It shortly antedates the "days of Unleavened Bread" spent at Philippi (Acts 20 6). It shows no single trace of such allusions to Passover ritual as fill the chapters of First Corinthians and Ephesians—an argument from silence which lends no small support to our conclusions from those Epistles. On the other hand we do find evidences of something like that aggregation of the material which we have already observed in the Gospels in groups corresponding in significance to the two great sacraments of the Church.

If we look carefully at the outline of Paul's thought in both Galatians and Romans, the two Epistles in which he comes nearest to a systematic exposition of his "gospel," we shall see that it has (so to speak) a certain polarity, and that in both Epistles the two poles of the thought are the same. Indeed Galatians affords a

double illustration of the principle; for Gal. 2 15-21, which gives in retrospect Paul's defence of his principles against Peter before the assembled church in Antioch, is but a sketch in miniature of the fuller defence which occupies the rest of the Epistle. In the dialogue with Peter verses 15, 16 give Paul's doctrine of Justification by Faith. But how can we account for his boldly imputing this doctrine to Peter also, unless it rests back upon a teaching "received" at the very outset (1 Cor. 15 3), a common, fundamental "gospel of the blood of Christ"? Without this indeed the faith of Peter and the Galilean disciples could never have rallied from the shock of Calvary. And to what else than the "cup of the new covenant in the blood of Christ" will that primitive gospel have attached "how that Christ died for our sins according to the Scriptures"?

In the remaining verses of the dialogue (17-21) Paul refutes those who draw the false inference that forgiveness through faith in the blood of Jesus leads to moral laxity. This brief refutation is developed later in the so-called "practical section" of the Epistle, beginning at 5 13; but both in the dialogue and the subsequent development the basis is Paul's doctrine of Life in the Spirit, which is always for Paul at least a doctrine associated with the rite of Baptism. The doctrine of Life in the Spirit is, in fact, like that of Justification in the blood of Christ, general and fundamental, a common doctrine of all Christians.

What is known as the "doctrinal section" of Galatians falls into two portions—an argument in 3 1-4 7, and a direct appeal to the readers to return to their former Christian standing, 4 8-5 12. With the latter we need not here concern ourselves, for its references are to matters of the experience of the Galatian churches. We are concerned with the argument in Gal. 3 1-4 7, which is a strict logical unit, proceeding from the single postu-

late, "This only would I know from you—received ye the Spirit . . . by the hearing of faith?" to the Q. E. D.: "Because ye are sons, God sent forth the Spirit of His Son into our hearts, crying, Abba, Father. So that thou art no longer a bond-servant but a son; and if a son then an heir through God."

It hardly needs the close parallel in Rom. 8 15-17, 26 f. to prove that this allusion to the cry (in Aramaic) "Abba" is an allusion to the "tongues" which accompanied and were considered to demonstrate the gift of the Spirit at baptism. The inarticulate prayers and groanings spoken of in Romans and the involuntary cry "Abba," had followed immediately in Galatia at the acceptance of Paul's proclamation of his gospel. They had not tarried to manifest themselves after the Judaizers had begun to win converts to their pseudo-gospel of "works of law." The "gifts of the Spirit," so invariable an accompaniment of Baptism to the mind of the early church that when they failed to appear the rite was administered a second time (Acts 19 1-7), had been the seal of God's own approval upon Paul's work in Galatia, so that he can well afford to rest his whole case, as he says he will, on "this only." We are quite prepared, therefore, for the climax of the argument in 3 26 f.: "Ye are all sons of God, through faith in Christ Jesus. For as many of you as were baptized into Christ did put on Christ." The "rabbinic" argument based on the use of the singular "seed" (σπέρματι) in Gen. 12 3, anticipated in 3 16, is now drawn out in 3 27-29. We have here Paul's doctrine of Life in the Spirit already advanced in 2 19 f., developed on its mystical side (*unio mystica*).

What we are less prepared for, after the Apostle's undertaking to limit himself to "this only," is his interjection between the appeal to the gifts of the Spirit in 3 2-5 and the reference to Baptism with its accompanying phenomena in 3 26-4 7 of a long section beginning at

3 6 on the Covenant of Promise, central in which are verses 13-14: "Christ redeemed us from the curse of the law, having become a curse for us . . . that upon the Gentiles might come the blessing of Abraham in Christ Jesus, that we might receive the promise of the Spirit through faith."

The argument, of course, concerns the covenant to Abraham of the Messianic blessings. Against his Judaizing opponents, who contend that the later enactments of ritual observances through Abraham (Gen. 17 9-14) and Moses (Ex. 24 4-8) have equal standing with the original in Gen. 15 3-18, Paul maintains that the Covenant of Promise to Abraham "preached the gospel beforehand." The legal and ritual enactments merely prepared the way for the coming of the worldwide blessing.

There is in Gal. 3 6-26 no specific mention of the Eucharist; yet it is manifest that the whole question turns upon the significance of the death of Christ, just as it did in the dialogue with Peter (2 21). Paul seeks to impose a meaning upon the "cup of the new covenant in the blood of Christ" which his opponents will not admit. The dialogue (2 16 f.) implies that they recognized it as "unto remission of sins," but not as implying that justification was not *also* through the law.

It is not, then, a surprising familiarity with the Old Testament generally which is presupposed by Paul among his Galatian converts in the doctrinal section of his Epistle when he digresses at 3 6 to speak of the revelations to Abraham and Moses, but only a familiarity with those portions which have a bearing upon—we may even say, are presupposed by—the doctrine of the New Covenant in the blood of Christ, a doctrine indubitably current wherever the Eucharist was observed.

Thus the doctrinal section of Galatians has the same "polarity" as the Gospels, or as its own account of Paul's

dialogue with Peter. The author sets out to prove that the baptismal "gifts of the Spirit" are a divine endorsement of his gospel of Justification without works of law. But he does not seem able to reach it except by way of his Redemption doctrine, and an exhibition of the true relation between the Covenant of Promise to Abraham and the Covenant of the Blood of Jesus. And when he has finished with his teaching of Baptism on the mystical side, as a guarantee of unity in the all-pervading Spirit of Jesus, he still returns again, showing in his "practical section" (5 13-6 10) how Life in the Spirit supersedes the need of law.

If in so practical an Epistle as Galatians Paul's thought should seem to "polarize" about Baptism and the Eucharist, it should occasion no surprise that in so systematic a presentation as Romans, a statement of his gospel written to forestall misrepresentation among believers he has never seen, Paul should employ the same structure for his thought. Particularly we should expect to find it in those central chapters which form the substance of his defence. And we are not disappointed.

It is common to subdivide the argument of Rom. 3-8 under the two heads, Justification and Sanctification. But we may better express the fact, in terms borrowed directly from the text, if we describe these chapters as setting forth first Paul's Doctrine of Reconciliation (*καταλλαγή*), and second his Law of the Spirit of Life. Up to Rom. 5 11 Paul's subject is the Atonement. He is defending a doctrine of justification by faith in the blood of Christ as the true issue, and as the God-intended meaning of the Covenant with Abraham. From 5 12 to the end of chapter 8 we have a new subject. The theme has become the Regeneration of Man and the Creation by Indwelling Spirit. The Apostle is expounding a doctrine of the Restoration of All Things (*ἀποκατάστασις παντῶν*) in the freedom of the Sons of God, and defend-

ing it against the charge that it gives the rein to sin. The relation of Rom. 3 19-5 11 to Gal. 3 6-18 is universally acknowledged. But a relation scarcely less close will appear between Rom. 5 12-8 39 and Gal. 3 19-4 7 so soon as it is perceived that the basis of reasoning on both sides is a doctrine of Life in the Spirit, a doctrine which we have learned to recognize as the essence of Paul's "teaching of Baptisms."

With the ensuing chapters (Rom. 9-11), containing Paul's special apologetic on the relation of Jew and Gentile in the divine economy, we need not concern ourselves, nor with the practical application of the whole in chapters 12-15. We are concerned with his *Weltanschauung*, his survey of "the whole tenor of the Scriptures," as the author of the *Muratorianum* has phrased it, his scheme of redemption as exhibited in 1 18-8 39, more particularly in his "gospel," which centres on the themes of justification by the blood of Christ (5 9) and regeneration through the Spirit (6 10 f.).

Even without the express references to the justifying blood of Christ (3 25, 5 9) in the first of these divisions, followed by a direct appeal to the symbolism of Baptism in the second (6 3 f.), it would be manifest from the general course of thought that Eucharist and Baptism are the nuclei of the respective elements of Paul's gospel. But let us trace the progress of his logic.

The introductory argument in Rom. 1 18 to 3 20 may be designated Paul's *kerygma*. It has the elements of the conventional Stoic "diatribe," especially as we find the diatribe in its Hellenistic adaptation and in its ultimately Christian form. Norden in his *Agnostos Theos* has familiarized us with the literary type, though (as was natural) he has not traced its pedigree with equal clearness on the Hebrew side through Deutero-Isaiah and Wisdom of Solomon. Paul's moral survey first of the Gentile, then of the Jewish world, to the

utter condemnation of both, is made, as the Apostle himself declares (3 19 f.), "that every mouth may be stopped, and all the world may be brought under the judgment of God: because by the works of the law shall no flesh be justified in his sight." All this, accordingly, is only preliminary. It introduces as a *τριτὸν γένος* "the righteousness of God through faith in Jesus Christ," whose general propositions are thereupon stated in outline in 3 21-31. It is here, then, that Paul's "gospel" in the strictest sense begins.

The demonstration of a righteousness, or justification (*δικαιοσύνη, δικαίωσις*), by faith as a prerogative of the "weak" and "ungodly," "sinners" and "enemies of God," against those who seek it under the covenant of Abraham through "works of law" occupies the whole of chapter 4 and is concluded in 5 1-11. The triumphant close is this: "We also glory in God through our Lord Jesus Christ, through whom we have now received the reconciliation" (*καταλλαγήν*). We easily recognize Paul's "message of reconciliation," as he terms it in 2 Cor. 5 19-21 "how that God did not reckon unto men their trespasses," but "made him who knew no sin to be sin on our behalf." There is no specific mention of the Eucharist, but the echoes in Rom. 4 25-5 9 of the Isaian passages on which the "received" doctrine was based that "Christ died for our sins according to the Scriptures" (1 Cor. 15 3) are the clearest of any in the Pauline writings. We call attention to the Isaian phrases *παρεδόθη διὰ τὰ παραπτώματα* (4 25); *δικαιωθέντες εἰρήνην ἔχωμεν* (5 1); *ὄντων ἡμῶν ἀσθενῶν . . . ὑπὲρ ἀσεβῶν ἀπέθανεν* (5 6); *δικαιωθέντες ἐν τῷ αὐτοῦ αἵματι* (5 9), etc. From the reference to the covenant with Abraham "that he should be heir of the world" (4 13), and the phrase of 5 9 "justified in his blood," it becomes manifest that Paul is expounding the doctrine of the cup of the new covenant in Christ's blood, and the phraseology into which he falls is the Isaian, familiar

to the church in its sacrament of the blood shed "for many" for the remission of sins.

With Rom. 5 12 a new subject is reached—the reign of death, and its overthrow. It is no longer Abraham and his covenant who stands over against Christ as a type of those who should afterward, like Abraham, believe "in God that quickeneth the dead" (4 17 and 24). Now it is Adam and his "one trespass unto all men to condemnation," who is opposed to Christ and his "one act of righteousness unto all men unto justification of life" (5 18 f.).

Baptism is now explicitly brought in as the basis of the doctrine (6 3 f.), because as the vehicle of the infusion of the Spirit of Adoption it mediates the restoration from the death that "entered the world through sin." But after the development of his antithesis of the first and the second Adam, extending to the practical exhortation of 6 12-14 to "present your members as instruments of righteousness to God as alive from the dead," Paul turns to a rebuttal of the charge that the doctrine "not under law but under grace" incites to sin. The attempt involves the clear exposition from 6 15 to 7 25 of the nature of our "freedom" in Christ, and the function of the law as revealing the "law of sin in our members" working death, a fairly close and very illuminating parallel to Gal. 3 19-22. Thereafter follows the great hymn on the Redemption by the Spirit, first of man's own body, second of "the creation itself," into "the liberty of the glory of the children of God," a parallel to Gal. 4 1-7. Thus the Restoration of All Things (*ἀποκατάστασις παντῶν*) through the indwelling Spirit (8 12-39) answers to the doom pronounced on the world when "through one man sin entered into the world and death through sin" (5 12). Thus beginning and end of the argument are bound together, making a unit of this whole section. Life in the Spirit is its theme.

We have no need further to point out that the starting point of this course of thought is the symbolism of Baptism as a "bath of regeneration" (λουτρον παλιγγενέσεως), wherein we are "buried with Christ into death; that like as Christ was raised from the dead through the glory of the Father, so we also might walk in newness of life" (Rom. 6 4). A doctrine of the regenerating Spirit *must* (for that age) revolve around Baptism; because it was in this rite that the neophyte became conscious of receiving the Spirit of Adoption and "the powers of the age to come."

If after Romans we turn to that other great general presentation of Paul's gospel, clearly designed for some group of Asiatic Christians not directly known to Paul in the flesh, though it has borne since an early period in the transmission of the text the title "To the Ephesians," we shall find that, while it resembles First Corinthians in its reflection of the ritual of Passover, it resembles still more closely Galatians and Romans in the "polarization" of its teaching about the symbolism of Supper and Baptism respectively.

In Ephesians the familiar Pauline argument for Justification by Faith has almost totally disappeared. Only lingering echoes remain in the interjected clauses of 2 5 and 8: "By grace have ye been saved." "By grace have ye been saved through faith; and that not of yourselves: it is the gift of God; not of works, that no man should glory." With good reason does the polemic disappear. The battle along this line was already won. But the disappearance of the polemic is very far from altering the deeper channels of Paul's thought. It continues to move along the parallel lines of Redemption by the blood of Christ, and Life in the Spirit.

The main division of Ephesians, separating it into two approximately equal parts, is fixed by the author. With the elaborate doxology and Amen at the end of chap-

ter 3 he makes an unmistakable transition from religious faith to practical application. The Prayer which begins at 1 15 after the long and rhapsodical Thanksgiving (1 3-14) is resumed after repeated digressions (1 19b-2 22 and 3 1b-13) in 3 14-19. It is a prayer for the readers' enlightenment by a gift of Christian *gnosis*, so that they may appreciate the infinite and unique grandeur of the Christian calling and inheritance. The digressions serve the purpose of exposition, so that the whole development takes the place of the "doctrinal section" to which we are so accustomed in Paul. Indeed this merging of the Prayer for the readers into a doctrinal exposition is somewhat exceptional, having its nearest Pauline parallel in First Thessalonians. On the other hand, the anticipation of the general themes of the Epistle in the exalted lyric of the Thanksgiving (1 3-14) is characteristic. A pair of three-fold refrains ("to the praise of his glory," ver. 6, 12, 14, and "according to the good pleasure of his will," ver. 5, 9, 11) divides it into three strophes concerned respectively with (1) Foreordination unto adoption as sons in the Beloved (ver. 3-6); (2) Redemption through his blood, attested by the gift of *gnosis* (ver. 7-10); (3) Inheritance as the "own possession" of God (ver. 11-14). The Thanksgiving serves (as so often in Paul) as a general preface to introduce the principal theme of the Epistle—in this case the Inheritance laid up for the Christian "in the heavenlies" with Christ. It is doubtless chosen by opposition to the tendencies (so easily recognizable in the twin letter to the Colossians) to "a gratuitous self-humiliation and worship of angels," "according to the weak and beggarly Elements of the world" (στοιχία τοῦ κόσμου—mere stewards and governors temporarily appointed over the heir, according to Gal. 4 2 f., 8 f.). Appreciation of the power and riches of God in Christ the Heir as evinced in the Resurrection and Exaltation, is consequently the gift Paul entreats

for his readers. But before considering further his Prayer and its elaboration, we must turn to the second division, that of practical exhortation, covering chapters 4-6.

Nothing can exceed the clearness with which in Eph. 4 1-6 9 the course of thought ranges itself under the head of the Pauline teaching of Baptism, or Life in the Spirit. It might really serve as the model, or rather the theoretical basis, for all Paul's ethical exhortations, bringing out the very soul of his doctrine of the indwelling Spirit of God, given through Christ, as root and spring of all right conduct. Here it is developed first in the relation of the various members in the church to one another (4 1-16); of the individual to himself (17-24); of individuals to other individuals, in the brotherhood, in the outside world, and in the church-meeting (4 25-5 2, 3-14, 15-21). Next it is applied to the relations of social authority (*ὑποταξίς*) in the household, the Spirit by its nature of loving service transmuting "subjection" into mutuality, as between husbands and wives, parents and children, masters and slaves (5 22-6 9). The Epistle ends with the exhortation already elucidated, to keep the vigil of the Lord's greater Passover (6 10-20), followed by Greetings (21 f.) and Benediction (23 f.).

It is only occasionally, as in 4 6 and 5 26, that Baptism is explicitly referred to in Ephesians. In a few other passages of this division the phraseology habitually associated with the rite is recognizable (4 30 "sealed in the Spirit"; "put off the old man . . . put on the new man," 4 22-24; "once darkness now light," 5 8); for Paul is concerned with the spiritual message of the rite, not its form. But if further evidence were needed that it is indeed the teaching of Baptism which underlies all this ethical application of the doctrine of Life in the Spirit, it might be drawn from the companion Epistle. Colossians, which has the same framework, and much

of the same phraseology as Ephesians, and which, on the assumption of authenticity for both, must have been written almost at the same sitting, begins the corresponding hortatory section:

"Take heed . . . for in Christ dwelleth all the fulness (spiritual endowment) of the Godhead bodily, and in him ye are made full. . . . In whom ye were also circumcised with a circumcision not made with hands, in the 'putting off' of the body of the flesh, in the circumcision of Christ; having been 'buried with him in baptism,' wherein ye were also raised with him through faith in the working of God who raised him from the dead."¹

Assuming that the proof is adequate that Eph. 4-6 is based on a doctrine of Baptism, we may return to the Prayer for the reader's enlightenment, which with its two digressions occupies Eph. 1 15 to 3 21. It is the first great digression in 1 19b-2 22 which particularly concerns us, the second (3 2-13) being a mere explanation and justification of Paul's application to himself of the title, "prisoner in behalf of you Gentiles." In the great digression after the mention of the manifestation of God's riches of grace and victorious power in the redemptive work of Christ it will not be hard to recognize that the course of thought is determined by a teaching of "the cup of the new covenant in the blood of Christ."

We have already noted that the shifting of the battle front has left behind the old war-cry of Justification by Faith; but the phrase "reconciliation" (*ἀποκαταλλαγή*) is still present (2 16), though changed in application. The "gospel of peace" preached to "them that are far off and them that are nigh" according to the word of Isaiah (Is. 52 7, 57 19), finds still, as in Rom. 5 1-11, its fulfilment "in the blood of Christ" (Eph. 2 13). Here is still the "reconciliation through the cross" as in the Justification paragraphs of the older Epistles.

¹ Col. 2 8-12; cf. v. 19, 3 1-3, 19 and the corresponding passages in Ephesians.

The mention of the exaltation of Christ to "the right hand of God," "far above all rule and authority and power and dominion, and every name that is named" (Eph. 1 19b-23; cf. Phil. 2 9-11), is just a signal for the launching forth in the whole second chapter upon a survey of the work of redemption filled with the phraseology belonging to the doctrine of the suffering Servant of Deutero-Isaiah, who "made peace by the blood of the cross."

Those who consider the Epistle deutero-Pauline may regard it as a further and serious objection to Pauline authorship that the "message of reconciliation" (here ἀποκαταλλαγή) is so different from that of the earlier and greater Epistles. The "gospel of peace" is not, as in Rom. 10 15 f., news of the reconciliation with God proclaimed by the heralds of the cross, but Christ's own proclamation, effected in the cross, of reconciliation between Jew and Gentile. By abolishing in his flesh the enmity, the law of commandments in ordinances, Christ made peace between circumcision and uncircumcision, and brake down the middle wall of partition (2 11-16). This is a decided change from Rom. 5 10, where sinful men are the "enemies" whom God reconciles to himself through the death of His Son. But, however we account for the difference, the parallelism is greater, and presupposes a common doctrine of the cross. The cross is in both (1) a demonstration of the great love wherewith God loved us even when we were dead through our trespasses (Eph. 2 4-7; cf. Rom. 5 8), and (2) an "abolition of enmity," a "reconciliation" which is not merely between Jew and Gentile but of "both in one body unto God" (Eph. 2 16; cf. Rom. 5 10).

This whole second chapter of Ephesians thus reveals itself as a parallel (whether Pauline or deutero-Pauline) to the "message of reconciliation" (καταλλαγή) which we have already recognized in Romans as a doctrine of the new covenant "in the blood of Christ." The

mention of "his flesh" and his "blood" (ver. 13, 15) is the more significant from the (somewhat incongruous) combination at the close (3 20-22) of the figure from the great Passover-psalm of the stone rejected by the builders but chosen by God to be the head of the corner (Ps. 118 22; cf. Is. 28 16), with the Isaian figure of the suffering Servant whose blood is made an atonement offering (Is. 52 15, 53 10-12).

The foregoing survey of the great Epistles in which Paul comes nearest to a systematic presentation of his "gospel"—Galatians, Romans, and Ephesians—may perhaps suffice to bear out the view that we have also in Paul traces of the same tendency observable in the structure of the Gospels, a tendency of the thought to "polarize" about the two great sacraments of the church. Paul's written "gospel" has the structural character we should look for if that oral gospel which he "received" (1 Cor. 15 1, 3) was already to some extent thus aggregated. It may be conceived as consisting of two elements: (1) A doctrine of the "justifying blood" of the new covenant, based on an identification of Jesus with the suffering Servant of Isaiah. (2) A "teaching of Baptisms," whose central thought was Life in the Spirit. What is obviously true on the small scale in 1 Cor. 10 1-4 would seem to be true on the larger scale in Paul's systematic presentations of his teaching. They do reflect the sacramental ritual of the primitive Church.

RECENT EXCAVATION AND EXPLORATION IN PALESTINE

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Since the appearance of Professor David G. Lyon's article entitled "Recent Excavations in Palestine," which was published in the January number of *The Harvard Theological Review*, 1908, other ancient Biblical sites have been explored and many noteworthy discoveries have been made. And now that the work of excavation and exploration has been indefinitely arrested by the outbreak of war, it seems especially fitting that what has been accomplished during the past six or seven years should be collected and summarized.

In the article referred to, Professor Lyon gave an account of the explorations at Tell el-Hesi (ancient Lachish) in 1890-92; of the four *tells*—Zachariya, es-Safi, el-Judeideh, and Sandahannah—in the Shephelah in 1898-1900; of Gezer in 1902-1907; of Ta'anach in 1902-05; of Tell Mutesellim (Megiddo) in 1903-05; of Tell Hūm (Capernaum?) in 1905; and of certain valuable "finds" by the Arabs in the two Canaanite cemeteries at Samieh near Bethel in 1906-07.

Since 1907, when Professor Lyon wrote his article, among the new sites which have yielded gratifying results are Jericho, Samaria, Bethshemesh, Ophel, Mt. Zion, Balata (ancient Shechem?), and Carchemish, the great capital of the ancient Hittites. Besides these, here and there throughout the country many other discoveries have been made, notably the richly orna-

mented sarcophagus of Turmus 'Aya, numerous anthropoid sarcophagi at Sidon, the standard Jewish "Talent," and a full set of Hebrew wet and dry measures at Jerusalem; besides an exceptionally fine mosaic floor with numerous colored animal figures and various Greek inscriptions found near the crest of Mt. Nebo.

The principal explorers during recent years have as usual been the English, Germans, and French; but the Americans have also made a beginning. All excavation has of course been seriously interrupted by the war. The Palestine Exploration Fund had already left off actively excavating in 1912, long before there was any talk of war; in fact they ceased digging at Bethshemesh before their Field Secretary, Dr. Duncan Mackenzie, had satisfactorily completed his examination of that place. On the other hand, Captain Newcombe, representing the Fund, was busy during the winter of 1913-14 surveying the northern portion of the Sinai Peninsula. The Germans have continued their work at Balata, adding much new and valuable material to the history of Central Palestine, especially of ancient Shechem. For it should be remembered that even Central Palestine, the most familiar portion of the country to Bible students, which has been visited and revisited over and over again by tourists and to some extent scientifically explored, is still rich in archaeological treasures, which ought to be investigated and given to the world. Surely the discoveries of the past quarter of a century warrant the conclusion that even still greater "finds" await those who will devote themselves to the careful and thorough research of the Holy Land. And especially now does this hold good, inasmuch as the way is today more accurately and scientifically prepared for a correct interpretation of what is discovered. From the different types of pottery found to prevail in almost every *tell*, it is now comparatively easy to trace the successive civ-

ilizations that lie embedded in any given site. The chronology of pottery is on such a sound basis that "the dating of the various strata of a city has become," as Macalister says, "almost mechanical." Accordingly it is reasonable to hope that shortly it will be possible, from the accumulated materials obtained through excavation, to write a history of Palestine from the archaeological point of view. Great is the encouragement, therefore, to continue as soon as peace is re-established the work which has been so patiently, laboriously, and successfully begun.

JERICHO

Between the years 1902 and 1909 Professor E. Sellin of Vienna dug over the hill of Jericho, and in 1913 he and Dr. Watzinger published an account of their excavations in a monograph entitled *Jericho, Die Ergebnisse der Ausgrabungen*. As is well known, the location of ancient Jericho was strategic. It lay on the caravan route from Gilead and Moab to Central Palestine. Both in war and peace it supplied the highlanders of Ephraim, Benjamin, and Judah with necessary food products. The *tell* itself is well fortified by nature, rising some forty feet above the level of the surrounding plain. In form it is an irregular egg-shaped mound, one thousand one hundred feet long by five hundred feet broad, having a total area of only about twelve acres. It was fortified in ancient times by a thick wall, whose foundations give evidence of great skill in construction. The height of its wall was sixteen feet and its length approximately half a mile. At the north end of the city the excavators found what they supposed are the foundations of an ancient citadel. Heavy walls twelve feet thick protected it before and behind. At each end of this citadel were massive towers. Another structure, possibly a watch-tower, stood close by. These were the two most important sub-

structures unearthed. No temple or sanctuary was laid bare, but the foundations of many dwellings were disclosed.

Archaeologically eight distinct strata were found to cover the mound, the chief of which are the following:

(1) The lowest of all, the prehistoric, probably Canaanitic. To this stratum, which represents the oldest culture, belong certain dwellings near the citadel, whose foundation walls are unmistakably ancient; the pottery, too, bearing all the marks of antique ware. The culture of this stratum is thought to be Canaanitic; for the remnants of this ancient period are found only in the strata which precede the destruction of the city, and cease suddenly, having no connection with the subsequent Israelite ware beginning from the ninth century B.C., when, as we know from the Old Testament, Hiel the Bethelite, in the reign of Ahab, rebuilt the city (1 Kings 16 34). Accordingly it is claimed that this gap, which is not found elsewhere in Palestine, shows that after the fall of Jericho, in about the thirteenth century B.C., the site was for a long time uninhabited, probably having been used for horticultural or agricultural purposes. Drs. Sellin and Watzinger lay great emphasis on this fact, thus accentuating the harmony between the Old Testament account of the history of Jericho and the verdict of archaeology.

(2) Above the Canaanitic deposits were found many evidences of Israelite culture. Houses of a distinct Hebrew type, built of burnt brick and having stairs of stone, were unearthed near the "fountain hill." Grey, yellow, red, and black pottery was found dating at the latest from the ninth century B.C. To this period are ascribed the foundations of more than thirty small dwellings closely crowded together, and having, what is very remarkable but not uncommon elsewhere, infant-jar burials beneath their floors. Some of these jars are evidently importations from Cyprus and Mycenae.

They are colored with white engobe or lilac-brown coating, which may carry them back to as early as the tenth or even the eleventh century B.C.

(3) Belonging to the late Jewish period were found sherds of black polished ware, of Attic type. Specimens of this kind were found especially numerous on the north side of the citadel. The excavators ascribe them to the fifth or possibly to the fourth century B.C. There were also discovered fragments in terra cotta of human and animal heads, jar-handles bearing Rhodian stamps, in some cases having Aramaic lettering upon them, notably the divine name Yah or Yahu—a distinct novelty in Palestinian archaeology.

(4) To the later Byzantine and Mohammedan periods certain sepulchres containing coins, vessels of glass and stone, clay lamps, knives and other objects of iron, were assigned; also wooden caskets and marble slabs, besides many other objects of lesser importance.

In the fourth chapter of their monograph the authors give a graphic summary of their discoveries, showing the bearing of them upon Israel's history. Pages 171-190 are particularly instructive. The authors freely allow on the basis of the excavations that the Biblical account in Joshua 6 of the taking of Jericho contains an essential kernel of history. The excavations show, they believe, that Jericho was first settled in the dim twilight of the fourth millennium B.C. The castle with its double wall having fallen, they conclude that the account in Joshua 2-7 is that of an actual event. The ceramics found point back to the first half of the second millennium B.C. While many Old Testament authorities hesitate to assign a date to the conquest of Jericho because of the allusions in certain Egyptian inscriptions to the Habiri, and especially because of the descriptions given in the Tell el-Amarna tablets of the conditions prevailing in Canaan at that time, Professor Sellin and Dr. Watzinger conclude with-

out hesitation that "Canaanitic Jericho was destroyed, at the latest, 1500 B.C.," and that for centuries thereafter the city was never rebuilt. In the period after the schism, however, new dwellings and other larger buildings were constructed and the city was inhabited till the downfall of Samaria (722 B.C.). But another long silence ensued shortly after this date, a silence which may have been due to Sennacherib's capture of it. In that case Jericho was probably one of the "forty-six walled towns and cities" which Sennacherib claims to have wrested from Hezekiah, king of Judah, in 701 B.C.

SAMARIA

During the three years, 1908-10, as the readers of this *Review* well know, Harvard University, under the direction of Drs. G. Schumacher and George A. Reisner, conducted extensive excavations at Samaria, one of the most important sites in all Palestine. For a detailed account of what was found, consult Professor Lyon's articles in *The Harvard Theological Review* for January, 1909, April, 1910, and January, 1911.

Between April and August of the first year, 1908, considerable remains were found: for example, a temple of vast proportions, belonging to the Graeco-Roman times, probably Herod's, which was unearthed on the north end of the hill, near the modern threshing floor; a marble statue of heroic size, thought to represent Augustus, on the summit of the hill; a large and well preserved Roman altar; besides the foundations of an immense temple, probably that mentioned by Josephus in his *Wars* (i, 21, 3), which Herod built in honor of Augustus and which Septimius Severus is reported to have repaired. Attached to this temple there was an immense stairway about eighty feet broad, furnishing an approach from the west to what must have been a stately edifice. More-

over, a great massive wall seems to have enclosed the entire temple precincts. This temple or palace, situated on the summit of the hill, was at one time unquestionably the dominant feature of the city.

In 1909 Dr. Reisner carried on most successfully what Dr. Schumacher had so auspiciously begun, discovering that the lower foundations of this presumably Herodian structure were of Hebrew origin, and probably belonged to the palace enclosure of Omri and Ahab. At the west end of the hill also he unearthed a large gateway flanked on either side by two large round towers, which were evidently Roman, resting upon two larger square towers respectively which were probably Greek, and these in turn built upon rock foundations which may well have been originally cut by the Hebrews. He also found at the extreme opposite end of the hill, near the threshing floor, at a point where the famous Street of Columns and the ancient Roman paved road terminated, a large basilica or court of law, which stood closely adjoining the forum of the Herodian city.

In 1910 the previous excavations of the site were carried to the mother-rock. The foundations of the temple on the summit of the hill were still more clearly investigated, and it was eventually found that the four diverse strata of débris on the surface of the *tell* represented four different periods of construction; and that the oldest belonged to the reigns of Omri, who bought the hill, of Ahab, who ruled from about 877 to 854 B.C., of Jehu, and of Jeroboam II. The date of the structure was obtained from an alabaster vase found in the ruins, which bore the name of Ahab's contemporary, Osorkon II of Egypt, who ruled from about 874 to 853 B.C. But the "find" of greatest significance was the *ostraka*, or inscribed potsherds, of which there were not less than seventy-five. In Egypt the *ostraka* which have been found are often inscribed with texts of the most varied

contents—business-letters and contracts, official documents and the like. Those discovered at Samaria seem to have been the inscriptions or labels of a wine shop, or of an oil magazine. For example, they tell about jars of “fine oil” and “old wine,” and give in every case except two the date of the inscription or label, often with the owner’s name attached, and specifications as to whence the oil or wine had come. Number 13 of the series, translated, reads as follows: “In the tenth year (presumably the tenth year of Ahab). From Abiezer. (Belonging) to Shemaryau. A jar of old wine for Asa. From the hill.”

These *ostraka* are all written in the ancient Hebrew character, the same substantially as that in which the Moabite stone (c. 850 B.C.) and the Siloam inscription (c. 700 B.C.) and ancient Phoenician inscriptions are written. The script is a running cursive, written in ink and evidently inscribed with a reed pen. A point or short dash divides the words from one another. The Divine name Yahweh is uniformly spelled Yau. In general these *ostraka* are of special interest to the epigraphist and of immense value to archaeology.

BETHSHEMESH

The excavation of 'Ain Shems, Bethshemesh of the Old Testament, was begun April 6, 1911, by Dr. Duncan Mackenzie, the Field Secretary of the Palestine Exploration Fund, and continued with interruptions until December, 1912. Dr. Mackenzie gives a full account of his “finds” both in the *Quarterly Statement* for 1911–12 and in the *Annals* of the Fund for the years 1911–13. The results of his investigations are also succinctly summarized by Dr. E. W. G. Masterman in the *Biblical World* for August, 1913 (pages 101–109). Bethshemesh archaeologically is regarded as a second Gezer on a small scale.

In the twenty or more feet of accumulated débris which covered the *tell*, Dr. Mackenzie found embedded not less than five periods of civilization, which he is able to trace with reasonable clearness. Belonging to the first, which he calls the Canaanitic period, he designates certain ancient tombs, having shafts but without doors; antique pottery of Egyptian and Cypriote design, such as water jars with vertical handles and rounded bottoms; and Egyptian vessels and scarabs of the 18th Egyptian dynasty. These furnish unmistakable proofs of Egyptian influence, and carry the date of Bethshemesh's civilization as far back as to about 2000 B.C.

To the second or Philistine period (c. 1300–1100 B.C.), which, judging by the thickness of the deposit, was by far the longest of the five periods, certain fragments of painted pottery were assigned. The colors of this pottery revealed a local imitation of Cretan and also of Philistine type. Terra cotta male and female figures were also found; but there were no traces in this stratum of Egyptian influence. The period was brought, it is supposed, to a sudden terminus by a tremendous conflagration, which left the south gate (thought to have been the only entrance to the city) buried beneath thick rubbish, which has prevented the doors being opened or closed ever since. From this it has been inferred that during the Philistine period the city was fortified, whereas during that of the Hebrews, which followed, it remained unwallled. The Hebrews generally are known to have rebuilt little of that which was destroyed by them in taking a city.

The third or Hebrew period, which extended from about 1100 to 700 B.C., is sharply differentiated from its predecessor by a layer of charcoal, which extended pretty generally over the whole site. This is supposed to have been due to the capture of the city by the Hebrews, who burned the ancient Philistine town. The pottery with

stamped handles belonged to this stratum, and bore unmistakable evidence that it was of Hebrew manufacture. On the other hand, none of it was painted or of definitely known Philistine make. During this period the city had no defence. And because in the region of the south gate a two-fold stratification of sun-dried deposits was found, it has been inferred by Dr. Mackenzie that the city must have been burned a second time, probably by Sennacherib and his army on their way to Lachish in 701 B.C. (2 Kings 18 13-17). Subsequent to this time the place seems to have been abandoned for perhaps 1000 years.

Abundant remains of the fourth or Byzantine period (300 to 600 A.D.) were found at the east end of the *tell*. Extensive ruins of a large Byzantine convent or monastery were laid bare. This structure is situated in the south-east corner of the city enclosure and upon the most lofty point of elevation. Its eastern wall seems to have rested on the thick, strong wall which surrounded the city. Dr. Mackenzie thinks this monastery was not yet completed when the city was taken by the Arabs.

To the period of the Arabs little of value is ascribed. The Arabs probably destroyed the monastery after driving out the inhabitants of the city. If they occupied the site at all, they probably rebuilt nothing, but merely lived upon its ruins a simple semi-nomadic village-life till perhaps about 1000 A.D.

The most important discovery made at Bethshemesh from the point of view of the religion and history of the place was the High Place Grotto Sepulchre. The Grotto, which immediately adjoins the sanctuary, runs back underneath the High Place, being approached by spiral steps. The relics found within it point to a time prior to the period of the eighteenth Egyptian dynasty. But this High Place Grotto was not the only instance of sepulture within the city area. There were several

others, some of which had long ago been transformed into cisterns or grain pits. The necropolis proper was situated outside the city wall on the north side. The tombs inside the walls are doubtless the more ancient. It was probably at the end of the first or Canaanitic period that the change from an unwallled to a walled city took place. Then it was that the High Place Grotto got covered up and forgotten, and henceforth the people of Bethshemesh began to bury their dead exclusively outside the city.

But the chief interest of all Dr. Mackenzie's discoveries centres in the High Place itself. While cutting a trench from north to south across the central area of the city, he found, as he tells us, toward the middle of the trench five pillars lying on their sides as though they had been knocked down, the one on the east side being broken in two as if it had been purposely smashed. These stones Dr. Mackenzie regards as the sacred pillars or *boetyls* of a high place, set up in veneration of the dead; the spirit of the departed being imagined by the ancients to take possession of his pillar on the performance of certain ceremonial and magic rites for that purpose. To the south of the high place an ancient well, over sixty feet deep, thought to belong to the Hebrew period, was found. One regrets that the resources of the Fund did not permit of a thorough investigation of the entire site.

OPHEL

During the winter of 1913-14 the Hebrews, represented by Captain Weill, working under the general direction of M. Clermont-Ganneau, began a thorough and scientific investigation of the hill known as Ophel, which is situated just south of the temple area of Jerusalem. Their hope was to find, if possible, the ancient sepulchre of David. Several years ago they purchased a small strip of per-

haps one hundred yards square, extending across the knoll from the Kidron to the Tyropoeon and from above the Virgin's Fountain down almost to the Pool of Siloam. They were allowed to dig, of course, only within the boundaries of the section which they had purchased and now possessed. This circumstance restricted them to a comparatively narrow area and in several respects crippled their work, but enough was accomplished in the few months they were engaged in the task to warrant a brief reference here to the results of their investigation.

Among the objects and facts of interest brought to light by Captain Weill are the following:

(1) The existence of a small tower at the south end of the hill not far from the Pool of Siloam. It rests upon a rock foundation which has been artificially cut down twelve feet and has rounded corners. Only a few courses of ancient masonry remain on top of the rock *in situ*. The suggestion has been made that this may have been "the tower in Siloam" which fell, and which is mentioned in Luke 13 4, but there is no proof that it is. Extending from the tower northward there is a heavy double wall, the inner and narrower one being four feet thick, and the outer eight. These ramparts form, it is supposed, in part at least, the fortifications of the original city of David, the fortress which David wrested from the Jebusites.

Captain Weill described to the writer and his students of archaeology who accompanied him the fortifications of the ancient city thus: first, there was a tower low down near the bottom of the valley; then, an inner wall somewhat higher up; next, a second wall still more elevated; and finally, an inner double wall which was the wall of David. Between the two inner walls great quantities of human skeletons, skulls, and other bones were found lying buried in a heap. Dr. Weill thinks that here we have evidence that the city was once

besieged, and that the dead who were buried here fell probably when attempting to storm the fortress. He dates these skeletons back as far as 600 B.C.

(2) Certain caves and tombs have also been found; but no tomb has as yet been discovered so old as the time of David. One cavity, sarcophagus shaped, but very roughly hewn, is perhaps the oldest of all. Two unmistakable tomb chambers were unearthed higher up on the crest of the hill, and in about the centre of the section excavated. One cave, twelve feet long by six feet broad and six feet high, with an oval roof and walls plastered with cement to keep out the water, was found, which resembles the tombs of Sidon. Another was discovered which was thirty feet long, ten feet broad, and six feet high, of similar type. Doubtless many others exist or existed in this the obvious necropolis of the city. But they have been destroyed by the Romans who subsequently used the place as a quarry. Enough remains, however, to show how tomb-chambers were sometimes cut one above the other; the upper being probably the older of the two. Captain Weill would date the upper storeys from about 500 B.C. and the lower from about 400 B.C. These cave tombs have groove-cuttings in their rock walls to receive the arched roofs. Fourteen inches below these grooves the rock has been rubbed smooth and two horizontal black lines, three inches apart, are discernible on the walls, similar to those in Hezekiah's tunnel, pointing to a possible date for the cave tombs themselves as early as about 700 B.C. All were quite empty; no Hebrew inscriptions were found anywhere. The cuttings are rough and, accordingly, Captain Weill concludes that they are Jewish, but probably not earlier than 500 B.C. Close by these tombs there was a cemented cistern with a bath, which doubtless belongs to early Roman times. A Greek inscription in uncial characters but bearing no date, was

found, which stated that once a synagogue, a hospice, and a bath stood here, having been built for the accommodation of strangers. These are supposed by Captain Weill to date from the age of Hadrian.

(3) But by far the most interesting discovery in the whole site was a rock-hewn underground tunnel-aqueduct, which Captain Weill traced low down on the east side of the hill, running practically parallel to the Tunnel of Hezekiah. In general, both these underground aqueducts follow the same course and are independent of each other. The newly discovered one is considerably further to the east and lower down than the other, and is probably the older of the two. It apparently brought the waters of Gihon, or the Virgin's Fountain, down to the Lower Pool of Siloam, known to the Arabs as the Birket el-Ḥamra, or "The Red Pool," which was probably "the king's pool" of Nehemiah 2 14. We inspected with candles at least two hundred feet of this new tunnel discovered by Captain Weill, and are persuaded that it gives evidence of very great antiquity. In the judgment of Captain Weill it is quite probably several centuries older than the Tunnel of Hezekiah, having been abandoned when the latter was cut. At one point the tunnel was excessively narrow, but we managed to press our way through. A short distance below this narrow point there was left projecting from the rock a jutting undetached bar, apparently intended to be used in damming the water flow. Close by to the left of this jutting bar, an opening in the rock wall of the tunnel allowed the waters which were held back to flow out into the gardens of the valley immediately below.

Captain Weill spent four months in excavating this small belt of the Ophel Hill and practically completed the work of examining all that the Hebrews at present possess. They covet of course more surface to explore.

Perhaps after the war has terminated they may be able to secure a larger tract, and thus be allowed to continue their search for the tomb of the Patriarch David.

MT. ZION

Across the Tyropoeon westward from Ophel rises the traditional Mt. Zion, which is a hill some two hundred feet higher than the eastern Ophel Hill. Here in recent years several new discoveries have been made by the Franciscans and the Fathers of the Assumption, who have been establishing themselves in Jerusalem for the last twenty-five years, chiefly in connection with the annual *Pèlerinages de Pénitence* from France. About twelve years ago the Franciscans purchased from the Armenians twenty acres of ground, which they have since slowly but persistently excavated. Streets, aqueducts, baths, halls paved with beautiful mosaics, and various other objects have been found.

But the most striking discovery made by the Franciscans is an altar or sanctuary, possibly an ancient Jebusite "high place." Father Barnabas Meistermann, author of a *New Guide to the Holy Land*, showed us it. It is situated low down in the earth, on the southern side of a cemetery enclosure, some nineteen and one-half feet below the surface of the accumulated débris which now covers the hill. The fact that it was found buried so deep beneath the rubbish does not of course militate against the supposition that it was once a sanctuary. When Dr. F. J. Bliss and Mr. Macalister excavated Tell es-Safi (Gath?) a few years ago, it will be remembered that they found what they called "a heathen high place" full twenty feet below the surface of the rubbish which covered that hill (cf. Bliss' *Development of Palestine Exploration*, page 280). Close by the supposed sanctuary on Mt. Zion there are unmistakable traces of an old

Roman pavement, also sunken, though not as deeply embedded in the accumulated rubbish of the centuries.

What really the Franciscans have here unearthed is difficult to say. The deep pit of the sanctuary which has been walled up and left open measures thirty-three feet long by twenty-four feet broad. At the bottom of the cavity, which is fully twenty feet deep, there are rock cuttings of peculiar interest. If they do not form part of a sanctuary, one is inclined to ask, what are they? There is first a large boulder of irregular shape, seven feet long by four feet broad; a rock-cut passageway, with three steps two feet broad leading up to it from a rectangular court; the court itself rock-cut, thirteen feet long by eight feet, four inches broad; a reservoir or pool nine feet long by five feet broad; and other grooves and cavities of varying dimensions, some of them cut to receive water; besides niches and alcoves and other cuttings, all suggesting more or less definitely the idea of an ancient sanctuary. Dr. Dalman, however, dissents from this view of Father Barnabas, alleging that it was once an oil press and nothing more. But it is difficult to see in it a single mark pointing in this direction.

Father Barnabas' opinion is that it was once a sanctuary, quite possibly one of the sanctuaries of the ancient Jebusites, and that here on the south-west hill of their ancient city the Jebusites had their High Place of worship. This view is not impossible. For, while the Jebusites may have occupied the lower hill on the east, called Ophel, they almost certainly held in their possession also this higher south-west hill as well. Numerous cisterns, not fewer than thirty, cover the surface of this south-western hill outside the present city walls. Modern Jerusalemites insist still on calling this hill "Mount Zion." Perhaps, as Sir Charles Watson in his excellent little monograph entitled *The Story of Jerusalem* (1912)

points out, both hills were occupied by the Jebusites, the east hill having been allotted to Judah and the west hill to Benjamin (Joshua 15 and 18). The tribe of Judah took the east hill; but Benjamin was not able to take the west hill (Judges 1 8, 21). During the period of the Judges both hills fell back into the hands of the Jebusites. David made the east hill his residence. Joab later captured the west hill, and David made it the people's city. This assumes of course that Jerusalem was from the first a twin city; which fact, if true, would help to explain the dual form of its Hebrew name, *Yerushalayim*, or "two Jerusalems."

The Fathers of the Assumption also have recently (1912) made several noteworthy "finds" in their property, which joins hard upon that owned by the Franciscans. For example, on the eastern slopes of their portion of Mt. Zion, as one descends towards the Pool of Siloam, they have found the Prison of Peter, and the foundations of an ancient church built supposedly over the spot where the Apostle, after having denied his Lord, went out and wept bitterly. They have also unearthed an ancient oil press which is one of the best preserved and most noteworthy in all Palestine; and in their digging they have come upon elaborate Roman baths and residences, and many rock-cut chambers, vaults, cisterns or dungeons; but most important of all, a long, broad, and solid flight of steps running down from the summit of Mt. Zion some three hundred feet or more toward the Tyropoeon valley, reminding one of the stairs which in Nehemiah's time descended from the City of David (Nehemiah 12 37).

These same Fathers of the Assumption, about six years ago, in their excavations on Mt. Zion came upon a set of hollowed-out stones, which have proved to be the measures of capacity mentioned in the Bible. In the series discovered were included also a set of small

vessels containing one-tenth of almost all the liquid measures. Their discovery has been reported by Mr. J. E. Spafford of the American Colony, Jerusalem, and published in *The Journal of the British Archaeological Association* for December, 1912 (pages 220-223). A fuller account of their "finds" is given by Père Germer-Durand, in a lecture published with illustrations in a small volume entitled *Conférence de Saint-Étienne* (1909-10). Through this discovery of the Assumptionists, we are able for the first time to form some idea of what was simply guessed at formerly, and understand better than we ever did before the obscure and vexed question of Bible metrology.

Now from Ezekiel 45 11 we know that the Bath and Ephah were of the same capacity, and from Exodus 16 36 that an Omer is the tenth part of an Ephah. These passages warrant the inference that the metric system underlay the Hebrew metrology. By a comparison of what is taught on this subject by modern Jewish authorities, and these discoveries on Mt. Zion, the following table of Hebrew measures is deduced:

4 Logs make 1 Cab; 3 Cabs make 1 Hin; 2 Hins make 1 Seah; 3 Seahs make 1 Bath; 10 Baths, or Ephahs, make 1 Homer or Cor.

THE STANDARD "TALENT" OF THE SANCTUARY

Another discovery of peculiarly interesting value is that made at Jerusalem in 1912 by the Algerian Fathers of the St. Anne Church and Seminary, namely, the standard *Talent* weight, which was kept in the sanctuary. It is on exhibition in the Museum of the White Fathers at the entrance to the Pool of Bethesda. Its appearance is that of a spherical stone, with flattened bottom, having a rude inscription at either end and weighing forty-two kilos or about nineteen pounds. Its weight accordingly

is about one-third greater than that of the talent of the Assyrians and Babylonians. This helps to explain the discrepancy between the Biblical account of Hezekiah's tribute to Sennacherib, "three hundred talents of silver" (2 Kings 18 14), and the "eight hundred talents" of which Sennacherib boasts in his *stele*, which is now in the British Museum.

During 1913-14 other minor excavations were made outside the Damascus Gate on the north side of the city, which revealed a depth of rubbish exceeding thirty-five feet; and also on the south side near the Dung Gate, where the Jews are building a new hospital. The latter definitely fixes the true course of the Roman Aqueduct which brought the water from Solomon's Pools across the Tyropoeon valley to the Temple area.

BALATA (SHECHEM?)

Another site which has recently been excavated is Balata, a *tell* situated about a mile and a half east of Nablus, modern Shechem, and a few hundred yards west of the Well of Jacob. Here, according to early Christian tradition and the Samaritan Chronicle, stood the oak (*ballut*) of Shechem (Joshua 24 26; Judges 9 6). For two seasons Professor E. Sellin, formerly of Vienna, now of Kiel, has been investigating this place with extraordinary success. He was assisted during the winter of 1913-14 by Drs. Praeschniker and Grohmann, who were exceedingly courteous in showing us about the ruins.

The dimensions of the mound, according to Macalister, are three hundred and twenty-four paces in length from east to west and one hundred and twenty-eight in maximum breadth. In the absence of any evidence of other ancient settlements near to Jacob's Well, Macalister ventures to suggest that "this mound may be the actual site of the long lost Sychar" (*Quarterly Statement*, 1907,

pages 93-94). The Germans, however, believe that here they have discovered the true site of ancient Shechem. Their reasons for thinking so are as follows:

(1) The foundations of many ancient houses unearthed which seem to be Hebrew. These are very irregular and singularly compact, requiring great care to discriminate between the original Hebrew foundations and the more recent superstructures.

(2) A large fragment of the old city wall, several yards in length, very broad and deep, and built obliquely at an angle of about forty-five degrees. This wall is obviously of very ancient masonry; and not improbably, as the Germans suppose, dates back to the period of the Amorites.

(3) The ruins of a large palace, which also gives evidence of extreme antiquity.

(4) But most noteworthy of all, a great triple gateway which is the largest that has ever been unearthed in Palestine. It stands on the west side of the mound, being flanked by the immense fragments of the above-mentioned oblique and possibly Amoritic wall.

Much of the pottery found in the *tell* is also very old. Besides, not far to the east of the site there was recently discovered an Egyptian sarcophagus which is thought to have been that of Joseph. For, despite the claim of the Moslems in Hebron that the Patriarch was buried there, the most ancient tradition known declares he was buried "in Shechem, in the parcel of ground which Jacob bought of the sons of Hamor" (Joshua 24 32). This sarcophagus is now in the museum at Munich.

CARCHEMISH

In 1911 the Trustees of the British Museum began to examine the mound known to the natives of North Syria as Jerablus. It is situated on the right bank of the

Euphrates about fifty miles north-east of Aleppo, and can now be reached by the Baghdad Railroad from the latter place. Jerablus is a *tell* fifty feet high and strongly fortified, having within its extensive wall-enclosure palaces, a citadel, and other public buildings. It is usually identified with Carchemish, the celebrated capital of the ancient Hittites. Already the sum of £10,000 has been expended in excavating the site, to which sum during the winter of 1914 a like amount was added to complete the task. Messrs. C. L. Woolley and T. E. Lawrence were in charge of the expedition during the year 1913-14. Dr. D. G. Hogarth has given a partial account of their discoveries in the *Illustrated London News* for January 24, 1914.

Three gates have been identified, one of which they call the Water Gate because it opens upon the Euphrates; another opening toward the north was just being excavated at the time of our visit in May, 1914; the third, which is perhaps the largest and most important of all, opens toward the south-west and is called by the excavators "The King's Gate." We approached the ruins by this south-west gate, which overlooks the plain on which Nebuchadnezzar checked the conquering career of Pharaoh Necho of Egypt (605 B.C.). On the inside of this gate once stood a palace, from whose jambs ran dadoes from five to six feet high, consisting of richly sculptured slabs of alternate black dolerite and white limestone (a style of architecture still imitated by the people of north Syria), on which were carved figures of bulls and horses and chariots, soldiers with armament like that which the Greeks derived from Asia Minor, officers marching to meet a royal group, a hunter-god, priestesses and acolytes bearing animals for sacrifice, a lion-headed sphinx with a tail ending in a bird's head, and other mythological figures, all in decidedly Hittite style. Concerning these carved figures Dr. Hogarth writes: "The style and execution of these reliefs upset all our

previous ideas about the quality of Hittite art; as do also the sculptures which lined the opposite side of the portal—royal ministers and servants, in whose delineation has been used a grace which is almost Greek.” Close by this south-west entrance there was found the figure of a Carchemish deity, a bearded god of Assyria, again in genuine Hittite style, seated on a heavy base, supported by two lions, which in turn are led by an eagle-headed figure. This deity is regarded by Dr. Hogarth as belonging to the eighth century B.C.

Among other noteworthy “finds” should be mentioned four male heads, belonging to a broken dolerite relief, and ancient vases, dating back perhaps as far as 1500 to 2000 B.C. Everywhere Greek and Roman superstructures cover ancient Hittite remains. An immense stairway has been unearthed, running up the face of the Acropolis on the north. Built upon the terraced face of this Acropolis there once stood a palatial residence, having a shrine-like chamber and an elaborately inscribed portal. Before this portal stood a great laver, resting on two bulls. Numerous ruins were found on the apex of the Acropolis. The Romans once built a great temple here. Sargon II in 717 B.C. is known to have taken Carchemish and to have built a residence for one of his officers at the north end of the city. A series of magnificent tombs have likewise been brought to light on the Acropolis, in which were found pottery and implements of various sorts, and seals dating probably from the second millennium B.C. and following. Indeed the stratification of the débris at Jerablus gives, it is claimed, orderly evidence from the Neolithic age down to the close of the Bronze age. The development of Hittite plastic art also can now be studied from its cradle to its grave; likewise the hieroglyphic texts, of which more than one hundred new ones have come to light.

Summing up the discoveries at Carchemish, the most important is a long Hittite hieroglyphic text, guessed to belong to the ninth century B.C., which is declared by the discoverers to be the longest Hittite inscription as yet known. But unfortunately no one can read it. As Dr. Hogarth freely allows, "The Hittite script cannot yet be read by modern man." Messrs. Woolley and Lawrence are hoping to discover a bi-lingual key.

The view from Jerablus, looking east over the Euphrates into Mesopotamia, is extensive.

THE SURVEY OF THE NEGEB

During the opening months of 1914, the Palestine Exploration Fund through its Field Director, Captain Newcombe, was actively engaged "in connecting the Egyptian triangulation of the Sinai Peninsula with that of the earlier Palestine Survey." The task assigned him implied the mapping of the Ottoman Province of Gaza from Beersheba southward to Akaba and eastward to the Wady Araba; in other words, to prolong the first survey of Palestine to the Egyptian frontier. Messrs. Woolley and Lawrence, who were in charge of the British Museum's excavations at Carchemish, were invited to join the expedition and report upon any observations in the Negeb of strictly archaeological interest.

Reports of the Survey have been given by Mr. Woolley in the *Quarterly Statement* for April, 1914 (pages 58-66), and by Captain Newcombe in the issue of the same Journal for July, 1914 (pages 128-133); but a fuller archaeological and geographical report of what was really accomplished may be found in the recently published Double Number of the *Palestine Exploration Fund Annual* for 1914-15, entitled *The Wilderness of Zin*. In this more formidable and exhaustive report of their brief visit to the Negeb, the authors, Messrs. Woolley and

Lawrence, give an account of their route, the history of the district, the ancient caravan route from Hebron to Egypt, their reasons for identifying Kadesh-Barnea with 'Ain Kadees, together with an extended review of the Byzantine remains still found in the northern part of the district which they surveyed, and of the mediaeval remains near Akaba. They also supply a much-felt want in giving to the Biblical world two new maps of the district, compiled with the permission of the War Office from the survey materials.

Though the time spent in the undertaking was brief, the whole work was completed with the exception of a small area near Akaba, which the Turkish authorities were unwilling to have the English survey.

DISCOVERIES BY NATIVES

It remains only to mention two or three further discoveries made by the natives of Palestine in different parts of the country; their "finds" coming sooner or later, accidentally, to the notice of western archaeologists.

Early in 1913 the government authorities in Jerusalem received information that a richly carved marble sarcophagus had been found at Turmus 'Aya, near Shiloh. This little village is on the carriage-road from Jerusalem to Nablus, being about eighteen miles north of the Holy City. The name of the village has suggested a possible relationship between it and the Thormasia of the Talmud. It has not been identified, however, with any Biblical site. Mr. Jacob E. Spafford of the American Colony in Jerusalem contributes a description of its discovery to the *Journal of the British Archaeological Association* for June, 1913 (pages 115 ff.).

Two large sarcophagi were here unearthed, both however without any inscription to furnish a clew to their

origin. The larger of the two was cut out of white marble and left quite without ornamentation. It measured approximately eight feet in length by four in breadth, being carefully dressed on the outside surface, but somewhat carelessly and irregularly chiselled on the inside. Its lid was of the gable-shape type, found elsewhere in Palestine and Syria. For example, there is a remarkably ornate Roman sarcophagus lying exposed to the public about two miles out from Antioch in north Syria on the roadside between that city and Daphne. Its gable-roofed cover lies one hundred feet distant from the sarcophagus itself. Both are richly decorated with carved figures, heads, and garlands; but the lid is cruelly hacked by the vandals of the district, who have evidently tried to break it in two in order to transport it. Otherwise the sarcophagus is in a most perfect state of preservation, and should be protected from further possible and almost inevitable vandalism.

At Turmus 'Aya, the chief interest centres round a sarcophagus of similar design. Besides the plain one already mentioned, there was discovered another richly carved, also of white marble and ornamented with elaborate figures and designs. Its style points to the Greek period prior to the Roman occupation. It probably dates from the second century B.C. The art is admirable, though pronounced by specialists as inferior to that of the so-called tomb of Alexander found at Sidon, which is now in the Turkish Museum in Constantinople. Though it was mutilated and only large fragments still exist, still there were enough, together with the lid, to give some idea of its character and beauty. Male and female figures adorn it in bold relief; representations of Bacchus, of waves of the sea and boats, of horses and men and dragons, of fruits and flowers and cornucopias, cover its entire front. The symbolism of its carvings has been studied by a Frenchman, M. Michon, who has

found that they represent the four seasons, winter, spring, summer, and autumn, with figures of the earth and ocean.

Whose mausoleum it may have been in which these sarcophagi were found, it is difficult to say. But in view of the fact, as Mr. Spafford points out, that in this same neighborhood, not more than ten minutes from Turmus 'Aya, there are the ruins of an imposing temple, called Kefr Istuná, the artistic work on which resembles the unusual type on this sarcophagus, and inasmuch as the Elephantine papyri mention a certain Ishtuma as a resident at that time in Jerusalem, it is quite possible that this Ishtuma may have been the builder both of this noble temple and of this remarkably ornate mausoleum.

AN INSCRIBED MOSAIC NEAR MT. NEBO

Returning from Petra in March, 1914, the writer and his students from the American School of Oriental Research in Jerusalem visited Madeba and Mt. Nebo, and about one mile south of the summit of the latter, in a region called by the Arabs Ard el-Muheit, examined a newly found mosaic which an Arab peasant had shortly before discovered while building a house or barn for his grain. In constructing his granary the Arab had used the materials of an old chapel or church and had built upon its foundation. After completing his structure, when he began to level off the interior to make the floor he found a beautiful mosaic, one of the most beautiful in Palestine, which must have originally formed the floor of some church, possibly of a mortuary chapel.

It is thirty-six feet long by twenty-seven feet broad, being richly adorned in colors, with figures of animals and men, aquatic creatures, and quadrupeds of various kinds. The whole is in an excellent state of preservation. Along the borders of the mosaic work there are three Greek in-

scriptions which have been translated and published with notes by my student and friend, Mr. Willard H. Robinson Jr., B.D., in the *American Journal of Archaeology*, 1914 (pages 492-498). They date probably from about the fourth century A.D. The largest and most important of the three, which is inscribed in front of the altar, consists of six lines and tells of the prayers of certain devotees to the god of the "Holy Lot" and of the "Holy Procopias"—obviously the patron saints of the chapel.

The designation of Lot as a patron saint seems at first striking; but, as is known, an Armenian version of a Jerusalem ritual mentions that Abraham and Lot were both revered in Galilee in the seventh century; and the seventh and eleventh Suras of the Koran assert that "Lot was sent as a preacher to the people of the Five Cities to deter them from their vices." These views, therefore, as Mr. Joseph Offord suggests, "have probably been taken over by the prophet from some Moabite or Ammonite traditions, which were also familiar among the Madeba people at the period the newly found inscriptions were engraved, and later up to the Hegira" (*Quarterly Statement*, April, 1915, page 92).

A VISIT TO THE CAVE OF MACHPELAH

We cannot close our survey of the archaeological conditions prevailing today in Palestine without an allusion to our visit to the interior of the mosque over the Cave of Machpelah in Hebron. It was on April 7, 1914, that the Hon. Henry Morgenthau, our United States Ambassador to Turkey, invited us to join his party. Non-Moslems are usually forbidden to enter this sacred place. The last Englishman to gain admission was Lord Northbrook, ex-Viceroy of India, in 1895; the last American, the Hon. James P. Angell, in 1898; and the last German, Prince Eitel Friedrich, in 1910. The

late King Edward VII as Prince of Wales, in 1862, and King George, also as Prince of Wales, in 1882, were among the few who were granted by the Sultan an entrance during the nineteenth century. Lord and Lady Bryce accompanied our party. A special *iradé*, or order from the Sultan, is necessary to enter. Unfortunately, the Moslems of Hebron are too bigoted to allow entrance to the cave itself. No one since Rabbi Benjamin of Tudela in 1163 A.D. has ever descended the twenty-four steps leading from the floor of the mosque to the bottom of the cave. So long as Moslems rule over Palestine, there is little hope of making a scientific investigation of this sacred enclosure. But while this special privilege may yet long be denied the archaeologist, there are other sites also most inviting, such as Kiriath-sepher, Gerar, Caesarea, and Machaerus, which may and ought to be explored.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE RELIGION OF THE HEBREWS. JOHN PUNNETT PETERS, Rector of St. Michael's Church, New York. Ginn & Co. 1914. \$2.75.

THE RELIGION OF ISRAEL. HENRY PRESERVED SMITH, Union Theological Seminary. Charles Scribner's Sons. 1914. \$2.50.

All history has to be rewritten from time to time; in the case of the Old Testament religion there is not only a constant accumulation of external material (pre-Israelite and other) and fresh exegetical results, but also new general views of history, broader conceptions of historical growth and historical unity, that is, of national life. The two volumes mentioned above pay due regard to all these considerations. They accept all the main conclusions of modern biblical criticism, and, though written independently of each other, are in substantial agreement as to the lines and the results of the religious development of Israel. The fact that the authors, members of two great orthodox Christian bodies, base their work on the conclusions of recent criticism, without question and without embarrassment, may help to remove or diminish the opposition to modern biblical criticism which still exists in some parts of this country.

The present Old Testament text, as our authors point out, contains material of various degrees of historical authority. There are contemporaneous documents (in histories, law-books, and the writings of prophets, psalmists, and sages); and there are parts that have been revised or rewritten by later scribes, the natural tendency being to import later ideas, ritual and Messianic, into earlier writings. Between original matter and additions the critic must discriminate by means of all the aids at his disposal, and he must not fail to recognize natural native development, when there is evidence for it, even when some outside influence is discernible or when some quite new conception seems to make its appearance. But, notwithstanding the varied character of Old Testament material, the text itself furnishes in the main the means of tracing an orderly growth of the old Hebrew thought. This is true particularly of the period after the time of David. The ground is less sure for the pre-Davidic period, and particularly for the beginnings. Both Peters and Smith recognize the meagreness of the records of the

most ancient time, as to the rôle, for example, to be assigned to Moses in the development. This, to be sure, is not a matter of fundamental importance—we are more concerned with the ethical and religious outcome of Hebrew life than with its starting-point. And it is doubtful whether the data at our command are sufficient to fix definitely the character and achievements of Moses. In regard to this there are two lines of tradition: one, the Judæan, says nothing about Moses as originator or introducer of the worship of Yahweh, speaking of it as practised by the patriarchs and as having begun in the time of a grandson of Adam; the other, the Northern or Israelite, represents Moses as having received the name Yahweh as a new name of Israel's god directly from the mouth of God. Recognizing this discrepancy in the two traditions, our authors agree, however, in regarding Moses as the real founder of the religion of Israel, and in some way connected with an initial ethical religious impulse. At the same time they hold that the Israelites, dwelling in the midst of the Midianites, absorbed or in some way adopted from them the cult of Yahweh. As to an ethical impulse at the beginning, there is no trace of ethical feeling in the Hebrew religion for more than two hundred years after the date usually assigned to Moses. On the other hand, the tradition from the ninth century and onwards persistently represents Moses as the founder of the national religion. The data have been treated in two ways: some scholars, relying on this later tradition, or insisting on the necessity for an individual founder (whose function was similar to that of Zoroaster or Jesus or Mohammed), regard Moses as a dominant religious personality; others, holding that he was a leader of some sort, yet find the general social conditions sufficient to account for the facts as we have them. It is the former of these views that is favored in the volumes under consideration, tentatively by Smith, decidedly by Peters.

The succeeding religious development is set forth in both volumes with fulness and clearness. The relation between popular opinion and the ideas of the religious leaders is kept constantly in mind—for example, the persistent polytheism of the masses down to a very late period, and the movement of prophets and sages through monolatry to a practical monotheism, which, however, permitted the recognition of the existence of other gods than Yahweh, but in actual life was not affected by this survival of the old beliefs. The effect of the growing sense of individual moral responsibility (a universal concomitant of moral growth) on the national religious life is clearly traced, and with it the development of the sense of sin which so

curiously combined spirituality with ancient physical conceptions. Israel's remarkable capacity of adaptation is pointed out. Whatever the social changes it experienced (sometimes apparently fatal), the nation was able not only to interpret them in accordance with the conviction of Yahweh's favor, but also to make them the occasion of a loftier view of the national mission in the world. The most striking illustration of this capacity is the treatment of the Servant of Yahweh in Deutero-Isaiah, regarded by both our authors as setting forth the future of the pious kernel of the nation, the true Israel, destined to be the teacher and savior of Israel and all other nations. The Messianic hope also (which illustrates the invincible reliance on Yahweh's saving guidance) is traced from its earliest appearance to the expectation of an individual saviour, generally a prince of the house of David, and finally, in the book of Enoch, to a supernatural pre-existent Man (the "Son of Man"), who is to crush all enemies and restore the ancient glories of the nation. It is properly pointed out that this hope was not destroyed by the growth of legalism; the devotion to the Law, nourished by the Synagogue, was, it is held, a quite natural and in many respects useful or necessary movement, accompanied by a keener sense of sin (which, however, was not wholly free from earlier low conceptions).

In both volumes the ethical growth of the nation is traced from the crude ideas and barbarous customs of the earliest times to the higher standards of the prophets, the legal literature, and the Wisdom books. The defect in the better moral thought, it is pointed out, is due to the self-complacent belief that Yahweh chose Israel out of all the nations and invested it with peculiar dignity and superiority to all the world, a belief from which followed a certain disregard of alien ideas and religious achievements. One would never learn from the Old Testament that Egypt, Persia, and Greece had produced anything in the sphere of religion that was valuable for the world. Yet, as is here pointed out, Israel did borrow or was influenced by outside ideas which it wove silently and skilfully into its own religious life. In the discussion of this department of religious thought, as in others, the moulding power of native external conditions and of psychical movements is recognized.

There is a noteworthy agreement in the two volumes in regard to critical questions such as the constitution and dates of various books—for example, Isaiah, Chronicles, and the Psalter. As is natural, there are different opinions among recent scholars as to the meaning of certain texts. The "Immanuel" of Isa. 7 14 is regarded by some as a designation of any child that should be born in the

immediate future, the "young woman" (not "virgin") being any Israelite mother, and the name signifying the presence and help of God; others regard the verse as belonging to the popular eschatology, a prediction of the coming deliverer; a third view, similar to the preceding, is that the young woman represents the nation, out of which shall arise the Saviour. Professor Smith prefers the first of these views, and Dr. Peters the third; yet the general conception of the development of Messianic thought is not affected by such exegetical differences. So there has been and is much discussion of Isa. 9 5 [6]; the passage is regarded by Smith as belonging to a later period, by Peters as Isaian. A whole literature has sprung up around the verse, into the discussion of which it is unnecessary to enter here, especially as the general sketch of Messianic thought is independent of the chronological and cultural considerations therein involved.

In both volumes the old-Hebrew idea of the future life is treated with caution and discrimination; in passages whose meaning is disputed the arguments on one side or the other are stated or indicated in such way that the reader can form his own opinion. This cautiousness regarding conclusions, a valuable quality, appears throughout the two histories. It is no easy thing to describe an ancient religion, particularly when the data are often meagre. But it may be said that, so far as the data go, Dr. Peters and Professor Smith have here given pictures of the religious life of ancient Israel that comply with all the demands of current historical science.

The proof-reading in these two volumes is admirable. Only one clerical error has been observed by the present reviewer: in Peters, p. 406, l. 8, instead of "second century of the Christian era," read "second century before the Christian era," or simply "second and first centuries B.C."

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REDEN UND AUFSÄTZE. HERMANN GUNKEL. Vandenhoeck u. Ruprecht. Göttingen. 1913. Pp. viii, 192. 4.80m., bound 5.60m.

Gunkel is known to many in this country by his *Legends of Genesis*, the English translation of the remarkable introduction to his epoch-making commentary on Genesis. In the present little book he has collected and edited eleven essays in order to give to a wider circle of readers some illustrations of the *religionsgeschichtliche* and of the *literaturgeschichtliche* study of the Old Testament, of which he is a leading exponent.

After presenting in the introductory chapter a character-sketch of Bernhard Stade, his famous predecessor at Giessen, Gunkel gives first two articles on "Aims and Methods of the Interpretation of the Old Testament" and "Fundamental Problems of the History of Israelitish Literature." These prepare the way for the treatment of Samson; Ruth; the Psalms; the Eschatological Hope of the Psalmists; Egyptian Parallels to the Old Testament; Egyptian Songs of Thanksgiving; Jensen's "Gilgamesch-Epos"; and the Odes of Solomon.

Specialists as well as others will be grateful for the collection in book form of these essays, which had appeared before in various, mostly popular, German magazines, not always easily accessible to us on this side of the Atlantic. For though the book is altogether popular, this does not mean that Gunkel has simply restated positions well known to scholars. There is always something new and fresh, and it is always presented in a graceful literary form. Old Testament scholars have all learned much from Gunkel's investigations in the history of religion in Israel and in the history of its literature. This suggestive and beautiful collection of addresses and essays is therefore sure of a cordial welcome.

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THE GOSPEL ACCORDING TO ST. MARK. A. PLUMMER. Cambridge University Press. 1914.

THE EPISTLE OF ST. PAUL TO THE EPHESIANS. J. O. F. MURRAY. Cambridge University Press. 1914.

THE GOSPEL ACCORDING TO ST. LUKE. W. F. BURNSIDE. Cambridge University Press. 1913.

The first two of these three volumes are parts of the *Cambridge Greek Testament for Schools and Colleges*, under the general editorship of R. St. John Parry. They are in some ways above the general standard of the series to which they belong; but it is impossible to extend a cordial welcome to either of them, because it is hard to see for what purpose they can properly be employed. The *Cambridge Greek Testament* is intended for the use of "schools and colleges," and all teachers would be most grateful for a series of commentaries on the New Testament which could be put into the hands of boys and young men at schools and colleges, and used as text-books for class work. What is required is a book which will make intelligible to its readers what the real problems are. It is not necessary that the writer should expound at great length his own or other

people's opinions as to the solution of these problems. It is of course desirable to indicate the various solutions which are offered by specialists, but the most important thing is to provide a clear statement of the problems. It is unfortunately characteristic of the recent numbers of the *Cambridge Greek Testament* that they, to a large extent, reverse this proceeding. There is no clear statement of the problems, but there is a great deal of purely partisan, though sometimes quite scholarly, exposition of some particular solution of the problems, and unduly extended treatment of some special point in which the writer is personally interested.

This is markedly the case in both the present volumes. In the commentary on the Gospel of Mark, Dr. Plummer deals at considerable length with many of the introductory questions. All that is known about Mark as a historic person is stated, and he gives a very good exposition of the evidence in Papias and elsewhere as to the writing of the Gospel. When he comes to deal with the question of the sources of the Gospel he discusses some of the more difficult points of the synoptic question, but never makes it plain what that question really is. He constantly speaks of Q in such a way that a school-boy will form the idea that the contents of Q are perfectly well known; but I do not think that any one will understand Dr. Plummer's general position unless he already knows so much about the question that he is not in the least likely to be using the *Cambridge Greek Testament* as a source of information. The treatment is moderately interesting to the trained scholar; but to him it falls short of conveying new knowledge, and to any one else it is obscure because it discusses problems which are never clearly formulated.

In the same way in the notes, though it is clear that the writer is constantly thinking of the eschatological question, it is never stated properly, and no sufficient help is given to the student who has heard of it but does not understand what it is. A similar complaint must also be made of the literature which is recommended. It is all chosen so as to recommend certain types of opinion, not to forward a thorough knowledge of the difficulties. All this is typical of the reason why the *Cambridge Greek Testament* is so unsatisfactory a series. It is written by scholars in a scholarly manner; but they only attempt to explain the difficulties of their subject so as to recommend the opinions which they think to be right, and the imposing discussions which take the place that ought to be filled by simple exposition are not really good enough to have any special value for advanced students.

Similar criticism is true of Dr. Murray's commentary on Ephesians. It is surely an abuse of opportunity that in dealing with the text of the Epistle there is no adequately clear statement of the principles followed by various critics, but a long dissertation somewhat in the style of Westcott and Hort on the question whether \aleph and B had a common original. It is the sort of essay which one would regard as meritorious, but rather wooden, in a student's dissertation for a degree; but it is absolutely out of place in an elementary commentary. It is also regrettable that the writer should have thought fit to inflict on us a long and somewhat acridly written refutation of Dr. Moffatt's treatment of the authenticity of the Epistle, instead of attempting to give a judicial account of the arguments which have led scholars to have doubts on the subject. It suggests that commentaries which ought to be valuable for the use of schools and colleges are being made the dumping-ground for semi-learned expositions of personal opinion, which under the appearance of fairness and moderation are really skilful statements of partisan positions, given an appearance of certainty either by silence as to the strength of other views, or by the selection from these of their weakest points as though they represented their whole case.

The third volume is an excellent book of a certain limited kind; it makes no pretence to being a work of original research, but claims merely to give a plain statement of facts and necessary explanations. Some of course will think that the standpoint is too conservative; but it is sensible and clear, and may well be recommended to schools in need of an orthodox but not controversial or reactionary book. The statement of the synoptic problem is the best elementary exposition which I have seen in a book of this kind.

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THE ESCHATOLOGY OF JESUS: H. LATIMER JACKSON, D.D. Macmillan & Co. 1913. Pp. 378. \$1.50.

There is always a certain satisfaction in travelling with a well-informed guide, even though he be somewhat tedious with his information. Dr. Jackson wants to impress upon our minds that a familiar landscape is full of an interesting and significant species of growth, called Eschatology, which the casual traveller of the past either overlooked or ignored. To this end we are led through the Gospels, the Old Testament, and the Apocalyptic literature, in the first four chapters; then in successive chapters through a

consideration of Judaism "in the days of Jesus," a comparison of Jesus' thought with that of Judaism, a study of the Person of Jesus, concluding with chapters on "Husk and Kernel" and "Eschatological Survivals in the Creeds." Everywhere individual specimens, sometimes monotonously like other specimens, are held up to view with the specialist's interest in minor variations and new sub-species.

The tone of Dr. Jackson's book is too moderate and judicial to permit of its inclusion among the works of the "thorough-going" eschatologists. But he firmly and convincingly insists that Jesus shared the beliefs of his time, allotting to himself the rôle of "Messiah" in the drama of the Last Things. The Kingdom is future. Jesus is, at first, the Herald. "The feeling grows on him that He is something more, and by degrees He identifies Himself with the Kingdom which He has proclaimed and heralded. If it be still future, He Himself belongs to it already; where He is, there the Kingdom is in partial manifestation." "Throughout conscious of limitations, He, destined Messiah that He is, eagerly awaits emancipation; the supreme moment when He shall have passed through the gate of death to be exalted, as the Son of Man, at the right hand of God. That from thence He would shortly come, come in glory with the clouds of heaven, come to this earth, He is absolutely persuaded. At His coming the nations will be summoned to a dread tribunal, where He Himself, it may be, figures as the Judge" (pp. 110-111).

In spite of all this, the Messianism of Jesus is in sharp contrast to that of Judaism. Dr. Jackson centres the distinction on the element of suffering, which is obvious enough. He seems to feel, furthermore, that the unique consciousness of Jesus somehow transcended Jewish Messianism, quoting with apparent approval Bousset's description of the title as "a heavy burden which He bore in silence almost to the end of his life" (p. 311). As reluctant as the reviewer is to follow Schweitzer to the end, he finds no refuge in this position. The history of his people definitely gave certain categories of thought to Jesus. He might conceivably have thought of himself as a prophet, or as the Forerunner, or as Messiah; that he chose the last, carries its own significance. On Jewish soil, self-consciousness could have no form except in the given terms of thought. Messiahship, therefore, is not a reluctantly chosen mode of expression; it is itself, in this instance, the thought that we translate by the very modern and over-worked term, "self-consciousness."

It is to be regretted that Dr. Jackson did not find it possible to discuss Schweitzer's theories more directly. He tells us in the Preface that he declines "to go the lengths of Albert Schweitzer";

but nowhere in the course of the book does the reader feel that Dr. Jackson comes to real grips with the author of *Von Reimarus to Wrede*. If, as Dr. Jackson admits, the eschatological element in the life of Jesus is to be emphasized, what is the answer to Schweitzer's theory that the eschatological dogma dominated and determined every act of Jesus' ministry? By what defence would Dr. Jackson maintain his development theory, based apparently on Mark, in the face of Schweitzer's furious bayonet charge against all "psychologizing"? Is Schweitzer right in maintaining that Jesus endeavored to conceal his Messiahship to the end, and that he died because it was this secret which Judas betrayed? Was the ethic of Jesus as entirely "world-renouncing" as Schweitzer maintains? These and similar questions are in our minds because Schweitzer has forced them upon us. But Dr. Jackson goes his own scholarly way, arguing freely on almost every page with Burkitt, J. Weiss, Bousset, and a host of others, and leaves us to infer as best we may, with the help of not more than two or three inadequate foot-notes, what he thinks of Schweitzer and his theories.

Dr. Jackson's final word is an interesting one. He describes eschatology as the "husk." To find the "kernel" he does not fall back on the idea that Jesus was primarily the founder of an ethical Kingdom; he is content with the eschatological Jesus. In his own words: "Is it not true to say that the idea embodied in the eschatology of Jesus—the embodiment belonging to its own day—is that of the ultimate triumph of the cause of God? The idea is so grand that it cannot be other than divine. Because divine, therefore of abiding significance" (p. 350). It is a reassuring word, but not a final one. Much remains to be said about the eschatology of Jesus that Dr. Jackson has not said in this book.

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THE MIRACLES OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. The Moorhouse Lectures for 1914. A. C. HEADLAM, D.D. John Murray. 1914. Pp. xvi, 361. 6s.

Dr. Headlam has written an exceedingly clever book in defence of miracles, the chief distinction of which lies in its method of presenting the evidence. Accepting the two-source theory, the author examines separately the evidence of Mark and Q, then of Matthew and Luke in their present form, and finally of other portions of the New Testament. Since the sources preceded the Gospels as we have them, and since, as the author holds, Luke was written

by a travelling-companion of Paul, the evidence is carried back to a comparatively early date, and the traditional connection of Mark and Q with Peter and Matthew respectively warrants a plea for its first-hand character. Accordingly, the evidence is pronounced good: "That is to say, if the events recorded were not such as to cause us difficulties in accepting them, we should give them credence as we should other events recorded in history" (p. 300). Dr. Headlam has so keen a mind that, were he not a theologian, we should suspect him of having written that sentence with his tongue in his cheek. For certainly he cannot seriously mean that the character of events reported has nothing to do with their credibility. To put it concretely: if a witness relates that he saw a painter fall from a swinging platform when the rope broke, and we believe him, should we give equal credence if the same observer testified that he saw the painter rise to his staging without rope or ladder or any such help but solely by spiritual levitation, before he began work in the morning?

Furthermore, Dr. Headlam makes much of current criticisms upon uniformity and laws of nature, and particularly of Huxley's well-known statement, arguing that belief in uniformity is not of scientific origin at all but was born of an *a priori* thought of God. But he fails to discriminate between event as such, and the interpretation of event as miracle. A scientific man may, indeed, be reluctant to declare *a priori* that this or that particular event cannot have occurred substantially as related, but the interpretation of it as miracle is quite a different matter. He would undoubtedly argue that the occurrence, although appearing miraculous, was in reality no miracle at all, but was due to the presence of circumstances and the operation of forces not yet thoroughly comprehended; and this Dr. Headlam would seem to accept, holding that scientific progress has made miracles more credible by revealing hitherto undreamed-of possibilities of nature. That is to say, x-ray photography creates a presupposition in favor of the turning of water into wine, or the feeding of five thousand men besides women and children with five loaves and two fishes which multiplied in distribution. That indeed may be true in the case of an uneducated man, but is it really true of Dr. Headlam? Concerning the various attempts to explain the latter miracle, Dr. Headlam says that "again and again a strain is put upon our powers of belief by the attempt to explain away a straightforward and natural story" (p. 326)—and, of course, none by its acceptance. It is remarkable that this particular miracle for which there is the best evidence, so far as testimony goes, should be the very one which intrinsically is least credible.

Miracles are finally defined as follows: "A miracle means really the supremacy of the spiritual forces of the world to an extraordinarily marked degree over the mere material" (p. 335). But such a definition is open to many objections. Man has supremacy over the material forces of the world, but it has been won through knowledge of their laws and confidence in their uniformity. To plead that nature and its laws are but the expression of God's will, and that therefore whatever happens because of his will as direct and active cause must be congruous with nature and in accordance with its laws, suggests again the tongue in the cheek. Is it true that power over "demons" once, and similar power over the deranged now, should be deemed spiritual power, especially in view of Mt. 7 23 and 12 27?

One lays down a book like this in a mood of hopelessness, for it makes glaringly evident the difference between the clerical and the scientific habit of mind. Dr. Headlam solemnly takes his opponents to task for their mental bias against miracles without recognizing that he is correspondingly prepossessed in their favor by his belief in revelation and the Incarnation. In fact, freedom from mental bias is quite out of the question for anybody above the level of a blockhead. The only question is whether the bias inclines towards or away from the rights of the case, or, to be specific, whether the scientific, critical attitude towards marvellous events reported to have occurred in the world of space and time is more appropriate than the clerical and ecclesiastical. What, for instance, would a scientific student think of this sentence which closes the chapter on the Virgin Birth? "From the naturalistic point of view it is really one of the least difficult of miracles; from the Christian point of view it is one of the most beautiful. It has been one of the greatest inspirations of Christian art, one of the purest influences on Christian life. The Church has *therefore* wisely retained it in its creed" (p. 299). The italics are mine.

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LIGHT FROM THE EAST; STUDIES IN JAPANESE CONFUCIANISM. ROBERT CORNELL ARMSTRONG, Ph.D. (University of Toronto Studies in Philosophy). Published by the Librarian. 1914. Pp. xvi, 326. \$1.50.

This book deals with a subject which deserves the attention of the world's thinkers and scholars, but which has hitherto been almost entirely neglected. This fact alone furnishes a strong reason for gratitude to the present book. The author tells us that the motive

which induced him to take up this subject was a desire to understand the Japanese through acquaintance with the sources of their moral training and ethical thought. This admirable intention of the author, added to the intrinsic interest—and, it is fair to say, the difficulty—of the subject, gives the work every claim to our respect.

There is perhaps no need of saying what an important rôle Confucianism played in moulding the moral life and ideas of the peoples of the Far East. Its founder, or rather systematizer, Confucius, was a practical thinker and powerful teacher—I do not wholly agree with the impression given by Dr. Armstrong that Confucius had almost nothing of metaphysics. The ethical teachings of Confucianism had two characteristics: one being the close connection of ethics with the cosmological theories of the Chinese, which leads to emphasizing the ultimate unity of human life with the “way of Heaven”; and the other the union of ethics and politics, the result of which is shown in the prominence given to civic virtues. In the course of time the Confucian system of ethics was developed in various ways, the most significant being that a certain discontinuity existing between its metaphysics, or cosmology, and its practical ethics was filled up by psychological theories. This was done chiefly by the Confucianists of the twelfth century, under the reign of the glorious Sung dynasty. The aim of these psychological studies was to furnish material for a mental discipline, through which the “cosmic reason” was brought closer to human life and metaphysical truths were incorporated in morality.

It was this modified Confucianism that was adopted by the Dictatorial government of Japan established early in the seventeenth century, and that was destined to rule the moral life of the Samurai, the rulers and fighters. This authorized system of Confucian ethics was based on the teachings of Chu-hi, known in Japan as Shu-shi. The system of Shu-shi is eminent in its emphasis on the virtue of obedience; its philosophy is a statical view of the world, and its moral teachings easily ran to an extreme of inactive sobriety, and even to something verging on hypocrisy. Naturally this system served well the purpose of the government to keep peace and order, but it did not equally satisfy those active minds which demanded initiative and originality. Some of those discontented souls derived inspiration from Wan-Yangming (known as Wō-Yōmei in Japan), an idealistic philosopher of the sixteenth century. His view was dynamic and his method intuitive, and his followers in Japan propounded a system of idealistic thought, and practised its

ethics in a vigorous life of activity made possible by invigorating mental exercises in spiritual introspection. Besides this school of Yōmei, there were various thinkers advocating principles at variance with the static ideas and quietistic influence of the orthodox Shu-shi school.

The interests of these thinkers and their points of view are manifold; their theories, metaphysical, psychological, and ethical, are important; their personalities and lives are in some cases highly interesting. These matters are treated at length in the volume before us. But there is another point of no less importance and scientific interest; namely, the influence of the time upon the thinkers, and the reaction, on the part of some of them, against the stagnant conservatism of the peaceful centuries in which they lived. This is the sociological point of view concerning these Japanese Confucianists, and it is essential to take it into account in considering their teachings and lives. I cannot enter into discussion of these aspects of the problem, but I say this because the present volume singularly misses this vital consideration. These Confucianists wrote in various styles, both in Chinese and Japanese; and to overcome the linguistic difficulties alone is a great task. Moreover, the conceptions in philosophy, psychology, and ethics which are expressed in their writings are often very different from Western conceptions, and in many cases not sharply defined. Intellectual ideas are associated with emotional terms, ethical reflections are connected with the social and political conditions of the time. Full recognition must be accorded to the author's attempt to master these conceptions, but it remains a question whether he has really mastered them. In fact, there are not a few cases, as we shall see presently, in which he has not been cautious enough in identifying Western conceptions with Confucian terms. Yet such is the difficulty of pioneer work in this untrodden field of research, that credit must be given to the author for the measure of success he has achieved.

An examination of the book shows that the main part of it, Parts II-IV, is a translation in abstract of the three books by Professor Inouye, which the author cites among his authorities on page xii, and to which he acknowledges his indebtedness in occasional passages. I compared the text throughout, and was able to identify the whole main part with its sources almost page by page. The author cites Professor Inouye's opinions in a few passages, referring to him by name; but almost everywhere else the opinions expressed, as well as quotations from the original authors, are Inouye's. The author faithfully follows Inouye, even in citing the Upanishads

side by side with the Johannine Gospel, in analogy to Tōju's ideas (p. 136). On the other hand, the author reproduces passages, greatly abridging the original. On page 148, for instance, the author cites Banzan's views on Christianity; and there he omits the last part of Banzan's opinion which says: "In case the true Confucianism shall decline and Buddhism be vanquished, the country will be conquered by the 'Kirishitans' (Christians). Then both Shinto and Confucianism will be broken down and the people will become beasts and the Imperial Throne will be destroyed" (Inouye, *Yōmei Gakuha*, p. 237). Omitting, or overlooking, this passage, the meaning of which is clear, the author interprets Banzan as if he had appreciated the superiority of Christianity, and (contrasting this with an unfavorable judgment of Christianity by the same Banzan) says: "But later he seems to have learned more about Christianity" (p. 148). This is one of the instances in which Dr. Armstrong has misinterpreted his texts by abridging them in a way not just to the originals.

The author's treatment of his sources places the reviewer in a very peculiar and puzzling position, as to which—Inouye's original or Armstrong's reproduction—should be the object of this review. The original author, Inouye, is responsible for the general arrangement and the materials selected; but the author of the present book is responsible for the condensed translation and for the expression of certain opinions concerning the Japanese Confucianists. I cannot review the book otherwise than by taking both things into account and quoting Professor Inouye's three volumes as the "original."

Taking this stand, the first point is, Why did not Dr. Armstrong so rearrange the original as to give a general view of the whole subject and adapt it to Western readers? Inouye's original presupposes knowledge, on the part of Japanese readers, of Confucian ethics at large, of the special points in Shu-shi and Ō-Yōmei, and of the general social conditions of the times. But when the matter is reproduced for English readers, the author cannot start with such presuppositions; and ought, therefore, to have treated the subject with a definite perspective. He should have brought the important figures into greater prominence than is done in the original, and have omitted many minor details and persons. To take one instance, the original gives the villages where the philosophers were born, or the amount of rice they received as emoluments from their feudal lords. These particulars may be interesting to Japanese readers, but of what concern are they to Western readers? Things

essential and characteristic should be mentioned, which serve to illustrate the personalities of those Confucianists; but the author rather confuses the impression by reproducing in minute dependence on the originals these and other insignificant details. More important, however, is the fact that the author follows the originals in copious quotations—though much abridged—which are full of repetitions. The result is that the main threads are often lost, at least to the sight of Western readers. I wish that the author had been at pains so to remodel the original that the sayings of the leaders should have been quoted in full—of course in an elucidating manner—and some minor figures and the repetitions omitted. In this way, and in this way alone, perspective and coherence could have been kept, for the sake of Western readers, for whom a clear perspective is infinitely more needed than for Japanese readers. In short, the author has not been judicious in selecting his materials, nor sufficiently careful in quoting the original sayings.

So far concerning the external form. When we come to the contents of the work, we notice a grave defect in the author's treatment; viz., that he has not observed a proper proportion between the metaphysical theories and their consequences or supplements. The author pays much attention to the metaphysical or cosmological theories of *Li* (*Ri*) and *Ch'i* (*Ki*), etc., but peculiarly neglects the psychological theories, and their relations to the mental culture or spiritual exercise which was regarded as the essential condition of ethical training in all these schools of Japanese Confucianism. Not only as regards Japanese Confucianists, but concerning Shu-shi himself, the author fails to notice their psychology, as is especially evident in his concluding chapter (pp. 299–306). This defect has an important bearing, because it was in this point that Shu-shi and other Chinese philosophers were influenced by Buddhism, and here also that Japanese Confucianism developed a characteristic trait of its ethics in uniting moral life with spiritual exercise. Of course, this cannot be overlooked; but the author touches only slightly on this vital point, and evidently does not sufficiently recognize the importance of this feature in the later Confucianists.

The neglect of this point may be illustrated by several instances. Not only the men of the Yōmei school but of the Shu-shi school also laid so much emphasis on mental training that they can hardly be understood without paying full attention to what they termed "*kufū*" (Chin., *kung-fū*), "method of drill," or "*sonyō*" (Chin., *ts'un-yang*), "the preservation and perpetuation (of the primeval vitality)." Our author in treating the ethics of a Shushist (p. 82)

simply omits his theory of the "*sonyō*," which is found in Inouye's *Shushi Gakuha* (pp. 254-259), and jumps at once, between lines 8 and 9, from the theory of benevolence to that of death. In fact, page 82 of the book is a reproduction of pp. 253-261 of Inouye's original, except the omission above mentioned. Now this omission may be attributed to the author's judgment, but the grave defect of thereby missing a very important point cannot be overlooked. This is an illustration of the fact that the author fails to see in the psychology of later Confucianists a vital link connecting their metaphysics and ethics.

This brings me to a more serious remark; viz., that the author has thereby fallen into a point of view almost contrary to the purpose of his studies. The reader is told that the work was undertaken with the aim of understanding the Japanese, and the author's sympathetic attitude is to be appreciated. In spite of this, he says in his conclusion (p. 295): "The moral ideal of Confucianism is good, so far as the letter of it is concerned. It is an excellent moral code in ink. Its weakness lies in its spirit. . . . They [moral systems of similar types] fail to inspire and to give life." Thus the author has seen metaphysical theories and moral codes, but has failed to see how those Confucianists cultivated their psychological theories not only in thought but in life, in "*kufū*," the vitalizing principle and method of Confucian ethics. What the author accuses Confucianism of is rather a defect of his own observation than of Confucian ethics.

The author's criticism of Confucian ethics is that it lacks inspiring power. There is a question which he should have put to himself before coming to this conclusion, even apart from the consideration of self-culture practised by Confucians. The question which will arise in the mind of every careful reader is this: Were all these teachers mere teachers of letters, or did they exercise any amount of actual influence on the moral life of the times? The author tells us much of the lives and theories of these teachers, and has added to Inouye's originals three chapters of general remarks on the nature of these schools. But the reader is left almost entirely without information as to what these thinkers had to do with the people or with the training of the Samurai class. Of course, the author mentions, for instance, that Kaibara wrote his works in popular style, or that Tōju influenced his villagers very deeply; but unfortunately his interests are directed chiefly to the theories and sayings of these teachers, and little is said of their educative methods and their concern with moral training. And yet the author's conclusion is

that Confucian ethics is merely a moral code in ink! In any case, the "Light from the East," as presented by the author, seems to be a reflection of a light, and not the light itself. Had not the light some warmth and life? The reader will not be satisfied with the author's summary conclusion, but will demand an answer to the question.

Omitting various other points in the author's treatment of the subject that might be discussed, let us see some of his renderings of Japanese expressions into English. To begin with single phrases: the author uses various terms for one and the same expression. The most significant is the word for "*shin*" or "*kokoro*," a term used by the followers of Shu-shi in a special sense. The author's renderings are, "mind," "heart," "soul." Had the author any definite intention in using these synonyms? "Reverence," "respect," "piety," "modesty"—these stand for "*kei*." "Living reason," "the principle of production," "the principle of life," "living principle," "the principles (of heaven and earth)," "the actual (!) law"—these are used for one and the same word, "*seiri*," on pages 80-81 and 93-94 alone. Synonyms are useful for the sake of rhetoric, but it is rather puzzling to render a definite philosophical term by such a variety within so narrow a limit of space.

Some of the quotations are abbreviated too much or in a way not clear. On page 89 it is said: "They [the scholars of the classical school] uphold the way but reject reason." This is hardly intelligible, unless some explanation were added or a reference made to the point treated on pages 228-229. On page 50 the author, in speaking about a difference between Razan, who thought somewhat like Yōmei, and Fujiwara Seika, says: "Yōmei emphasized intuitive knowledge, . . . and hoped . . . to reach the intuitive knowledge by which he hoped to reach the 'Holy Place.' Fujiwara thinks the word 'Seiki' differs from the one used by Shu-shi, meaning original reason (*Kyū-Ri*), but that the thought is the same." This is a repetition of a passage quoted on page 41 (Inouye's original, page 28) and it will be very hard to grasp the meaning without reference to that passage or without an explanation. Let me add an explanation. The point is this: Yōmei aimed at realizing man's original nature by intuitive knowledge or spiritual introspection; and he deemed this attainment to be the realization of the "*sei-iki*," which meant "to be within the threshold of the sage's ideal perfection." Now Fujiwara Seika thought that this ideal aim of Yōmei differed but in name from Shu-shi's ideal perfection. The latter taught that the perfection was attainable by "*kyū-ri*," i.e. in "exhausting the source

of the universal reason," which is the original nature of mankind. I wonder whether the meaning is conveyed in the author's quotation. To take another, lighter one: on page 51 there is a quotation from Razan: "Man is originally a moving animal; how can he resemble a dead body?" This translation is quite right, but would it not be more intelligible to say, for instance: "Man is endowed with life, this is his original nature; how can he behave like a dead body (as recommended by Taoism)?"

The author discusses some points of Confucian ethics and its difference from Buddhism, but I confess that many of these discussions are quite beyond my grasp. Take, for instance, what he has to say on Jinsai's theories of the way and virtues on pages 231-234, which are identical in outlines with pages 233-244 of Inouye's *Shushi Gakuha*. The author quotes Inouye's interpretation of Jinsai as if it were Jinsai's own words (p. 231, lines 10-33), and uses the same word, "nature," for that by which Jinsai meant metaphysical essence and which he opposed, and for what Inouye employed in the usual sense of the word. Even apart from a confusion of this kind, the whole discussion is rather confusing than elucidating. The point seems to me not so complicated as the author makes it, but to amount to the difference between a metaphysical interpretation of the moral nature of man and an ethico-psychological view of moral virtues.

Let me add another passage on what the author calls Oriental pantheism. Since I am at a loss to grasp the meaning, I simply quote the passage (p. 126). It reads: "Yōmei's system, like most pantheistic systems, does not logically provide for evil. In so far as he makes evil separate from the original form, his system ends in a dualism, although he would not admit it. . . . This is the case with all Eastern pantheism. It is not true pantheism, since it ends in a dualism (?). So Western theism, whether of the Jew or of the Greek, is not true monotheism, since it ends in dualism—God *versus* the Universe. These two points of view are complementary. The East needs the West; the West needs the East. There can be no real pantheism which makes individuality an illusion. If so, we should be explaining the pantheism by the illusion. True pantheism is true monotheism. It provides for personality and individual responsibility."

The author devotes an appendix to Buddhism. Instead of taking up various points therein brought out, which are very disputable, I shall only quote his remarks on the conception of the Dharma-kāya of Buddha (p. 318). He says: "In process of time, through the

influence of the Upanishads, and especially through the Yoga philosophy, this revered law became practically identified with the impersonal deity of Brahminism." I wish that the author would one day present the evidence for this bold assertion.

Lastly, in minor details the author leaves on me an impression that he left his manuscripts for publication in the hands of those who had no knowledge of the subject. Many names are spelled wrongly; in some cases Chinese names are written separating the family and the personal names, and in others united; one and the same book is cited under different names, such as "a classic on history" and "Shosho" for the same Shū-king; I-king is cited as "a classic on Philosophy"; the mythological portion of the *Chronicles of Japan* is cited as "a book written in ancient times"; the "Gozan," the "Five Great Monasteries," is cited as if it were one temple, etc. There are some startling novelties; for example, that "Japan had conquered the Loo-Choo Islands [in the sixth century!]" (p. 17); "Fujiwara Takechimaro became professor of the university in 704" (p. 19); "the word heaven [in Chinese] is a development from the original teaching about God" (p. 36); "the influence of Buddhism on this teaching becomes very clear if we substitute the 'world of illusion' for 'Ki,' and the word 'spiritual body of Buddha or law' for 'Ri'" (p. 38); "in the beginning of the ninth century, after the Chinese had driven out their enemies, there was a very strong patriotic feeling" (p. 301).

In conclusion, the painstaking labor of the author must be highly respected. But a little more care would have made the book a really valuable contribution to the world. Especially to be desired are perspective and coherence in general and careful investigation of historical data in detail. The volume is of a kind to which good indexes are indispensable; the index (pp. 325-326) is useless.

M. ANESAKI.

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THE PLACE OF THE CHURCH IN EVOLUTION. JOHN MASON TYLER. The Houghton Mifflin Co. 1914. Pp. xiv, 202. \$1.10.

Professor Tyler offers some wise and generous reflections, chiefly applicable to laymen, but serviceable to the ministry as well. He presents a clear and hopeful outline of evolutionary processes which lead up to personality as the "clearest and fullest expression of the power behind and in civilization." The church is the body through which the divine life is to express itself by degrees more completely,

and its business is to aim at social amelioration in many forms, through the use of the diversity of gifts within it, and even more, to aim at "a higher and better personality." It is to be a centre of contagion—the contagion of goodness—and men who desire to do God's will should be welcome in it, though they may differ in the details of their formal confessions of faith. To remain outside is to miss the encouragement and knowledge that life needs in order to be adequate for its spiritual tasks. Within the church the disciple is in an organization that may be likened, historically, to a ship beating against the wind, but one that gains upon her havens in the end.

There is nothing startlingly new in the book, but its frequent sententious passages are reassuring to faith, and to some they may be even more.

GEORGE T. SMART.

NEWTON HIGHLANDS.

THE THEOLOGY OF THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND. F. W. WORSLEY. E. P. Dutton & Co. 1913. Pp. viii, 259. \$2.25.

This is a very poor book. Such a dogmatic statement needs some proof, even although it seems a pity to waste space to prove what almost a glance would make evident. The book claims to deal with "The Theology of the Church of England." Yet it is only a commentary on the Thirty-nine Articles, together with a few remarks on the Prayer Book. Not a word about Hooker or Jewel or Chillingworth or Laud or Taylor or Tillotson!

Even within its scope the book fails in scholarship and in fairness. As to scholarship, the author, after mentioning the "thirteen articles" drawn up at a conference of Lutheran and Anglican divines, together with some other early documents, says, "None of the above had any real influence on the Articles as we have them." Yet the effect which these thirteen articles had on the Thirty-nine can be seen by a glance at the former as given in Hardwick's *History of the Articles of Religion*. And Gibson says of them in his book on the Articles: "Their importance, however, historically, is very great, for they form the link between the Confession of Augsburg and our own Articles. A comparison of the three documents makes it perfectly clear that it was only through the medium of the Book of the Thirteen Articles that the Lutheran formulary influenced the Forty-two Articles of 1553, from which our own are descended."

As to fairness, the following quotation will suffice. Mr. Worsley says in his preface: "Another leader, Dr. Hastings Rashdall, writes

as follows: 'Men will not go to church to hear views about the damnation of heretics, about the Fall, about the Atonement, about Absolution and the Sacraments which they have ceased to believe.' One is inclined to think that when people have ceased to believe in the Atonement and the Sacraments, it is about time that they ceased going to church." Now it is perfectly clear that, in the quotation from Dr. Rashdall, the word "which" does not refer to "the Atonement" and "Sacraments," but to "views" about the Atonement and Sacraments, which views they have ceased to believe.

It is hoped that these remarks and quotations will sufficiently justify the opening sentence of this review.

EDWARD S. DROWN.

EPISCOPAL THEOLOGICAL SCHOOL, CAMBRIDGE.

THE LIFE OF ST. SEVERINUS, BY EUGIPPIUS. GEORGE W. ROBINSON.
Translated into English for the first time, with notes. Harvard University Press. 1914.

The Life of St. Severinus of Noricum possesses great importance through the fact that it is one of very few sources dealing with the downfall of Roman government and culture in the Pannonias at the time of the Gothic and Germanic invasions. It gives a vivid picture not only of imperial disintegration, but of the rise of the Church to semi-political authority, and its inner life during days of Arian and barbarian domination. Severinus acquired, as an ascetic of unusual austerity, wide political prestige; kings and queens came penitently to his cell; Odoacer elicited his prophecies of good omen.

It is gratifying that the first appearance of this classic Life in English should be effected so meritoriously. Hitherto we have had to depend on Migne, or Rodenberg in the "*Geschichtschreiber*" series, or Mommsen in the bulky *Scriptores*. A mutilated version of the Life was included by Baring-Gould in his collection of the Saints; but no recommendable English version has hitherto been given us.

Now, however, we have in Mr. Robinson's work an admirable translation, thoroughly annotated. But one detail of translation is open to criticism: we regret to find such a Latinism as "vicinage" (p. 58). The notes, particularly those relating to questions of historical interest, are meticulously full, and the instruction they give us original and trustworthy (for instances: that on the exhortation to Queen Gisa, chapter 40, page 95; on the status of the Rugii, chap-

ter 5, page 40; on the difference between "*ostiarius*" and "*custos*," chapter 10, page 51). Mr. Robinson's strictures upon the airy surmises and baseless additions of former editors are often amusingly adroit; but could not the same joust be made against our editor's flat assertion of "*pleurisy*" as the proper translation of "a pain in his side" (page 90)? All in all, however, the editorial work has been done with the most scholarly exactness and a fertility of inquisitiveness.

For the student of political and cultural history the work is of course particularly valuable. The same cannot fail to be true with regard to the student of church history. But would it have been outside the purpose of Mr. Robinson's work to include notes on the literary relations of Eugippius' production? To be sure, we are given some very illuminating references to parallel miracles in the Lives of St. Martin, Alneus, Antony, and Paphnutius; but these single instances scarcely make up the deficit of a thorough critique of the Life as a specimen of hagiography. This realm Mr. Robinson enters but does not invade. A glance at Pope Gregory's *De Miraculis* or at Günter's *Legenden Studien* convinces us that a rich possibility has been overlooked; a possibility verified by Tamasia's brilliant critique of the Legends of St. Francis, and by Zoepf's on the legends of the saints of the tenth century.

CHARLES H. LYTTLE.

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JOHN CALVIN: HIS LIFE, LETTERS, AND WORK. HUGH Y. REYBURN, B.D., Kirkintilloch. Hodder & Stoughton. 1914. Pp. viii, 371. \$2.50.

In presence of the immense amount of source-material and the flood of books and articles since the quater-centenary of 1909, one wonders on taking up a new life of Calvin whether to admire the courage of the biographer or to view askance his temerity. The reformers were such indefatigable workers and their voluminous writings were so well preserved that many a modern scholar has had to give up the ghost before mastering the works of even one man. The Strassburg editors of Calvin's works—Baum, Cunitz, and Reuss—one by one passed off the stage, leaving the completion of the work to their followers. One of these died before the task was done; while the other—Erichson—pathetically wrote his "*absolvebam*" at the end of the last of the fifty-nine quarto volumes, twenty-seven years after his "*vénérées maîtres*" had begun the publication, and only a few months before his own death. The year of the comple-

tion of the *Calvini Opera* saw also the death of the Swiss scholar Herminjard, whose monumental *Correspondance des Réformateurs dans les Pays de Langue Française* had in its nine volumes come down only to 1544. The Old Catholic Kampschulte died, leaving to his friend Cornelius his remarkable study unfinished. Cornelius, likewise falling under the spell of the Genevan archives, devoted himself to first-hand investigation before he should complete Kampschulte, and he too found life too short and left both his own work unfinished and Kampschulte's second volume to be published by Goetz. One is sometimes tempted to wonder whether, with the possible exception of some proof-reader, the number of persons who have actually read Calvin's works entire would exceed the number of righteous men in Sodom. One hopes that Professor Doumergue of Montauban will live to do it, and to complete, indefatigable and devoted as his hero, the fifth and, if necessary, a sixth volume to round out the nearly 3,000 large quarto pages he has already given us in his scholarly biography of Calvin.

Remembering then the appalling amount of material, one is inclined to make some allowances for the lacunae and errors in the disappointing bibliography of this recent Scotch biographer. There is no mention in the bibliography or foot-notes of a single work in German. So far as one may judge, the book is based upon Calvin's Latin and French works and modern French and English writers, with no use of such German authors as Stähelin, Kampschulte, Cornelius, Lang. The author seems not to have known of the fourth volume of Doumergue, published in 1910. Had he done so, he might have utilized more of the over 150 books and articles there listed as published, 1908-10, in connection with the celebration of the four-hundredth anniversary of Calvin's birth. On the other hand, it should be said at once that Mr. Reyburn gives constant proof of faithful and intelligent use of his *Calvini Opera* and his Herminjard *Correspondance*, and, with the limitations as to range of materials, has produced a well conceived, well written, forceful, and fair-minded presentation of Calvin's life.

The book is interesting, and will stand with that of Professor Walker of Yale as one of the most readable and thoughtful biographies of Calvin in any language. It is far better than the slight and rather negligible French sketch of Bossert (1906); and, on the whole, a more satisfactory treatment of Calvin's life and activities than Lang's scholarly sketch (1909), or the rhapsodical Life by the Dutchman Penning; though Lang's monographs show a keener critical knowledge than Reyburn's biography. It may well be read

by many who could not find time or inclination to go through the monumental work of Doumergue. The most natural comparison is with Walker. Clearly Reyburn has not mastered, as Walker has, the German and monographic literature of his subject, and he would not be resorted to by the scholar who wished to know the most recent, critical, and trustworthy conclusions as to much discussed questions. There is nothing comparable with the minutely critical study by Walker (some of which evidently was done in proof after publication of monographs unavailable when the book was first written) on the date of Calvin's conversion—a discussion noted with appreciation by German scholars. On the other hand, Reyburn gives about a fifth more matter than there is in the brief life by Walker; and, in spite of limitations as to German and other recent critical work, the Scotchman evidently understands his man and gives us a first-rate story, that moves along and shows keen analysis and insight both into the constructive power and the austerity of the much discussed reformer. Both the American and the Scotchman show an admirable spirit of cool detachment in the treatment of a life that has too often been handled with undue partisan heat by French and Germans.

Reyburn treats the early portion of Calvin's life and the conditions in Geneva much less adequately than Walker, giving less than a fifth of his book to the period up to Calvin's exile from Geneva, while Walker devotes nearly one-half his volume to this period. Reyburn is much fuller on the period after the execution of Servetus in 1553. To the subsequent epoch of triumph and to discussion of phases of Calvin's work and influence Reyburn gives one-half his book, Walker about one-fourth. Naturally it is in this latter half of the biography that the reader finds the most adequate and suggestive part of Reyburn's work, especially in half-a-dozen chapters upon "controversies," "the care of the churches," "the university," "personal characteristics," Calvin's "work," and "his theology."

There are some unfortunate errors, and somewhere perhaps the biographer could find something to say in defence of his statements and in criticism of the reviewer's conclusions. Through his error in stating that Calvin after his father's death turned his attention to theology again,¹ the biographer misses the significance of Calvin's keenest interest in the humanistic studies to which in fact he turned. The author appears less at home in Geneva than with Calvin. His statement² that in January, 1537, the "requests relative to discipline and excommunication were passed as pre-

¹ P. 15.

² P. 66.

sented," is a pardonable interpretation of a somewhat vague vote, but it will not bear a more careful scrutiny of the various votes of the council, their actions and Calvin's, and the latter's letter to Bullinger. It took eighteen years of struggle to secure to the church the right of discipline in 1555.³ The population of Geneva is set down several times as 15,000. The most careful estimator of Genevan numbers—E. Mallet—has shown the earlier and larger guesses untrustworthy, and his conclusion that the population did not exceed 13,000 receives deserved acceptance. The publication of the *Registres du Conseil de Genève* shows that the council of fifty was instituted in 1457, not in 1502 as Reyburn says. It is a mistake, as Kampschulte and Walker have pointed out, to use the name "Libertine" as a contemporary appellation for the Genevan party opposed to Calvin. "*Vénérable Compagnie*" is another term not used in Calvin's day, as Borgeaud has shown. The author gives no authority for his assertion that the council was made up of fathers of families. The franchises, council records, and testimony of the contemporary Bonnivard indicate that the membership was made up of *citoyens*, *bourgeois*, and *habitans*, who had been admitted by council and taken oath. In 1561 the council did not agree that "the members of the consistory should be selected from all who desired to follow the teaching of God, *whether they were citizens or not.*" Mr. Reyburn apparently follows the request of Calvin rather than the vote of the council, which was willing to go only so far as to agree that the selection should be without distinction between *citoyens* and *bourgeois*. The significance would be lost by his misinterpretation; Calvin was here, as on other occasions, ready to go further along the road tending toward democracy and separation of church and state than was the political authority of Geneva.

Such errors are venial rather than mortal sins and do not destroy the value of the essential picture of the reformer. One gets the impression that here is a biographer who has given time and interest to his task, has understood the reformer, and yet has had enough detachment and logic to pick flaws in the reasoning of Calvin. He has really interpreted him to modern minds. He has a happy faculty of illustrating his generalization by felicitous examples drawn from correspondence, sermons, and acts of councils. Calvin's "ceaseless vehemence" in enforcement of law and pursuit of offenders is illustrated by his measures to get rid of vice in the public baths and "the devil's acre," and by his efforts to make "the harlot, the drunkard, the blasphemer, and the loafer" "feel that a decent life gave

³ Cf. note by the writer in this *Review*, I, 411.

them their only chance of peace and prosperity." His interpretation of how Calvin laid the foundations of modern democracy is clear and sound, as the author interprets democracy, though in a dozen pages one cannot expect much of illustrative detail. He points out how Calvin tended to develop reason and conscience, the power of the layman, the strong self-reliant man unabashed by artificial distinctions, strict morality, education, the conception of life as "a post of duty." A layman who would like a well written, non-technical exposition of a clear-headed theologian's views would find such a chapter as Mr. Reyburn's closing one a felicitous approach to a theology that fascinates because it is fearless and never shuffles. On the difficult subject of predestination the author shows suggestive and critical thinking of his own, and is keen and frank enough to point out an interesting "break-down" in Calvin's logic. His way out of Calvin's conclusions is through denial of his premise regarding the permanent alienation of any from the Father. His closing comparison between Calvin's teaching of predestination and the theory of the survival of the fit, leaves the reader with a feeling that the biographer has read and thought deeply as a Scotch biographer of Calvin would be expected to do. Reyburn's life may fairly be classed with Walker's as one of the best two brief biographies of Calvin so far written.

HERBERT DARLING FOSTER.

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SOME LOOSE STONES. Being a Consideration of Certain Tendencies in Modern Theology Illustrated by Reference to a Book called *Foundations*. R. A. KNOX, Fellow and Chaplain of Trinity College, Oxford. Longmans, Green, & Co. 1913. Pp. xxiv, 233. \$1.35.

RESTATEMENT AND REUNION. A Study in First Principles. B. H. STREETER, Dean of Queen's College, Oxford. Macmillan & Co. 1914. Pp. xxiv, 194. 2s. 6d.

In 1913 there was published in England: *Foundations. A Statement of Christian Belief in Terms of Modern Thought. By Seven Oxford Men.* It was an answer to an answer, a reply to *Lux Mundi*; which had endeavored to reply to the movement aroused by the long-preceding *Essays and Reviews*. But of course *Foundations* must itself be answered; and so there soon appeared the first of the volumes mentioned above—*Some Loose Stones*.

The author disclaims the competence to write a theological book (p. vii). The reader will be inclined to consider that he "doth protest too much"; for, whatever one may think of Mr. Knox's

opinions, he certainly shows much acquaintance with theology, at least of the static type. His position may be judged by his own description of himself: "If obscurantism is simply to believe that there are limits defined by authority within which theorizing is unnecessary and speculation forbidden, that there are some religious principles of such *a priori* certainty that any evidence which appears to conflict with them does not destroy them, as it would destroy a mere hypothesis, but by conflicting with them proves itself to have been erroneously or inadequately interpreted, then I welcome the title" (p. x). "The whole position stands or falls by the weakest parts in the defences; give up one article of the Nicene Creed, and the whole situation is lost." This is sturdy stalwartism, and Mr. Knox throughout is sturdily stalwart. In this spirit he treats Authority, the Incarnation, the Atonement, the Kenosis, the Virgin Birth, the Resurrection, Miracles; defending what he regards as the Catholic view as against the heresies of the writers of *Foundations*. There is always an interest in watching vigorous cudgel-play, and Mr. Knox's blows rain thick and heavy. His brilliant style indeed tends to a Chestertonian fondness for smart verbal effects—to paradox, antithesis, epigram; as on page 20: "the credibility of Judges or the edibility of Jonah." Controversy like this belongs to a bygone generation. It convinces those only who are already convinced. The arguments which carry conviction today must show more of the restraint of the scientific investigator and less of the overbearingness of the professional advocate.

The editor of *Foundations* and one of the contributors to it was Mr. B. H. Streeter, at that time chaplain to the bishop of St. Alban's. But the bishop's friends insisted to him so strongly that he ought to be scandalized at having such a dangerous person in his employ that, while he would not actually dismiss Mr. Streeter, he put it to him whether it was not his duty to resign. This hint Mr. Streeter accepted, and resigned.

The present book may be taken as an answer to *Some Loose Stones*, and a statement of Mr. Streeter's position with reference to the ecclesiastical situation in general and the Kikuyu controversy in particular. He takes his stand as follows: "I would urge that, provided always a clergyman is a sincere believer in the Divinity of our Lord and in the reality of his personal conquest over death, there is nothing anomalous or incongruous in his claim to treat certain clauses in the Creed as symbolical rather than as strictly literal expressions of these beliefs" (p. xvii). The author holds that "the principle of authority must necessarily occupy a far more impor-

tant place in religion than in any other department of thought or life. But in religion, as in every other department, authority can at most procure acquiescence. Conviction only results when a certain amount of understanding or personal verification is present also" (p. 40). In endeavoring to point out the ground of authority Mr. Streeter comes to the conclusion that "the authority of the church must await re-union, and re-union must await the clearer delimitation of truth." He holds that "the various branches into which the Western Church has been divided since the Reformation seem to have *specialized*, as it were, in different aspects of the Christian life. . . . A healthy unity is incompatible with uniformity. . . . Union, on the basis of a forcible suppression of differences, not only fails to achieve its object in practice, it is also wrong in idea. If it be true, for instance, that Anglicans, Presbyterians, Congregationalists, and Friends, have each of them something to learn from the other, none of them must throw away the characteristic truth they have to teach" (p. 162 f).

To many outside an established church such statements are not new. But to hear them from a highly placed ecclesiastic of the Church of England (Mr. Streeter is not only Dean of an Oxford College but has recently been appointed Canon of Hereford Cathedral) is a cheering sign that the tide of intelligence and courage in ecclesiasticism is rising. Yet though he has to a great degree passed beyond the limitation of his surroundings, he still shows traces of its narrowing influence in the cautiousness and sense of daring with which he takes steps which to others would seem beyond question (cf. p. 189). He does not yet walk unaware of danger. But to do so is perhaps asking too much from one who has felt so recently the fires of persecution.

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SAINT MAXIMUS THE CONFESSOR AND THE BYZANTINE THEOLOGY. (In Russian.) S. A. EPIFANOVIC. Kieff. 1915. Pp. 138.

Saint Maximus the Confessor is deservedly praised both in the West and the East as one of the most acute theologians and profound mystics of the Greek Church. He was indeed the first systematic teacher of that type of Christian theology which the historians of ecclesiastical literature are wont to designate with the epithet of Byzantine. In his writings a powerful originality of view seems to vie with a rare greatness of conception. His genius focusses the

culture of Byzantium of the sixth and seventh centuries, and embodies the conflicting tendencies of an epoch of transition from the dead world of classical reminiscences to a thorough reconstruction of Christian theology on purely Christian foundations. Hence it follows that, to be rightly understood, the theological inheritance of Maximus, dogmatic and mystical, ought to be studied in the light of its social environment and of the tumultuous life of that metropolis where it was cradled.

We discover the dominating feature of Byzantium in the age of Maximus in its general aim at building up a new type of Christian theology, at emancipating its cultivated classes from the glamour of pagan beauty, at superseding the influence of the poets and philosophers of old on the development of Christian speculation and Christian inward experiences. In the literature of the age to which Maximus belongs, a deep religious feeling tones down and effaces the pagan element, which had been engrafted on Christian thought by the Alexandrian theological school. A great mystical fervor pervades all the classes of Byzantine society, and permeates every department of science and art. Church and State are no longer in sharp antagonism to each other; clergy and laity bind themselves together in the bond of a purely ecclesiastical ideal. The social influence of monasticism steadily increases; monks come out of monasteries and put forth preposterous claims to subject the civil society to the roughness of their ascetic ideal, and they play a foremost rôle in the shaping of the new soul of Byzantium. The Byzantine spirit, weaned from the learning of heathen masters, drenches itself in the purest Christian waters. To it, philosophy is as a means to the end of quarrying stones for the theological building of the Christian faith; poetry confines its task to enriching the treasure of the liturgical hymnology with new and invaluable pearls; the liberal arts have no other aim than that of filling up with rigid, gold-faced saints the mosaics of the churches. There is no manifestation of the Byzantine genius which does not bear the deeply impressed stamp of a religious ideal, or rather of an ascetic one. In its mystical outbursts Byzantium impels its vast crowds to the passionate pursuit of a cloistered life and of a cloistered literature.

These two characteristics of the Byzantine genius in the sixth century give a strong flavor of novelty to the writings of Maximus, and every lover of Byzantine literature will receive gratefully the book devoted to him by Sergius Epifanovic, a professor of the ecclesiastical Academy of Kieff. By the way, it must be noted that the strong personality of Maximus is well known in Russian ecclesiasti-

cal literature, which boasts some valuable contributions to the literary history of the Greek Fathers.

Suffice it to quote the following Russian works which throw light upon the mystical and dogmatic schemes of our great Byzantine theologian: A. Th. Vertelov, *Western Mysticism in the Middle-Ages and its Relations to Mysticism*, Kharkoff, 1888, pp. 55-66; Orloff, *The Writings of Saint Maximus the Confessor with regard to the Development of the Dogmatic Teaching of the Church about the Two Wills in the Person of Christ*, Petrograd, 1888; A. Brilliantoff, *The Influence of Eastern Theology on Western in the Writings of Johannes Scotus Erigena*, Petrograd, 1898; Bishop Alexis, *Saint Maximus the Confessor as a Representative of Christian Mysticism*, Viera i Razum, 1905, III, 124-139; Popoff, *The Idea of Deification in the Early Eastern Church*, Moscow, 1909; P. M. Minin, *The Chief Tendencies of the Old Ecclesiastical Mysticism*, *Bogoslovsky Vestnik*, 1911, III, 823-838; 1913, II, 151-172; 1914, II, 304-306, III, 42-68.¹

Professor Epifanovic, indeed, has drawn some materials from the above quoted works of his countrymen as well as from foreign sources. But his thoroughly and completely elaborated volume supersedes all the earlier attempts at a systematizing of Maximus' mystical theories. The many references with which the pages of his volume are crammed show how perfectly he is acquainted with the literature of his subject, and with the doctrines of the Greek Fathers from the age of Clement of Alexandria up to the renaissance of Greek Mysticism in the fourteenth century.

When we come to analyze the book of Professor Epifanovic, the task is not an easy one. No chapters, no paragraphs, no indices in it to make its reading easier. The treatise resembles a lecture of considerable length. To trace back the sources from which Maximus drew the rules of the mystical life, Professor Epifanovic gives an account of the Mysticism of the Greek Church as it is exhibited in the writings of Macarius the Egyptian, Gregory of Nyssa, Evagrius, and Pseudo-Areopagita. After an historical sketch of Monophysite and Monothelite controversies he synthesizes the peculiar doctrines of Maximus, and portrays him as the leader of his contemporaries at Byzantium in the paths of the orthodox faith as well as of Christian perfection.

The best pages of his volume are occupied in bringing out in strong relief the quite opposite frames of mind of the Alexandrian and

¹From an orthodox point of view is written also the modern-Greek work of S. Stavrides about the mystical teaching of Maximus: "Ἡ ὁδὸς πρὸς τὸν Θεόν, ἡ περὶ τοῦ τέλους τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, κατὰ Μάξιμον τὸν Ὁμολογητὴν." Constantinople, 1894.

the Antiochian schools in the ancient Greek Church. In different ways these two schools clothed in a scientific dress the truths of the Christian revelation and for souls athirst for God prepared a celestial symposium. The Alexandrian Fathers manifest themselves as mystics of the deepest insight, while the Antiochians are thinkers of sober reasoning. Those undergo the preponderating sway of religious feeling; these aim at scientific research. Alexandrian scholarship, drawing nearer to God, sets forth the unattainable side of Christian teaching, dwells upon the spiritual and divine element of revealed truths, which they do not look upon with the short-sighted eyes of the human mind. Antiochians, on the contrary, attach not much weight to the mystical kernel of the Christian faith, and set themselves to the task of illuminating the mysteries by the pale gleams of the human intellect, and of formulating in precise terms the Christian dogmas. In regard to exegesis, Alexandrian Fathers and writers are fond of the allegorical method; in their apologetic essays they point to the mysterious influence of the Word upon mankind; as polemical writers they make the central point of their system the deification of believing souls; as historians they do not lay stress upon the supernatural factors leading the human race into the paths mapped out by Divine Providence. In their turn, Antiochians are followers of the literal interpretation of Holy Scripture; as polemicists and historians they overestimate the cogency of rational arguments and the value of the empiristic method. To speak briefly, Alexandrian scholarship bathes itself in a deeply religious atmosphere saturated with mysticism, while that of Antioch moves freely over the field of a theology grounded upon the rational treatment of revealed truths.

Professor Epifanovic is not content to gather together the flowers of doctrine blossoming in the spiritual garden of Maximus. In the last pages of his work he goes back to the primal sources of Maximus' teaching; he discerns carefully what in it is impressed with the stamp of originality from what was carried in by the stream of the earlier Mysticism. Under his pen Maximus appears to us as a searcher holding fast to the traditional inheritance of Christian theology, handed down to him by an unbroken series of illustrious witnesses; and, on the other hand, as adding to the legacies of the past his own new experiences and new solutions to the problem faced by his genius. As Brilliantoff truly remarks, in the Eastern Church Maximus is hallowed with that crown of glory which in Western Christianity sparkles around the name of Augustine. As a dogmatic teacher, says Epifanovic, Maximus is the truest embodi-

ment of the Orthodox faith; in the polemical field, his productions displace the earlier Byzantine polemics against Monophysitism and Monotheletism. As a mystical ruler his influence became far-reaching in the Greek Church, and overstepped the limits of his age. By a happy fusion of the dry speculative system of Pseudo-Areopagita with the living ethical results of contemplative asceticism, he laid down sure foundations for the later mystical systems, and deserved to be designated by the name of founder of Byzantine Mysticism. Greek mystics of the eleventh century, like Simeon Junior and Nicethas Stethatos, and of the fourteenth century, like Gregory Sinaita, Callixtus Katafigiotis, Nicholas Kabasilas, Callixtus Xanthopoulos, wrote under his direct and immediate influence and clothed their conceptions in the literary garb adopted by him.

That is, in short, the portrait of Maximus traced by the Russian scholar. In the present output of mystical studies his work, no doubt, supplies a real want and renews the interest in mysterious and fascinating Byzantium. We do not presume to open the sealed book of the future, but we are firmly convinced that the vital powers of Byzantium are far from being exhausted. If through centuries of darkness it repeated the Horatian saying, "*Non omnis moriar*," it may also awake its slumbering energies, and begin a new era in the history of the world, and particularly of Eastern Christianity. We ought, therefore, to receive gratefully a work that unveils to us one side of the complex and multifarious soul of Byzantium, that launches us into the turmoil of its intensest religious and literary life, and gives us a meeting-place with the leaders of its genius and its spirit.

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CHRISTIANITY IN EARLY BRITAIN. HUGH WILLIAMS, D.D. The Clarendon Press. 1912. Pp. viii, 484. 12s. 6d.

Hugh Williams died after his book was practically finished, but before it had been published. During his last illness David Phillips and John Owen Thomas consented to see it through the press. It is an expansion of the Birkenhead Lecture delivered in 1905.

Although the volume deals with the subjects that any scholar of the period would examine, it treats of many that appear only in books devoted to Welsh and Celtic specialties; such, for example, as the British Hagiographic Literature and the *Annales Cambriae* and

Annales Brittonum. And although it covers the well-known province of British, Celtic, and Roman Christianity, at every point it does so with a fresh and original touch. Not only does it tell the story of David and Illtud, but along with the narrative there is a critical analysis of the sources and a philological study of geographical and historical significance. And again even though the author comes to certain conservative conclusions, as, for example, in regard to St. Patrick, he does so only after mustering his evidence to the disadvantage of Zimmer and the advantage of Bury. Being more recently in the field and having a mastery of his material no less thorough than that of other scholars, his conclusions are entitled to careful examination.

The book enters regions of study which, although not new, are unusual. It asks and tries to answer the question, What would be the detailed service of a British church of A.D. 200? also, What was the actual or legendary relation between a prince, like Arthur, and the Church? It takes up some of the general assumptions, like the opposition of Druidism to Christianity and the intercourse between Britain and Armorica; showing in the one case that the hostility of Druidism was of little moment in Britain but of much in Ireland, and in the other case that Brittany was really another Britain with a vital Christian life, due to Britain's retreating before the invader and to the monastic missionary spirit.

Certain tentative conclusions to which the author comes are both interesting and indicative of independence. He thinks that Harnack is too hasty when he attributes the story of King Lucius and Pope Eleutherus to an error in transcription, whereby the British king is confused with a king at Edessa. According to Dr. Williams, Harnack allows too little for a very early Roman belief of Christianity in England. He would not have us accept the story; neither would he have us accept Harnack's ingenious explanation. He is inclined to account for all the divergences between Celtic and Roman use by the retention in the Celtic Church of institutions which at one time were common and possibly Roman. The reckoning of Easter which Augustine found in Britain was common to the continent not long before; Celtic Baptism was a combination of baptism and chrism, both administered by the presbyter—an early custom; ordination (consecration) was at the hands of one bishop instead of three—another early and common custom; the Celtic clergy, presbyters and bishops, were married, as they were in many places; the Celtic monks had the peculiar tonsure of close-cut hair across the front of the head from ear to ear, a fashion not

unknown on the continent and representing a widely exercised freedom in tonsure styles. At least these suggestions of Dr. Williams have the virtue of conclusions based upon comparative study and upon common sense.

By no means the least valuable part of the book, as already intimated, is its constant reference to the language current in the Church in Britain, to the pure Celtic words, to the loan-words, and to the Latin. To Dr. Williams language is a sensitive sign of the contemporary life, and therefore it may be of the first importance to the historian. However, the worth of the book in this respect is within the province of the philologist.

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